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Knowledge is a full grasp of knowledge 
KnoZOHGJHLVNQRZLQJµWKHVHOI¶KHDUWDQGVRXO 
If you KDYHIDLOHGWRXQGHUVWDQGµWKHVHOI¶ 
Then all of your reading has missed its call 
Yunus Emre 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the difficulties and challenges experienced in the first strategic 
planning process of the Turkish Ministry of Interior (MoI) between the years 2007 and 2013 
through case study method. Specifically, it documents how and why top-down, mandatory 
and formal strategic planning in a one-size-fits-all fashion can be poorly implemented through 
an authoritative and bureaucratic ministry located in the Turkish central government, within 
the context of a highly centralised and dynamic policymaking environment. Triangulating 
data from multiple sources, the research applies the theories of rational planning and 
incrementalism to the case through a pattern-matching approach along with a rival 
explanation logic in order to explain the structures and mechanisms that lead to ineffective 
practice in strategic planning in the MoI. The research proposes a variety of underlying 
mechanisms for ineffective strategic planning that originate from; the formal-legal strategic 
planning framework, environmental and institutional contingencies, socio-political factors, 
FXOWXUDO WHQGHQFLHV SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶ DFWXDl practice, culture of democracy, public service and 
domain characteristics, organisational memory, leadership, values, external powers and 
tendencies. The research argues that no single theory fully explains the strategic planning 
process and practice of the MoI, although incrementalism fits better than rational planning. It 
proposes a rule-based decision-making mental model as a generative mechanism that leads, in 
interaction with other mechanisms, to incremental analysis. It demonstrates that incremental 
decision-making may still continue in a public organisational setting while formal strategic 
planning is in force and legally binding. The research concludes that the application of 
strategic planning does not produce automatic results, at least in the short-run, and effective 
strategic planning requires transformation of mental models from rule-based to goal-based, 
which can be made possible by the effective intellectual preparation of strategy practitioners. 
Thereby, the research calls for increased attention on strategy practitioners and their actual 
practice in strategic planning processes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
³,QWHOOLJHQFHLVWKHDELOLW\WRDGDSWWRFKDQJH´- Stephen Hawking 
       (Girod, 2014, p. 235) 
 
 
 
Intelligence has been defined in many ways depending on the disciplinary field and 
background of those who are defining it and their philosophical viewpoint of the social and 
physical world. No definition of intelligence could be more relevant to the concept of strategy 
than the one offered by the great physician Stephen Hawking cited above. Indeed, strategy has 
traditionally been seen as the product of intelligence that is deployed by armies, for-profit, 
public and non-profit organisations and even by the ordinary people in their lives to adapt to 
changes in their surroundings.  
Strategy is widely used as a military- and war-related concept (Nutt and Backoff, 1992; 
Quinn, 1980; Steiss, 2003). This is perhaps because human agents make the most of the 
faculties of their intelligence when a close threat of extinction invokes their basic instinct of 
survival. Similarly a passion to dominate wealth and other people may operate through the 
same mechanism. In both situations, human beings evaluate all possible scenarios considering 
the limits of their power and resources, and of their opponents, to survive or to dominate. And 
they come up with strategies that will make them achieve their goals. Regardless of the 
underlying reasons, scholars converge on the idea that strategy has stemmed from military 
practices. Most strategic planning and management scholars refer to Greek Mythology and 
even to the seminal writing of Sun Tzu on war strategies, µ7KH$UWRI:DU¶(Mintzberg, 2000, 
p. 6; Quinn, 1980, pp. 156-157), as the origins of contemporary strategy.  
2 
 
Despite the overlap between intelligent behaviour and strategy, however, it would be 
misleading to think of strategy as solely a linear cognitive product of the human intellect. As 
it has become more widely accepted in recent theorisation, strategy has been seen as a 
³SK\VLFDOVRFLDOHPRWLRQDOHYHQVSLULWXDO´DQGFRPSOH[KXPDQDFWLYLW\(Bryson et al., 2010) 
and as artful in the real sense (Whittington, 2006, p. 620). This perspective values the tacit, 
informal, and unconscious dimensions of strategy and recognises the role of interaction, 
intuition, improvisation and creativeness in its generation (Bryson et al., 2010; Jarzabkowski 
and Paul Spee, 2009; Whittington, 2006).  
Research suggests that within strategic planning and management the use of the concept of 
strategy spread from military to for-profit sector and from for-profit sector to public and non-
profit sectors (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993, p. 18). Starting from 1960s, governments started to 
introduce strategic planning, and later strategic management into the public domain, as a 
practical tool for rational and better public management. Introduction of strategic planning 
was a response to the high demands and challenges of ever-changing social life as a 
consequence of technological development, globalisation, scarcity of public resources 
(Bryson, 2011) and the uncertainties this created for the public sector. Since then, it has been 
introduced and applied in various public services (Poister et al., 2013) from space to 
agriculture policies, and implemented at all levels of government, from armies to 
municipalities, in different public settings. While strategic planning continued to proliferate 
throughout 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, it started to draw the attention of researchers from the 
1980s (Bryson and Roering, 1987; Bryson and Roering, 1988), when, scholars of public 
administration focused their efforts on understanding and theorising around this area of study. 
Scholars hoped to come up with better prescriptions of strategic planning for governments and 
public managers (Bryson and Roering, 1988) in order to contribute to the sustained creation of 
public value (Moore, 1995).  Early studies of public strategic planning and management 
constituted the basis for the contemporary literature (Joyce et al., 2014). These focused 
mainly on understanding: different practices of public strategic planning in different 
organisational contexts; difficulties and challenges of applying strategic planning in 
government; the role of strategic planning in the creation of public value (and thereby the 
relation between strategic planning and organisational performance); and the role of strategic 
planning in network governance at different levels of government (Joyce et al., 2014, pp. 23-
24). 
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This thesis aims to understand the difficulties and challenges of applying strategic planning in 
a central governmental setting by taking an in-depth look into the strategic planning process 
and practice of the Turkish Ministry of Interior (MoI) as a case study. Hence, this research as 
both draws on and contributes to the second stream of research according to the classification 
by Joyce described above; namely the difficulties and challenges of implementation. 
1.1. Defining the Concepts  
1.1.1. The Concept of Strategy  
The concept of strategy is central to this research and it requires elaboration of how it is 
XQGHUVWRRG ZLWKLQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKLV UHVHDUFK 7KH ZRUG µVWUDWHJ\¶ HW\PRORJLFDOO\ stems 
from WKH *UHHN ZRUG µVWUDWHJRV¶ WKDW PHDQV µJHQHUDO¶ (Steiss, 2003, p. 1). In the military 
context and in line with the view of strategy reflected in the introduction, strategy is defined 
DV³DJHQHUDOVHWRIPDQRHXYUHVFDUULHGRXWWRRYHUFRPHDQHQHP\GXULQJ FRPEDW´(Nutt and 
Backoff, 1992, p.56). Again in the military sense, strategy involves the planning and directing 
of battles or campaigns on a broad scale, which is the responsibility of a general in military 
ranks (Steiss, 2003). Therefore, strategy is related to the broad and the general, rather than the 
specific. At the same time it is mainly related to a high rank, rather than a low one,  
suggesting that strategy is mainly the responsibility and within the power of top officials or 
³WKHGRPLQDQWFRDOLWLRQ´(Miles and Snow, 1978). 
,Q WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQDO FRQWH[W VWUDWHJ\ LV GHVFULEHG DV ³D SDWWHUQ LQ D VWUHDP RI GHFLVLRQV´
(Mintzberg, 1978, p. 935). Similar to the rationale for deploying strategy in the military 
context, strategy is defined as the manoeuvres executed by a firm in order to achieve its goals 
(Nutt and Backoff, 1992). Goals that are comprehensive, broad, and visionary are, from time 
to time, referred to as strategies (Christensen et al., 2007). The conventional approach, 
however, considers goals as ends, and strategies as means. The following definition reflects 
this perspective:  
³2EMHFWLYHVDUHWKH³HQGV´DQGVWUDWHJ\LVWKH³PHDQV´RIDFKLHYLQJWKHP,QHIIHFWVWUDWHJ\LV
the pattern of actions managers employ to achieve strategic and financial performance targets 
«´7KRPSVRQDQG6WULFNODQGFLWHGLQ6WHLVVS 
Unlike day-to-day decisions, strategic decisions are ones with far-reaching impact that 
determine antecedents of future decision-making; require commitment to a course; and are 
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difficult to retract once taken (Poister et al., 2013). Following the military analogy, strategy 
refers to particular actions taken to neutralise or pre-empt the real or potential  actions of 
competitors (Steiss, 2003, p. 1). Hence, it is employed in the for-profit sector as a means of 
overwhelming, or at least supressing, the competitors (Walker et al., 2010, p. 185). What 
makes strategy important when employed successfully is that it enables an organisation to get 
into the right position in order to meet the demands of a highly ambiguous and uncertain 
future (Nutt and Backoff, 1992, p. 59). Strategy helps co-ordinate efforts and activities within 
an organization towards an agreed course or direction.  
Strategy looks paradoxical because it encapsulates stability and flexibility concurrently (Nutt 
and Backoff, 1992). Boyne highlights the importance of flexibility and adaptability of 
strategies within the context of rational planning (2004) and this subject is increasingly 
gaining importance in the public strategic management scholarship (Poister et al., 2013). An 
important characteristic of strategy is that it is observed to be emergent as well as planned 
(Bryson, 2011; Joyce et al., 2014; Mintzberg, 1978; Nutt and Backoff, 1992). 
1.1.2. Planning, Strategic Planning and Strategic Management 
Strategic planning is one form of planning and general planning theory underlies strategic 
planning. Understanding planning theory in general, therefore, is essential for strategic 
planning research. Planning is understood to be about anticipating and controlling the future 
and is defined as: ³DIRUPDOL]HGSURFHGXUHWRSURGXFHDQDUWLFXODWHGUHVXOWLQWKHIRUPRIDQ
LQWHJUDWHGV\VWHPRIGHFLVLRQV´(Mintzberg, 2000, p. 7). Planning is forethought and aims at 
determining the future by predicting developments within and out of the organisation; shaping 
organisational goals; and, formulating strategies in the form of a plan to reach those goals 
(Boyne, 2001). Therefore, planning is related to decision-making in consideration of the 
future and future courses of action (Faludi, 1996). Planning is defined by Robinson and Faludi 
as the art of rational decision-making on social issues (cited in Friedmann, 1987, p. 36). 
Planning is associated with rational and intelligent behaviour, as is strategy.  
2QHFDQVLPSO\GHILQHVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJDVµSODQQLQJVWUDWHJLFDOO\¶6WUDWHJLFSODQQLQJLVWKH
process in which various strategy options are evaluated and formulised within a 
comprehensive plan. In a highly influential account by Bryson, strategic planning is defined 
as: 
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³>D@GLVFLSOLQHGHIIRUWWRSURGXFHIXQGDPHQWDOGHFLVLRQVDQGDFWLRQVWKDWVKDSHDQGJXLGHZKDW
DQRUJDQLVDWLRQRURWKHUHQWLW\LVZKDWLWGRHVDQGZK\LWGRHVLW´(Bryson, 2011, p. 12). 
Strategic management goes beyond mere strategy formulation and is described as a preferred 
mode of planning within contemporary organisations (Koteen, 1997, p. 21). It is seen as an 
integrative management framework that coalesce other management functions of 
organisations around a strategic agenda that is driven by the mission, vision, and fundamental 
values of the organisation (Ingraham and Donahue, 2000; Poister and Streib, 1999). From an 
all-encompassing point of view and with regard to the creation and execution of a strategic 
DJHQGDVWUDWHJLFPDQDJHPHQW LVDUJXHG WREH LGHQWLFDOZLWK³PDQDJLQJIRUUHVXOWV´ (Poister 
and Streib, 1999, p. 323).  
There is a multitude of definitions of strategic management in the public sector strategic 
management literature and the variation mostly stems from the theoretical positioning of the 
authors (Joyce, 2001). Chapter 2 explains how different theoretical views lead to different 
insight of strategy, strategic planning and management. The multiplicity of views enriches 
theoretical arguments; however, it concurrently leads to confusion and misunderstanding of 
the term, which subsequently prevents its effective employment in public organisations 
(Vinzant and Vinzant, 1996). Strategic management at the same time is a more abstract, fluid, 
and contingent rather than tangible and solid term, and it is an ever-evolving phenomenon, 
which puts constraints on reaching consensus on a specific definition (Eadie, 1983; Joyce, 
2001). 
The use of terms in this thesis needs clarification at this point. The concepts of strategic 
planning and strategic management are frequently used interchangeably in the public strategic 
management literature (Eadie, 1983; Poister and Streib, 1999). While some authors (Berry 
and Wechsler, 1995; Eadie, 1983; Streib and Poister, 1990) SUHIHU WKH WHUP µVWUDWHJLF
SODQQLQJ¶WRUHIHUWRDFRPSOHWHVWUDWHJ\SURFHVVRWKHUVRSWIRUVWUDWHJLFPDQDJHPHQWWRUHIHU
to the same processes (Andrews et al., 2009; Joyce, 2001; Koteen, 1997; Vinzant and 
Vinzant, 1996). In addition, other terms are employed to explain the same phenomenon. For 
H[DPSOH LQ WKH 8. WKH FRQFHSWV RI µFRUSRUDWH SODQQLQJ¶ DQG µEXVLQHVV SODQ¶ UDWKHU WKDQ
strategic planning, are preferred. For the sake of the existing research, the terms strategic 
planning and management are mostly used interchangeably. 
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1.2. The Problem Addressed by the Research  
Strategic planning and management practices of public organisations, particularly in the US 
and the UK, have been the dominant subject of strategic management research in the last three 
decades. Continental European government practices have begun to be the subject of intensive 
inquiry recently (Joyce and Drumaux, 2014b), particularly through the contribution of the 
European Group for Public Administration (EGPA) which brings together scholars and 
practitioners of strategy from all around Europe and the World on an annual basis. While the 
number of governments that adopt strategic planning and management has increased recently, 
most attempts to apply such reforms in public organisations demonstrated limited or no 
success at all (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011; Bryson and Roering, 1987). Hence, one main 
problem within public strategic planning scholarship has been to understand the difficulties 
and challenges before the implementation of strategic planning in the public sector. (Joyce et 
al., 2014). The aim of much of the scholarship has been to identify and propose common 
success factors gleaned from best practices and to prescribe better formulas. One weakness of 
the existing research endeavour has been its focus on success and neglect of failure. Through 
reviewing the empirical literature from a success and failure perspective, Chapter 3 
demonstrates how case study research, in particular, focuses on successful cases in order to 
prescriptively theorise effective strategic planning. The tendency of case study research to 
focus particularly on the US and on successful cases leaves a lot to be desired in terms of 
researching the difficulties and challenges to application of strategic planning in different 
public administration contexts. Theorising public strategic planning requires sensitivity to 
context-specific and situated factors, structures and mechanisms as well as common ones that 
cause strategic planning to fail in different public administration contexts.  
This research intends to contribute to the theory and practice of public strategic planning, 
through a case study that looks into the subject by not only focusing on success factors, but 
also examining the  root causes of ineffectiveness and failure, within the Turkish Ministry of 
Interior (MoI). As failure is thought to be more informative than success (Altman, 2015), 
researchers are likely to learn more about the different dimensions of strategic planning from 
failing cases.  
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1.3. The Context of Turkey 
Strategic management reform in Turkish Public Administration has been precipitated as a 
consequence of the fiscal and economic crises in early 2000s. In 2000 the Turkish economy 
was hit by a balance of payments crisis that disrupted all macro-economic indicators and 
financial accounts (Alper, 2001). Under these adverse circumstances, the then coalition 
government reached an agreement with the World Bank in order to provide financial support 
to overcome imbalances in public accounts (UWrk, 2003). A conditionality of the loan was 
the rationalisation and prioritisation of public investments and determination of a set of global 
criteria to guide public organisations in line with these aims (UWUN. This launched the 
reform process towards restructuring of the budget and the financial management system.  
The Justice and Development Party, which ruled the country until mid-2015, won the 2002 
elections and resumed power as a one-party government. The Justice and Development Party 
government adopted strategic planning reform along with some components of the new public 
management paradigm both of which were included in their Urgent Action Plan (2002). 
Accordingly, strategic planning was introduced into public administration by the legislation of 
the Public Financial Management and Control Law (PFMCL) 2003, as part of a wider public 
ILQDQFLDOPDQDJHPHQWUHIRUP7KHWKHQ8QGHUVHFUHWDU\WR WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHUgPHU'LQoHU1 
acted as the champion of strategic planning and led the reform for the whole public sector 
HQWKXVLDVWLFDOO\gPHU'LQoHUZDVWKHKHDGRIWKHFLYLOVHUYLFHDQGZDVZRUNLQJQH[WWRWKH
Prime Minister, which significantly facilitated the realisation of his plans. Eventually, a 
number of factors resulted in the introduction of the strategic planning reform in a top-down 
and one-size-fits-all fashion into the Turkish public sector. These included the economic and 
financial crisis as the triggering factor; the subsequent peer pressure by the World Bank as an 
external coercive factor; and the adoption of strategic planning reform by the AKP 
government as voluntary factor. A strategic planning guide was prepared and published for 
the first time in accordance with the agreement in 2003 by the State Planning Organization 
(SPO, which is currently called the Ministry of Development) which was updated in 2006. 
                                                 
1 Y ­              ǯǡ
his special interests in his academic studies in the context of the for-profit sector. 
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1.4. Research Aims and Questions 
Strategic planning reform came into the agenda of the Turkish Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
through a legal mandate as discussed above. The PFMCL 2003 mandated rational planning 
processes that are similar to that of the GPRA in the US based on formal strategic planning. 
The PFMCL 2003 aimed at rationalisation of strategy-making processes in the MoI through a 
series of steps including: conducting formal analyses of strengths and weaknesses and 
opportunities and threats; preparing a formal strategic plan for a five-year period; preparing 
annual performance budgets; and monitoring implementation and annual performance 
reporting. The formal strategic planning model mandated by the PFMCL 2003 is referred to 
E\ WKH DXWKRU RI WKLV UHVHDUFK DV µWKH IRUPDO 3)0&/ IUDPHZRUN¶ WKURXJKRXW WKH WKHVLV WR
ensure coherence in the use of terms. 
The first focus of the research is practice. Public management reform stipulates the deliberate 
alteration of the structures and processes of public services to enhance their performance 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Reforms that occur in a top-down direction, as in the case of the 
MoI, and the force towards change they bring about can very likely receive resistance from 
the members of the reformed organisation (Boyne et al., 2003). There can be a time lag 
between the formal introduction and implementation of reform measures and the impact of 
reform may still be minor although the extent of the reform is formally major. As noted by 
%R\QHDQGKLVFROOHDJXHV³>6]ubstantial changes in policy principles can co-exist with trivial 
changes in management practice´ (Boyne et al., 2003, p. 29). The administrative reform 
history of Turkey abounds with such stories of failure %HUNPDQ DQG +HSHU  6|]HQ
2005). Hence, what has been the case for the MoI is one area of focus of the inquiry. 
The second area of interest for the research is theory. The formal strategic planning 
framework mandated to the MoI by the PFMCL was based on rational planning principles. 
The pursuit of the prescriptions of rational planning is expected to enhance the degree of 
procedural rationality in the management processes of the MoI. However, early findings of 
other research show that strategic planning practice in the Turkish public sector is not in line 
with prescribed rational procedures (Canpolat and Kesik, 2010). Some examples of poor 
procedures in Turkish public organisations include the continuation of input-based budgeting; 
routine activities, rather than strategic issues, being included in strategic plans; cost-benefit 
analyses are not conducted; monitoring implementation is carried out merely to meet the 
formality of the legislation; and the results of activities and programmes are not evaluated 
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systematically (Canpolat and Kesik, 2010). The technical complexity of rational planning and 
inadequacy of resources are reported to be the most frequent obstacles facing successful 
implementation of rational planning in the public sector (Boyne et al., 2004). If rational 
planning does not suffice to explain the strategic planning process and practice of the MoI, 
then incrementalism be a good rival theory, since it is claimed to be the most influential 
decision-making approach in public organisations (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970; 
Lindblom, 1959a). The thesis investigates this as a second subject.  
In light of the above discussions, the aims of the research are: 
x To present an account of the first strategic planning practice of the MoI as an 
original case of strategic planning in central government. 
x To analyse the causes and underlying mechanisms of failure of strategic planning 
practice of the MoI, with reference to a set of practice-based criteria. 
x To examine what mechanisms make rational planning or incrementalism theory 
more relevant in explaining the strategic planning process of the MoI. 
With an intention to achieve the above aims, the research questions are: 
Research Question 1:  
µ+RZZDVVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSUDFWLFHGLQWKH0oI; and why did or GLGQ¶W LWJHQHUDWH
tKHH[SHFWHGFKDQJHDQGUHVXOWV"¶ 
Research Question 2: 
µ7RZKDWH[WHQW and how and why do theories of rational planning or incrementalism 
H[SODLQWKHVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSURFHVVDQGSUDFWLFHRIWKH0R,"¶ 
The first research question requires an approach that considers strategy as a human activity 
and that values the role, attitude, behaviour and interaction of the practitioners of strategy. It 
involves consideration of non-analytical and social dimensions, as well as the analytical 
dimensions of strategy (George and Desmidt, 2013).   
Theory-related curiosity raises the second question. Eighteen years ago, Vinzant and Vinzant 
(1996, pp. 140-141) wrote, with regard to implementation of strategic planning, that there 
were no REMHFWLYH FULWHULD DW WKDW WLPH WR MXGJH µZKDW D VXFFHVVIXO VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ ORRNV
OLNH¶7KHSUREOHPLVVWLOOrelevant and the question is yet to be answered (Bryson et al., 2010; 
Poister et al., 2010). A conceptual framework is developed within this context in Chapter 2 in 
an effort to answer the second research question.  
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The next section signposts the reader towards the content of the thesis in order to aide 
navigation between chapters.  
1.5. Outline of Chapters 
To the ends argued above, Chapter 2 reviews theories of strategic management. First, it 
presents the rationale for the relevance of the theories of rational planning and incrementalism 
to the case study of the MoI. Then it critically reviews two dominant process theories, rational 
planning and incrementalism, in order to derive theoretical patterns for theory-testing. Finally, 
it presents the theory-based conceptual framework developed for this case study. 
Chapter 3 presents a review of the descriptive and empirical literature; first, to present the 
initiation, development and current situation of public strategic planning, and second, to 
assess the success factors in public strategic planning, as well as causes of failure. The first 
part of the review particularly looks into the background and basis of public strategic 
planning, its¶ use in the world, differences between the public and for-profit sectors, and a 
conceptual framework of public strategic planning processes by Poister et al. (2010). With 
reference to the conceptual framework presented in the first section and in order to derive 
practice-based success and failure factors, the second part looks into the empirical literature 
from the perspective of the contingencies, preparation, strategy formulation, implementation 
and outcomes of strategic planning. The chapter presents a summary of success and failure 
factors, which are later deployed in Chapter 8 to discuss the practice of the MoI. 
Chapter 4 gives an account of methodological themes. This chapter justifies the research 
design, sources of data and data collection processes, and presents the reflections of the 
researcher, who as a district governor in the MoI, is a member of the case organisation 
examined.  
The 5th, 6th and 7th Chapters of the thesis are data analysis chapters. Chapter 5 presents a 
holistic account of the strategic planning practice of the MoI management with a view of 
strategy as a human activity, in which analytical and social practices, power relations and 
different kinds of interaction transpire in the organisational setting. This chapter presents 
contextual information, including environmental and organisational specificities to 
demonstrate how strategy-making is influenced by external forces and pressures. Then, it 
looks into the strategic planning activity, particularly into organisational and re-structuring 
practices, situation analysis, definition of vision and mission, goal-setting, strategy content, 
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costing and budgeting, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and feedback in the MoI to 
reveal how external factors and internal dynamics interplay in strategy formation and how the 
persistence of the existing organisational culture plays an important role for continuity.  
Chapter 6 applies the patterns of rational planning derived in Chapter 3 as a conceptual 
framework; which comprise (1) comprehensive analysis of strategies, (2) formality (3) 
implementation and (4) integration and co-ordination; to the practice of the MoI to highlight 
and explain the degree of pattern-matching between theory and practice. Findings from 
pattern-matching are presented through tabulation in the conclusion of the chapter. 
With the same approach, Chapter 7 applies the patterns of incrementalism developed in 
Chapter 3; comprising (1) partisan mutual adjustment, (2) agreement as criterion for good 
strategy (3) simple incremental analysis (4) trial-and-error and (5) flexibility and dynamism; 
to evince and explain the extent of pattern-matching between the theory and the case in 
question. As in Chapter 6, the root causes of practice are traced to the end to examine and 
explain which factors and mechanisms led to the management practice observed in the MoI. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. Addressing the first research question, it discusses findings 
related to the practice of the MoI vis-j-vis the success and failure factors criteria derived from 
the existing empirical research in Chapter 3. Addressing the second research question, it 
debates the results of theory-testing. Third, it discusses the contribution of the study to the 
literature and methodology in studying public strategic planning. The thesis concludes by 
outlining the projections of future research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 1: THEORIES OF 
STRATEGIC PLANNING AND THE 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE 
RESEARCH 
 
 
³1RWKLQJLVVRSUDFWLFDODVDJRRGWKHRU\´ 
                         (Lewin, 1945) 
 
 
The previous chapter argued that the description of strategy and strategic planning varied 
according to the theoretical viewpoints of the researchers. Hence, theory is central to public 
strategic planning research. The second question of this research listed in Section 1.4 has a 
theoretical focus that aims to investigate whether the theory of rational planning or 
LQFUHPHQWDOLVPKDVWKHSRZHUWRH[SODLQWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSUDFWLFH&RQWULEXting to 
this goal of the research, this chapter reviews rational planning and incrementalism theories 
for a couple of aims. First, it explains the state of the two enduring theories of public strategic 
planning within the wider strategic planning field and discusses the grounds for the relevance 
of these two competing theories for the case of the MoI. Second, it develops a conceptual 
framework based on the dimensions and patterns of the two theories as part of the rival 
explanation strategy adopted for this research. By doing so, the chapter lays the foundations 
for theory-testing of rational planning and incrementalism through a pattern-matching 
approach (Yin, 2003) in empirical chapters 6 and 7.  The chapter is structured as follows: 
1) The relevance of rational planning and incrementalism, 
2) The theory of rational planning, 
3) The theory of incrementalism, 
4) Conclusion. 
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2.1. The Relevance of Rational Planning and Incrementalism 
Strategic planning was examined mainly from the process and content theoretical viewpoints 
(Alford, 2001; Andrews et al., 2009). Strategy content is a pattern of actions formulated for 
the achievement of organisational goals (Boyne and Walker, 2004). Content theorists seek to 
H[SODLQWKHFRQWHQWRIVWUDWHJLHVRU³:KDWDQRUJDQLVDWLRQLV>RUVKRXOG@WRGR´(Alford, 2001, 
p. 2). Content is the outcome of the strategy process, and content theorists posit that strategy 
content, as well as strategy process, impacts on organisational performance (Andrews et al., 
2006; Boyne and Walker, 2004).  
This research is mainly looking into the strategy process in the MoI. It basically aims to 
explain the µZK\V¶ DQG µKRZV¶ RI VWUDWHJ\ IRUPXODWLRQ as well as strategy execution and 
assessment in the MoI. Theories related to process are central to planning theory (Alexander, 
1992) and are developed to explain how strategy is, or should be, formulated and 
implemented (Furrer et al., 2008). Rational planning and incrementalism have been the most 
debated and enduring process theories in the planning literature (Andrews et al., 2009). Faludi 
(1973) argues that any instance of planning practice will find a place somewhere in between 
rational planning and incrementalism theories. Incrementalism is a derivative theory that is 
built on a critique of rational decision-making and provides an alternative explanation for the 
strategy process in the public sector, as well as the private. As will be discussed at length in 
the following sections, the two theories diverge in their basic assumptions, for example with 
regard to pure vs. bounded rationality, infinite vs. limited resources, ends-means distinct vs. 
ends-means interdependent. They also deviate in their premises, for example comprehensive 
vs. limited analysis and integrated system vs. fragmented system. The contrast between the 
two theories of strategy provides a convenient context for the application of a rival 
explanation strategy in the MoI case. Adopting the rival explanation strategy, the research 
aims to investigate whether incrementalism (rival theory), rather than rational planning 
(original theory) explains the patterns of practice observed in the MoI better (Yin, 2003). 
Chapters 6 and 7 fulfil this aim through testing the two theories successively. 
The research takes rational planning as the original theory for the case, since the management 
reform that the MoI has undergone is based on rational planning theory. As in the case of the 
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GPRA 1993 in the US, the PFMCL 2003 in Turkey mandated rational procedures such as 
setting quantified goals for a five-year term, evaluating alternatives, choosing the optimum 
option, implementation, performance monitoring and evaluation. Hence, the expectation and 
hypothesis is that a significant DPRXQW RI UDWLRQDOLVDWLRQ VKRXOG EH REVHUYHG LQ WKH 0R,¶V
VWUXFWXUHVSURFHGXUHVDQGLQWKHPDQDJHPHQWV¶EHKDYLRXUZLWKUHJDUGWRVWUDWHJ\IRUPXODWLRQ
and implementation. Therefore, testing rational planning theory is expected to demonstrate the 
extent to which the structures, processes and patterns in management behaviour are 
rationalised in the MoI and thus, the strength or weakness of the original theory to explain the 
case. Second, as reforms most often do not produce expected results (Boyne et al., 2003), 
incrementalism, as a rival theory, has the potential to generate an alternative explanation for 
MOI practice. As argued in Chapter 5, the MoI did not have explicit strategy formulation 
processes in place prior to the PFMCL 2003 reIRUP ZKLFK FRQVWLWXWHV D VWDWH RI µVWUDWHJ\
DEVHQFH¶ (Walker, 2013, p. 680). Organisations mostly grope in the dark in the absence of 
deliberate strategy processes, and the theory of incrementalism, which is defined as muddling 
through (Lindblom, 1959a), is a convenient theory to explain such states. Being an 
explanatory case study, the research not only presents a descriptive account of theory-testing, 
it also links the observed patterns to the forces and mechanisms that generate the observed 
effects through causal logic. The following two sections review rational planning and 
incrementalism theories and develop the conceptual framework for empirical theory-testing. 
2.2. The Theory of Rational Planning 
As a normative-prescriptive theory (Bell et al., 1988; Mintzberg and Lampel, 2003) rational 
planning is employed as the primary theory to be tested in this research because of the 
rationale laid out in the previous section.  
It is suggested that any planning activity, by all means, is a rational one (Alexander, 2000). 
Accordingly, planning has been interpreted as acting rationally (Faludi, 1973). With regard to 
its foundations, planning is seen at times as synonymous with decision-making (Mintzberg, 
2000). The theory makes claims about comprehensive rationality (Dror, 1968; Faludi, 1973). 
It is premised on the existence of complete information about alternatives and consequences; 
complete baseline data; and completely sufficient time, capability and other resources (Bell et 
al., 1988; Forester, 1984; Lindblom, 1959b; Steiss, 2003). Rationality is associated with a 
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scientific approach to analysis and problem solving in the decision-making and planning 
context (Alexander, 1992). 
Rational planning comprises the basis for conventional strategic management in which formal 
strategic planning is central and decision-making is analytical (Andersen, 2000). The 
assumption of rationality dominates the strategic management literature (Dean and Sharfman, 
1993). Rational, or classical (Joyce, 2001), planning theory considers sWUDWHJ\DV³DUDWLRQDO
process of deliberate calculation and analysis, designed to maximize long-WHUP DGYDQWDJH´
(Whittington, 2001, p. 2).  Similarly, rational planning is described in its relation to strategy 
as follows: 
³,W LV FKDUDFWHULVHG DV D VHTXHQce of analytical, logical and rational procedures, followed 
precisely to formulate an intended strategy.´(Collier et al., 2001, p. 18) 
According to the theory, strategy is formal, intended and deliberate and the planning process 
is unambiguous and rigorous (Boyne and Gould-Williams, 2003). It is at the same time highly 
analytical, mechanistic and linear. Formal strategic planning typically involves the 
employment of quantitative methods. It stipulates the centralisation of systems and demands 
for high co-ordination and integration. It is a cyclical process, where the stages are reiterated 
once a plan is implemented and its period is completed. With similar premises to rational 
planning theory, a typical formal strategic planning process involves the following steps 
(Bryson, 2011; Poister et al., 2013): 
x Clarification of mission and mandates,  
x Identification of essential values, 
x Building organisational vision for the future, 
x Analysis of internal strengths and weaknesses, 
x Conducting environmental scanning to identify opportunities and threats in the 
external milieu, 
x Setting strategic goals and objectives, 
x Analysing and formulating strategies for the achievement of goals,  
x Implementing strategies, 
x Monitoring implementation and evaluating results, 
x Reviewing and revising strategies in light of developments. 
There have been several attempts to adapt the for-profit, sector-oriented strategic planning 
model to the field of public management (Bryson and Roering, 1987; Eadie, 1983; Nutt and 
Backoff, 1992; Olsen and Eadie, 1982; Poister and Streib, 1999). As a result, it has spread to 
numerous public sectors in the world, increasingly from the 1980s replacing the classical 
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long-range planning. Some differences between the comprehensive long-range planning of 
1960s, which is also based on a rational model, and strategic planning are underlined by 
different authors (Ansoff, 1984; Bryson, 2011; Bryson and Roering, 1987; Kaufman and 
Jacobs, 1987). For example, it is argued that long-range planning assumes the future is 
predictable by means of continuities with the past; whereas strategic planning takes the future 
to be unpredictable due to uncertainties (Ansoff, 1984; Eadie, 1983). It is also argued that 
strategic planning stresses more on: 
x Finding and responding to essential (strategic) issues (Poister and Streib, 1999), 
x Action, results, implementation (Bryson and Roering, 1987; Kaufman and Jacobs, 
1987),   
x Feedback (Vinzant and Vinzant, 1996),  
x Organisational change (Eadie, 1983), 
x Deliberation with wide and varied groups of stakeholders (Bryson, 2010),  
x More participation (Kaufman and Jacobs, 1987), 
x Awareness of internal strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities and 
threats (SWOT) in a changing environment (Bryson and Roering, 1987; Kaufman 
and Jacobs, 1987; Poister and Streib, 1999; Quinn, 1980), 
x Awareness of current or candidate rivals (Bryson and Roering, 1987). 
Organisations carry out formal strategic planning in order to synchronise their activities and to 
act rationally (Mintzberg, 2000). The proponents of formal planning argue that it helps with 
clarification of goals and objectives; facilitates communication of mission and goals 
throughout the organisation and provides bottom-up staff support (Boyne, 2001; Poister and 
Streib, 1999). It brings internal and external strengths and weaknesses into consideration; 
serves as a basis for analytical decision-making; stimulates co-operation and promotes unity; 
and as a result enhances organisational performance. Rational planning is not only prescribed 
as the best way of achieving goals, but as the most appropriate framework for the justification, 
legitimacy, and accountability of decisions to both internal and external audiences 
(Alexander, 2000; Dean and Sharfman, 1993; Faludi, 1973). Alexander puts this as follows:  
³5DWLonal planning is not good planning because it produces better decisions: It is good 
planning because it can account for the proposed courses of action.´(2000, p. 243) 
This view of rational decision-making has been systematically criticised for being an 
idealistic theory that lacks practical value (Dror, 1968; Etzioni, 1967; Lindblom, 1959b, 1979; 
March and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1956). Critics have based their contention on the argument 
that the problems in the real world are often unclear, poorly defined and complete availability 
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of information is impossible for decision-making (Forester, 1984). Simon and many other 
scholars have discussed constraints to human computational and predictive capabilities which 
put limits on and cripple the procedures of rationality (Faludi, 1973; Forester, 1984; 
Lindblom, 1959b; Miner, 2005; Simon, 1955; Whittington, 2001). From this point of view, 
institutions or individuals are biased in making sense of information and do not investigate all 
the possible alternatives available to them to maximise goal achievement (Rothblatt, 1971; 
Steiss, 2003; Whittington, 2001). This view asserts that there is a restriction on the 
comprehensive search process of limitless alternatives prescribed by formal rationality 
(Alexander, 2000). 
Rational decision-making has been viewed by some scholars as a utopian theory (Etzioni, 
1967) and implementation of  pure-rational theory is seen as impossible except from some 
quantifiable fields such as information and communication technologies policies (Dror, 1968). 
At the very least, rational strategy formation has been seen as difficult, if not impossible, to be 
practiced in the public sector (Boyne et al., 2004) because it drains resources; requires 
technical expertise and generates conflict in organisational politics (Boyne et al., 2004). It is 
criticised for approaching a policy matter as an intellectual problem and ignoring the 
influence of political powers on the subject matter (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970; Bryson, 
2011). From this perspective, any rational technique in order to be adopted by public 
organisations has to be inspired from and ensure political rationality, since public 
organisations themselves exist in highly politicised environments (Bryson, 2011). Rittel and 
Webber (1973) contend that the approach has proved inadequate in coping with the 
LQWULQVLFDOO\ ³ZLFNHG´ SUREOHPV RI VRFLHW\ (1973, p. 160). Rational decision-making is 
accused of stunting creativity and innovation due to its extensive quantitative and analytical 
focus (Alexander, 2000; Lenz and Lyles, 1985).  This critique of rationality provokes new 
approaches to theories of choice. An adapted definition of rational decision-making with 
reference to planning comes from Banfield: 
³$UDWLRQDOGHFLVLRQLVRQHLQZKLFKDOWHUQDWLYHVDQGFRnsequences are considered as fully as 
the decision-maker, given the time and other resources available to him, can afford to consider 
them.´(1959, p. 362) 
Despite intensive critiques for over decades, rationality has served as the general theory 
underpinning planning while precipitating the exploration of many methods for effective 
decision-making (Alexander, 1996). Some planners in the tradition continue to see the 
limitations of rationality as obstacles to be overcome (Faludi, 1973). According to advocates 
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of rationalityLWVYDOXHLVQRWLQLWVIXOODSSOLFDELOLW\EXWUDWKHULQLWVEHLQJ³«DQLGHDOWKDWLV
ZRUWK VWULYLQJ IRU´ (Faludi, 1996, p.68). Although there have been other approaches in 
different governments, a rational planning approach to strategic management has been the 
most widely prescribed one (Alford, 2001). 
2.2.1. Dimensions of Rational Planning 
With the aim of constructing the first pillar of the bi-partite conceptual framework for this 
case study, this section presents the dimensions of rational planning to be deployed. The 
pattern-matching approach adopted by this study requires the specific description of 
theoretical dimensions of rational planning. A review of the literature shows that some 
distinctive dimensions and operational measures of rational planning have been put forward 
(Boyne, 2001). These dimensions are (1) comprehensive analysis of alternative strategies, (2) 
formality (3) implementation and (4) integration and co-ordination.  
2.2.1.1. Comprehensive Analysis of Alternative Strategies 
This dimension specifically relates to cost-benefit analysis of strategy alternatives in the 
process of strategy formulation for optimum choice (Faludi, 1973). Analysis takes place in the 
form of a cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness evaluation in rational planning, which takes into 
account all effective factors to judge the feasibility of alternatives. Analysis of alternative 
strategies in regard to range or feasibility involves both information gathering and the use of 
information related to intra-organisational factors, such as resources and skills, and extra-
organisational factors (Dean and Sharfman, 1993). In this regard, conducting situational 
analysis for strengths and weaknesses (Poister et al., 2013) and scanning the environment 
(Eadie, 1983; Kaufman and Jacobs, 1987) for opportunities and threats, or challenges, in the 
external milieu of the public agency are critical (Bryson, 2011). The scope of environmental 
scanning is comprehensive with regard to both level and substance. The range of scanning 
includes the exploration, identification and analysis of the sources of influence, developments 
and trends at the local, state, regional, national and also international levels vis-j-vis the 
mission and purpose of the organisation (Eadie, 1983). The analysis unfolds explicitly and 
formally in rational planning and formal analytical methods, such as cost-benefit analysis, 
Regulatory Impact Assessment and others are used in examinations. While the application of 
a working theory is required for the success of rational planning, piloting is proposed as a 
remedy when organisational goals or problems require new approaches rather than pre-tested 
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theories (Dror, 1968)(IILFLHQF\ZKLFKLVGHILQHGE\6LPRQDV³WKHDWWDLQPHQWRIPD[LPXP
values with limited mHDQV´(1997, p. 75), is the overarching criterion for choosing alternatives 
for the attainment of rationality. This requires, at the stage of the evaluation of alternative 
strategies, to inquire into the negative factor of µFRVW¶DQGWKHSRVLWLYHIDFWRU of µRXWFRPHV¶
expected (Simon, 1997, p. 267). The application of the efficiency rule to a decision may result 
in minimising the cost when outcomes/benefits of alternative strategies are fixed; or 
maximising the outcome/benefit when the costs of the alternatives are fixed (Simon, 1997). 
Hence, this dimension subsumes (1) information gathering and use (2) consideration of a 
range of alternative strategies including innovative ones (3) use of piloting and formal 
analytical methods and (4) the employment of the µHIILFLHQF\UXOH¶LQVWUDWHJLFFKRLFHVZLWKLQ
the MoI. 
2.2.1.2. Formality 
The second dimension of rational planning is formality. Strategic plans based on the rational 
model are also named formal strategic plans (Armstrong, 1982). Formality is essential for the 
rational mode of planning and it entails the commitment of explicit objectives and strategies 
in a written plan (Boyne, 2001; Whittington, 2001). The rational planning process is 
deliberately unambiguous, precise and logically organised (Whittington, 2001). Formality 
surrounds the structures formed for planning purposes and any activity within the strategic 
planning framework, from the review of the mission to the development of strategies (Vinzant 
and Vinzant, 1996). Formality is conceived of in such a way that the procedures employed in 
planning are preordained and that the advancement of the process is checked against a pre-
determined timetable or a preparation programme (Boyne, 2001; Favoreu et al., 2015). 
Therefore, the dimension of formality comprises (1) the existence of a written strategic plan, 
(2) formality of planning structures and processes and (3) the existence of a preparation 
programme in the MoI. 
2.2.1.3. Implementation 
The third dimension of rational planning is implementation. Implementation, first, refers to 
the implementation of strategies. Implementation is a distinct stage of the rational strategy 
SURFHVV DQG GHILQHG DV ³WKH FRPPXQLFDWLRQ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DGRSWLRQ DQG HQDFWPHQW RI
VWUDWHJLFSODQV´$QGUHZVHWDOES$Ftions in the short-term vis-j-vis the strategies 
in the long-term and plan implementation are stressed as these determine the practice of 
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planning in the organisation involved (Boyne, 2001). As generally argued in the literature, 
³SODQQLQJPDWWHUVIRULPSOHPHQWDWLRQ´(Elbanna et al., 2015, pp. 2-3). Within this context, the 
necessity of central control mechanisms (Andrews et al., 2011b), such as monitoring and 
feedback, in strategic planning and management is stressed by several authors (Poister and 
Gregory, 1999; Vinzant and Vinzant, 1996). Monitoring and feedback is a process through 
which implementation of a plan is evaluated; deviations and defects are spotted; necessary 
actions for correction and adjustment are considered; and top management is informed 
through feedback (Faludi, 1973). Evaluation of implementation includes the assessment of 
programme outcomes as well as programme outputs. Performance measurement and 
management systems have been developed to increase the capacity of organisations for 
effective implementation, monitoring and feedback (Poister, 2003), which are based on 
rational planning theory. The development and use of action plans (Andrews et al., 2011b), 
performance budgeting, re-structuring and programme and project management are also found 
to be effective in this regard (Poister and Gregory, 1999).  
Second, implementation refers to the overall application of the formal strategic planning 
model. Whether the components of the model are applied appropriately (Boyne, 2001) matters 
within this context. An indicator of effective application of the model is the attainment of the 
expected outcomes from formal strategic planning in the MoI, such as an increase in the 
degree of rationality of management. While it is generally overlooked in the literature, this 
case study draws conclusions regarding this dimension in the concluding chapter. 
2.2.1.4. Integration and Co-ordination 
Integration and co-ordination is the fourth dimension of rational planning. This dimension 
relates to the mission and vision of public agencies. Rational planning requires the inclusion 
of all units, such as divisions or departments, or related agencies of a multi-agency 
department, within the plan and the planning process around the mission of the organisation 
(Boyne, 2001). Mission plays an integrative role for different and fragmented departments in 
a multi-department organisation. Development of an organisational vision for the future is 
also thought to perform an integrative function. Formal strategic planning stresses the 
integration of all organisational resources and processes for the achievement of strategic goals 
(Vinzant and Vinzant, 1996) and vision. As for co-ordination, strategic planning is a natural 
result of effective co-ordination in government; among agencies related to a department 
(Faludi, 1973) or among units of a single organisation. Formal strategic planning occurs when 
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the need to co-ordinate a considerable number of organisations emerges (Bryson, 2011). 
Rational planning amalgamates all strategic planning-related activities, from strategy 
development to evaluation and feedback. This dimension, therefore, comprises (1) the 
existence and degree of integration of all departments in a strategic plan around an explicitly 
defined mission and a common vision and (2) the degree of co-ordination within an 
organisation and between the involved organisation and other public bodies.    
2.3. The Theory of Incrementalism 
Incrementalism is employed in this research as the alternative of the original theory of rational 
planning to interpret the evidence from the MoI. Chapter 7 tests the patterns of 
incrementalism in line with this aim. This section critically reviews incrementalism and 
completes the bi-partite conceptual framework by presenting its second pillar: the dimensions 
of incrementalism.  
Incrementalism provides a conceptual framework for explaining the drawbacks of rational 
decision-making and planning, such as in means-ends analysis in policymaking, and offers 
new insights for a better understanding of actual public decision-making and problem solving. 
Thus, it provides analysts with an alternative way of simplifying the analysis of complex 
policy problems (Mintzberg, 1978; Ring and Perry, 1985). It draws attention to the political 
nature of the internal and external environments of public organisations, which is generally 
overlooked by rational planners, highlighting the interplay between the two and how 
interactions, tensions, and partisanship lead to agreement on policies and co-ordination 
amongst various politically motivated agents (Lindblom, 1979; Quinn, 1980). 
Unlike rational planning, incrementalism has an ambiguous view of the goals and values of 
public organisations and claims thereupon that decisions are widely made in the absence of 
consensus and clearly defined objectives and values in the public realm (Lindblom, 1959). 
The theory asserts that public policymaking and analysis builds upon existing circumstances, 
gradually, in small, incremental degrees (Lindblom, 1959), and with a repetitive sequence of 
trial-and-error (Lindblom, 1979). Changes along with deeper understanding of policy issues 
do and should occur incrementally, according to this perspective (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 
1970). Theorists argue that these linked and quick sequential moves may still have superiority 
over more far-reaching manoeuvres in altering the status quo (Lindblom, 1979). The 
distinctive trait of incrementalism is its restriction of analysis to a limited number of policy 
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alternatives that are marginally different from each other and from the status quo (Alexander, 
1992; Lindblom, 1959b). 6XFKPHWKRGLVLQLWLDOO\FDOOHGDV³VXFFHVVLYHOLPLWHGFRPSDULVRQV´
E\/LQGEORPSDQGLW LV ODWHUGHYHORSHGDV³GLVMRLQWHGLQFUHPHQWDOLVP´S
517).  
The theory suggests some rationales for the simplification of the search process. First, it 
considers the constraints on the intellectual capacity of human analysts and on resources, such 
as information, time and finances. Second, it views a deductive means-ends analysis 
impossible and claims that institutional-behavioural aspects of organisations force them to 
adopt similar and relevant policies (Leach, 1982).  
For some, the logic of incrementalism, which is marked by exploration and trial-and-error, 
excludes any attempt for long-range planning (Leach, 1982). Incrementalism considers such 
planning as irrelevant as it demands allocation of high levels of time and financial resources 
to policies, whereas often these resources are limited (Boyne et al., 2004; Lindblom, 1959b). 
It does not completely rule out planning; however, it favours a highly flexible form. For 
example, Braybrooke and Lindblom argue: 
"Often a plan is no more than a loosely stated set of goals and possible steps. It is relevant to 
the kind of actual decision-making we have been describing, but its goals and steps ordinarily 
have to be reformulated with each policy move." (1970, p. 77) 
)URPDQLQFUHPHQWDOLVWSRLQWRIYLHZ³>5DWLRQDO@SODQQLQJLWVHOILVVLPSO\DURXWLQHRUULWXDO
ZLWKQRUHDOLPSDFWRQSHUIRUPDQFH´(Boyne and Gould-Williams, 2003, p. 118). Recognising 
the highly political milieus of public organisations, planning with an incrementalist approach 
is one of the later stages of strategy development which can preempt the formation of 
opposition against the strategies envisaged (Quinn, 1980). This last point resonates with 
/LQGEORP¶VLGHDV 
³>,QFUHPHQWDOVWHSV@GRQRWURFNWKHERDWGRQRWVWLUXSWKHJUHDWDQWDJRQLVPVDQGSDUDO\]LQJ
schisms as do proposals for more drastic change.´(Lindblom, 1979, p. 520) 
Unlike the cyclical pattern in the rational planning process, strategy, from the point of 
incrementalism, is a continuous and ongoing process with no exact beginning or end in an 
ever-changing environment (Eadie, 1983; Quinn, 1980). According to Eadie: 
³« HQYLURQPHQWDO VFDQQLQJ DQG VWUDWHJ\ IRUPXODWLRQ PXVW EH RQJRLQJ DFWLYLWLHV LI DQ
organisation is to respond effectively both to threats and opportunities.´(1983, p. 451) 
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Thus, having a very different outlook from rational planning, implementation is characterised 
by flexibility and dynamism within strategies and plans. Incrementalism rejects a one-size-
fits-all approach and favours contingency planning (Quinn, 1980). Strategy-making is a 
process of learning, in which strategy execution feeds back strategy formulation for 
adjustment; and intended strategies are revised and turned into emergent or unintended 
strategies during the course (Mintzberg, 1978). The formulation and implementation 
dichotomy is irrelevant and even false as it impedes strategic learning in organisations, 
according to this perspective (Mintzberg, 1978). Strategy cannot be easily formulated, since 
strategy, as patterns of decisions, includes unconscious and random mental activity 
(Mintzberg, 1978). Therefore, organisations pursue an adaptive mode or the incrementalist 
approach, rather than rational planning, for strategy formation. 
Incrementalism can be observed in strategic management. It has been observed, for example, 
that the patterns of strategy develop incrementally through informal learning and most times 
without conscious and deliberate actions by the strategists (Mintzberg, 1978). In another 
situation, incrementalism has been witnessed as a conscious and intentional strategy, which is 
employed to manage strategic change in private companies. This type of incrementalism is 
referred to DVµORJLFDOLQFUHPHQWDOLVP¶(Quinn, 1980).  
Logical incrementalism, offered a new perspective for strategy development in organisations. 
The proponents stressed the importance of experimentation, organisational learning, 
continuous adaptation to changing environments, inclusion and management of stakeholders, 
organisational politics and conflict, coalition building, timing, and many other aspects of 
strategy development (Mintzberg, 1978; Quinn, 1980). Although there are many overlapping 
ideas between the logical and disjointed modes of incrementalism, logical incrementalism has 
been claimed to be a µSXUSRVLYH¶ RU µFRQVFLRXV¶ incrementalism (Quinn, 1978, p. 19), as 
opposed to muddling through, and in contrast to disjointed incrementalism it has prescribed a 
wider alternative inquiry into available strategy options. Some authors argue that logical 
incrementalism fits best with public, variable and volatile milieus (Johnson and Scholes, 
2001; Walker, 2013), while others advocate that this way of strategy formulation could only 
be efficient in uncomplicated and stable environments (Boyne, 2001). Considerable empirical 
evidence from the tests of the Miles and Snow (1978) model demonstrates that incremental 
implementation of strategies perform better in tackling complex and dynamic environments 
(Walker, 2013). 
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Studies on incremental strategising have come to have an affect on the approach to rational 
planning, for example, with regard to the flexibility vs. rigidity of planning and plans (Wolf 
and Floyd, 2013). Following the early advice of scholars (Nutt and Backoff, 1992; Ring and 
Perry, 1985) authors increasingly prescribe more flexible models that consider contingencies, 
which enable managers to adapt public organisation strategies to changing environments 
(Boyne, 2001; Bryson, 2011; Eden and Ackermann, 2013; Poister et al., 2013). Recent 
empirical research provides evidence for the superiority of a mix of rational and 
incrementalist models over formal strategic planning (Poister et al., 2013). Such an approach 
introduces flexibility to strategic planning processes, through which goals and strategies can 
be continuously reviewed and adjusted to new circumstances (Poister et al., 2013), in light of 
ongoing environmental scanning and information gathering (Eadie, 1983)6LPLODUO\WKHµRQH-
size-fits-DOO¶(Poister et al., 2010, p. 527) RUµEOXHSULQW¶DSSURDFK(Eden and Ackermann, 2013, 
p. 7), which has been rejected all along by incrementalism, is now increasingly being 
criticised in the literature and scholars are appreciating the notion of emergent strategies 
(Mintzberg, 1978), as well as intended strategies, and asking for more contingency planning 
due to differences in the contexts of public agencies (Bryson et al., 2010; Eden and 
Ackermann, 2013; Joyce and Drumaux, 2014a; Walker et al., 2010).  
At the same time several limitations of the theory are highlighted by its critics. For example, 
Etzioni (1967) advocates that incremental decisions anticipate more fundamental decisions 
and function as generators of non-incremental decisions once they were made. The total value 
of incremental moves is determined by more far-reaching decisions. At the centre of the 
critique, however, is the claim that the theory favours the status quo by encouraging adaptive 
moves at the cost of far-reaching or innovative ones (Atkinson, 2011; Etzioni, 1967). For that 
reason, incrementalism is claimed to be ineffective in tackling complex and deep-rooted 
public policy problems that demand more radical and creative approaches (Steiss, 2003). 
Another reason for rejection is linked to the notion of partisan mutual adjustment, which has 
the potential to overlook the values and preferences of the weak and unorganised groups 
(Etzioni, 1967), either in the societal or organisational contexts. Where claims have been 
made that attribute a normative value to incrementalism (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970) 
these have been criticised for not being grounded in sound evidence (Alexander, 1992). 
In contrast to the proponents of incrementalism, it is argued that both disjointed and logical 
LQFUHPHQWDOLVPEHDU³DFKURQLFVXE-RSWLPLVDWLRQ´RISHUIRUPDQFHZKLFKOHDGVWREDGVHUYLFH
provision and dissatisfaction among insider and outsider key stakeholders (Bryson, 2011, p. 
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19). This view is supported by some empirical findings, such as a recent study measuring the 
effects of logical incrementalism over organisational performance in local governments, 
which found that incrementalism, as well as absence of strategy, had negative consequences 
(Andrews et al., 2009). Yet, this is the result of a single research and further research is 
needed to support this argument. Recognising the shortcomings of the theory, Lindblom 
(1979) advocates that incrementalism is closer to the actual experience of organisational 
planning and should be employed consciously due to the limitations of rationality and because 
of the dynamic nature of public policy problems. The application of such a computed and 
thoughtful method constitutes ³VWUDWHJLFDQDO\VLV´in his view (Lindblom, 1979). 
2.3.1. Dimensions of Incrementalism 
This section presents the second pillar of the conceptual framework of this research by 
presenting the dimensions of the theory of incrementalism. The distinctive theoretical 
dimensions of incrementalism discussed in this section are: (1) partisan mutual adjustment, 
(2) agreement as criterion for good strategy, (3) simple incremental analysis, (4) trial-and-
error and (5) flexibility and dynamism. 
2.3.1.1. Partisan Mutual Adjustment 
Partisan mutual adjustment describes a fragmented system of shared powers of politically 
motivated actors who interact with other stakeholders to reach an agreement on goals and 
actions (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970). It represents an inductive form of decision-
making, as opposed to the deductive approach of the rational planning model, in which a 
consensus is assumed to have been reached over goals (Bryson, 2011). Public organisations 
operate in political environments and they interact with different stakeholder groups, and their 
decisions are affected in varying degrees by those stakeholders and power centres. In contrast 
to a comprehensive approach, analysis and evaluation of policy is disconnected; they take 
place in diverse centres in the society over diverse policy problems, showing the patterns of 
explicit disorganisation and weak communication (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970). Such a 
decision-making setting is mainly characterised by conflict and bargaining (Forester, 1984). 
Conflict and bargaining are common in organisational settings, as well as in government and 
are very likely to occur in the process of goal-setting and allocation of organisational 
resources in the context of strategic planning. Hence, the dimension of partisan mutual 
adjustment is relevant to (1) whether prioritisation of goals and targets occur in a highly 
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political environment and (2) whether resources are allocated upon and through conflict and 
bargaining in the involved organisation.  
2.3.1.2. Agreement as a Criterion for Good Strategy 
In relation to the dimension of partisan mutual adjustment, incrementalism posits that 
agreement on means is superior to procedural rationality in the highly political environment of 
public organisations, where the ends or values of the stakeholders are as diverse as the 
stakeholders themselves and in which a clear-cut distinction between ends and means can be 
problematic (Lindblom, 1959). In such decision-making conditions the criteria for a good 
strategy is whether it is agreeable rather than whether it is procedurally rational.  
2.3.1.3. Simple Incremental Analysis 
Within the practice of incrementalism, the analysis of alternative strategies is non-
comprehensive as the alternatives considered are marginally different from each other and 
from the status quo (Lindblom, 1959). Analysis does not involve a comparison of, for 
example, the values of security and freedom in a broad sense but of the increments of these 
values offered by different policy options and the future states that these options stipulate 
(Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970). Therefore, the decision-maker needs to determine the 
extent to which an increment in one value is more worthwhile than an increment in the other. 
Whether or not an increment in one alternative is more worthy than the other will 
consequently determine the decision-PDNHU¶V FKRLFH 7KHUHIRUH the analysis of options is 
comparative (Lindblom, 1959) DQGWKHFKRLFHDPRQJDOWHUQDWLYHVLVPDGHWKURXJK³UDQNLQJLQ
order of preference the increments by which social states dLIIHU´(Braybrooke and Lindblom, 
1970, pp. 85-86). Incrementalism prescribes consideration of a small set of alternatives which 
are very close to each other and to the status quo. The inadequacy of theory or experience in 
resolving complex social problems compels the consideration of familiar policies, while 
encouraging the negligence of non-incremental options (Lindblom, 1959). Far-reaching 
RSWLRQVDUHRYHUORRNHG³EHFDXVHWKH\DUHLPSUDFWLFDOLQWKHLUUHTXLUHPHQWVRUXQSUHGLFWDEOHLQ
WKHLU FRQVHTXHQFHV´ $tkinson, 2011, p.10). Simple incremental analysis is argued to be 
widespread within public organisations (Lindblom, 1959). 
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2.3.1.4. Trial-and-Error 
Incrementalism suggests that no single best or right solution exists for solving policy 
problems (Etzioni, 1967). Public organisations will repeat incremental moves continuously, 
with trial-and-error, as their ambitions and circumstances change and as they gain new 
insights into the problem in question (Atkionson, 2011; Lindblom, 1959). The expectation of 
the public body is a partial achievement of objectives through incremental moves. This 
strategy enables the decision-makers to test their preferences, to become cognizant of its 
consequences, refrain and recover swiftly and easily from its detriments, if any, as their minor 
moves remain retrievable (Lindblom, 1959). As with the simple incremental analysis pattern, 
trial-and-error is claimed to be employed frequently in governments (Atkinson, 2011).  
2.3.1.5. Flexibility and Dynamism 
Incrementalism hypothesises that ends and means, or values and policies, are defined 
synchronously and concurrently in the decision-making process (Lindblom, 1959). The 
process of analysis progresses reciprocally and concurrently through the analysis and 
formulation of means and ends towards the adjustment of the two in a continuous, flexible 
and dynamic manner (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970). In other words, goals and strategies 
are dynamically reviewed and revised after every move during progress for the adjustment of 
both (Quinn, 1980). Incrementalism does not favour planning although it does not totally 
reject it, as discussed earlier. A plan would be a flexible, dynamic and an ever-changing 
document if it existed (Mintzberg, 1978), because continuous adaptation of means and ends is 
required to be responsive to changes in the internal and external environments. 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed two prominent process theories of strategic planning in order to 
build a dual conceptual framework that is empirically tested in chapters 6 and 7. The chapter 
presented its argument in three sections. 
The first section addressed the relevance of rational planning and incrementalism for this case 
study, which embraced a rival explanation method as an analytical strategy for the 
interpretation of case evidence. It argued that the strategic planning reform that the MoI 
underwent was based on the theory of rational planning. Hence, rational planning is selected 
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as the original theory to be tested. Incrementalism is employed as a competing theory for at 
least two reasons. Firstly, incrementalism is reverse rational planning and these two theories 
are mutually exclusive. In other words, incrementalism presents a contrasting account of what 
rational planning presents, which renders it a rival theory. Secondly, the absence of explicit 
strategy formulation procedures in the MoI before the strategic planning reform opens up 
some space for incrementalism since it is widely accepted in the public management literature 
that legal reforms do not straightforwardly bring about change in practice due to a number of 
prevalent factors, including organisational culture. This kind of situation can be best 
explained through the premises that underpin incrementalism, such as trial-and-error (non-
purposive) or simple incremental analysis.  
The second and third sections critically reviewed rational planning and incrementalism 
theories in order to complete the dual conceptual framework for this case study. Section two 
discussed the fundamentals and main precepts of rational planning. It revealed that rational 
planning comprises the basis for formal strategic planning and that strategy in rational 
planning is formal, analytical and mechanistic, analysis is comprehensive, integration and co-
ordination is high and the implementation of strategy is explicit. The proponents of the theory 
argue that rational planning provides a justification for organisational strategy, enhances 
organisational capacity and performance, as well as relations with stakeholders. Later, the 
section demonstrated how the claim of comprehensive rationality was challenged by critics 
because of the shortcomings of human rationality due to limited cognitive capacity and 
organisational resources. Opponents¶DUJXPHQWV focused on the impracticality of the theory, 
its neglect of the role of politics in public strategy-making, and its difficulty to address the 
complexities of social problems in public administration. Finally, as the first dimension of the 
conceptual framework of this case study, the section presented the dimensions of rational 
planning. These dimensions are presented in Table 2.1below as patterns of rational planning. 
Table 2.1. Conceptual Framework of the Research 
 Patterns of Rational Planning Patterns of Incrementalism 
1 Comprehensive Analysis of Strategies Partisan Mutual Adjustment  
2 Formality Agreement as Criterion for Good Strategy 
3 Rational Implementation Simple Incremental Analysis 
4 Integration and Co-ordination Trial-and Error 
5 - Flexibility and Dynamism 
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In a similar approach, section three discussed the basics and principles of incrementalism 
critically. It argued that incrementalism introduces a new perspective in public decision-
making by contrasting it with the theory of rational planning. Incrementalism stimulates a 
field of public strategic management by challenging a purely analytical view of strategy with 
a one-size-fits-all approach. Rigid planning is rejected and instead contingencies are 
considered and organisational conflict and reconciliation is incorporated into the equation. 
The theory hypothesised that public organisations should limit their search for alternative 
strategies to a few feasible and familiar options due to the limitations of rationality and that 
they should advance through learning-by-doing dynamically and flexibly. It was argued that 
logical incrementalism is developed as purposive incrementalism, as opposed to muddling 
through, blending the analytical and non-analytical dimensions of strategy. Once more, 
logical incrementalism stressed organisational politics and organisational learning in strategy 
development. From the perspective of critics of incrementalism, the section discussed that the 
theory is blamed for preserving the status quo and overlooking the voices of the weak in 
society by prioritising partisan mutual adjustment, in which the powerful often dominate 
strategy-making. Another point made in the arguments was that the theory was crippled with 
sub-optimisation and that it deteriorates organisational performance in the public sector. 
Finally, section three presented the patterns of incrementalism to be tested as the second 
dimension of the conceptual framework.  
Table 2.1 presents the conceptual framework for this case study. The conceptual framework 
combines the patterns of rational planning (see Section 2.2.1) and incrementalism (see Section 
2.3.1), which are derived from the review of the two theories above. Chapters 6 and 7 
empirically test these two theories successively.  
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 2: THE DESCRIPTIVE 
AND EMPIRICAL DIMENSIONS OF 
STRATEGIC PLANNING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first research question presented in Section 1.4 asks whether strategic planning has been 
effective in the MoI, and is aimed to assess how and why this is the case. Hence, one main 
purpose of this research is to explain what mechanisms and forces lead to success or failure in 
strategic planning within the context of the Turkish MoI. This chapter first expands the review 
of descriptive public strategic management literature by addressing the background of 
strategic planning in the public sector, its worldwide application, implications of the 
difference between public and private sectors, and by presenting a rather linear public 
strategic management process (Figure 3.1). The second part of the chapter reviews empirical 
literature covering three decades to make explicit what has been found to be effective in the 
success or failure of strategic planning processes in public organisations so far. The second 
part is structured in accordance with the strategic management process presented in Figure 
3.1. %\ UHFRJQLVLQJ WKH µSUDFWLFH¶ GLPHQVLRQ RI VWUDWHJ\-making (Jarzabkowski and Paul 
Spee, 2009; Whittington, 2006), the review touches on the role of the practitioners of strategy, 
as well as a preparation stage, since they are the actors whose preparedness for strategic 
planning is of great significance to the effectiveness of the process. Incorporating the role of 
practitioners in strategy aims to avoid the fallacy of viewing strategic planning as a purely 
logical, unsociable and unemotional set of mechanistic procedures that can be verbatim 
duplicated in all circumstances (Bryson et al., 2010). Table 3.1, in conclusion, synthesizes the 
success and failure features derived from the existing empirical research. These criteria are 
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later utilised in Chapter 8 to judge the strategic planning practice of the MoI. To these ends, 
this chapter is structured as follows: 
1) Strategic planning in the public sector: A general view, 
2) The strategic management process: empirical perspective, 
3) Conclusion. 
3.1. Strategic Planning in the Public Sector: A General View 
3.1.1. Background and Rationale 
Strategic planning and management originated in for-profit organisations back in the 1950s 
(Bruton and Hildreth, 1993; Bryson and Roering, 1987; Streib and Poister, 1990) and virtually 
all strategic management tools and models in circulation today have been developed for the 
private sector (Nutt and Backoff, 1992, p. 23). This management technique was introduced 
into the public sector in the 1960s, starting with the US Department of Defence under the 
Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) (Boyne et al., 2004; Mintzberg, 2000; 
Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). It occupied a prominent place in the governmental agendas of 
the US, the UK, and France in the early 1970s for the achievement of more rational and 
strategic policymaking (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Expansion of strategic planning and 
management across governments rose with public administration reforms in the US and 
parallel international reform agendas in New Zealand, Canada and Australia in the 1980s and 
1990s (Bryson, 2010).  
The tension between resource scarcity and demands for enhanced public service performance 
(Berry, 1994; Eadie, 1983), the increased external stakeholder aspirations for public service 
accountability and the commitment of public agency practitioners for better management 
(Poister et al., 2013) are argued to be the main impetus for public strategic planning. From a 
broader perspective, the expansion of strategic planning across public administrations has 
been the consequence of significant changes in science and technology and many aspects of 
social, economic, financial, and political life (Bryson, 2011; Osborne and Gaebler, 1993; 
Poister and Streib, 1999; Steiss, 2003). The world haVEHFRPHD³VXSHU-globalised and hyper-
FRQQHFWHG´ (Orr, 2015) place, in which any development at one place has the potential to 
reverberate unexpectedly in other parts (Bryson, 1999, p. vii). Developments in the public 
domain have evoked the immediate need for more cost-effective, efficient, responsive and 
innovative management techniques in the public sector (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). Public 
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organisations that want to survive in the new conditions have to be adaptable and malleable, 
delivering value for money through the provision of high-quality and diversified goods and 
services; being responsive to constituents; being open for stakeholder participation; ensuring 
the buy-in of employees; and going beyond serving clients through authorizing them 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1993, p. 15).  
While the public are looking for better services (Eadie, 1983, p. 447), they are also asking for 
more transparent governance, parallel to the demands for greater democracy (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011). Accordingly, there is a great emphasis on output-oriented or results-
focused management styles in search of an ever-effective public sector (Poister and Streib, 
1999, p.308). At this point, strategic management constitutes a versatile tool for public bodies 
to overcome internal threats, such as poor management and performance (Joyce, 2001, p. 1). 
It helps to tackle external emergent menaces in the ever-changing environment and ensures 
long-term vitality of public organisations when used effectively (Joyce, 2001; Poister and 
Streib, 1999). Hence, strategic management is a practical apparatus that has the power to 
increase the adaptability of public organisations to an ambiguous environment and 
unforeseeable future (Miles and Snow, 2003; Poister and Streib, 1999; Steiss, 2003).  
Strategic management underlines buy-in and better internal and external communication to 
emphasize the importance of determining a strategic agenda through stakeholder participation 
on shared values (Joyce, 2001; Poister and Streib, 1999). To stress the significance of buy-in 
LQVWUDWHJLFPDQDJHPHQW&DPSEHOOZURWH³,I\RXGRQ¶WKDYHEX\-LQ\RXGRQ¶WKDYHDSODQ´
(2002, p. 433). Strategic management is a dynamic and adaptable process, rather than a static 
and inflexible one. It is an integrative framework on the grounds that it (Poister and Streib, 
1999, p. 308): 
x draws attention throughout functional units and across different organisational 
levels on common goals, themes, and issues;  
x links management processes and programme initiatives to targeted results in the 
exterior milieu; and, 
x associates tactical, daily-basis decisions with long term strategic goals. 
  
Additionally, the general purpose(s) of strategic management are argued to be (Poister and 
Streib, 1999, pp. 311-312):  
x to protect the harmony of the organisation with its environment by continuous 
monitoring of external trends, 
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x to build internally and externally a lasting commitment to the mission and vision 
of the organisation;  
x to provide the sustenance of a strategy culture which upholds and cooperates with 
the mission and vision;  
x WRSURYLGHDVXVWDLQHGDWWHQWLRQRQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQV¶VWUDWHJLFDJHQGDWKURXJKRXW
its decision processes and activities. 
 
Realisation of organisational mission, fulfilment of mandate and generating public value are 
the main functions of an organisation, while organisational learning acts as a supportive 
element for an ongoing and satisfactory realisation of the three (Bryson et al., 2010, pp. 495-
496; Koteen, 1997, p. 5). Strategic management is believed to help public managers to 
manage efficiently and cost-effectively for the attainment of public value (Joyce, 2001, p. 6; 
Koteen, 1997) ³'R PRUH EHWWHU VPDUWHU ZLWK OHVV´ KDV EHHQ WKH PRWWR RI VWUDWHJLF
management in government (Koteen, 1997, p. 6). More significantly, strategic management is 
employed to guarantee long-term viability and success of public agencies (Poister et al., 2010; 
Steiss, 2003). The value of this versatile tool has been appreciated in the public domain and it 
is now applied all around the world by many governments (Poister et al., 2010). How 
strategic management can successfully be applied in public organisations has been a central 
problem for strategic management scholarship. 
3.1.2. Strategic Planning and Management in the World 
More than two decades ago, Bryson, as an influential public strategic planning scholar, wrote: 
³6WUDWHJLFSODQQLQJLVOLNHO\WREHFRPHDSDUWRIWKHUHSHUWRLUHRISXEOLF«SODQQHUV´(Bryson, 
1988, p. 73). In the mid-1990s public strategic planning was being promoted as an innovative 
approach in the public sector (Berry, 1994). Developments in the field have confirmed 
%U\VRQ¶V IRUHFDVW DV WKH PRGHO GRPLQDWHV PDQ\ JRYHUQPHQW SROLF\ DJHQGDV WRGD\ 6RPH
governments are revising initially introduced models, whereas others have recently introduced 
them for the first time. The spread of strategic management approaches started in particularly 
Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US, the UK, New Zealand, Canada and Australia. It later 
diffused to different governments all around the world from continental Europe (Germany, 
Netherlands and Norway) to Africa (South Africa, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya) and Asia (South 
Korea, Malesia and Pakistan) 6RQJU . The experiences of the US and the UK are 
reviewed below to exemplify the rise of strategic planning.  
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3.1.2.1. The Case of the US 
Many US cities had started to exercise corporate-style strategic planning in the early 1980s 
(Kaufman and Jacobs, 1987). At the federal level, only two agencies in the US were identified 
as having strategic plans in the late 1980s (Koteen, 1997). However, by 1990, Streib and 
Poister (1990) found in a survey study that strategic planning was diffused countrywide across 
large and small cities of the US, for both in-house operational and communitywide planning 
purposes. This was three years before the enactment of the Government Performance and 
Results Act 1993 (GPRA), which obliged all federal government agencies to introduce 
strategic plans by the end of 1997. Another survey revealed that 60% of participating state 
agencies were using some sort of strategic planning by the year 1995 (Berry and Wechsler, 
1995) /HJLVODWHG GXULQJ WKH &OLQWRQ DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ IRU ³UHVWRULQJ WKH FRQILGHQFH RI WKH
$PHULFDQSHRSOHLQWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW´(Radin, 1998, p. 308), the GPRA had a one-size-
fits-all or one-best-way approach that mandated top-down, formal strategic planning to 
federal public agencies (Long and Franklin, 2004). It obliged federal governmental agencies 
to develop strategic plans for a five-year period, a performance plan, and an annual 
performance report as a framework for rational strategy formulation and decision-making, 
with effective resource allocation, enhanced performance,  accountability and inclusion of 
diverse stakeholders through consultation. The basic aim of the legislation was to improve 
service quality and public satisfaction by focusing on results (Radin, 1998). Although top-
down with regard to dictating a standard formal-comprehensive strategic planning model, the 
GPRA stipulated a bottom-up strategy formulation approach through consultation with 
internal and external stakeholders (Long and Franklin, 2004). Most of the states in the US 
have passed parallel laws following the GPRA (Poister and Streib, 1999). Despite problems 
with implementation (Long and Franklin, 2004; Radin, 1998), strategic planning has become 
common practice following three decades of deployment in the US (Bryson et al., 2010; 
Poister et al., 2010).  
3.1.2.2. The Case of the UK 
In the UK, rational strategy formulation was adopted as a governmental policy through a 
SURFHVV WKDW VWDUWHG ZLWK WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI WKH 1H[W 6WHSV 5HSRUW E\ WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V
Efficiency Unit in 1988 (Hyndman, 2001). The Next Steps Initiative targeted the separation of 
policymaking from service delivery through the establishment of autonomous agencies at 
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arms-length from the central government and improving efficiency and effectiveness through 
effective performance reporting and establishing personal responsibility for top managers (E 
U, 1988). In 1998, the Best Value framework announced by the Department of Environment, 
Transport and the Regions required local authorities to specify organisational goals and 
objectives for sustained advancement in the quality and efficiency of local services (Boyne et 
al., 2004). UK local authorities were asked to undertake a number of measures to improve 
efficiency which included directions to conduct performance reviews; compare their own 
performance with other local governments; consult the public for the identification of service 
preferences; set clear targets on an annual basis for a five-year period and assign performance 
indicators to monitor progress (Boyne and Gould-Williams, 2003). Additionally, they were 
also obliged to publish performance plans that lay down quantitatively defined objectives and 
targets for better service and also to prepare action plans for programme achievement. Public 
Service Agreements and Public Spending Reviews were introduced as means for rational and 
strategic management 6RQJU . Under the recent coalition government public 
departments prepared structural reform plans and business plans that lay out the vision, 
priorities, structural reform plans, expenditure and transparency of business, which were due 
to be reviewed and revised every year in the light of new developments (HO, 2010).  
Departments were expected to report their performance through annual reporting and 
accounting (for example DfE, 2011; HO, 2013). 
While strategic planning became more diffused across international governments, difficulties 
with application in the public sector compelled scholars to question its efficacy and relevance 
in the public sector, and hence raised concerns about the public-private dichotomy. 
3.1.3. Public- Private Dichotomy in Strategic Planning 
Whether public and private (for-profit) organisations are of the same kind or different in some 
respects with regard to the application of strategic planning has been the subject of debates 
among scholars (Joyce, 2015; Nutt and Backoff, 1992; Ring and Perry, 1985). Some authors 
have distinguished public agencies from private sector organisations with regard to their 
multi-purpose character, the effect of political leadership in management, and exemption from 
competition in markets (Christensen et al., 2007). Nutt and Backoff (1992) have outlined a 
wide array of differences between the two sectors consisting of environmental differences, 
transactional differences, and process-related differences. Similarly, Ring and Perry (1985) 
have argued that public and private sectors reveal differences with regard to goal ambiguity, 
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transparency of strategy processes, diversity of stakeholders and interests, time constraints, 
and lifetime of coalitions. Some frequently-cited differences between the two sectors are 
discussed here. 
Unlike private organisations, the goals of public organisations are multiple, ambiguous, 
generally unquantifiable, and are often conflictual (Rainey and Jung, 2010; Stewart, 2004). 
Goal ambiguity is said to provide a supportive environment for public administration, since it 
facilitates agreement on goals and values, and encourages public managers to use personal 
discretion, which may not otherwise be practiced when goals are articulated precisely. On the 
contrary, it is revealed that managers of effective for-profit organisations concentrate on a few 
clearly outlined goals, such as growth and market share (Ring and Perry, 1985, p. 279). Public 
organisations act in an environment that is influenced by electoral outcomes, power struggles, 
conflict, and bargaining (Wechsler and Backoff, 1986), though to varying extents in different 
societies (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970). These organisations have to take into account 
diverse stakeholder groups, both internally and externally, and their views and interests in 
strategy formulation processes (Joyce, 2015; Dror, 1968), while their managers are not totally 
autonomous in their relations with stakeholders (Stewart, 2004). Although there is room for 
organisational politics within for-profit firms (Quinn et al., 2003; Quinn, 1978), it does not 
amount to the level of internal and external politics that public organisations are subject to.  
One of the main differences between the for-profit and non-profit sector strategy lies in the 
purpose of the employment of strategy. Unlike the private sector, strategy is seen as a way of 
enhancement of organisational performance for sustained creation of public value (Moore, 
1995), rather than a means of competition or gaining advantage over (Bruton and Hildreth, 
1993) or defeating rivals (Moore, 1995; Poister and Streib, 1999; Walker, 2010). Bryson, 
Berry, and Yang (2010) argue that the private sector employs strategic management to 
maximise profit, foster growth and increase the share in the market through rivalry or 
coalition; while in the public sector it is exploited to improve performance, citizen satisfaction 
and to ensure the long-term viability of organisations.  
Strategic discretion is argued to be relatively restricted in the public sector  because of strict 
ex ante and ex post control over public management, for example in terms of entering into 
new markets or constituencies, or abandoning existing markets (Bryson et al., 2010; Pitts, 
2010; Stewart, 2004). Strict control is exercised by political powers (Stewart, 2004)³KLJKHU
DXWKRULWLHV´DQG³PRQLWRUV´(Ring and Perry, 1985, p. 280) through limiting goals and strategy 
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options beforehand, for example by the use of legal, political, and regulatory means (Boyne 
and Walker, 2010, p.186) or by the scrutiny of the final strategies through by ad hoc 
mechanisms. Public organisations demonstrate a highly exogenous character under the 
conditions of stringent external control (Walker, 2010; Wechsler and Backoff, 1986). 
The differences embedded in the nature of public administration and the problems and 
limitations stemming from these suggest that strategic planning does not fit well with public 
management (Stewart, 2004; Vinzant and Vinzant, 1996) or is highly challenging to apply 
(Ring and Perry, 1985) and precise emulation of the model is inevitably problematic (Bryson 
and Roering, 1988). It is argued that strategies are largely emergent, rather than intended, in 
the public sector; and hence the contribution of formal strategic planning is contended to be 
controversial (Ring and Perry, 1985). The opponents of strategic planning contend that strict 
financial and political control over public agencies and the associated risk of liability suits 
produce risk-averse behaviours within managers, which counteracts the virtues of strategic 
planning in the public realm (Kissler et al., 1998a). Strategic planning is even considered by 
VRPHVFKRODUVDQGSXEOLFVHUYLFHSUDFWLWLRQHUVDVDQ³DQDWKHPD´WRSXEOLFDJHQFLHV (Walker, 
2010, p. 228), an oxymoron under conditions of goal ambiguity (Campbell, 2002, p. 430), or a 
NLQG RI ³VWDWLVWLFDO PDQDJHPHQW´ ZLWK QR UHDO HIIHFW RQ VHUYLFH SHUIRUPDQFH (Boyne et al., 
2004, p. 346). Criticisms have mostly been directed at prescriptive rational strategy processes, 
as discussed at length in Chapter 2. The proponents of the model, on the contrary, see 
strategic planning as a framework for rational policy and decision making in government, 
with a clearer mission and set of goals that give strategic direction to the agency and improve 
public service performance, efficiency, accountability, responsiveness and ensure long-term 
vitality in public administration (Berry, 1994; Boyne and Gould-Williams, 2003; Bryson et 
al., 2010; Poister et al., 2010).  
Although the theory of organisations does not treat public and private organisations as 
different entities, and early strategic management research included cases from both sectors in 
their samples (for example Miles and Snow, 1978), a stream of public strategic management 
literature that is aware of the differences and similarities between the public and private has 
developed (Joyce et al., 2014; Wechsler and Backoff, 1986) since 1986.  
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3.1.4. Components of Strategic Planning 
7KLVWKHVLVSULPDULO\ORRNVLQWRWKHVWUDWHJ\SURFHVVZKLFKLVGHILQHGDV³WKHSURFHVVEy which 
DVWUDWHJLFGHFLVLRQLVPDGHDQGLPSOHPHQWHGDQGWKHIDFWRUVZKLFKDIIHFWLW´(Andrews et al., 
2011a, p. 2). Process-RULHQWHG DXWKRUV RIWHQ RYHUORRN µVWUDWHJ\ FRQWHQW¶ LQ WKHLU GHILQLWLRQV
although strategy content is viewed by other authors as equally important as strategy 
formulation processes (Andrews et al., 2006; Boyne and Walker, 2004; Koteen, 1997). 
Despite variations in definition, on a broader scale strategy and strategic management theories 
have some common components, which are (1) strategy formulation, (2) strategy content, (3) 
implementation, and (4) control and evaluation (Berry, 1994; Bryson, 2011; Eadie, 1989; 
Koteen, 1997; Nutt and Backoff, 1992; Poister et al., 2010; Steiss, 2003, pp. 6-7; Vinzant and 
Vinzant, 1996). Chapter 2 explicates these components within the context of theory. These 
components overlap with the for-profit sector view of strategic management. Resource 
allocation, which links organisational resources with specific strategies formulated in a plan, 
is considered by some authors as one of the most important elements of strategic management 
(Poister et al., 2010; Vinzant and Vinzant, 1996). A linear and mechanistic view of public 
strategic management processes by Poister et al. (2010) is presented below in Figure 3.1.  
 
According to this figure, some environmental and institutional factors and forces motivate 
organisations to engage in strategic management (Links 1-2). These forces may affect 
strategic management process by influencing its components. The Strategic Management 
stage incorporates the process of strategy formulation, strategy content and implementation of 
Determinants 
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Figure 3.1 A Conceptual Model of Strategic Management  
Source: (Taken from Poister et al., 2010, p.525) 
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strategies (including control and evaluation), which interact with and impact on each other 
(Links 3-4-5-6-7). The outcomes of strategic management are enhancement in organisational 
capacity in the short-run, and advancement of organisational performance in the long-run 
(Links 8-9-10). Development in organisational capacity itself leads to better performance 
(Link 11). Changes in organisational capacity and performance shape the overall strategic 
management process, particularly with organisational learning through feedback loop 
represented by Link 12. 
This reflects a highly mechanistic view of strategic planning and does not take into account 
the role of the practitioner in strategic management. Thus, the conceptual framework 
presented in Figure 3.1 is revisited in the conclusion of the thesis (Chapter 8) in light of the 
findings from the MoI case to show how the preparedness and capability of the strategy 
practitioners can be decisive in the effectiveness of the strategic planning process.  
The next section reviews empirical literature with regard to the conceptual framework 
presented in Figure 3.1 above by taking into account the practice and practitioner dimensions 
of strategy-making.  
3.2. The Strategic Management Process: Empirical Perspective 
3.2.1. Contingencies of Strategic Management 
Understanding how different environmental and organisational contingencies affect the 
adoption and practice of strategic planning and in what ways is valuable for a better 
understanding and explanation of public strategic planning processes. Environmental 
contingencies appear in different forms. Evidence shows that legislative and executive 
mandates are important factors that lead to the initiation of strategic planning in public 
agencies and that many agencies have adopted strategic planning willingly (Berry and 
Wechsler, 1995; Poister, 2005). For example, Poister (2005)  reveals that among thirty US 
and Canadian Departments of Transportation (DoT), eight cases cite legislative and four cases 
mention executive mandates as determinants, while fifteen cases report that they launched 
strategic planning by choice, and three cases through a blend of preference and external 
mandate. Berry and Weschler (1995) have found that a third of the US state agencies in their 
VDPSOHLQLWLDWHVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJGXHWRWKHJRYHUQRUV¶SUHIHUHQFHDQGJXLGDQFHIURPEXGJHW
offices.  
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Economic and social forces surrounding public agencies shape the performance of public 
agencies to a considerable extent (Walker, 2013, p. 681). These forces determine the 
characteristics of the external environment, the extent to which it is complex, dynamic and 
munificent, affecting the initiation and practice of strategic planning in public organisations. 
Two survey studies that look into the extent of use of strategic planning in the US 
municipalities (Streib and Poister, 1990) and in New York state agencies (Miesing and 
Andersen, 1991) suggest that public managers are increasingly seeking better management 
models to respond to changes under the conditions of dynamic and competitive environments. 
Berry (1994, p. 328) surmises in her study of US state agencies that the pressure wielded by a 
turbulent environment upoQSXEOLFPDQDJHUVWRµUHLQYHQWJRYHUQPHQW¶OHDGVWKHPWRHPXODWH
the strategic planning practices of other public agencies and of private sector organisations. In 
another study, Poister (2005) discloses that senior managers of state DoTs in the US and 
provincial DoTs in Canada perceive strategic management as crucial for their departments to 
tackle extraordinarily turbulent environments. According to a very recent survey study of 
Canadian public organisations, strategic planning performs well in dynamic (unstable or less 
stable) environments that are particularly marked by uncertainty since it clarifies through 
formal analysis, to some extent, the issues likely to confront the organisation (Elbanna et al., 
2015, p. 20).   
The emergence of a strategic planning practitioners network, in which public agency planners, 
private consultants, and professional associations closely interact, is found to be an effective 
environmental facilitator of the diffusion of strategic planning (Berry and Wechsler, 1995). In 
the same research, the authors contend that the initiation of strategic planning in state agencies 
is motivated by an aim to be responsive to constituents; learn from others experiences; tackle 
financial constraints; give a strategic direction to programmes and policies; and, prioritise 
resources (Berry and Wechsler, 1995, p. 166). 
Organisational factors are also influential. Public agencies are more inclined to adopt strategic 
planning if they are more business-oriented; when a new leader takes over or if there is 
resource abundance (Berry, 1994; Boyne et al., 2004); and, through emulation when there are 
other near-by agencies practising strategic planning (Berry, 1994; Berry and Wechsler, 1995). 
Findings from the UK local authorities show that resource abundance not only affect the 
existence, but also the quality of planning documents (Boyne et al., 2004). Services that have 
prior experience with aspects of rational planning; that possess a corporate planning unit; and 
41 
 
agencies that limit planning to fewer functions can more straightforwardly develop planning 
documents (Boyne et al., 2004).  
With regards to centralised-decentralised systems, in their study to find the development and 
use of planning documents in state agencies in the US, Long and Franklin (2004) determine 
that agencies with centralised systems develop better plans. This is consistent with the 
findings of Hendrick (2003) with regard to the state of Milwaukee practice, which 
demonstrates that strategic planning is more difficult in departments that employ decentralised 
processes.  
Findings based on previous case study research are also often inconsistent on the effects of 
organisational size. Roberts and Wargo (1994) have found in their case study of the US Navy 
that large organisations struggle to apply formal comprehensive strategic planning because of 
the challenges of effective coordination of multiple units and the limitations of the model in 
enabling the organisation to respond to complex and unpredictable conditions in a timely 
fashion. The case of the US Navy demonstrates that strategic issue management, instead of 
comprehensive planning, leads to better performance and compensates for the limitations of 
formal planning in large organisations. A case study based on the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (Kemp et al., 1993) has similarly found that an adaptive 
strategic (issue) management approach, rather than formal planning, can be successfully 
applied to a relatively large public organisation. The findings of this study cannot be directly 
related to a specific model of strategy formulation as the author uses the concepts of the both 
PRGHOVWRGHILQHWKHSODQQLQJSURFHVVRIWKH((2&:KLOHWKH((2&¶VVWDIISRSXODWLRQDWWKH
time was 2800 which can be deemed as a large organisation, the US Navy constituted a 
µPHJD¶RUJDQLVDWLRQZLWKDVWDIISRSXODWLRQRI(Roberts and Wargo, 1994).  
In contrast, a case study of the US Air Force has found that formal corporate style strategic 
planning can be practiced effectively in a mega public organisation; although, the author 
recognises that strategic planning may be challenging for federal agencies (Campbell, 2002). 
Comprehensive strategic planning suits the US Air Force due to its large size and its need for 
co-ordination of numerous functional units, as well as the immensity of its capital investment 
(Campbell, 2002, p. 431). Successful cases of various size demonstrate that some sort of 
strategic management can be effectively applied to large and mega organisations, as well as 
small ones. 
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3.2.2. Preparation Stage 
This research puts extra stress on the necessity of preparation for strategic planning. While 
&KDSWHUJLYHVDGHWDLOHGDFFRXQWRIWKH0R,¶VSUHSDUDWLRQIRUVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ&KDSWHUV
and 7 analyse the effects of this factor where appropriate and Chapter 8 draws conclusions 
regarding the effects of the preparation stage.  
Even though the importance of preparation for strategic planning is underscored in the 
expository literature (Bryson, 2011; Eadie, 1983; Vinzant and Vinzant, 1996; Whittington, 
2006), empirical studies overlook this dimension. Successful application of strategic planning 
is dependent on building the management capacity for strategic planning (Favoreu et al., 
2015; Kemp et al., 1993; Poister, 2005; Streib and Poister, 1990). For example, Poister and 
Streib (1990, p. 41) at the time of their research found that the high management capacity of 
US cities enabled city managements to successfully initiate and exploit strategic planning 
along with other effective techniTXHV VXFK DV ³EXGJHWLQJ WRROV´ ³WUHQG PRQLWRULQJ´ DQG
³UHYHQXHDQGH[SHQVHIRUHFDVWLQJ´,QWKHVXFFHVVIXOFDVHRIWKH((2&WZRVHQLRUPDQDJHUV
conducted a literature review for self-training to understand the strategic management process 
and to find the best available model for the organisation (Kemp et al., 1993). A 
comprehensive literature review was undertaken also by the Naval Surface Warfare Centre 
(NSWC) planning team in a successful corporate planning practice, through which strategic 
planning was institutionalised (Baker, 1992). While training staff on strategic planning has 
been found to help encourage ownership of the process, it has also enabled managers and staff 
to participate more productively in strategic planning processes (Poister, 2005). For instance 
the experience of the City of Rock Hill in South Carolina, the U.S, demonstrated that the 
employment of external consultants as educators of the community contributed to the 
achievement of strategic planning on a citywide planning basis (Wheeland, 1993). The 
NSWC developed workbooks and other training resources in addition to holding workshops, 
consultant demonstrations and individual self-assistance programmes for training 
practitioners, who participated in corporate strategic planning for the first time (Baker, 1992). 
6XFFHVVIXOSUHSDUDWLRQKDVEHHQIRXQGWRLQFOXGHD³GHWDLOHGGHVLJQ´RUDJDPHVFHQDULRWKDW
illustrates the expected outcomes from strategic planning and resource requirements for the 
successfully execution of the process (Kemp et al., 1993, p. 134). 
The stage of preparation in public strategic planning and management has a direct effect on 
strategy implementation and results. Among other reasons, many strategic planning initiatives 
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fail because of insufficient preparation, as will be shown in the case of the MoI throughout 
this thesis. Hence, it deserves more attention from both the practitioners and scholars for the 
successful finalisation of strategic planning attempts by public agencies.  
3.2.3. Strategy Formulation 
Strategy formulation is the first component and backbone of formal strategic planning, and 
how and why other public organisations have effectively or ineffectively formulated strategies 
is very relevant to the case of the MoI. It is empirically evidenced in the case of the 
Departmental Fire Rescue in France that the processes of goal-setting and strategy 
formulation are as important as the outcomes of the process (Favoreu et al., 2015). An 
important dimension of formal strategic planning is the one-size-fits-all approach to public 
strategy. Many public administrations dictate a standardised model to public agencies through 
legislation, such as the GPRA 1993 in the US and the PFMCL 2003 in Turkey. Research 
findings recommend contingency planning, which takes internal and environmental 
contextual differences of organisations into account, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach 
(Poister, 2005; Roberts and Wargo, 1994). Research findings also suggest that public 
organisations cannot exactly replicate business-style corporate strategic planning practices 
because they have various stakeholders, pervasive goal conflicts, high demands for 
accountability and because of the difference between public and private values (Bryson and 
Roering, 1988). Hence, public organisations tailor business models for their own specific 
needs and conditions. For example, a study of public transit agencies proposes that planning 
models must be adapted to contextual elements such as decision-making systems and 
management styles of senior management for effective strategic planning (Ugboro et al., 
2010). Long and Franklin (2004) have found in their study of fourteen cabinet-level 
departments that federal agencies adapt the mandated model to their specific contexts to 
address challenges that are unique to the agencies. Elements of strategic planning in the US 
Air Force have been found to be adapted to fit the organisational context and needs, 
contributing to the success of planning (Campbell, 2002). It is argued that a one-size-fits-all 
approach in a top-down fashion impedes organisational and strategic learning and adaptation 
(Long and Franklin, 2004). 
Flexible planning practices, rather than set-in-stone planning, is found to be much more 
favourable to success (Favoreu et al., 2015; Poister, 2005; Wheeland, 1993). Flexibility 
emphasises monitoring and modernising application, through which plans become living 
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documents, as was the case in the Rock Hill experience (Wheeland, 1993). Formal strategic 
planning within a broader framework of incremental strategy-making, which allows public 
organisations to review and revise strategies periodically to respond flexibly to changes in the 
environment, is found to be far superior to any single model of strategising (Poister et al., 
2013). Favorue and his colleagues (2015) evidenced the advantages of evolutionary and 
dynamic strategic planning in the case of the Departmental Fire and Rescue Service in France.  
The rest of this section focuses on formality, the use of analytical tools, the role of strategy 
practitioners, top-down vs. bottom-up planning, participation and creativeness of the 
environment which are significant factors in strategy formulation.  
3.2.3.1. Formality 
Studies show that public organisations at different levels adopt different, but mostly private 
sector-oriented, approaches to strategy formulation, such as formal-comprehensive planning 
(Baker, 1992; Berry and Wechsler, 1995; Miesing and Andersen, 1991; Poister, 2005; Ugboro 
et al., 2010), strategic issues planning or management (Kemp et al., 1993; Roberts and 
Wargo, 1994), and visualisation (Kissler et al., 1998a; Wheeland, 1993). The process output, 
with regard to producing a strategic plan, varies (Bryson and Roering, 1988). For example, in 
the case of city planning, different city managements in Minnesota came up with formal 
VWUDWHJLFSODQVRU³JRYHUQPHQWDOGHFLVLRQSDFNDJHV´RULQIRUPDOSODQV(Bryson and Roering, 
1988, p. 1000), while a vision document was produced in the Oregon case (Kissler et al., 
1998a). The studies referred to here evidence the effectiveness of different approaches to 
strategic management.  
The Harvard Policy Model, as a strategic planning practice that underscores SWOTs (Bryson 
and Roering, 1988), has been found by Berry and Wechsler to be the most common technique 
among the surveyed US state agencies (1995). Agencies agree on an initial scheme for 
planning (Bryson and Roering, 1988), scanning and evaluating the internal and external 
environment; define a vision of achievement, mission, and goals; investigate internal 
weaknesses and strengths and external opportunities and threats; analyse, select and formulate 
strategies and implement, monitor and evaluate preferred strategies (Berry and Wechsler, 
1995; Bryson and Roering, 1988)3RLVWHUDQG6WUHLE¶V (2005, p. 48) findings in their research 
of 512 US municipal governments on the ratio of the use of strategic planning elements are 
presented as: 
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x Analysis of stakeholder preferences and concerns (72 percent), 
x Formation of strategic agendas (71 percent), 
x Assessment of internal strengths and weaknesses (60 percent), 
x Evaluation of external opportunities and threats (57 percent), 
x Clarification of organisational mandate (53 percent), 
x Cost-benefit analysis of strategy options (36 per cent). 
 
They also found that 225 out of 512 municipalities (44 percent) had formal strategic planning 
introduced by their jurisdiction, which was a six percent increase in a decade from their 
previous findings. Likewise, in the case of the City of Milwaukee Hendrick (2003) found that 
seven out of fourWHHQ GHSDUWPHQWV DSSOLHG FRPSUHKHQVLYH SODQQLQJ SURFHVVHV LQ WKH FLW\¶V
strategic planning process. Berry and Wechsler (1995) discovered that planning becomes 
more formal and requires more resources in the US state agencies when the agency has a 
corporate planning unit. This finding resonates Boyne, Gold-:LOOLDPV /DZ DQG :DONHU¶V
(2004) findings in the context of Best Value regime practice in the UK local authorities. 
Comprehensive-planning units are found to have been perceived as good and committed 
planners in the context of city departments (Hendrick, 2003).  
The way in which strategies are formulated by public organisations may have important 
implications. For example, quantitative, formal and mechanistic strategic planning produces 
positive results in public transit agencies (Ugboro et al., 2010). Formal planning processes at 
all times ensure consensus on goals and strategies in New York state agencies (Miesing and 
Andersen, 1991). Strategic planning also benefits significantly from a number of measures 
that include undertaking cost-benefit analyses; adopting a corporate-level strategic planning 
approach; developing cascading department-level strategic plans; and adopting a customer-
oriented approach (Poister, 2005). Transition from strategic planning to strategic management 
institutionalises strategy in organisations and is significant for success since it enables the 
application of the strategic agenda to direct choices and actions on a continual basis. On the 
other hand, the experience of the state of Oregon (Kissler et al., 1998a) and the City of Rock 
Hill  (Wheeland, 1993) at the state and city levels demonstrate that visualisation, that is 
focusing on broad strategies for a desired future and overlooking detailed formal planning 
(Wheeland, 1993, p. 68), generates successful outcomes at these levels of government. These 
findings underpin the idea that the appropriate mode of planning is dependent on the 
contingencies (level, size, environment etc.) of the organisation involved (Miesing and 
Andersen, 1991). 
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3.2.3.2. Use of analytical tools 
7KH HPSOR\PHQW RI DQDO\WLFDO WRROV LQ WKH VWUDWHJ\ SURFHVV VXFK DV ³WUHQG PRQLWRULQJ´
³UHYHQXHDQGH[SHQVHIRUHFDVWLQJ´DQG³VRSKLVWLFDWHGEXGJHWLQJWRROV´GXULQJWKHSODQQLQJ
process is a sign of high management capacity, which is an important factor for success of the 
strategic planning process (Streib and Poister, 1990, p. 41). For example, the US municipal 
governments employ line-item, programme, performance, results-based, and zero-based 
budgeting techniques to support their strategic planning processes (Poister and Streib, 2005). 
2UJDQLVDWLRQV WKDW XWLOLVH SHUIRUPDQFH EXGJHWLQJ DUH PRUH OLNHO\ WR OLQN WKH DJHQF\¶V
resources to strategic plans, when compared to the ones that perform line-item budgeting 
(Poister and Streib, 2005). The capacity to link budgets to strategic plans, additionally, leads 
to more comprehensive forms of strategic planning in the US state agencies (Berry and 
Wechsler, 1995). The practice of cost-benefit or feasibility analysis, in addition to the analysis 
of the range of available strategy options, is a success factor in the context of the US 
municipal governments (Poister and Streib, 2005). In the Oregon case, linking the findings of 
scientifically conducted analyses to formal proposals and to benchmarks contributed to the 
development of a more logical plan and helped in the monitoring of progress (Kissler et al., 
1998a). 
3.2.3.3. Strategy Practitioners 
It is crucial to scrutinise the attitudes and behaviours of strategy practitioners, as the agents 
developing and delivering the strategy, in order to understand the dynamics of the strategy 
process. To enable a discussion on this topic in the last chapter, this section reviews the 
empirical literature with a focus on the influence of practitioners on the strategic management 
process. Strategy practitioners are internal and external actors and the direct performers of 
strategy in the broadest meaning (Whittington, 2006). This section looks into the roles of 
process champions, process sponsors, strategic planning team, strategy development unit, 
managers and staff, consultants, and reform watchdogs as strategy practitioners.  
A critical role for internal practitioners for effective strategic planning is acting as a process 
champion or leader. Having a process champion to lead strategic planning processes is 
generally considered to be a significant factor for effective planning (Baker, 1992; Barzelay 
and Jacobsen, 2009; Bryson and Roering, 1988; Poister, 2005; Ugboro et al., 2010; 
Wheeland, 1993).  Research suggests that process champions vary according to the planning 
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organisation. In different cases, the process champion was the city manager or the mayor 
(Hendrick, 2003; Wheeland, 1993), senior managers or top commanders (Baker, 1992; 
Campbell, 2002), the strategic planning team (Baker, 1992), strategic planning team leaders 
(Bryson and Roering, 1988) and theme group leaders (Wheeland, 1993). The most important 
characteristics needed for process champions includes their level of trust in the benefits of 
strategic planning; their openness to consultation; commitment to stages of the planning 
process (Bryson and Roering, 1988); dedication of time and personal support (Baker, 1992, p. 
78; Wheeland, 1993); being creative and visionary and having planning and good public 
relations skills and expertise (Wheeland, 1993). The statistically significant positive 
association between leadership and strategic planning effectiveness in the context of 
government transit agencies, along with other parallel findings (for example Barzelay and 
Jacobsen, 2009; Bryson and Roering, 1988), explains why the role of process champions is 
critical to strategy formulation (Ugboro et al., 2010)$SURFHVVFKDPSLRQ¶VUROHLVWRNHHSWKH
team together and the process going, which amounts to the most critical apex of the process, 
as discovered by Bryson and Roering, when identifying strategic issues and generating 
strategies, for these are found to be the most susceptible stages (1988). In the Rock Hill 
citywide strategic planning experience, for example, the participants of the research defined 
the representative of the champions, the project co-RUGLQDWRU DV ³WKH JOXH WKDW KHOG WKH
SURFHVVWRJHWKHU´(Wheeland, 1993, p. 67). 
Equally important is having process sponsor(s) among key decision-makers, who facilitate 
strategic planning by giving their support to the planning team and to the whole process 
particularly through critical supportive decisions that they make (Bryson and Roering, 1988). 
%U\VRQ DQG 5RHULQJ¶V  VWXG\ SURSRVHV that sponsorship of key decision-makers is of 
great significance for the legitimation of the work undertaken to outline and inform 
fundamental cross-departmental decisions. They found that full sponsor support leads to a 
high level of strategic planning effectiveness, as observed in two cases, and inadequate 
sponsor support  leads to ineffective practice as observed in the remaining six cases (Bryson 
and Roering, 1988). 
With regard to the appointed-elected leaders dichotomy, it was found in the context of the UK 
local authorities that there was no significant difference in the attitudes of appointed managers 
and the elected politicians towards planning (Boyne et al., 2004) DQG ³D GLDORJLFDO
SDUWQHUVKLS´EHWZHHQWKHWZRLQFUHDVHVWKHVXFFHVVOHYHODVVKRZQ in the example of the US 
Air Force (Campbell, 2002, p. 451). The study on the UK local authorities also presents 
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findings that undermine the widespread belief that planning changes the balance of power in 
favour of the appointed or at the expense of the elected (Boyne et al., 2004). 
Case study research that looked into efficacious cases proposes the significance of building a 
competent strategic planning team for better results (Baker, 1992; Barzelay and Campbell, 
2003; Barzelay and Jacobsen, 2009; Bruton and Hildreth, 1993; Bryson and Roering, 1988; 
Kemp et al., 1993). Effective planning teams are found to include DFWRUVZKR³XQGHUVWRRG the 
ODQJXDJH RI WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ´ (Baker, 1992, p.75), specifically through experience of line 
management and technical dimensions of service; having a focus on the external environment 
(externally oriented) (Bruton and Hildreth, 1993)DQG³WKHDELOLW\WRHQJDJHLQUHODWLRQDOFR-
RUGLQDWLRQ´ (Barzelay and Jacobsen, 2009, p. 329) (YLGHQFH DOVR VXJJHVWV WKDW D WHDP¶V
positioning close to the senior management and receiving their support is critical to the 
process (Ugboro et al., 2010). 
Strategy development units are crucial institutional practitioners of strategy-making. 
Empirical research shows that strategic planning units are needed to provide guidance and 
technical support; to co-ordinate activities; and to make things simple for the rest of the 
organisation (Ugboro et al., 2010). Barzelay and Jacobsen (2009) explain why the application 
of the strategic planning model is not DXWRPDWLF DQG KRZ HIIHFWLYH ³DFWRU FHUWLILFDWLRQ´ RI
strategy unit leads to successful realisation of strategic planning reform in the European 
Commission. Having a key role in reform implementation, actor certification is not only the 
formal establishment of a strategy unit, but more importantly its actual conduct through 
LQWHUSUHWLQJVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ³SUDFWLFHWHPSODWHVLQWRRUJDQLVDWLRQDOURXWLQHV´(Barzelay and 
Jacobsen, 2009, p. 331). Barzelay and Jacobsen (2009) suggest two other critical conditions 
that lead to successful actor certification and consequently to effective strategic planning. 
)LUVW WKHVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ UHIRUP LVDOZD\VRQ WKHDJHQGDRI WKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
Vice President and other commissioners. And second, the powerful representation and 
practice of the leader of the strategy unit facilitates the process through negotiation, which 
demonstrates his personal and organisational capability to the rest of the European 
Commission.  
Another critical aspect is building ownership, acceptance or buy-in of lower level managers 
and staff. Findings suggest that widespread staff participation generates staff buy-in, which 
then helps keep the pace of the planning process (Kemp et al., 1993).  In his study of DoTs, 
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Poister (2005, pp. 1053-1054) presents four factors effective for ensuring manager and staff 
ownership of strategic planning as:  
x attributing formal responsibility to high managers to simplify strategic management 
process, 
x creating personal responsibility for achievement by linking targets, performance 
measures, and action plans to specific individuals,  
x using micro-level goals and targets as inputs of performance management and staff 
appraisal,  
x sharing the significance of commitment to and ownership of the process with all 
internal and external stakeholders incessantly. 
$FWRUV¶FRPPLWPHQWWRDQGRZQHUVKLSRIWKHVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSURFHVVLVDQHOHPHQWWKDWLV
iteratively found critical in empirical studies (Donald et al., 2001; Kemp et al., 1993; Poister, 
2005; Ugboro et al., 2010). One dimension of the issue is the support and commitment of the 
leaders and senior managers to the process. Research suggest that leaders and senior managers 
show their commitment to strategic planning through allocating significant personal energy 
(Baker, 1992), time, organisational resources, such as funds and staff, to strategy formulation 
(Donald et al., 2001; Ugboro et al., 2010, p. 21), and assigning priority to strategy by 
including it on their active agenda (Poister, 2005, p. 1054). The amount of time dedicated by 
senior management gives a clear indication to other managers and staff about the degree of 
commitment of top management to the process, which then significantly influences the level 
of acceptance, or resistance, from junior staff (Ugboro et al., 2010). While commitment from 
top management is of paramount importance for strategic planning to be institutionally 
embedded, commitment itself needs to be institutionalised for sustainable strategic planning, 
as in the case of the US Air Force and the US NSWC (Baker, 1992, p. 78; Campbell, 2002). 
In these cases, successive leaders maintained commitment and let strategic planning become 
ingrained in organisational routines. Hence, short tenures of top manager(s) (Baker, 1992) and 
short policy cycles pose (Berry and Wechsler, 1995) significant risks to the institutionalisation 
of commitment and consequently to the continuity of strategic planning. For example, in the 
Minnesota multiple case study, the process of strategic planning collapsed in two cities when 
city managers, as key players in the process, quit their jobs for other positions (Bryson and 
Roering, 1988). At the same time shortness of policy cycles compels public agencies to focus 
on short-term prospects of one to three years (Berry and Wechsler, 1995), which contradicts 
the long-term orientated principle of strategic planning. Interruptions, postponements and 
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even cancellations are likely to be the outcomes in the initial trials of strategic planning, as in 
the case of Minnesota (Bryson and Roering, 1988). 
Consultants are another group of practitioners who play a vital role in public strategic 
planning, according to case study research. In a case study based on community strategic 
planning in Nebraska, Blair (2004) has highlighted the importance of cooperation between 
practitioners, including public administrators, consultants, and local people, for effective 
public participation and hence, for advancing efficacious planning and implementation. 
Kemp, Funk, and Eadie have documented that the employment of a programme consultant as 
³DGHVLJQUHVRXUFHWHFKQLFDODGYLVRUFRDFKDQGIDFLOLWDWRU´(1993, p. 134) LQ((2&¶VVWUDWHJ\
formation process not only bolstered employee ownership, but it also helped the Commission 
to enhance its organisational capacity. In the context of the City of Milwaukee most of the 
participating departments stated that they had utilised a model designed by Bryson (1995) as a 
template for their planning processes (Hendrick, 2003). Strategic planning consultants, then, 
may greatly influence strategic planning processes; first, through taking an active role and 
interacting with public administrators and other stakeholders, as revealed by Bryson and 
Roering (1988) in eight city government cases in the US, by Eadie (through Strategic 
Development Consulting Inc.) in the US EEOC case (Kemp et al., 1993), by Favorrue, 
Carassus and Maurel (2015)  in the case of a local French Departmental Fire and Rescue 
Service and by university consultants in Nebraska (Blair, 2004). In the first three studies, the 
consultants conducted different kinds of action and intervention research (Favorue et al., 
2015) and presented their findings in journal articles, which are cited in this chapter. Bryson 
DQG5RHULQJ¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHLUUROHJLYHVLPSRUWDQWclues on the role of experts and impact on 
the strategy processes: 
³:H ZHUH DFWLYH SDUWLFLSDQW REVHUYHUV ZKR ZDQWHG WKH HLJKW XQLWV WR VXFFHHG ZLWK WKHLU
strategic planning efforts. We were active teachers, consultants, and advisors at different 
points thrRXJKRXWWKHXQLWV¶HIIRUWV´(1988, p. 997). 
Their account demonstrates the high extent to which strategy experts may impact the strategy 
process from the outset. Consultants also influence public bodies through their published 
work, such as books written by Bryson (1995) highlighting the case of Milwaukee, and by 
Hax and Majluf  (1988; 1991), disclosing the case of the US NSWC. As strategic planning 
experts, at individual or institutional level, they have a significant role in public strategic 
planning and their skills, expertise, and previous experience can be decisive for public 
agencies that intend to conduct strategic planning with their support. The strategy-as-practice 
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perspective calls for further investigation into the central role of private consultants and 
broader strategic management networks in strategic planning (Whittington, 2006). 
In the context of strategic planning reform, the watchdogs have a responsibility for external 
guidance. For example, insufficient guidance by the General Accounting Office, the 
Congress, and the Office of Management and Budget in the US on how stakeholder 
consultation ought to be made by federal agencies led to inadequate consultation with external 
stakeholders, as found by Long and Franklin (2004). 
The influence of strategy practitioners is discussed in the context of strategy formulation here; 
however, the arguments made in this section are equally valid for the other stages of strategic 
management, such as implementation. 
3.2.3.4. Top-down vs. Bottom-up Planning  
Findings reveal that the strategic planning practices of public organisations have high levels 
of variation, even if the bodies are part of the same entity, such as the departments of 
Milwaukee (Hendrick, 2003). In the case of Milwaukee, departments practiced strategic 
planning differently: as a top management activity and internal high-level decision-making 
process on the one hand, or on the other as a process that includes a wide range of internal and 
external stakeholders with a bottom-up view; as  a process heavily guided by external 
consultants, or a process of learning-by-doing with no external guidance; and through a retreat 
perspective or an activity that is extended long-term (Hendrick, 2003). Among fourteen US 
federal agencies eleven were reported to follow an integrated approach, in which cross-
departmental strategies are developed, while the remaining adopted a holding-company 
approach, in which sub-agency strategies are developed independent of each other (Long and 
Franklin, 2004). 
Whether a top-down or bottom-up planning generates better results is addressed by some of 
the studies. Research findings suggest that public agencies can adopt a top-down (Campbell, 
2002; Hendrick, 2003; Kim, 2002; Roberts and Wargo, 1994; Ugboro et al., 2010), a bottom-
up (Franklin, 2001; Wheeland, 1993) or a mixed approach (Baker, 1992; Long and Franklin, 
2004). A multi-agency department that adopts a bottom-up approach authorises each agency 
to function autonomously, free from other agencies. In another form of bottom-up approach, 
DJHQFLHV VWDUW WKH SURFHVV E\ FRQVXOWLQJ ZLWK D ZLGH UDQJH RI H[WHUQDO VWDNHKROGHUV ³IURP
VFUDWFK´WKURXJKLQWHUDFWLRQLQFRQIHUHQFHVRUODUJH-scale assemblies (Franklin, 2001, p. 131). 
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The case of the state of Oregon reveals that a bottom-up strategic planning approach is apt for 
state-wide planning for it involves citizens and increases their cognizance of the extent of the 
FRPSOH[LW\DQGLQWHUFRQQHFWHGQHVVRIWKHVWDWH¶VLVVXHVDVZHOODVEULQJLQJQHZYLVLRQVLQWR
the process (Kissler et al., 1998a). Similarly, the research on US federal agencies suggests 
that agencies that follow bottom-up approaches demonstrate more externally-oriented 
practice; endeavour more to receive external stakeholder views; and evaluate the possible 
effects of stakeholder attitudes on long-term purposes of the agency (Franklin, 2001). On the 
other hand, a top-down approach proved effective in the US Air Force (Campbell, 2002) and a 
mixed approach generated positive results in the corporate strategic planning practice of the 
US Naval Surface Warfare Centre (Baker, 1992).  
/RQJ DQG )UDQNOLQ¶V UHVHDUFK RQ IRXUWHHQ FDELQHW-level federal agencies empirically 
demonstrates how state agency practice is dominated by non-standardised patterns in meeting 
the mandate of the GPRA 1993 (2004). The authors conclude that a bottom-up strategic 
planning approach creates non-VWDQGDUGLVHGRXWSXWVGXH WR WKHXQLTXHQHVVRIHDFKDJHQF\¶V
management process, even though the GPRA 1993 mandates strategic planning in a top-down 
fashion and prescribes standardised outputs (Long and Franklin, 2004). Hence, agency 
practices on the ground with respect to GPRA 1993 produced unintended results, as well as 
some intended ones, that may not have value for the agency. 
This evidence partly supports the idea that a top-down strategic planning approach may be 
better suited to military-style hierarchical organisations with strict command and control and 
centralised decision-making; and that a bottom-up approach is more apt in the context of 
citywide or community planning. Hence, deciding whether to adopt a top-down, bottom-up or 
a mixed-approach is dependent on organisational contingencies and a strong conclusion 
cannot be made in favour of one or another. 
3.2.3.5. Participation 
 Participation is an important strategy practice. Empirical literature underlines the positive 
contribution of inclusion of internal and external stakeholders to strategic planning (Blair, 
2004; Campbell, 2002; Kissler et al., 1998a; Poister, 2005; Wheeland, 1993). The link 
between strategic planning and participation is found to be reciprocal, where participation 
improves strategic planning and strategic planning enhances public participation in strategy-
making processes (Blair, 2004)86IHGHUDODJHQFLHVRUJDQLVH³VXPPLWVUHWUHDWVconferences, 
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ZRUNVKRSV«IRFXVJURXSVVXUYH\VZHESDJHFRPPHQWV«´(Long and Franklin, 2004, p. 
134) DV GLIIHUHQW SDUWLFLSDWLRQ DFWLYLWLHV ,Q WKH 6WDWH RI 2UHJRQ FDVH ´UHJLRQDO PHHWLQJV´
were employed in order to incorporate external stakeholder views into the process (Kissler et 
al., 1998a, p. 358). Research has found that internal consultative mechanisms increase the 
likelihood of successful strategic planning through the elaboration of strategy options from 
different perspectives; gaining buy-in of members; bringing in innovative views; and 
providing legitimacy for preferred strategies (Campbell, 2002). In the case of the US Air 
Force, established consultative mechanisms gave the organisation the identity of collective 
machinery and provided significant leverage for the process (Campbell, 2002). Similarly, the 
extensive participation of managers and other staff in the strategic planning process was found 
to be an important success factor in the DoTs (Poister, 2005). Staff participation in the DoTs 
in the US and Canada gradually increased after they gained experience in strategic planning 
(Poister, 2005). Collaborative planning enhanced joint learning and promoted collective 
rationality in the case of a local Departmental Fire Rescue Service in France (Favoreu et al., 
2015). 
Studies diverge in their findings with regard to the extent to which participation affects 
strategic planning and plans. A study of US federal agencies reveals that they employ 
participative mechanisms just to meet the GPRA requirements oU´WRFKHFNWKHER[´DQGWKDW
external stakeholder views make only marginal contribution, if any, to the final strategic plans 
(Franklin, 2001, p. 137). An important finding of this study is the low level of attention on 
citizens and service users as a group to be consulted. The study also reveals a low level of 
staff member participation in the planning processes. The authors conclude that participatory 
management requires transformation in the existing mentality and culture of the organisation 
in order to show its real effect on strategy-making. This is equally valid for a bottom-up 
approach to planning.  
On the other hand, the structure and content of the community strategic plans are significantly 
affected by the level of public participation in the case of community planning in Nebraska 
(Blair, 2004). For example, strategic plans included fewer community development strategies, 
as well as classical business strategies (Blair, 2004). Similarly, the participation of citizens 
and other external stakeholders, as well as internal stakeholders, in municipal strategic 
planning in the US vastly improves effective strategic planning (Poister and Streib, 2005).  
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An important finding from two pieces of research is that secrecy, embedded in the nature of 
some public services, such as military service, can be a significant obstacle to external 
stakeholder participation. Both the cases of the US Air Force (Campbell, 2002) and the US 
Navy (Roberts and Wargo, 1994) show that confidentiality, stemming from the very nature of 
the military and security service, inhibits the participation of external stakeholders in the 
strategic planning processes. As in these cases, secrecy significantly affects the strategic 
planning process of the MoI which is discussed in more detail in the empirical chapters.  
3.2.3.6. Creativeness of the Environment  
Successful cases show that the strategy process unfolds effectively when interaction takes 
place within a creative environment. Such positive relation between strategic planning and 
creativity within the environment was observed in the case of Rock Hill city-wide planning 
(Wheeland, 1993). In this case, for example, the process champions named the sessions 
³&KDUHWWH´DKDQGFDUWXVHGE\DUFKLWHFWXUHVWXGHQWVLQDQHIIRUWWRV\PEROLFDOO\LGHntify the 
process with creativeness (Wheeland, 1993, p. 68). In the State of Oregon, inclusion of 
university schools and students enhanced the creativeness of the process by bringing in new 
perspectives for public discussions (Kissler et al., 1998a). The process of back-casting in the 
US Air Force required a visionary and creative approach for successful completion of the 
planning process (Campbell, 2002). This successful case showed how scenario-building and 
role-playing, as practices of innovation and creativeness, contributed to change through 
GLUHFWLQJWKHKLJKFRPPDQG¶VDWWHQWLRQIURPWKUHDWVWRIRUHFDVWHGGHPDQGVDQGRSSRUWXQLWLHV
lying ahead for the organisation (Campbell, 2002, p. 450). The assignment of stretch goals 
(goals that are challenging to achieve) was an important factor that urged creativeness and 
innovation in the US Air Force strategic planning process (Campbell, 2002). 
An important dimension of strategy formulation is the interaction between strategy 
practitioners during the strategy process. Some effective forms of interaction supported by 
evidence are work sessions (Kemp et al., 1993), task-force approaches or theme-group 
meetings (Wheeland, 1993), stakeholder meetings (Franklin, 2001), and round-tabling 
(Barzelay and Campbell, 2003; Campbell, 2002). As another example, intensive work 
sessions for brainstorming in both the case of the US EEOC (Kemp et al., 1993) and the city 
of Rock Hill (Wheeland, 1993) led to successful strategic planning. In the case of the US Air 
Force, round-table meetings served as platforms for back-casting, a technique of visioning 
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that is used to link a preferred future to the present for the purpose of identifying required 
strategies, leading to effective strategic planning (Campbell, 2002). 
3.2.4. Implementation 
Implementation is another component of strategic management as explained in section 2.2.1.3 
in the previous chapter. Poister (2005) proposes performance measurement as a significant 
HOHPHQWFRQWULEXWLQJWRVXFFHVV LQ WKH$PHULFDQ'R7V¶VWUDWHJLFPDQDJHPHnt processes. He 
specifically contends that strategic management processes are facilitated in these public 
bodies through: 
x The development and use of output and outcome measures to gauge progress 
towards strategic aims, within the framework of a performance measurement 
system, 
x Assigning quantitative targets as performance measures that are bound with time 
frames, 
x Adopting a proactive attitude for the use of performance measurement to manage 
strategic issues of the organisation. (Poister, 2005, p. 1053) 
 
The same study elucidates that performance measurement, such as the use of balanced score 
cards, became a common practice in the US DoTs. This finding corroborates a previous 
finding by Berry and Wechsler (1995), which discovered a tendency among US state agencies 
to develop performance measures to underpin the strategic planning process through gauging 
programme and service results. Research into US municipal governments has found that 22 
percent of the cities in the research sample used performance indicators to monitor the 
achievement of strategic targets set in their strategic plans (Poister and Streib, 2005). The 
regression model used in this study reveals that ascribing strategic plan-based performance 
targets to department heads and other managers, and evaluating managers through 
performance appraisal over their achievement of strategic objectives are the two most 
important factors for effective strategic management. Linking budgets to strategic issues that 
are formulated in the plan, particularly through the use of performance budgeting, and 
developing action and business plans for the realisation of strategic initiatives are effective 
tools for better implementation (Poister, 2005). Similarly, relating strategic plans to 
benchmarks leads to successful plan implementation (Kissler et al., 1998a). In the Nebraska 
case study implementation of community-based strategic plans is significantly facilitated by 
external technical support and local or non-local financial assistance (Blair, 2004). 
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Community-based strategic plan implementation is also enabled by extensive participation of 
local people in the planning process (Blair, 2004). In a study of fourteen US federal agencies, 
Long and Franklin (2004) have found some common challenges in planning implementation. 
7KHVH FKDOOHQJHV LQFOXGH WKH DEVHQFH RI ³V\VWHPV DOLJQPHQW´  SHUFHQW LQDGHTXDF\ RI
resources (79 percent); uncertainty concerning the term of the US executive branch (71 
percent); unsupportive organisational culture and resistance to transformation (57 percent); 
and the absence of valid and dependable data (57 percent) (Long and Franklin, 2004, p. 314). 
More recent evidence suggests formal strategic planning, in its own right, was important for 
better implementation of strategies in Canadian public bodies at federal, provincial and 
municipal level, particularly because it helps reduce uncertainty regarding the preferences of 
powerful stakeholders, such as elected politicians (Elbanna et al., 2015). The involvement of 
top, middle and line managers in strategic planning processes reinforces this relation 
(mediating effect). 
The findings related to plan implementation so far reveal that rational theory-based 
approaches and tools facilitate the implementation of strategic plans. In an alternative case, 
survey research conducted with Welsh local authority departments found a positive, however, 
insignificant relation between rational implementation and organisational performance 
(Andrews et al., 2011b). The study put forth a negative relation between incremental strategy 
implementation and performance as well as between strategy absence and performance. These 
findings contradicted the previous empirical findings to a great extent (Andrews et al., 
2011b). However, the authors demonstrated that when they consider strategy content, rational 
planning leads to improved performance with a defender stance, while incremental 
implementation performs well with a prospective stance (Andrews et al., 2011b, p. 20)  
3.2.5. Outcomes of Strategic Planning 
Organisations utilise strategic planning for the realisation of some short and long-term goals 
(Wolf and Floyd, 2013), such as the enhancement of organisational capacity and performance 
particularly in the public sector (Poister et al., 2010). Whether these outcomes were achieved 
is important to determining the effectiveness of the strategic planning process in public 
organisations. This section constructs an empirical basis for the discussion of the case of the 
MoI from an outcomes viewpoint.  
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Several proximate and distal outcomes of strategic planning are mentioned in the empirical 
literature in tangible or intangible form. For proximate outcomes, clarification of 
organisational mandate and goals is an important tangible gain. Eighty percent of the 512 
municipal governments in a study perceived strategic planning to be helpful in clarifying their 
organisational task, aims and priorities (Poister and Streib, 2005). Departments that adopted a 
comprehensive strategic planning approach in the state of Milwaukee had more explicit and 
measurable objectives (Hendrick, 2003).  
Strategic planning helps public organisations to improve their in-house management capacity. 
This is a common finding from two studies on US state agencies (Berry and Wechsler, 1995) 
and the US municipal governments (Poister and Streib, 2005). Evidence suggests that 
strategic planning improves decision-making through fostering strategic thinking, what Baker 
SFDOOVD³WDQJLEOHUHVXOW´RIVWUDWHJLF planning in the case of the USNSWC. The 
US municipal governments are reported to widely benefit from advanced decision-making 
ZLWKUHJDUGWR³SURJUDPVV\VWHPVDQGUHVRXUFHV´(Poister and Streib, 2005, p. 52). It is found 
to lead to the alignment of resource allocation with strategic needs and hence to improved 
budgeting in the US federal and state agencies (Baker, 1992; Berry and Wechsler, 1995). 
Strategic planning is not only reported to improve decision-making but to provide 
justification; for instance, with US state agencies it was the basis for justifying organisational 
continuity, preferences and actions (Berry and Wechsler, 1995), particularly with regard to 
allocation of resources (Miesing and Andersen, 1991).  
Strategic planning is reported to integrate different programmes and units of public 
organisations through the creation of cross-cutting strategies (Berry and Wechsler, 1995). 
Development of a common language of strategy improves communication among disparate 
departments and their staff, and builds a common insight of and commitment to organisational 
strategies, goals, and objectives (Baker, 1992). Strategic planning is also thought to be 
beneficial to public agencies through serving as a framework for the course and control of 
staff activity, which is a tangible outcome (Poister and Streib, 2005).     
Expected distal outcomes of strategic planning are numerous and the empirical literature 
provides support for at least some of those impacts. For example, strategic planning has been 
demonstrated to give public organisations a clear strategic direction by helping to clarify 
organisational mission and goals (Berry and Wechsler, 1995). As an intangible result, it is 
found to lead to strategic change in public organisations (Baker, 1992, p. 78) through building 
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a positive and supportive organisational culture (Poister and Streib, 2005). Providing strategic 
OHJLWLPDF\RU³DFOHDUUDWLRQDOHIRUFRUSRUDWHGHFLVLRQV´LQWKHUHOHYDQWSXEOLFRUJDQLVDWLRQDV
in the case of NSWC, is another important long-term outcome of strategic planning (Roberts 
and Wargo, 1994, p. 78). 
The ultimate purpose of strategic planning reforms in government is to enhance public service 
performance (Andrews et al., 2011b). Performance advancement, then, holds an important 
measure of success for the impact of strategic planning; however, establishing a causal link 
between the two is highly problematic (Eden and Ackermann, 2013). Eden and Ackermann 
DUJXHWKDWPHDVXULQJRUJDQLVDWLRQDOVXFFHVVLVDNLQWRFRPSDULQJ³WKHDFWXDODQGK\SRWKHWLFDO
SHUIRUPDQFH´ WR ILQG RXW ZKHWKHU DQ RUJDQLVDWLRQ would have performed better with and 
without strategic management, which is a highly challenging mission (2013, p.12). 
Researchers who have looked into the relationship between strategic planning and 
performance have found evidence of a positive association between the two in the public 
sector. While some research simply gathers the perception rate of respondents to survey items 
that target dimensions of performance (Berry and Wechsler, 1995; Poister, 2005), others 
utilise statistical models in order to explain the complex relationship between strategic 
planning and performance (Boyne and Gould-Williams, 2003; Hendrick, 2003; Kim, 2002; 
Poister et al., 2013). In the first category, Berry and Wechsler documented that improvement 
in service delivery, as a dimension of organisational performance, was a perceived important 
outcome of strategic planning by state agency managers (Berry and Wechsler, 1995). 
However, only slightly less than 25 percent of the total respondents (295 in total) perceived 
the occurrence of such an outcome. In a survey of managers of state and provincial DoTs in 
the US and Canada, Poister (2005) found that 69 percent of the executives perceived 
improvements in the maintenance of general financial circumstances, 71 percent perceived 
efficient operation management, and 89 percent perceived improved service quality as the 
outcomes of strategic planning. 
In the second category, research utilised statistical models to measure the association between 
strategic planning and performance. Based on this, Kim (2002) found, in the context of the 
departments of Clark County, Nevada, in the US, that participative strategic planning 
improves both organisational effectiveness and employee satisfaction as aspects of 
performance. Employee satisfaction receives support also in a study by Poister and Streib 
(2005), however, based on a positive perception rate of 48 percent of the total respondents. 
Hendrick (2003) has found a positive statistical relationship between strategic planning and 
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performance, particularly in the dimensions of satisfaction or difficulty in planning and 
strategic capacity, in the context of fifteen departments of the City of Milwaukee, in the US. 
Boyne and Gould-Williams (2003) have looked into the extent to which service quality, cost, 
efficiency, and cost-effectiveness, as dimensions of performance, are affected by strategic 
planning in their research of Best Value regime in the context of Welsh local authorities in the 
UK. The statistical results reveal that strategic planning leads to improvements in service 
performance, however slightly (Boyne and Gould-Williams, 2003). The same study found 
that an increase in specific numerical targets weakened performance (Boyne and Gould-
Williams, 2003).   
In contrast to the research cited above, researchers have found a strong association between 
strategic planning and some dimensions of performance in the context of public transit 
agencies in the US, particularly when previous performance of public organisations is 
considered (Poister et al., 2013). The authors found no improvements in efficiency and cost-
effectiveness measures, while they found that strategic planning very strongly affected the 
dimHQVLRQV RI ³WUDQVLW V\VWHP XWLOLVDWLRQ´ DQG ³V\VWHP SURGXFWLYLW\´ ZLWKLQ SHUIRUPDQFH LQ
public transit agencies (Poister et al., 2013, pp. 604-605). The authors argue that the 
differences between the context of the US public transit agencies, dominated by the private 
sector and steeped in competition, , and that of the Welsh local authorities may explain the 
discrepancy in the strength of the findings (Poister et al., 2013).  
Contrary to the above dimensions of performance, research has also found that strategic 
planning improves stakeholder and service user satisfaction. Strategic planning has been 
shown to enhance customer relations, external relations and general public support in US state 
agencies (Berry and Wechsler, 1995) and municipal governments (Poister and Streib, 2005), 
most likely through effective communication and enhanced participation mechanisms (Kissler 
et al., 1998a,; Poister and Streib, 2005).  
An important distal outcome is the advancement of organisational learning, since good 
strategic management is associated with thinking, acting, and learning strategically (Bryson, 
2011). Strategic management, beyond simple strategy formulation, then helps 
institutionalisation of the components of strategic planning, such as visioning, situation 
analysis or strategy development (Bryson and Roering, 1988) through having a strategic 
attitude. Evidence shows that organisational learning took place in the US federal agencies 
through the introduction of GPRA 1993 (Long and Franklin, 2004). A strategic learning-
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related gain of public organisations is producing strategically-oriented managers in the long-
run, as in the case of US NSWC (Roberts and Wargo, 1994). Helping create such competent 
strategists and an ever-evolving organisational capacity that enables the organisation to 
overcome future challenges, strategic management helps organisations adapt to the changes in 
WKH HQYLURQPHQW DV LQ WKH FDVH RI 2UHJRQ¶V FRPPXQLW\ VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ (Kissler et al., 
1998a). 
3.3. Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the descriptive and empirical literature of public strategic planning. 
The first section discussed the foundations of strategic planning in the public sector, its 
operation internationally, with the US and the UK discussed as pioneering countries, 
differences between public and private sectors and the implications for strategic planning in 
the public sector, and a commonly referenced conceptual framework of strategic planning 
(Figure 3.1).  The second section reviewed the empirical literature by specifically looking into 
contingencies, preparation, strategy formulation, implementation and outcomes of strategic 
planning in an effort to build an empirical basis for the discussion of the first research 
question of this thesis (see Section 1.4). The findings from the review are summarised as 
success and failure factors in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 - Criteria for Success and Failure in Strategic Planning 
Component Element Related Dimensions or Characteristics Effect 
 
 
 
 
Contingencies 
 
Environmental 
Dynamic and Turbulent (-)/(+) 
Existence of experienced sister agencies + 
Organisational 
Change of leader  + 
Being business-orientated + 
Resource slack + 
Fewer goals + 
Existence of Corporate Planning Unit + 
Centralised decision-making + 
Size - 
Preparation 
 Management 
capacity Capability to use analytical tools + 
Training Senior manager training activities (e.g. literature + 
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review) 
Staff training activities  + 
Hiring external consultants + 
Production of training materials (e.g. workbooks) + 
Self-assisting programmes + 
Workshops and demonstrations + 
Game-scenario Indicating expected outcomes and resource needs + 
Strategy 
Formulation    
 One-size-fits-all Prescription of a single model for the whole public 
sector - 
Tailoring Adaptation of SP model to contextual differences + 
Flexibility Adaptive planning + 
 
Senior managers 
Prepared, knowledgeable, committed (allocating 
energy, time, other resources and assigning priority), 
supportive 
+ 
Short tenure - 
Political leaders Short policy cycle - 
Process Champions Skilled, supportive + 
Process Sponsors Key decision-maker(s), supportive  + 
Strategy 
Development Unit 
Guide, supporter, facilitator through effective 
practice, + 
SP Team Competent, close to senior management + 
SP Reform 
Watchdogs Effective Guidance + 
Middle managers 
and staff Widespread buy-in through participation + 
Consultants Professional, skilled (in coaching, mediation and 
alike) knowledgeable, co-operative + 
Strategy Network Influential + 
 
 
Formality 
Formal plans  + 
Informal plans + 
Vision documents + 
Scope Corporate SP + 
Analysis 
Stakeholder analysis + 
Strategic issue identification + 
Assessment of  strengths and weaknesses + 
Assessment of opportunities and challenges + 
Clarification of mission and goals + 
Cost-benefit analysis + 
Management 
capacity Capability to use analytical tools + 
Budgeting 
Performance ± Programme Budgeting + 
Line-item Budgeting - 
Benchmarking Linking plan to benchmarks + 
 
 Planning direction Top-down (in hierarchical structures) + 
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Bottom-up (in citywide or community planning) + 
Mixed approach + 
Participation OR 
Collaborative 
Planning 
Existence of mechanisms (regional meetings, 
workshops, focus groups, theme groups, round-tables 
etc.) 
+ 
Widespread participation of internal and external 
stakeholders + 
Unsupportive culture - 
Confidentiality - 
Participation 
Environment Creative (e.g. through assigning stretch goals) + 
Techniques used 
during interaction 
Brainstorming, visualisation, back-casting, scenario-
building, war-gaming + 
 Conflict Disagreement on goals, process, strategy - 
Implementation 
 Formal Strategic 
Planning 
 
Formulation of strategies in a formal way + 
 Rational 
Implementation 
 
Centralised, distinct, emphasised particularly along 
with a defender stance + 
 Incremental 
Implementation 
Decentralised, intertwined with formulation, dynamic 
- 
 
 
When accompanied by a prospective stance + 
 
 
 
 
 Manager 
Involvement 
The degree of top, middle and line manager 
participation in strategic planning + 
 
Performance 
Measurement and 
Management 
Output and outcome measures + 
Assigning performance measures to individuals (e.g. 
heads of departments) + 
Performance appraisal of managers + 
Benchmarking Linking plans to benchmarks + 
External support Technical, financial, non-financial + 
Resources Insufficiency of resources - 
Culture Unsupportive culture and resistance to change - 
Data Absence of valid and dependable data - 
  
The first column of Table 2.1 presents the relevant components of the strategic planning 
process. The second column presents the elements of the related component. The third column 
includes the dimensions and characteristics of the relevant element. And the fourth column 
shows the direction of the effect caused by the relevant element and its dimension or 
characteristic. Outcomes of strategic planning are not listed in Table 2.1 since these are 
considered as dependent variables and the direction of their effects on other variables is not 
the focus of this chapter. The findings summarised in Table 3.1 are of benefit to the first 
section of the last chapter of the thesis (Chapter 8) as criteria to benchmark and discuss the 
0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJH[SHULHQFHZLWKPRUHHPSKDVLVRQSUDFWLFHUDWKHUWKDQWKHRU\ 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE 
RESEARCH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses the methodological issues and approaches adopted for this case study. 
The chapter describes the following subjects in turn: 
1) Research design, including case study as method; criteria for data interpretation; unit 
of analysis; ethics and access, 
2) Sources of data and data gathering, 
3) 5HVHDUFKHU¶VUROHDQGUHIOHFWLRQV 
4.1. Research Design 
The aims and questions of this research are already presented in Chapter 1 (see Section 1.4). 
Therefore, this chapter discusses the rationale for the selection of a case study method, 
criteria used for data interpretation, unit of analysis and ethics and access. 
4.1.1. Case Study as a Method 
This is a qualitative study based on a case-study design with a single-case focus. Case study 
GHVLJQ LV HPSOR\HG KHUH DV D FRQVHTXHQFH RI WKH UHVHDUFKHU¶V LQWHUHVW LQ WKH UHODWLRQship 
between theory and case evidence (Barzelay and Campbell, 2003). This research approach is 
appropriate for the investigation of complex phenomena in the real world context, in an 
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attempt to understand objective reality (Yin, 2003; Yin, 2013), which is strategic planning for 
the current research. The research meets the criteria for a sound case study given by Yin 
(2009, p. 8) as; 
x it aims to generate answers to how and why questions, 
x its focus is on some contemporary event sequences,  
x the researcher does not have control over the set of events.  
In contemporary scientific inquiry, case study strategy, be it single or multiple, is utilised for 
gaining an understanding of the organisational and administrative processes and testing 
theory but it is not confined to these activities (Flyvbjerg, 2006). It is argued that most 
consistent theories are established through case study research (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Case study 
designs are frequently applied by researchers of public strategic planning and management 
(Barzelay and Campbell, 2003; Campbell, 2002; Kissler et al., 1998a; Roberts and Wargo, 
1994; Wheeland, 1993). Case study is recommended either explicitly (Poister et al., 2010) or 
implicitly (Bryson et al., 2010) particularly for a better understanding of the causal 
mechanisms that link strategic planning and management to its anticipated outcomes.  
Case study designs are effective in generating social scientific knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2006; 
Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003). Generalisation in single case research can be made through 
theoretical statements, as in single experiments, rather than to the population; and such 
generalisation is not statistical, but analytical (Yin, 2003, p. 10). Yin writes:  
³<RXU FDVHV DUH QRW ³VDPSOLQJ XQLWV´ DQG VKRXOG QRW EH FKRVHQ IRU WKLV UHDVRQ 5DWKHU
individual case studies are to be selected as a laboratory investigator selects the topic of a new 
experiment.´S8) 
Case studies are apt for theory-testing. For example, a seminal case study research by Allison 
(1971) that explained the decisions taken in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 from three rival 
theoretical perspectives (decision-takers as rational actors, complex bureaucracies, and 
politically motivated groups) had a great impact in the field of decision-making (Yin, 2009). 
This and many other successful case studies show that case study research, with a single case, 
can provide excellent conditions for testing theories and explaining social phenomena.  
This project is designed as an ³intrinsic´ case study (Stake, 1995, p. 3) because of the 
DXWKRU¶VLQWHUHVWLQWKH7XUNLVK0R,$WWKHVDPHWLPHLWLVD³holistic´ case study (Yin, 2009, 
p. 46), which deals with the MoI as a whole. The time scale and focus of the study begins 
from the year 2007, the year that strategic planning preliminaries started in the MoI and ends 
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by the completion of data gathering in September 2013. The research does also look into the 
period between 2003, the year of the legislation of the PFMCL and 2007 in order to provide 
contextual and background information. 
4.1.2. Criteria for Data Interpretation: Conceptual Framework 
One important element of the design of this research is its deployment of two rival theories or 
explanations to serve as the criteria to collect data and interpret the empirical evidence 
obtained from the MoI (Yin, 2009). Combined with a pattern-matching approach, in which 
patterns observed in the MoI are judged against the patterns of the rival theories, a rival 
explanation strategy is adopted to overcome the biases that may result from a single 
explanation. The conceptual framework presented in Table 2.1 is developed from a review of 
rational planning and incrementalism theories (see Chapter 2) in order to apply the pattern-
matching technique in Chapters 6 and 7. The dimensions of the two theories are reduced to 
observable entities and described clearly as patterns to enable the testing of the theories vis-j-
vis the formal PFMCL framework and strategic planning practice of the MoI. The research 
deploys the patterns presented in Table 2.1 as a template and investigates in Chapters 6 and 7 
whether these patterns exist in the MoI and explains the causal mechanisms that generate the 
achieved results. Including two competing theories had important implications for the 
research. Initially, the dimensions of the two theories shaped the interview guide establishing 
what kind of data was to be gathered from the informants and from the case in general. 
Subsequently, the theories led to the specification of the themes and codes of the research that 
are employed for data analysis. 
A principle aim of this research is to find whether the MoI has effectively adopted and 
applied strategic planning in practice, how it has done so and why. This required 
EHQFKPDUNLQJWKH0R,¶VSUDFWLFHDJDLQVWWKHSUDFWLFHRIRWKHUSXEOLFRUJDQLVDWLRQV&KDSWHU
reviewed the empirical literature for success and failure factors and developed a set of criteria 
that is presented in Table 3.1. The strategic planning practice of the MoI is judged against 
these criteria in Chapter 8, within a comprehensive discussion focusing on practice and non-
analytical dimensions of strategic planning (Jarzabkowski and Paul Spee, 2009; Whittington, 
2006). The practice dimension refers to how the MoI management understood, interpreted, 
adapted and put the standard formal strategic planning model into operation. Including the 
practice dimension fills a gap stemming from purely analytical and logical views of strategy 
and enables the researcher to analyse the human and social aspect of strategising.  
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4.1.3. Unit of Analysis: The Case 
Strategic planning was seen by some scholars of planning as a tool for multi-agency public 
organisations to implement effective allocation of resources or giving new strategic direction 
to bound agencies, for example by assigning new goals for the involved agency (Faludi, 
1973) +RZHYHU µDW ZKDW OHYHO VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ ZRUNV EHVW¶ LV D TXHVWLRQ \HW WR Ee 
addressed. While strategic planning is mostly practiced by the units within departments and 
departments themselves and is applied at country-wide, state, regional, and local levels 
(Kaufman and Jacobs, 1987; Poister et al., 2010), there is no research that looks into strategic 
management from the perspective of the level of government (Bryson et al, 2010). The MoI 
is a central governmental department and strategic planning targets the headquarters of the 
MoI. It had a staff population of 2049 to 2581 in the headquarters between 2010 and 2013, 
which put it into the category of large organisations (Roberts and Wargo, 1994). Its budget 
UDQJHGIURPLQWRLQZKLFKLVDSHUFHQWLQFUHDVH
in five years, as presented in Table 5.1. The MoI has departments for main service, 
consultative-supervisory service, support services, subsidiaries and permanent boards.  It has 
six main service departments:   
x General Directorate for Provincial Administration, 
x General Directorate for Civil Registry and Citizenship, 
x General Directorate for Local Administration, 
x Department for Associations, 
x Department for EU Affairs and Foreign Relations, 
x Department for Smuggling, Intelligence, Operation and Data Collection. 
Three consultative and supervisory departments:  
x Department for Strategy Development, 
x Department for Legal Consultancy, 
x Centre for Research and Studies. 
Six supportive departments: 
x General Directorate for Personnel, 
x Department for Training, 
x Department for Administrative and Financial Affairs, 
x Department for Information Technologies, 
x Centre for Disaster and Emergency Management, 
x Bureau of Border Management. 
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And five subsidiaries:  
x The Turkish National Police,  
x General Command of Gendarmerie,  
x The Turkish Coast Guard Command, 
x the Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security, 
x Directorate General for Migration Management. 
The Department for Strategy Development, which from now on will be referred as Strategy 
Development Unit (SDU), was established within the framework of strategic planning reform 
in 2006. The last two subsidiaries were established later during the plan¶V implementation 
period: the former in 2010 and the latter in 2013. A ministerial committee that is chaired and 
dominated by the undersecretary and that consists of the four deputy undersecretaries and the 
heads of the departments is the supreme decision-making body that runs the business. The 
MoI departments are located in multiple sites. While some departments, such as provincial 
administrations, local authorities and associations, are located within the headquarters of the 
MoI, others, such as civil registration and citizenship, EU and foreign affairs, migration 
management and public order and security, are located outside the headquarters due to lack of 
capacity within central facilities.  
The MoI is also represented in 81 provinces under the management of governors and over 
800 districts under the supervision of district governors. Shaping the provincial structure and 
real service delivery branches of the MoI, these bodies were excluded from strategic planning 
in practice as will be discussed in the following chapters.  
The researcher as a member of the organisation has familiarity with the case making the 
choice purposive (Patton, 2002; Seidman, 2006). The Ministry is an interesting case to be 
studied for the following reasons: First of all, Turkey is a developing country, in contrast to 
the developed countries that earlier adopted strategic planning. Whether the theories of 
planning work or fail in different contexts is an interesting research topic in itself. The 
scarcity of empirical research on strategic planning practices in the Turkish public sector 
raises the need for qualitative data and therefore validates the application of an in-depth case 
study strategy. Existing emSLULFDOUHVHDUFKRQ7XUNH\¶VH[SHULHQFHZLWKVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJLQ
its public sector amounts to nothing beyond a large-N quantitative study which took Special 
Provincial Authorities as units of analysis 6RQJU , a few doctoral dissertations, an 
article published in an international journal (Canpolat and Kesik, 2010) and a few book 
sections by the same authors (for example Kesik and Canpolat, 2014). 
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Secondly, the Ministry constitutes a potential typical case in terms of its organisation and 
management among twenty-six ministries in the Turkish central government. The reason is 
that ministries in the Turkish government are structurally and functionally organised 
uniformly under the provisions of a constitution-OLNHSRZHUIXODFWWKH$FW1ODEHOOHG 
the Act on the Establishment and Duty Principles of Ministries, which came into force in 
1984, two years after a military coup. The uniform nature of the Turkish central bureaucracy 
is widely recognised by Turkish scholars in the field of public administration (Canpolat and 
&DQJLU6|]HQ.  
Thirdly, the researcher works for the case organisation and is interested in seeing how 
strategic planning and underlying theories work in the MoI. This work has the potential to 
elucidate the mechanisms in place. This understanding may open up the way for predictions 
that have the potential to allow for new policy advice (Yin, 2009). 
The sampling strategy for the case can be analysed in two parts with regard to the role of key 
informants and the structures within which these actors played a role in the planning process. 
Figure 4.1 below illustrates the management echelons of the Turkish Ministry of Interior. As 
seen in Figure 4.1, the highest level of informant is the undersecretary while the lowest level 
comprises directors and planners. The two components of selection are as follows. 
4.1.3.1. Strategy Development Board (Ministerial Committee) 
The Strategy Development Board comprises the management elite and dominant coalition of 
the MoI consisting of the undersecretary and the heads of departments (main service, support, 
consultative-supervisory units), with ultimate decision-making responsibility in terms of 
strategy choice (MoI, 2009c). The dominant coalition is the group of decision makers with 
the highest impact on the system of an organisation, who are expected to detect and settle 
organisational problems (Miles and Snow, 2003). The minds of tRS PDQDJHUV¶ DUH where 
separate elements of a strategy are merged (Quinn, 1993)$QRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VSHUFHSWLRQRILts 
milieu is almost  identical  to  that  of  its  dominant  coalition  and  it  is  that perception that 
responds to change in the environment, strategic decisions, prioritisation of resources and 
creation of new structures and processes in the organisation (Miles and Snow, 2003). Since it 
is the perception and interpretation of the dominant coalition of events and facts that shape 
organisational decision-making, analysis of this perception deserves a primary focus.  
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Research, whether qualitative or quantitative, that focuses on probing the effects of strategic 
planning and management on organisational performance and change is mostly, if not totally, 
conducted on the perceptions of the dominant coalition and other managers of the 
organisation at different levels (Andrews et al., 2006; Poister et al., 2013). The Ministerial 
Committee or the Strategy Development Board had fifteen former members, and seventeen 
current members due to the creation of two new departments. The former members are the 
ones who took part in the preparation stages of the first strategic plan (MoI, 2009c) and 
appointed to different posts or different institutions since then. Nine of the members have 
been appointed as governors to provinces, three of them to other public organisations, two 
retired, and the then undersecretary has been appointed as the deputy-minister to the Minister 
of Interior. Sampling is carried out by means of a snowballing approach (Seidman, 2006; 
      Deputy Undersecretary 
       Director General 
           Deputy Dir. 
          Undersecretary (CEO) 
        Deputy Minister 
         Minister 
          Director 
Governor (Provincial) 
     Head of Department 
Planning Specialists         Manager 
       Chief 
Figure 4.1   Management Echelons of the Turkish Ministry of Interior 
Managerial Level 
 Source: Adapted from MoI, 2013b 
Highest Level of informant 
Lowest Level of informant 
Political Level 
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Silverman, 2010). Detailed statistics of interviews and the interviewees are presented in 
section 4.2.2.2. 
4.1.3.2. Selection Strategy for Other Practitioners 
Having informants from different hierarchical levels of an organisation reinforces the 
accuracy of the empirical data collected. Although interviewing management elite is a fruitful 
data gathering method, it still has potential pitfalls for creating biased information. To 
overcome this danger, a series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with deputy 
directors-general, directors and with planning specialists, who personally took part in 
planning activities. Although the GLUHFWRUV¶LQIOXHQFHUHJDUGLQJVWUDWHJ\GHYHORSPHQWLVUDWKHU
limited and indirect compared to upper management levels, they have a direct impact on 
strategy implementation for serving as line managers. Planning specialists have also been 
seen as key informants for this research as they have participated thoroughly in the planning 
process (MoI, 2009c). In this phase of identification, key informants from fourteen units and 
planning specialists are picked in accordance with the snowballing approach.  
An important note to be made is that the General Command of Gendarmerie and Turkish 
Coast Guard Command (subsidiaries) are intentionally excluded from the study since these 
two subsidiaries were given exceptional status by the PFMCL 2003 not to prepare strategic 
SODQV$FFRUGLQJO\QRUHIHUHQFHWRWKHVHWZRRUJDQLVDWLRQVLQWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQH[LVWV
The Turkish National Police was also purposefully excluded from the scope of the research as 
the PFMCL envisaged a separate strategic planning procedure for this subsidiary. Hence, no 
direct reference to the Turkish National Police exists in the strategic plan. However, 
PDQDJHUV¶ SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH VHFXULW\ DQG ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW VHUYLFHV in their relation to 
strategic planning is reflected in the research.  
4.1.4. Ethics and Access 
The research is conducted in accordance ZLWK WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI 1RWWLQJKDP¶V &RGH RI
Research Ethics and the SSSP (School of Sociology and Social Policy) ethical principles and 
rules. An ethical clearance form, including a participant information sheet and consent form, 
was approved by the principal supervisor on 6 February 2013 and reviewed and authorised by 
the SSSP ethics officer on 25 February 2013. Regarding the case organisation, to note, there 
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were no formal ethical clearance procedures to be fulfilled. Ethical issues were negotiated 
and settled orally with the MoI officials. 
As the researcher had personal links within the MoI due to employee status within the 
Ministry and as the PhD programme was sponsored by the MoI, organisational access was 
obtained relatively easily. Individual access was partly gained through acquaintance but 
mostly by taking advantage of the snowballing technique during field work (Seidman, 2006; 
Silverman, 2010). 
Of vital importance, informed consent was gained from participants prior to conducting 
interviews (Lewis, 2008; Mason, 2002; Ryen, 2011; Seidman, 2006). In brief, the participants 
were given the opportunity to read the consent form and to ask questions either related to the 
form or to other aspects of the research before the interview(s) commenced. All participants 
read, filled in and signed the consent forms. Confidentiality and anonymity were strongly 
assured. An effort has been made to disguise the identities of the participants and make the 
excerpts used in this thesis untraceable. Extra attention is paid to HQVXUHWKDWµRIIWKHUHFRUG´
interview content is not disclosed (Goldstein, 2002, p. 671).  
In terms of access to documents, the strategic plan, performance programmes and annual 
reports, which are one group of the two core data sources apart from interviews, were in the 
public domain and available via the internet. Access to minutes of seven strategic plan 
preparation meetings of the Strategy Development Board was gained through the pursuit of 
ministerial procedures for in-site examination. 
4.2. Sources of Data and Data Gathering 
The distinctive features of case study design is the demand for multiple sources of evidence, 
in-depth examination and the need for the triangulation of data because of the difficulty in 
discriminating the phenomenon under scrutiny from the context (Yin, 2009). The process of 
strategic planning, both in terms of formal arrangements and practice (Boyne et al., 2003), 
can be properly investigated through researching the existence and the quality of planning 
documents and through the perceptions of informants that played a role in the planning 
process (Boyne et al., 2004; Langley, 1988). The analysis of official-legal texts primarily 
sheds light on the formal arrangements of the strategic planning reform, while interviews  and 
plans, programmes, and reports that are produced in the post-reform era inform research 
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DERXW DFWRUV¶ SUDFWLFHV  )ROORZLQJ WKHVH SULQFLSOHV Whe two main data sources for this 
research are interviews and documents (Bryman, 2008).  
4.2.1. Documentary Data 
Case study research requires the utilisation of multiple sources of data in order to strengthen 
the construct validity and reliability of the research (Yin, 2009). Qualitative analysis of 
documents is an indispensable part of this study. Documentary analysis based on thematic 
analysis (Bryman, 2008) is employed to provide greater comprehensiveness and richness of 
knowledge; to enhance the quality of data gathered and of data analysis and to compare 
empirically obtained data (King, 2004). Primary sources that have informed the research are 
documents (legal texts, cross-JRYHUQPHQWDO VWUDWHJ\ GRFXPHQWV WKH 0R,¶V SODQV
performance programmes, annual reports and minutes of meetings) and archival records 
(organisation organogram(s) and budgetary records from 2009 to 2013). These sources are 
shown in the references section. 
The main sources of documentary evidence have been the MoI and the internet. A 
comprehensive internet search was conducted prior to the site visit (Yin, 2009). As 
transparency and accountability are important functions of strategic planning, it is 
compulsory under Turkish law to annually publish plans (any final strategic plan), programs 
and activity reports for public organisations. The MoI publishes its related documents on the 
http://www.strateji.gov.tr web portal which is devoted exclusively to strategic planning and 
related activities. All planning documents were accessed via this portal. The legal documents 
such as acts, regulations and communiques are accessible for the public at the 
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr web portal. All legal documents mentioned above were obtained 
from this portal. Cross governmental strategy documents were provided via the portal at 
http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/Kalkinma.portal which is governed by the Turkish Ministry of 
Development (MoD). All other strategy related documents were obtained from the portal at 
http://www.sp.gov.tr/tr which is specifically developed and hosted by the MoD for 
synchronising the strategic planning activities of Turkish public organisations. Minutes of 
meetings were accessed as in-site examination which means that no photocopying was 
allowed. It was observed that the minutes were originally taken as summary notes rather than 
verbatim. Primary documents are referenced in the bibliography. 
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Secondary sources of the research refer to the sources that constitute the literature. Strategic 
planning is related to multiple literatures. The theories of strategic planning stem from 
decision-making, planning and public policymaking fields. Furthermore, empirical research 
that targets strategic planning exists in strategic management (covering both public and for-
profit organisational research) as well as in general public administration literature. 
Secondary sources included: 
x books 
x journal articles 
x conference papers 
x web material 
The libraries of the University of Nottingham and the online access facilities provided by 
them to databases for e-books, journal articles and the like have been the main access points 
for secondary sources.  
4.2.2. Semi-structured Interviews 
The interview method is seen as an essential means of social inquiry, along with observation 
(Snow and Thomas, 1994). It has been one of the most frequently deployed qualitative 
methods among management researchers (Mason, 2002; Snow and Thomas, 1994). As an 
H[DPSOH %DU]HOD\ DQG &DPSEHOO¶V  FDVH VWXG\ RI VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ LQ WKH 86 $LU
Force is a very good example of the application of interview technique in public strategic 
planning research. Interviews have been a time and labour intensive method which required 
an enormous amount of physical and mental effort in the conduct, transcription and data 
analysis stages. As a precaution against the risks of response bias; inaccuracy of data because 
of memory problems and reflexivity, measures were taken by the research design, such as the 
deployment of two rival theories for explanation to enhance reliability or, including lower 
level managers as informants in addition to management elites (Andrews et al., 2006; 
Wechsler and Backoff, 1986). Conducting four pilot interviews greatly enhanced the quality 
of the interview guide.  
This research is concerned with human behaviour and an effective way of understanding this 
is by asking the actors to reflect on the meanings they ascribe to behaviours themselves. 
Given that most case studies have behavioural or human aspects (Yin, 2009), interview 
technique constitutes a central part and a key method of case study designs (Stewart, 2004). 
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The interview method enabled the researcher to elicit the perceptions and theoretical 
perspectives of management elites, as well as other managers, which are harder to access 
through other sources of data (Goldstein, 2002; Lilleker, 2003; Richards, 1996). Common 
theory-driven and open-ended questions were asked of all participants. While this technique 
provided a common topic-framework regarding the interviews, at the same time it allowed 
participants to come up with their own responses and stress their own points without time or 
other constraints (Dunford and Jones, 2000). By allowing the researcher to ask non-
standardised questions, as well as the standardised ones, semi-structured interviews helped 
the researcher to produce situated knowledge (Mason, 2002), which facilitated the 
understanding of contextual knowledge. 
4.2.2.1. Formulation of the Interview Guide 
As recommended by research methods theory on the interview process, a semi-structured 
interview guide (Appendix 2) (Bryman, 2008; Seidman, 2006; Silverman, 2010) was 
designed based upon a comprehensive review of the literature including previous guides and 
questionnaires employed in the field (Andrews et al., 2009; Barzelay and Jacobsen, 2009; 
Boyne, 2001; Scholes and Johnson and Scholes, 2001). The guide was prepared in English 
and later a Turkish copy was produced. Prior to the actual interviews, four pilot interviews 
were carried out in March 2013 in order to test the comprehensibility, practicality and 
effectiveness of the interview guide to elicit the right kind of data, and to make necessary 
adjustments. The two initial pilot interviews included a head teacher in the UK and a finance 
manager of an agency outside the UK. Both participants were picked for their experience 
with strategic planning and management in their organisations. The interview guide was 
reviewed and revised after each pilot interview in order to fine tune the guide. The guide was 
later tried on two members of the MoI. One of the two participants was a former head of unit 
and the other had previously worked for the SDU at management level. The guide was 
reviewed and adjusted after each pilot interview and finalised in late March 2013. 
4.2.2.2. The Conducting of the Interviews 
The Ministry is located in the capital city Ankara, Turkey. Therefore, the field work required 
travelling to Turkey. Prior to conducting the interviews, official advance letters along with 
participant information sheets were sent to the potential participants. The documents were 
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written in English and later translated into Turkish, the official language spoken in Turkey. 
The covering letter included the contact details of the researcher; brief information about the 
topic of the project; request for interview; information about the expected duration (60 to 90 
minutes), place and the contribution expected from the research (Goldstein, 2002; Lilleker, 
2003; Richards, 1996). The letter also informed potential respondents that they were going to 
be contacted by the researcher later in person to negotiate and decide the time schedule for 
the interview if possible.  
The participant information sheet presented the name and the contact details of the 
researcher, the aims of the research, potential participants, principles of voluntary 
participation, information on the duration, the expected contribution of participants, the 
expected outcomes of the research, that the content will be recorded upon consent, that the 
content will be used both in the PhD thesis and in other publications and that the principles of 
confidentiality and anonymity will be stringently adhered to. Finally, the names and contact 
details of the PhD supervisors and the School of Sociology and Social Policy (SSSP) Ethics 
Officer were provided in case of the need for extra information or a complaint procedure. An 
introductory letter authored by the PhD supervisors was also sent in order to formally inform 
potential participants that the research was being conducted under the supervision of the 
SSSP authorities. 
A total of fourtytwo interviews were carried out between April and June 2013: Thirty-six 
interviews with managers and six interviews with planning specialists. Interviews with 
managers included undersecretary (1), deputy undersecretaries (4), directors-general (5), 
heads of departments (10), deputy directors-general (8), deputy heads of departments (1) and 
directors (7). A disguised list of the interviewees according to their departments is available 
in Appendix 1. Participants were interviewed only once in their offices with a request for 60 
to 90 minutes which was not exceeded to keep their attention alive (Seidman, 2006). 
Accordingly, the interviews lasted around sixty minutes in average as in the case of the pilot 
interviews. The shortest interview took 33 minutes while the longest lasted 104 minutes.  
All interviews, except one, were recorded upon informed consent of the participants. Notes 
were taken in this single instance. Recordings were carried out by means of a digital sound 
UHFRUGHUµ7KDQN\RXOHWWHUV¶ZHUHVHQWDIWHUZDUGVWRDOOSDUWLFLSDQWV 
76 
 
4.3. Data Analysis and Validity 
The data was sensitively systematised for a better quality of analysis (Seidman, 2006). Both 
the interview and documentary data was coded and analysed through Nvivo 10 qualitative 
data analysis software to enhance the reliability of coding. The content themes were drawn 
deductively from the two rival theories, as was the interview guide. Observed patterns in the 
data set were coded under relevant themes that were derived from the two theories. Data 
coding continued until the data set was organised in the order of themes, codes, sub-codes, 
sub-sub-codes. For a rigorous explanatory account and to strengthen the internal validity of 
ILQGLQJV WKH FRGHG GDWD ZDV RUJDQLVHG LQ WKH IRUP RI FDXVDO QHWZRUNV XQGHU WKH µPRGHOV¶
component of the Nvivo 10 software (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Developing causal maps 
helped the researcher, through visualisation, distil the data and ideas and firmly establish and 
clarify perceived causal links between different mechanisms and forces that were influential 
in the case. The causal networks, then, were translated into summary reports, which enabled 
the researcher to check the logical coherence and meaningfulness of the account. A pattern-
matching technique (Yin, 2003) was employed to compare the case patterns against the 
patterns derived from the dimensions of the two rival theories. A tabulation technique was 
used where necessary in order to present qualitative and quantitative data that was gathered 
from interviews and documents in an organised way (Seidman, 2006; Silverman, 2010). For 
example, the results for the pattern-matching of the two theories are presented through 
tabulation at the end of Chapters 6 and 7. Compliance with these strict procedures 
underpinned the internal validity and reliability of the findings of the research (Mason, 2002). 
Addressing opponent explanations highly contributed to the same end (Patton, 2002; Yin, 
2003). Construct validity is assured by a comprehensive review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature, including the previous interview guides and questionnaires. 
7KH5HVHDUFKHU¶V5ROHDQG5HIOHFWLRQV 
It should be noted that this is primarily research on the MoI, not for the MoI. As the 
researcher is an employee (district governor) of the MoI this might have affected the research 
process. Being a member of the case organisation provided the researcher with easier access 
to potential informants as well as insider knowledge and experience. Particularly, possessing 
concrete and also tacit knowledge related to the functions, businesses, operations and 
practices of the MoI and of separate units, the internal culture within the Ministry and the 
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broader culture within the Turkish central and provincial government, the relation and tension 
between politics and bureaucracy, all gave an important advantage in understanding and 
interpreting the data gathered (Bryman, 2008). This privileged knowledge and experience, 
however, are also likely to influence the personal values of the researcher with a potential to 
undermine the objectivity of the research. The researcher has been aware of his position 
throughout the research and attempted to deal with his values and biases by taking his 
position into account in order to enhance the objectivity of the research. He has also been 
aware that personal values and biases are highly difficult to deal with in qualitative research 
and additional measures should be taken to tackle this issue. The strict measures discussed 
throughout this chapter, particularly in sections 4.1.2 and 4.3, are prioritised in order to 
reduce the risk of interference by personal values in the research process. To what extent this 
is achieved is up to the audience.  
One of the potential problems identified includes the tendency of elites to control the 
interview process (Morris, 2009; Richards, 1996). This could very likely be the case for the 
researcher as the elites were his superiors in the hierarchical structure of the MoI. Fortunately 
this researcher did not experience considerable problems related to unbalanced power-
relations in the interview settings. Apart from non-standardised questions, all participants 
were asked the standardised questions in the interview guide, so they have been treated 
equally. Secondly, by planning the interviews with senior managers at a later stage of the 
fieldwork (as long as their time schedules were available), the researcher had the opportunity 
to benefit from his interview experience with lower level managers. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STRATEGIC PLANNING IN THE MOI: THE 
ACTUAL STRATEGY PRACTICE 
      
 
                                       ³Caravan gets aligned on the way´2 
(Interview_21_manager) 
 
 
  
This chapter describes and analyses the strategic management practice of MoI practitioners. It 
aims at presenting a complete and coherent account of the MoI case study by casting light on 
the dynamics of the extra and intra-organisational environment; the way strategic planning 
was perceived by the MoI managers and planners; the way it was put into practice; analytical 
and social practices, actions, reactions, tensions and other types of interaction that occurred 
within this process. The account is told from an integrative perspective that joined the views 
of the managers and planners as key practitioners, in light of the documentary data. It unfolds 
in congruence with the chronRORJLFDORUGHURIWKH0R,¶VSUDFWLFH1DUUDWLYHVRIWKHDFWRUVDUH
JLYHQ SODFH ZLWKLQ WKH VHFWLRQV SDUWLFXODUO\ WR SURYLGH D EHWWHU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH 0R,¶V
cultural paradigm. To this aim, the chapter is structured in four main sections as follows: 
1) Socio-Political, Environmental and organisational context, 
2) Stages of strategic planning, 
3) Implementation, monitoring, evaluation and feedback, 
4) Conclusion. 
The conclusion section presents a summary of findings. The findings from this and the 
following two empirical chapters are discussed at length in Chapter 8 in comparison with the 
success and failure criteria developed in Chapter 3 in Table 3.1. The discussion starts with an 
                                                 
2 ǮòòòǯǮǯ-a-ǮǯǤ 
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outline of the outer and inner context of the MoI on the eve of its first strategic planning 
journey. 
5.1. The Socio-Political, Environmental and Organisational Contexts 
5.1.1. The Socio-Political Context 
In this section, two determinative socio-political characteristics of Turkish State are discussed 
from the perspective of their influence on public sector reforms. The first characteristic of the 
Turkish public administration and politics has been the dichotomy and tension between the 
state (i.e. the bureaucratic machinery as defined in the Turkish Constitution) and elected 
governments. DiffeUHQW IURP WKH µSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶ PRGHO RI WKH $QJOR-Saxon world, the 
Turkish system has shown the characteristics of the rechtsstaat administration model (Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2011, p. 62), in which the dichotomy is explicit. A continuous power conflict 
between the elected governments and the highly centralised, bureaucratic and secular state 
have characterised the nature of state-government relations. The congruence between the two, 
for PRVW WLPHVKDVEHHQGHOLFDWH VLQFH WKH\ KDYHEHHQ ³KRVWLOH DGYHUVDULHV´ +HSHU
p.215). Equipped with wide veto powers (Sakallioglu, 1997), the Armed Forces, the National 
Security Council, the Constitutional Court and other high courts and institutions acted as the 
guardians of the secular state (Heper and Keyman, 1998; Sozen and Shaw, 2002), the 
SULQFLSOHV RI ZKLFK ZHUH GHILQHG E\ 0XVWDID .HPDO $WDWUN LQ WKH HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI WKH
Turkish Republic in 1923 (Heper and Guney, 2005; Sakallioglu, 1997). The influence of the 
state institutions is amplified by the patrimonial patterns in Turkish traditions and by the lack 
of a developed middle class in Turkish society (Sozen, 2012; Sozen and Shaw, 2002).  
Hence, the success of the administrative reforms in Turkey greatly depended on the stance 
and attitude of the state institutions against reforms (Sozen and Shaw, 2002, p.480). The 
governments have de facto been given little discretion with regard to change and reform in 
the main state apparatus, and the core of the bureaucracy itself was designed as an immune 
structure against significant government interventions. Under these circumstances, it has been 
IUHTXHQW SUDFWLFH E\ JRYHUQPHQWV WR EHVWRZ H[HPSWLRQV RQ WKHVH KLVWRULFDOO\ ³SULYLOHJHG´
(Heper and Guney, 2005, p.636) and autonomous agencies (Sakallioglu, 1997) in numerous 
laws that intended to transform the public sector. The governments that have challenged the 
system have been toppled by the main guardian of the system, the mLOLWDU\E\FRXSG¶pWDWVLQ
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   DQG D µpostmodern¶ FRXS LQ  gzel, 2003; Kalaycioglu, 2001) 
respectively or by the constitutional court through banning political parties, such as in the 
case of the Welfare Party in 1998. The ruling Justice and Development Party avoided a ban 
by the constitutional court in 2009 marking the start of a shift in the balance of powers in 
Turkish internal politics gQLú . As a consequence of a series of police operations 
against top ranking officers of the Turkish military between 2008 and 2012 with claims of 
illegal inner-state operations, the once most powerful actor of Turkish politics and the 
guardian of the regime, the military, evidently stepped back from the political arena (Aydinli, 
2011). The elected government appeared as the most powerful actor of public policymaking 
with over a decade of one-party rule and with a clear majority in the Turkish Parliament. 
Ironically, this also marked a significant turn in the approach of the government towards 
reforms including the strategic planning initiative of the year 2003. Previously, reforms were 
seen by the government as means of demilitarising Turkish politics and undermining the 
established political order; and the relations with and external pressure from particularly the 
EU, as well as the IMF and the World Bank, were used by the government as rationales 
against the status quo and anchors for the legislation and enforcement of the reforms. Once 
the mLOLWDU\ UHFHGHG DQG WKH HOHFWHG JRYHUQPHQW ³VHFXUH>G@ FRQWURO RYHU DOO OHYHUV of the 
7XUNLVK VWDWH´ $UPVWURQJ, 2014), public sector reforms showed a tendency of slow down 
and even retreat gQLú) as will be exemplified in Chapters 6 and 7.  
The role of the military in politics is of particular interest to the MoI within the context of 
strategic planning initiative, since it has two semi-military subsidiaries, the General 
Command of Gendarmerie and the Coastal Guard Command, for law enforcement and 
security. Parallel to the shift in the balance of powers throughout the 2000s, the hierarchical 
controls of the Minister of Interior on the semi-military agencies were largely increased at the 
detriment of their autonomy. Started by the legislation of PFMCL in 2003 and ended by the 
fourth year of strategic plan implementation in 2014, the first strategic planning process of 
the MoI was greatly influenced by these developments in the external and internal 
environments and unfolded with ups and downs. 
Another important characteristic of the Turkish politics and public administration that is 
strictly associated with the fate of public sector reforms is the prevalence and validity of 
patrimonialism, clientelism and political patronage (Sozen and Shaw, 2003), which also 
HPEUDFHV WKH HOHPHQWV RI ³QHSRWLVP´ ³IDYRXULWLVP´ DQG IDFWLRQDOLVP  .DOD\FLRJOX 
p.63). As widely argued, democracy is seen by the political elites in Turkey as a means for 
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better access to public resources (Heyer and Keyman, 1998; Kalaycioglu, 2001; Sozen and 
Shaw, 2002). For example, appointments to senior bureaucratic posts are made through 
political patronage, patrimonialism and loyalty rather than by means of a merit-based system.  
By doing so, the ruling elites not only ensure that the incumbents of bureaucratic posts are the 
supporters of the same party or ideology, members of the same family, clan or religious 
group, they also invest in securing forthcoming elections. Hence, any reform attempt that 
challenges this order is perceived by these actors as a threat to their continuity in power.  
Stressing this trait of the Turkish system, Sozen and Shaw argue:  
³&OLHQWLVPDQGSDUW\SDWURQDJH«are the fundemantal characteristics of the Turkish political 
system. The nature of party politics requires transferring state sources to their supporters 
through clientistic relations and network politics. For political parties patron-client relations 
with electorates are an important factor in determining electoral victory. As a consequence 
DQ\UHIRUPSURJUDPPHVZKLFKSRVHDWKUHDWWRSROLWLFLDQV¶FRQWURORYHUSDWURQDJHDUHKLJKO\
UHVLVWHG«´S 
Such a tendency in the Turkish politics and public administration has been an important 
barrier before the success of public sector reforms that aimed building a rational bureaucracy 
and a responsive public administration, leaving a big gap between the formality and the 
reality of the reforms (Sozen and Shaw, 2003). To what extent this has been the case for the 
strategic planning initiative of the MoI is addressed throughout the remaining chapters.  
5.1.2. The Environmental Context 
As hinted in the previous section, the environment of the MoI has been a highly complex, 
extremely dynamic and in many respects uncertain from the early 2000s to date, according to 
MoI managers. This has been a process marked by numerous reforms and transformation 
both in the state apparatus and in the wider society in Turkey (Interview_30, 
_former_manager; Interview_34, manager), during which the MoI was at the centre of the 
changes (Interview_29_manager). At the same time, it has been an era in which various 
trends such as civilisation, democratisation and human rights, localisation, governance, 
transparency and accountability dominated the public realm. Likewise, the explosions in 
technological development, globalisation and transition to the information society have been 
influential on Turkish public administration, particularly through Europeanisation, which was 
accelerated by the EU accession negotiations that started in 2004. As an example, one-third 
of the Turkish Constitution, a product of the 1980 military coup, changed during this period 
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LQRUGHU WRPHHW WKH(8¶V&RSHQKDJen Criteria (UfPOS, 2013). The MoI Managers mostly 
perceived the period accordingly: 
³7KHVWHSVWKDW7XUNH\WRRNLQRUGHUWRPHHWWKH&RSHQKDJHQ&ULWHULDWKHUHIRUPVWKDWZHUH
realised with regard to democratisation and in the structural sense; [and] the successive 
constitutional changes enabled [Turkey] to force [all] those things into a couple of years, 
ZKLFKWRRNWKH(XURSHDQ&RXQWULHVGHFDGHVWRUHDOLVH´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The impact of the dynamic environment varied in respect to the interaction and tension 
between the surrounding trends and specific service domains. Those tendencies and 
developments that have had the most impact on the MoI are examined in more detail next. 
5.1.2.1. Localisation 
The period from 2002 to date has been one in which a growing localisation trend has emerged 
and gained pace in Turkey, though with ups and downs. This trend included the replacement 
RIFODVVLF WXWHODU\SRZHUVRI WKHFHQWUDO VWDWHZKLFKZHUHH[HUFLVHGE\ WKH0R,¶VSUHIHFWV
with regulatory powers and the gradual delegation of some powers and services to local 
authorities that had been used and delivered by the provincial branches of the central state. 
The MoI has been more the subject of the reforms, rather than the driver, being at the 
receiving end of contLQXRXV KLJK SUHVVXUH WR FKDQJH 7KH ORFDO DXWKRULW\¶V UHIRUP SURFHVV
also unfolded unexpectedly and in an unplanned manner, as perceived by the MoI 
management, as the reform agenda had not been fully proclaimed in advance by the 
government (Interview_12_manager). For example, the government decided to abolish 
Special Provincial Administrations3 in 2012, which it had devolved more autonomy and 
given more financial resources to only in 2005.  Even the replacement of appointed prefects 
by elected governors was widely spoken about within this period, although it was not 
officially declared as a governmental policy (Berkan, 2013). Localisation precipitated a total 
re-organisation of the state and social relations in Turkey in that period (Apan, 2011). The 
trend has been so dynamic and powerful that it led the majority of the MoI management to 
perceive a serious threat to the existence of the prefectural class, which was the backbone of 
the MoI bureaucracy and of the central state apparatus (Interview_3; Interview_12; 
Interview_17_managers). A typical expression reflecting the concerns of the management 
cadre was as follows: 
                                                 
3 Special Provincial Administrations are the local authorities for the rural areas that are outside the 
physical borders of municipalities. 
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³/RFDOLVDWLRQLVLQIOXHQWLDO«WRGD\>WKHUHLV@«DVHULRXVFKDQJHJUDYHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ«,
am of the opinion that this surely affects the goDOVWDUJHWV>DQG@DFWLYLWLHVRIWKH0LQLVWU\«
Certainly, I have serious worries regarding the extent to which a strategic planning whose 
goals, targets, and consequently, activities are intervened, can be the one contemplated at the 
RXWVHW«%HFDXVHDJUeement between the targets you set and the ones you realised can occur 
RQO\LQVWDEOHHQYLURQPHQWV´Interview_6_manager) 
Hence, the period from the 2000s to date is marked by contrast and conflict between the 
governmental and bureaucratic goals with regards to the centre-local relations. The strong 
one-party government has not left room or opportunity for the MoI bureaucracy to balance or 
resist the changes, as it was able to manage during coalition governments previously 
(Interview_15_manager). 
It is important then to view the Strategic Goal 1, that is reinforcement of the prefectural 
system and Goal 4, which is empowerment and accountability of the local authorities (MoI, 
2009c), in the light of the tension caused by the localisation trend. 
5.1.2.2. Democratisation and Civilisation 
The main mandate of the MoI is perceived by both its internal and external stakeholders as 
security and public order. This is a perception built upon a practice and experience going 
back decades, in an insecure domestic environment marked by internal turmoil, FRXSG¶pWDWV, 
martial law and states of emergency, the last instance of which in the south-eastern region of 
the country was abolished by the Justice and Development Party government in 2002 
(UfPOS, 2013). The period between 2002 and 2010 was a distinctive one for Turkey, which 
marked a change from an authoritative state towards a more democratic one that emulated the 
standards of EU societies. Numerous reforms, such as abolishment of capital punishment and 
right to freedom of information, were put into place in less than a decade (UfPOS, 2013). 
Parallel to these developments, a tendency towards democratisation within the MoI was 
apparent (Interview_15_manager), which transpired, and continues to do so, as a transfer of 
services traditionally delivered by security agencies to the newly established or existing civil 
departments. Such service areas included NGO or association services, migration and asylum 
services, record-keeping of political parties and labour unions, and passport issuance from 
2015. While the localisation agenda repressed bureaucracy and even started debates over the 
existence of the MoI, the civilisation process opened up new horizons for civil bureaucracy as 
the example of the recent establishment of the new General Directorate for Migration 
Management in 2013 demonstrates.  
84 
 
5.1.2.3. Governance, Transparency and Accountability 
The period was also one in which governance, participation, transparency and accountability 
of the public sector became an unusually dominant theme. It was officially announced by the 
3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFHLQWKHZHOO-NQRZQµ&KDQJHLQ0DQDJHPHQW¶UHSRUWWKDW 
³7KH UHRUJDQLVDWLRQ RI WKH SXElic administration was built upon the advancement of 
HIIHFWLYHQHVVDQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQ´(Dincer anG<ÕOPD]S 
The reforms emphasised transparency and accountability of the public administration and 
indicated governance as a target, which favoured networks and partnerships between multiple 
actors and interaction in defining and addressing social problems 'LQFHUDQG<ÕOPD]. 
The MoI had an active role in the realisation of the intended changes, for example by funding 
projects within NGOs. The democratisation trend along with the emphasis on governance in 
reforms encouraged service users to demand better services and to hold public services and 
organisations to account (Interview_42; Interview_3_managers). Although the reflections of 
change within Turkish society were limited when compared to the EU, it was still visible and 
enough to put some pressure on public organisations for better quality services, as perceived 
by the MoI managers. The comments of a manager were: 
³)RU LQVWDQFH ZKLOH \RX FRXOG WHOO >LQ WKH SDVW@ D  FLWL]HQ ZKR DSSOLHG IRU D UHJLVWUDWLRQ
service, to wait for fifteen dD\V « KH FRXOG ZDLW IRU WZHQW\ GD\V >PD\EH@ « %XW QRZ D
FLWL]HQ ZKR ZDLWV WKUHH PLQXWHV VWDUWV JUXPEOLQJ LQ WKH IRXUWK PLQXWH VD\LQJ µ:KDW¶V
KDSSHQLQJ"´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The increasing pressure from service users for better quality services was recognised by the 
internal stakeholders during the SWOT analysis study (MoI, 2009c). By the legal mandate of 
the PFMCL 2003, the strategic management reform compelled transparency and 
accountability of public organisations and services through performance reporting to 
Parliament, to the Court of Accounts (CA) and by publicising details on the internet and other 
channels. 
5.1.2.4. Technological Revolution 
Another important trend was the global technological revolution. The Turkish Government 
acted willingly to adapt to recent developments in computer and internet technology, 
particularly to the growing trend of e-government, in order to enhance administrative 
processes, service production, delivery and information sharing (Interview_7, manager). 
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Starting from the early 2000s, the Turkish Government initiated internet and computer-based 
projects such as MERNIS (Turkish Central Registry System), in which the MoI played an 
important role (Interview_31_former_manager). Hence, the strategic planning period 
overlapped with a period in which the MoI bureaucracy had already initiated a transformation 
from paper to digital communication through electronic networks, service delivery through e-
government tools, call centres, electronic signature and electronic payment (MoI, 2010a). 
While the computerisation process brought new opportunities in service production and 
delivery, it also introduced new challenges for and demands from the MoI management and 
staff to develop new skills and to enhance management capacity to better adapt to this new 
technology-laden work place environment, service delivery and data security (MoI, 2009c). 
7KH0R,¶VHIIRUWVWRDGDSWWRWKHWHFKQRORJ\PDQLIHVWHGLWVHOIFOHDUO\LQLWVILUVWVWUDWHJLFSODQ
in the form of a distinct strategic goal (MoI, 2009c).  
5.1.2.5. Resources 
Unlike Western cases, strategic planning came into the agenda of the MoI at a time when 
there was considerable resource abundance in the MoI, as in the whole Turkish public sector. 
That was the positive result of structural reforms, new economic development policies, and 
the unusual stability in government through one-party rule for almost a decade. Table 5.1 
SUHVHQWVWKH0R,¶VVL[-year period budgetary figures from preparation for strategic planning 
to the fourth year of plan implementation. 
7DEOH7KH0R,¶V%XGJHWDU\6SHQGLQJ-2013)                                     8QLWVLQ*%3 
Planning Preparation Plan Implementation 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Realised 
Budget 
Spending  
716,548,152  883,654,864 1,361,911,364 1,064,833,245 1,201,048,450 1,418,114,382 
Increase in 
Spending 
(%)  
23 54 -22 13 18 
* Figures converted from Turkish Lira to GBP by referring to the exchange rates of the Turkish Central Bank in the 
respective reference years.  
Source:  (MoI, 2009c, 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2014a) 
 
7DEOH UHYHDOVDJUHDW LQFUHDVH LQ WKH0R,¶V FRUSRUDWHEXGJHW WKURXJKRXW WKH UHVHDUFKHG
period. Specifically, there was a budgetary upsurge by 54 percent in 2010 in the first year of 
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plan implementation. Although there was a decrease of 22 percent in spending in 2011 
compared to the previous year, the spending was still well over the 2008 and 2009 budgetary 
figures. The budget increase continued through 2012 and 2013 by 13 and 18 percent 
respectively. The data indicates a 60 percent increase in revenues from 2009 to 2013 and 98 
per cent increase when 2008 is taken as the reference year, which means that the MoI 
revenues almost doubled in the five year-period during the preparation and implementation 
stages. From a theoretical point of view, this substantial amelioration in financial conditions 
built a munificent environment for the strategic planning process of the MoI. Whether the 
availability of finances led to a better strategic planning practice is the topic of discussion for 
forthcoming sections.   
5.1.3. Internal Environment 
5.1.3.1. Organisational View 
The MoI is a bureaucratic organisation and its bureaucratic character has been exceptionally 
reinforced by the intrinsic dynamics of the security and law enforcement service domain. 
Likewise, the prefectural system has traditionally been steeped in bureaucratic practices and 
ascribes a distinctive place to MoI bureaucracy within the structure of the state 
(Interview_6_manager). The provision of a wide range of public services and the position of 
the prefects as co-ordinators of the central services, such as civil registration, security and 
HGXFDWLRQ LQ SURYLQFHV DQG GLVWULFWV KDV OHG WR WKH 0R, EHLQJ FRQFHLYHG LQWHUQDOO\ DV ³an 
organisation that serves public from cradle to grave´(MoI, 2009c, p. 60).  
The governors and sub-governors as prefects are representatives of each minister at the 
provincial level. The MoI is perceived by the majority of its management as identical with the 
VWDWHEXUHDXFUDF\ DQG DV DPLQLVWU\ ³WKDW has the most deep-rooted mechanism in the state 
administration´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU7KLVZDVFRQFLVHO\H[SUHVVHGE\DIRUPHU0LQLVWHU
RI,QWHULRULQZKDWKDVQRZEHFRPHDFOLFKpDPRQJWKH0R,PDQDJHPHQW 
³2QHKDOIRI7XUNH\ LVDGPLQLVWHUHGE\ WKH0LQLVWUy of Interior and the other half is by the 
UHPDLQLQJPLQLVWULHV´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Having a history of over 150 years, the MoI is viewed by its internal stakeholders as having 
an established and strong organisational tradition and culture, which is mostly expressed 
through the practice of a strict hierarchy and state protocol. The MoI is viewed by its 
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management as a pioneering organisation within the public sector (MoI, 2009c). There have 
been some practices that empirically support this perception, such as the recent successful 
cross-cutting e-government projects conducted by the MoI, which were also assessed as a 
strength of the organisation during strategic planning (MoI, 2009c).  
However, a powerful conservatism and strong traditionalism also exist within the MoI, which 
has various consequences. For example, conservatism leads to status quo bias, which then 
functions as a resistance mechanism against change in the MoI (Interview_16_manager). At 
the same time it can lead to the re-emergence of traditional values and principles, such as 
human- or citizen-oriented service 'LQFHUDQG<ÕOPD] that has been dominant in the 
7XUNLVK 6WDWH WUDGLWLRQ 7KLV ILQGV H[SUHVVLRQ LQ WKH PD[LP ³Let man flourish so that the 
State can flourish.´ 4 Human-oriented management or service delivery, which is deployed as a 
counterweight to WKH FRQFHSW RI µFXVWRPHU-RULHQWHG VHUYLFH¶ SUHYDOHQW LQ :HVWHUQ SXEOLF
services, has once more gained salience as a valued principle in the management paradigm of 
the MoI in the recent decade (MoI, 2009c).  
The prefectural class, which constitutes the majority of the MoI managers, is inclined to focus 
on day-to-day management due to their provincial administration experience, in which crisis 
management and problem solving has priority (e.g. Interview_39; Interview_16_managers). 
This characteristic of the 0R,EXUHDXFUDF\ZDVH[SUHVVHGE\DSODQQHUVD\LQJ³The urgent 
issues always have priority over the important issues in bureaucracy.´
(Interview_28_planner) It rendered the MoI management more inclined to favour flexible 
ways of management over long-term and plan-based management (Interview_39, 
former_manager).  
5.1.3.2. Awareness of Need for Change 
Internal dynamics for change to effect a more efficient organisation have always existed 
within the MoI, though marginal and concentrated more at the lower levels of management 
(Interview_42; Interview_39_managers). The management of the MOI was aware in the early 
2000s that its bureaucratic structure inhibited the development of creative strategies to 
address established and long-lasting problems such as separatist terrorism. A Strategy Centre 
was established ad hoc in the year 2000 as a think-tank unit with the support and approval of 
                                                 
4 This is a translation of a Turkish maxim that is used to indicate that the well-being of each individual 
living in a country is a condition of the prosperity and future of the whole country. 
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the then Minister of Interior, to fill the strategy content gap, rather than initiate a strategy 
process, and to meet the demand for creative strategies in the field of home affairs. A 
PDQDJHUVXPPDULVHGWKHXQLW¶VUROHDV 
³,WZDV DXQLWZKLFKZDVSURGXFLQJNQRZ-how, related to the strategies that were to be, or 
VKRXOG EH SXUVXHG E\ WKH 0LQLVWU\ « IRU WKH H[HFXWLRQ RI WKH GRPHVWLF SROLF\´
(Interview_27_former_manager). 
The establishment of the Centre was remarkable at a time when the term strategy was only 
used and institutionalised in the military and foreign policy context in Turkey. The Centre 
was working in close contact with academia, civil society and the private sector. Research 
was conducted by specialists employed by the academics through contracting-out or through 
joint ventures. Most R&D activities involved extensive fieldwork, brainstorming and 
roundtable meetings, briefLQJV DQG YLVLWV WR RWKHU FRXQWULHV )RU H[DPSOH WKH &HQWUH¶V
officials visited the UK Home Office and Northern Ireland Institutions several times in the 
early 2000s to learn from their experience in handling the IRA problem, particularly non-
security measures, in order to develop strategies to settle the separatist terrorism in Southeast 
Turkey (Interview_ 27_former_manager). The Centre had a relatively free and flexible space 
to manoeuvre; could act outside bureaucratic constraints; reported directly to the 
undersecretary and the Minister; and therefore could generate strategies that were 
significantly innovative compared to the prevalent policies of the MoI in the early 2000s. It 
developed strategies in areas such as combatting terrorism through non-security policies; 
enhancement of the administrative performance (for example performance-based appraisal 
system, transparency of services, and prefectural system), social policy (for example 
PLJUDWLRQ FKLOGUHQ DQG ZRPHQ¶V ULJKWV DQG DOLNH (CfRS, 2014a). Just after five years of 
EHLQJ HVWDEOLVKHG WKH&HQWUH¶VQDPHZDV FKDQJHG WR7KH&HQWUH IRU5HVHDUFK DQG6WXGLHV
(CfRS) after an Amendment (2005) in the PFMCL 2003, which enforced the establishment of 
the SDUs in public organisations. Most strategies developed by the Centre could not be put 
into action in those years as they challenged the status quo in the MoI as well as the country 
(Interview_27_former_manager). For example, the counter-terrorism strategy developed by 
the Centre suggested radical policy changes in the traditional counter-terrorism approach, 
such as widening the cultural rights of Kurds and empowering local authorities, political risks 
of which could not be undertaken by the Government at the time. 
The MoI management faced the challenge of applying strategic planning under these 
conditions. The discussion now turns to the actual practice of strategic planning in the MoI. 
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5.2. Strategic Planning in Action 
Strategic planning did not start as a bottom-up movement within the MoI 
(Interview_6_manager) but rather it entered into the agenda simultaneously with other public 
sector organisations upon the enforcement of the PFMCL in December 2003. The 
preliminary work for the first MoI strategic plan was set out after three years in 2006 by the 
creation of the SDUs in public departments and agencies by the Amendment to the PFMCL 
2005. This policy move aimed at forming specialised corporate units in public bodies that 
could overcome the technical hardships and challenges of formal strategic planning, which 
wDV ³WRWDOO\ XQNQRZQ WR WKH 0R, DQG WR WKH ZKROH 7XUNLVK 3XEOLF $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ´
(Interview_2_manager) at the outset of reform efforts. The MoI established its own SDU in 
early 2006. The SDU undertook the creation of the Strategic Planning Study and Co-
ordination Group, which is FDOOHGµWKHSODQQLQJWHDP¶LQVKRUWIRU WKHVDNHRIWKLVUHVHDUFK
Consisting of urban planners and financial service specialists and led by a director who was 
an associate professor, the planning team was responsible for carrying out the strategic 
planning process on behalf of the undersecretary, who was accountable to the Minister for 
strategic planning. The head of the SDU supported the team leader and the team, rather than 
leading the team himself. The team consisted of two groups, due to the structure of the SDU, 
which originated from the Strategic Planning Department and the Department for 
Performance and Budgeting. While the former department was responsible for the overall 
strategic planning process, the latter was specifically assigned to work on performance 
indicators, costing, and performance budgeting. The preparation stage of the plan lasted three 
years and developed in six progressive stages: 
x Organisation and restructuring for planning, 
x Situation analysis, 
x Development and identification of vision, mission, and basic values, 
x Specification of goals, objectives, strategies and assignment of performance 
indicators, 
x Costing, 
x Budgeting. 
These stages were followed by implementation, which started in January 2010 and went on 
until the end of December 2014. The planning process commenced with the formation of a 
three-level participative decision-making pyramid.  
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5.2.1. Organisation and Re-structuring 
The establishment of the SDU was a governmental response to the structural requirements for 
a proper strategic planning process. Although the MoI¶V SDU appeared to be a brand new 
unit, it inherited staff from the Research, Planning and Co-ordination Unit (RPCU) which had 
been abolished concurrently with the creation of the SDU. The abolished RPCU was legally 
responsible for the preparation of five-year plans for the MoI that had to cohere with the five-
year cross-JRYHUQPHQWDOGHYHORSPHQWSODQ+RZHYHUWKHSODQQLQJUHIHUUHGWRLQWKH53&8¶V
mandate was neither rational nor long range planning nor had it any professional staff with 
technical expertise in planning. Therefore, the emergence of the SDU was more a change in 
the terminology rather than the inception of something new.  This was perceived by managers 
and planners (e.g. Interview_28_planner) as a significant obstacle to strategic planning. A 
PDQDJHU¶VFRPPHQWZDV 
³>7KH ODZ@DEROLVKHG WKH53&8>DQG@HVWDEOLVKHG WKH6WUDWHJ\ >'HYHORSPHQW8QLW@ ,PHDQ
[so called] from scratch. But only the nameplates changed in practice. So, the head of the 
RPCU became the head of SDU. And the name of the things that they were doing as RPCU 
was changed to strategy. So, nothing changed much in practice´
(Interview_27_former_manager) 
The SDU did not join with or follow the direction of the Strategy Centre, that had the 
IXQFWLRQ RI GHYHORSLQJ VWUDWHJ\ FRQWHQW EXW ERUURZHG WKH ZRUG µVWUDWHJ\¶ IURP LWV WLWOH
instead (CfRS, 2014a). The former Strategy Centre was turned into the Centre for Research 
and Studies and discontinued its strategy development activities by the end of 2006 and 
became redundant, leaving that function to the SDU as a requirement of the formal PFMCL 
framework. 
$OWKRXJKWKH0R,ZDVWRVRPHH[WHQWIDPLOLDUZLWKWKHFRQFHSWRIµVWUDWHJ\¶LWGLGQRWKDYH
any experience in applying it to planning. Thus, at the outset, according to the managers and 
planners, the concept of strategic planning and related concepts such as vision, mission and 
performance were totally new to the SDU staff, including the planners, the MoI management 
and even the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the SPO that is responsible for guidance and 
supervision of the planning activities of all public organisations. Neither were there 
equivalent words for these concepts in the Turkish language. The wording of the PFMCL 
2003 received intensive critique for being a direct and poor translation of the Anglo-Saxon 
models rather than interpretation and adaptation of them. The equivalent words for strategy, 
YLVLRQ PLVVLRQ DQG SHUIRUPDQFH LQ 7XUNLVK ZHUH µVWUDWHML¶ µYL]\RQ¶ µPLV\RQ¶ and 
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µSHUIRUPDQV¶ UHVSHFWLYHO\ ZKLFK ZHUH DOPRVW LGHQWLFDO ZLWK WKH RULJLQDO ZRUGV LQ (QJOLVK
Two managers commented on the challenge this posed to comprehension: 
³)RULQVWDQFH\HVVRPHWKLQJ>ORRNVOLNH@UHDGLQJLQ7XUNLVKEXW\RXDUHWU\LQJWRILJXUHout 
ZKDWLWVD\V´ (Interview_31_former_manager) 
 ³<RXDUHXVLQJWKHFRQFHSWVRIDGLIIHUHQWFXOWXUHDQG\RXXVHWKHVHFRQFHSWVDVWKH\DUH«
there will be, and even are, problems with the comprehension and implementation of such a 
system based conceptually on translation.´Interview_17_manager) 
There was nothing more than a statutory adoption among the MoI management and the staff 
in general at the beginning, particularly among the managers of an older generation, based on 
legal obligation rather than deep insight and willingness. The older generation of managers 
ZHUHDSSDUHQWO\GRPLQDWLQJ WKHSURFHVVKRZHYHU WKHPDQDJHUV¶YLHZVVWLOO UHYHDOHGVRPH
variation. For example, the younger managers, a few of whom were also working as 
department heads, were more aware of the need and eager for change:  
 ³<RXQJEXUHDXFUDWVLQWKH0LQLVWU\DUHRSHQIRUWKHVHFKDQJHV1RKHVLWDWLRQRQWKLV<RXQJ
bureaucrats; these were people most of whom were educated abroad, went [abroad] for 
language [courses], for master [studLHV@´,QWHUYLHZBBIRUPHUBPDQDJHU 
Adoption levels among these young managers were higher than in any other group and they 
contributed most to the discussions during workshops and brainstorming meetings. Yet, the 
uncertainty-related concerns stemming from lack of previous experience was prevalent within 
WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ³,WZDVPHUHO\IXOILOPHQWRIDJLYHQWDVNVLQFHWKHUHZDVQRWDQHVWDEOLVKHG
FXOWXUH´ UHflected a manager (Interview_39_former_manager). Some managers and staff 
members with negative views voiced their concerns about the incompatibility of strategic 
SODQQLQJZLWKWKH0R,¶VPDQGDWH7KH\ZHUHWKLQNLQJRXWORXG 
³:KDW FDQ \RX PHDVXUH LQ WKH VRFLDO >ILHOG@ DQG KRZ" 7KLV LV D UHDO FKDOOHQJH «´
(Interview_2_manager).  
In addition, perception of an expected increase in workload and responsibility was leading to 
unease within the departments. There was resistance, symbolically directed at the SDU, 
voiced as: ³<RXDUHEULQJLQJLQDQH[WUDHQIRUFHGODERXU´ (Interview_28_planner). This view 
mostly stemmed from the perception of strategic planning as merely extra and excessive 
documentation of the business-as-usual.  
There was also a feeling of curiosity among the staff and within the planning team about how 
the process would develop and what the oXWFRPHVZRXOGEH)URPWKHSODQQHUV¶SHUVSHFWLYH
92 
 
strategic planning was not considered by the management at that time as a means for strategic 
change in the MoI (Interview_36_planner). Despite low adoption levels, the management was 
seeking ways to prepare a technically good plan. The technical aspect of the preparation of 
the plan, on the other hand, was perceived by the management to primarily be the duty of the 
6'8 $OWKRXJK WKHUH ZDV DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKDW WKHUH ZDV µD IRUPDO WDVN WR EH GRQH¶ WKH
management were also trying to explore, at least to some extent, how strategic planning could 
DGGWRWKHLURSHUDWLRQV,QWHUYLHZB$PDQDJHU¶VFRPPHQWVHYLGHQFHGWKLV 
³%XWZKLOHWKLVZDVEHLQJPDGH«DPHQWDOLW\RIµ+RZFDQZHEHQHILWIURPWKLV"+RZFDQ
this FRQWULEXWHWRXV"¶ZDVFRPLQJWRWKHIURQWDVZHOO.´ (Interview_39,_former_manager) 
7KH PRRG RI WKH PDQDJHPHQW ZDV ³FDXWLRXV RSWLPLVP´ DV GHVFULEHG E\ D PDQDJHU 
(Interview_34_manager).  
In these circumstances, with an aim to develop a common language and adoption of strategic 
planning in the broader public administration, the SDU (MoI) representatives suggested the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQRID µWUDLQLQJ WKH WUDLQHHV¶SURJUDPPHLQD IRXU-way meeting also attended by 
the MoF, the SPO and representatives of the Prime Minister (Interview_28_planner). The 
suggestion could not be put into practice since the SPO and the MoF, as co-ordinator 
organisations, did not adopt the idea. Neither of these bodies appreciated the importance of 
mental preparedness for good quality strategic planning process (Interview_28_planner). 
Public bodies had to pursue laws, by-laws and the SP Guide 2006 provided for them to 
navigate through the processes.   
Under these circumstances, in an effort to fill a knowledge gap in the MoI, the SDU 
publishHG D OLWHUDWXUH UHYLHZ EDVHG ERRNOHW LQ HDUO\  WLWOHG µ6WUDWHJLF 3ODQQLQJ LQ WKH
3XEOLF 6HFWRU¶ 7KH ERRNOHW LQFOXGHG VKRUWKDQG GHILQLWLRQV DQG H[SODQDWLRQV RI VWUDWHJLF
planning related concepts and the rationale for its application in the public sector. The SDU 
ODWHUGHYHORSHG WKHERRNOHW WXUQLQJ LW LQWR DERRN WKLV WLPH WLWOHG µ6WUDWHJLF0DQDJHPHQW¶
publishing 1500 copies at once to dispatch to other public organisations along with the MoI 
departments $úJÕQ). The book did not only benefit the MoI departments but also the 
line ministries and agencies which were desperate for such kind of source, as reflected by the 
planners. 
Despite lacking skills, expertise and experience in planning, the SDU was cognizant of the 
need for adoption and participation for success according to a member of the planning team:  
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³:HWRRNWKHPHQWDODQGLQWHOOHFWXDOSUHSDUDWLRQSURFHVVYHU\VHULRXVO\%HFDXVH,VDZLWLI
\RX WDNH LW OLNH JHWWLQJ ULG RI D OHJDO REOLJDWLRQ \RX FDQ¶W PDNH WKDW PXFK SURJUHVV 7KH
Ministry of Interior is an established institution with strong traditions. There, you have to 
make that mental preparation in order to introduce something new´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
To facilitate insight and adoption, they held training seminars for the management and the 
staff (Interview_33_planner). The strategic planning booklet and the book produced by the 
SDU were used as the main reference sources during training activities. The planning team 
organised several preparative and training seminars and meetings for the staff members 
between 2006 and 2009 (SDU, 2006b). The training seminars were held as short daily 
activities that covered a wide group of participants from the undersecretary at the top, to the 
line managers at the bottom. According to the perceptions of planners, these activities 
translated into a positive difference in the adoption levels of the management within months 
(Interview_28_planner). However, the perceptions varied among the recipients regarding the 
extent of their impact. A manager commented on training activities with reference to the 
SWOT analysis study:  
³8QIRUWXQDWHO\«WKLVSXWVIRUWKWKHUHDOLW\RIDQDWWHPSWWRSODQZLWKSHRSOH«ZKRZHUHQRW
trained well. In that period, maybe there occurred [training activities] attended by a few 
friends including myself; but not everyone came [for planning] as formerly trained; [and] I 
WKLQN WKDW LW FRXOGQ¶W EH D WUDLQLQJ RI [good] kind only through [a few] conferences´
(Interview_42_manager) 
The SDU was leading the process in line with the SP Guide 2006, which was the rule of 
thumb for strategic planning in the Turkish public sector. The guide was stipulating the 
establishment of a planning committee in order to carry forward the strategic planning 
process through the support of a co-ordinator unit, which was the SDU by default in all 
public bodies. However, the SDU did not find this mechanism adequate in raising awareness 
and providing participation across the large organisation. The SDU formed a three-level 
planning and decision-making structure, a decision pyramid, aimed at ensuring awareness, 
adoption and participation in strategic planning at all levels from very bottom to the very top. 
The three levels of the decision-pyramid formed in April 2006 were (SDU, 2006b): 
x Strategic Plan Study Groups (level 1): It consisted of 15 committees with the 
inclusion of three members of staff at different levels from 15 different units. 
Formation of these groups aimed at widening participation and buy-in in the 
process. 
x Strategic Plan Executive Group (level 2): The members of this group were deputy 
heads and it was organised to prepare proposals and to fill in the potential gap 
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FDXVHGE\GLVUXSWLRQVLQWKHVWUDWHJ\GHYHORSPHQWERDUG¶VPHHWLQJVIRUH[DPSOH
due to time limitation. 
x Strategy Development Board (SDB) (level 3): The highest level of decision-
making in the process consisted of the undersecretary, his deputies and the head of 
units.  
Particularly the SDB was of extreme significance for the strategic planning process. The MoI 
was a gigantic bureaucratic entity consisting of a number of different units with different 
functions and it was impossible to carry out planning activities smoothly without the approval 
and command and control of the top management, particularly of the undersecretary. It was 
challenging for the team to get full attendance from the undersecretary and the unit heads in 
planning meetings at a time when awareness of and support for the process was low 
(Interview_28_planner). But thanks to an existing legally binding tradition of the MoI, the 
unit heads were meeting on a weekly basis in the Ministerial Committee to discuss and 
resolve significant issues in their agenda. The team took advantage of this existing body, 
which facilitated decision-making during planning. 
The decision system was operating in the following way: at the first level based on demand 
from the SDU, separate units were producing unit-specific data under the co-ordination of the 
study groups that existed in every unit. The study groups were coming together in meetings 
fRU WKH GLVFXVVLRQ RI LVVXHV LQ D SDUWLFLSDWLYH ZD\ ³6HYHUDO PHHWLQJV ZHUH KHOG ZLWK WKH
ZRUNLQJJURXSV«´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHUZLWKLQWKLVFRQWH[WDVUHIOHFWHGE\DSODQQHU$W
the second level, massive data was compiled and refined by the planning team and submitted 
to the Strategic Plan Executive Group for discussion and preparation of proposals. In the third 
and last level, the proposals shaped by the executive group were discussed by SDB members 
and articulated into decisions. Although the formal decision route was designed with the 
intention of promoting participative decision-making, effects of hierarchical decision-making 
were dominant along the upper levels, particularly at the SDB meetings. Discussions at the 
highest level took place within the rHPLWRIµEXUHDXFUDWLFFRXUWHV\¶,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
In addition to the formal framework of decision-making, there was a form of internal 
diplomacy that expected the existence of and exploitation of strong personal links and 
effective communication skills. Having the full backing and sponsorship of the SDU head, 
the team leader kept close contact with the undersecretary at all stages to justify strategic 
SODQQLQJDQGJDLQWKHXQGHUVHFUHWDU\¶VVXSSRUWDQGVSRQVRUVKLSIRUPRUHSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH
process, DQGPRVWFULWLFDOO\WRILOWHUWKHWHDP¶VVXJJHVWLRQVLQWRWRSPDQDJHPHQWGLUHFWLYHV
But the team could not rely solely on directives, which would contradict the aims of 
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voluntary participation (Interview_28_planner). The process was conducted with diplomacy 
through informing, explaining and persuading department heads to reflect the rationale of 
strategic planning and to ensure the adoption and ownership of strategies emerging from 
lower levels. Through the use of informal diplomacy, decisions, particularly ones that could 
not be settled within the board meetings, were passed on to the undersecretary and to the 
department heads through the formal decision-making channels, so as to facilitate definite 
RXWFRPHV2QHPDQDJHU¶VYLHZVZHUH 
³,IDQDPELHQFHRI DJUHHPHQWFDQ¶WEHSURYLGHGWKHUH,JXHVVWKHLVVXHVDUHVHWWOHGEHWZHHQ
the undersecretary and the head of the SDU. This is not strange; I mean this is ingrained as a 
method and acknowledged within the culture and traditions of our ministry´
(Interview_39_former_manager). 
At a time when top management had considerably limited knowledge of strategic planning 
and under the prevalence of strict hierarchy, it was sometimes extremely challenging for the 
team to accept their decisions on issues that they did not have technical expertise in. In one 
notable instance, it was argued by a member of the Strategy Development Board that a link 
between the strategic plan and the budget was not a requirement for effective strategic 
planning and management. Diplomacy on most occasions helped the team to settle problems 
of this and other kinds, though explication and persuasion sometimes required inordinate 
amounts of effort and time (Interview_28_planner).  
The SDU inherited the staff of the abolished RPCU many of whom had not acquired planning 
expertise and technical knowledge of its processes. This compelled the SDU managers to 
search for possible solutions. The SDU, first, transferred planners and financial service 
specialists from other central departments and provincial branches of the MoI to strengthen 
the planning team. Second, they contracted out consultancy services to another public 
organisation, the National Productivity Centre (NPC). From the very beginning of the 
process, the NPC specialists supported and even carried out the process at all levels including 
the moderation of the meetings, conducting and analysing questionnaires. However, as 
reflected by some managers, even the expertise of the NPC specialists did not suffice to 
enlighten the MoI staff as to the meaning of basic concepts, the importance of strategic 
planning and in what way it would make difference. A manager commented as: 
³7KHEDVLFSUREOHPZDVWKDW«,PHDQKRZPDQ\SHRSOH>RU@EXUHDXFUDWVZHUHPHQWDOO\DQG
theoretically ready for this? That technical knowledge was lacking; neither was it given 
widely; that [technical] knowledge was given to limited individuals at a certain level. And 
what is the ultimate aim of strategic planning in reality? How shall it contribute to us; to the 
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public bureaucracy; to our services; to public administration? A substantive training was not 
given on this matter. We can talk about a deficiency of information there´
(Interview_30_former_manager) 
Meanwhile, despite the exemption from strategic planning given to the Gendarmerie and the 
Coastal Guard Command by the PFMCL 2003, the MoI management insisted on the 
participation of and contribution from these two agencies to the corporate strategic planning 
process. With this aim in mind, at the very beginning of the process, to gain the support of the 
top management, the SDU made an official call to the two agencies, as well as to the National 
Police, to participate in the planning activities for the co-ordination of strategies related to 
law enforcement and security duties and functions (SDU, 2006c). 
In the first six months of the groundwork between August and November 2006, the planning 
team finished a Preliminary Programme (2006) which defined the works, deadlines, actors, 
and their roles in planning and sent it to the SPO to meet the legal requirements of the by-law 
on the Methods and Principles of Strategic Planning in Public Organisations 2006 
(hereinafter MPSPPO By-law 2006). Having the organisational structure established, a road 
map for the process defined and other formalities completed, the planning team was ready to 
move forward to the situation analysis stage. A noteworthy feature of the planning process, as 
perceived by the managers, was that it was progressing in a strictly formal way. The planning 
team was seeking to abide by regulations, particularly the SP Guide 2006, in all activities 
they were carrying out (Interview_2; Interview_28, planners).  
As the organisation and structuring was completed, it was time for the SDU and the planning 
team to pass on to the second stage, situation analysis, which was designed to produce 
comprehensive data relating to the internal and external environment of the MoI, upon which 
the strategies would be built.  
5.2.2. Situation Analysis 
The planning team regarded the whole situation analysis study as an attempt to respond to the 
TXHVWLRQRIµZKHUHGRHV WKH02,VWDQGZLWKLQ LWVPLOLHX"¶ (MoI, 2009c, p. 17). This was a 
four-stage study that aimed at clarifying and linking the internal dynamics of the MoI with 
the developments and trends in its external environment. It was also a stage that was 
anticipated to produce adequate data to help and guide the selection and formulation of 
organisational goals and strategies. It included internal structural analysis, environmental 
analysis, stakeholder analysis and SWOT analysis phases. The internal and external analyses 
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studies were carried out by the respective departments of the MoI. The planning team 
gathered separate reports from the departments and sought and analysed extra data if they 
detected any gap in the reports. The stakeholder and SWOT analyses, however, were 
orchestrated by the planning team on a participatory basis with the support of the NPC 
consultants.  
Internal analysis included the investigation and clarification of the legal mandate and human, 
financial and physical resources of the MoI. Starting from December 2006, each unit 
analysed their mandate and duties vis-j-vis the legal framework that they were acting upon, 
ongoing projects and service provision, human, physical, technological resources and service 
infrastructure (MoI, 2009c). This study was expected to feed into the SWOT analysis stage 
and act as a basis for strategies to be formulated. The reports included detailed statistical data 
regarding the qualification of the staff, such as academic degrees, foreign language 
TXDOLILFDWLRQV FRPSXWHU VNLOOV DQG WKHQXPEHUV DQG WKHGHWDLOHG IHDWXUHV RI WKH0R,¶V ,&7
infrastructure.  
As with the internal analysis studies, the environmental analysis report was produced upon 
the evaluations of separate departments of their respective service fields. This stage required 
an outward focus and necessitated an effort to understand the present and anticipated 
developments, tendencies, changes, opportunities and threats in the surroundings both 
domestic and international (MoI, 2009c).Within this stage, the departments reviewed reports, 
strategy documents, legislation, practices of other organisations, such as the EU, OECD and 
the EC, as well as countries, and similar data sources relating to the scope of the MoI. This 
included developments in local governments in Turkey, in Europe and the rest of the world; 
civil society organisations in Turkey and in the rest of the world; the nature and impact of the 
EU justice and home affairs policy on Turkey; public financial management and e-
government (SDU, 2007a). The cross-governmental strategy documents such as Information 
Society Strategy Action Plan (2006-2010), the Ninth Development Plan (2007-2013), Mid-
term Plan, and Annual Programme were scrutinised so as to be incorporated within the 
strategic planning process in this stage. The planning team consolidated the departmental 
reports and amalgamated them into a high volume environmental analysis report in the first 
quarter of 2007 (SDU, 2007a).  
7KH 0R, ODFNHG D GHGLFDWHG PHFKDQLVP RU XQLW WR V\VWHPDWLFDOO\ DQDO\VH LWV VWDNHKROGHUV¶
preferences in the pre-SODQQLQJ HUD $V FRPPRQO\ FRQYH\HG E\ WKH PDQDJHUV WKH 0R,¶V
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relations, particularly with its external stakeholders, were traditionally based on reactions to 
complaints raised by service users and other stakeholders. Negative reactions and complaints 
were treated as warning signs of a need for revision of existing decisions (Interview_4; 
,QWHUYLHZB,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHUV2QHPDQDJHU¶VFRPPHQW was: 
³%XWPRUHZHDUH«IRUFHG WR DVVHVVRXUVHOYHV DVZH VXEVHTXHQWO\EHFRPHDZDUH WKDW WKH
practices have led to problems at the provincial level. This is a problem-focused approach in a 
sense. If there is no voice being echoed in the provinces about a regulation that we did, [we 
come to think that] it is successful´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
As pointed out by managers, complaints were raised through various channels such as the 
right to petition, feedback from prefects who worked at the frontline on the provincial level, 
the politicians acting as mediators between the citizens and the MoI, the media, the Right to 
Information Act in force since 2004, the internet and others (Interview_21; 
Interview_34_managers). For an organisation with such traditions, pro-active consideration 
of stakeholder opinions was to a great extent a new experience. The planning team 
considered this an opportunity that could either contribute to the formulation of the best goals 
and strategies through advanced collective rationality, or correct any existing misconceptions 
of stakeholders about the MoI and its services (Interview_28). Underpinned by these motives, 
the analysis incorporated internal as well as external stakeholders.  
For internal stakeholder inclusion, the planning team, first of all, designed a web-based 
TXHVWLRQQDLUHWKDWZDVSXEOLVKHGRQWKH0R,¶VZHESRUWDO LQRUGHUWRIDFLOLWDWHDQGLQFUHDVH
staff participation. A total of 322 members of staff responded to the questionnaire; 102 of 
whom were managers, while 220 were other staff (SDU, 2007b). The questionnaire included 
perception-PHDVXULQJ LWHPV UHODWHG WR WKH UHVSRQGHQW¶V RZQ XQLW VXFK DV VWDII VDWLVIDFWLRQ
participation, performance and service quality; inter-departmental relations with the MoI, 
such as hierarchical relations, co-ordination and corporation and human resources such as the 
competency of staff (SDU, 2007b). There was also an open-ended question that enabled staff 
to note what they perceived to be noteworthy. 
Information on internal stakeholder opinions was not restricted to the survey. The study 
groups at the first level of the decision-pyramid shaped the formal departmental proposals in 
consultation with other members of the staff within respective departments. The consultation 
was carried in two ways. First, the study groups received the official written foresights and 
proposals of every section for goals, strategies and other related subjects for the next five 
years. Then, the proposals were discussed in departmental meetings through staff 
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participatioQ WR VKDSH WKH ILQDO SURSRVDO IRU WKH GHSDUWPHQW $ PDQDJHU¶V YLHZV RQ WKH
departmental consultation mechanism were as follows:  
³,PHDQ«ZHWRRNHYHU\RQH¶V>RSLQLRQV@IURPWKHYHU\ERWWRPWR WKH WRS«E\PHDQVRI
PHHWLQJV « ZH UHIOHFWHG WKH WH[W RQ WR WKe screen; works were conducted over the screen. 
>7KH PDQDJHUV@ FDPH « WKHUH ZH ZHQW RYHU LW LWHP E\ LWHP´
(Interview_31_former_manager) 
Secondly, the departmental proposals were discussed in common brainstorming meetings of 
the study groups at the first level of the decision-pyramid, whereby managers from other 
GHSDUWPHQWV KDG WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ WR OHDUQ PRUH DQG FRPPHQW RQ RWKHU XQLWV¶ SURSRVDOV ,Q
these meetings, however, discussions were focused more on issues of common interest 
mostly linked to the powers, rights, needs and the future of the MoI and of the prefectural 
system (Interview_28_planner).  
The internal survey was succeeded by the external stakeholder analysis survey. External 
stakeholder analysis was aimed at clearly specifying and taking the views of collaborators, 
interactive working partners, service users, indirectly affected groups and central public 
ERGLHV WKDW DUH RULHQWHG WRZDUGV WKH 0R,¶V DFWLYLWLHV (MoI, 2009c). Service users were not 
surveyed individually but through representative organisations, such as associations and 
labour unions (Interview_28).The questionnaires were sent to 370 organisations and 270 of 
them responded.  
The overall central stakeholder analysis study was challenging for the team because of the 
reluctance of stakeholders to respond to the questionnaires. The team was forced to prompt 
the stakeholders to complete and send back the questionnaires to achieve a satisfactory 
response rate. ³:H ZHUH VR WR VSHDN IRUFLng them to share their opinions,´ disclosed a 
planner (Interview_28_planner). An underlying reason could be the general tendency to 
ignore questionnaires or the fledgling level of participatory democracy in Turkey, according 
to the same participant. However, it was a real problem that the team had experienced with 
the internal stakeholders as well.  
Although formal-central stakeholder analysis was very new to the MoI in a broad sense, some 
departments deviated from the mainstream. For instance, the analysis of both internal and 
external stakeholder preferences through questionnaires, meetings and by any other available 
means and acting upon stakeholders feedback was routine for the Department of Associations 
since its foundation in late 2003 (Interview_30_former_manager). The main explanation for 
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this deviation was that the founder head of the Associations Department, who served as the 
department head between 2003 and 2009, had an MPA degree from a UK University and his 
GLVVHUWDWLRQ KDG EHHQ RQ VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ LQ WKH SXEOLF VHFWRU 7KHUHIRUH WKH PDQDJHUV¶
views on stakeholder participation in NGO-related services differed significantly from the 
central SDU-led stakeholder analysis. Goal 5 of the strategic plan that targeted the 
enhancement of associations, and thereby civil society, was set as a high priority with support 
from both the internal and external stakeholders (Interview_17_manager).  
Stakeholder analysis was finalised in May 2007. Both the internal and external stakeholder 
analyses generated detailed statistical data, not only to feed into the planning agenda, but also 
for future comparison to observe change in perceptions during or after plan implementation. 
Despite the challenges, some managers (e.g. Interview_6; Interview_29; Interview_30, 
managers) viewed it as a satisfactory process, particularly as it was the first strategic planning 
DWWHPSWLQWKH0R,$PDQDJHU¶VUHIOHFWLRQVZHUH 
³:LWK WKH KLJKHVW SDUWLFLSDWLRQ E\ WKH SDUWLFLSDWLRQ RI DOO GHSDUWPHQW KHDGV LQFOXGLQJ WKH
internal stakeholders, external stakeholders; I believe that ± [though] it was our first strategic 
plan ± a perfect participation rate was achieved.´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
Stakeholder analysis was followed by an executive group meeting at the second level of the 
decision-making pyramid in May 2007 (SDU, 2007g). The executive group discussed and 
adopted the structural and environmental analysis reports and evaluated the outcomes of the 
stakeholder analysis at the meeting. The team demanded more temporary staff support from 
units as they started to feel the need for more personnel to advance the process. The team 
pointed out the importance of attendance by permanent members of the executive group as 
well, since some units started to be represented by lower level managers in the meetings, on 
the pretext of a high volume of departmental workload (Interview_36; SDU, 2007g).  
The findings from the first three phases of the situation analysis study, along with the 
outcomes of other planning-related activities were demonstrated next by the planning team to 
the department heads in the second SDB meeting in June 2007 (SDU, 2007c). In this meeting 
the planning team once again reemphasised the need for adoption, participation and 
contribution of the units to the planning process and raised the expectations that the team and 
the SDU had from the departments. The undersecretary gave his full support to the team by 
personally stressing the vitality of the plan and calling for active participation in it. During 
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the meeting, there was an emphasis on a wider consideration of the ideas of the staff 
members before the next meeting of the board on SWOT analysis (SDU, 2007c).  
The next and last step of the situation analysis was SWOT analysis.  The SDU fed the data 
generated in the former steps directly into the SWOT analysis study. Evaluation of internal 
strengths and weaknesses and external opportunities and threats were again discussed and 
settled through a bottom-up approach in the formal three-step decision mechanism. At all 
three levels, the meetings were moderated by the NPC consultants along with the planning 
team members (Interview_36_planner). The SWOT analysis sessions were fairly new for the 
MoI management and received interesting reactions from the participants who pointed to the 
deficiencies in the readiness of the management for such studieV$PDQDJHU¶VUHDFWLRQZDV 
³)RU H[DPSOH OHW¶V VD\ µZKDW LV 6:27 DQDO\VLV"¶ µ:KDW DUH \RXU >GHSDUWPHQW¶V@
RSSRUWXQLWLHV>DQG@WKUHDWV":KDWDUHWKHSULRULWLHV"¶6RRQDQGVRIRUWK:KDWWKUHDW",WZDV
DSURFHVVSURJUHVVLQJRYHUKHVLWDWLRQVVXFKDVµ«Zhat does this mean? In what way should I 
SHUFHLYHWKLV"´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Therefore, the process itself developed in a learning-by-doing (Interview_28_planner) or 
even in a groping fashion (Interview_34_manager). The SWOT analysis exercises were 
finalised in June 2007 in a meeting of the SDB, where there was a strong call for the units to 
keep critical personnel available until mid-July 2007 when intensive planning works would 
take place (SDU, 2007d).  
5.2.3. Definition of Vision, Mission and Organisational Values 
$IWHUORFDWLQJWKH0R,ZLWKLQLWVPLOLHXWKHTXHVWLRQWREHDQVZHUHGQH[WZDV³:KHUHGRHV
WKH0R,ZDQWWREHLQWKHIXWXUH"´(MoI, 2009c, p. 9). To address this question, the MoI re-
explored its mission and basic values and set out a formal organisational vision statement. 
Definition of a vision, mission and organisational values was relatively straightforward. The 
planning team formally demanded the proposals of the units, and then they combined and 
compiled the proposals and carried a nuPEHURIDOWHUQDWLYHVWDWHPHQWVWRWKH6'%¶VDJHQGD
In an exceptional scenario, the board was chaired by the then Minister personally, who was 
appointed in May 2007 among governors for the three-month interim election period, as a 
constitutional requirement, for the identification of mission and vision statements. The 
PLQLVWHU¶VDWWLWXGHZDVSHUFHLYHGDVEHLQJYHU\VXSSRUWLYHSDUWLFXODUO\E\WKHSODQQLQJWHDP
and the SDU. A Planner expressed his feelings as follows: 
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³)RUH[DPSOHLQWKH«PLVVLRQYLVLRQEDVLFYDOXHVVWDJH«WKHWKHQKRQRXUDEOH0LQLVWHU«
DWWHQGHGWKHPHHWLQJKHVWLPXODWHG>XV@RZQHGWKHPDWWHU«,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWWKHPLQLVWHU
[personally] comes and backs the goals, targets, basic values in every ministry.´
(Interview_33_planner). 
In June 2007 under the chairmanship of the Minister, the strategy board comfortably adopted 
an encompassing mission that directly reflected the legal mandate of the Ministry, 
HQXPHUDWHG LQ WKH VHFRQG VHFWLRQ RI WKH 6WDWXWH RI WKH 0R,  /DZ 1 
(Interview_41_planner). There was no confusion or conflict about the mission of the MoI, at 
least at the conceptual level. The mission of the MoI read as: 
³5HSXEOLFRI7XUNH\0LQLVWU\RIWKH,QWHULRUFRQGXFWVLWVGXW\DQGVHUYLFHVLQWKHIUDPHRI
an efficient and human oriented administrative perception, regarding protection of homeland 
security and public order, indivisible unity with the country and nation, rights and freedoms 
laid down by the Constitution, public peace and general morality; ensuring preservation and 
safety of border, coast and territorial waters; carrying out studies related to domestic policy of 
homeland, foundation, abolishment and arrangement of civil administration departments; 
arrangement, orientation, coordination and supervision of interests and relations of local 
administration with central administration; prohibition and tracking of smuggling, 
associations, civil registry and citizenship affairs by means of its organizational structure 
H[WHQGHGDORQJWKHFRXQWU\´ (2010c, p.1) 
A vision IRUWKHIXWXUHZDVDOVRGHYHORSHGLQWKHPHHWLQJ7KH0R,¶VYLVLRQZDV 
³9LVLRQ RI 5HSXEOLF RI 7XUNH\ 7KH 0LQLVWU\ RI ,QWHULRU LV WR EH DQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ WKDW
integrated its institutional background with the contemporary administration perception; 
pioneering the other public institutions and organizations in terms of the quality of its services 
DQGWREHDVDIHJXDUGRIDSHDFHIXOVRFLHW\ZKRVHSXEOLFSHDFHDQGVDIHW\DUHHQVXUHG´0R,
2010c, p. 1) 
The strategy board adopted all the contemporary ideal principles of a democratic public 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ DV EDVLF YDOXHV WKDW ZHUH H[SHFWHG WR JXLGH WKH 0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF DLPV DQG
operations. These values included democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, 
human-orientedness, respect for social values, trustworthiness, transparency, equity, 
accountability, participation, modernity, service quality, efficiency, effectiveness, 
accessibility, leadership, openness for corporation, professionalism and environment-
friendliness (MoI, 2009c; SDU, 2007f). 
After this relatively straightforward stage, the planning works moved to the most complicated 
stage in which goals, targets, strategies and performance indicators were formulated. As work 
on goal-setting and strategy formulation continued, the first important change in staffing 
occurred. The interim Minister who chaired the mission, vision and values meeting was 
appointed as the new undersecretary in December 2007, while the existing undersecretary 
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was appointed as a governor to the Province of Bursa. This was the first sign of a high senior 
manager turnover in the MoI, which was defined as an important internal weakness in the 
SWOT analysis study (MoI, 2009c). Further, four ministers served successively as the 
Ministers of Interior during the researched period of 2007 to 2013 indicating short policy 
cycles, though under the same one-party government. 
5.2.4. Formulation of Goals, Objectives, Strategies and Performance Targets 
$W WKLV VWDJH WKH 0R, GLUHFWHG LWV HIIRUW WR DQVZHU WKH TXHVWLRQ ³+RZ FDQ ZH UHDFK WKH
desireGVWDWH"´(MoI, 2009c, p. 19). This was the most important stage, as argued previously 
(Bryson and Roering, 1988), since strategic goals and strategies had to be formulated. 
Contrary to the definition of the mission and vision, the team had to work hard to formulate a 
quantifiable, implementable and achievable set of goals. 
5.2.4.1. Goal Setting and Analysis of Strategies 
At the time of planning, there was a consensus among the management and the MoI staff 
over the mission that was provided by statutory powers. $PDQDJHU¶VUHIOHFWLRQVZHUH: 
 ³>7KHVRXUFHRIRXUPLVVLRQLV@VWDUWLQJIURPWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQEHLQJSULPDULO\WKHFRQVWLWXWLRQ
it is the Law 3152 regulating the organisation and duties of the Ministry´
(Interview_10_manager) 
MoI managers and other staff mostly perceived, at first glance, the mission and goals of the 
MoI as clear and achievable. This perception of clarity in the mission and goals was mostly 
due to the unambiguity of the wording of the statements in the statute, rather than to their 
ability to be turned into quantifiable and measurable commodities. As indicated by managers, 
LW ZDV QRW VR HDV\ WR TXDQWLI\ WKH 0LQLVWU\¶V ZRUN for example Interview_27, 
former_manager). Developments later showed that it was extremely difficult in areas such as 
regulation and standardisation of local authorities to assign performance indicators as 
outcome measures. 
The planning team continued to follow the SP Guide 2006. This stage started with a formal 
call from the planning team, as it did in the previous stages. The departments were asked to 
send their formal proposals for goals, objectives and performance indicators. At this stage 
two elements demarcated the boundaries of goal-setting for the departments: The first was the 
statutory mission of the MoI and the second was the upper norms in the cross-governmental 
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strategy documents such as the 9th Development Plan. The cross-governmental strategy 
documents prevailed upon goal-setting and on some occasions on strategy formulation due to 
the integrative approach of the formal PFMCL framework.  
Under these circumstances, as suggested by the planners, every department, without 
exception, proposed almost all of their statutory duties, projects and activities to be included 
within the strategic plan. A planner commented as follows:  
³7KHUH ZDV DQ H[FHVVLYH UHVSRQVH WRR PDQ\ DFWLYLWLHV WRR PDQ\ SURMHFWV HYHQ PLQRU
EXVLQHVVHV ZHUH LQFOXGHG DV DFWLYLWLHV VR ZH KDG D KLJKO\ FRPSOH[ GRFXPHQW LQ KDQG «
Although arguable in quality, we received enormous numbers of alternative activity sets, 
project sets [and] target phrases.´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
The attitudes of departmental representatives were the same during meetings 
(Interview_28_planner). The reason was simple. Although mental adoption of strategic 
planning was ORZDPRQJPDQDJHUVWKH\ZHUHVWLOOPRWLYDWHGWRVHFXUHWKHLUXQLW¶VVXUYLYDOLQ
an uncertain and unknown future in which strategic planning could either be central to 
management or be formulated into a plan sitting on the shelf (Interview_31, 
former_manager). It was particularly crucial for the departments to be recognised by the 
strategic plan at a time when strong localisation trends were eroding the mandate of the MoI 
and even threatening some units with becoming aimless and redundant 
(Interview_13_manager). The managers were motivated by the idea that budgets would be 
allocated in accordance with the strategic plan. They were not wrong in thinking in this way 
because the formal PFMCL framework introduced performance budgeting into the system. 
Management concerns reached an apex when the NPC consultants started to emphasise in 
meetings that any activity or project out of the plan would not be eligible to receive 
appropriations from the budget (for example Interview_26_manager). The following account 
of a planner highlights how perceptions of a contingent relationship between plans and 
budgets influenced the interests of MoI management in the strategic planning process: 
³7KHQDQLQVLJKWVWDUWHGWRGHYHORS7KHDSSURDFKH[KLELWHGZDVOLNHµ:HZRQ¶WEHDEOH to 
UHFHLYHDSSURSULDWLRQVIURPWKHEXGJHWLIZHFDQ¶WGHILQHRXUJRDOVDQGWDUJHWVDVUHTXLUHG¶ 
When that stage came, and as such a concern came about, the interests of the departments 
increased abruptly. They started to propose all of their [businesses].´,QWHUYLHZBB3ODQQHU 
The sudden increase in departmental interest led to an upsurge in the number of activities and 
performance indicators from about 300 to about 900, which was then reduced again before 
the submission of the plan to the SPO for review. However, the planning team had to 
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persuade, rather than oblige, the departments to discard any formal proposal made by them. 
They kept in close dialogue with department managers to convince them that some of their 
proposals were not of significance or of interest. The team and the units were meeting on a 
FRPPRQ JURXQG RYHU WKH SULQFLSOHV RI SHUVXDVLRQ DQG UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ $ PDQDJHU¶V YLHZ
reflected the types of interaction at the time:  
³,DPRIWKHRSLQLRQWKDWLWZDV>DNLQGRI@FRQVXOWDWLRQQHJRWLDWLRn, affection, inducement, 
[and] interaction.´,QWHUYLHZB29_manager) 
A notable characteristic of strategy proposals was that they were mostly the ongoing 
activities and projects undertaken by the units. A member of the planning team and a 
manager summed up the scene neatly:  
³,W ZDV WKH FU\VWDOOLVDWLRQ RI ZKDW WKH 0LQLVWU\ KDG DOUHDG\ EHHQ GRLQJ.´
(Interview_28_planner) 
 ³,WKLQNLWREWDLQHGWKHV\VWHPDWLVDWLRQRIZKDWZHKDYH>DOUHDG\@EHHQGRLQJDVD0LQLVWU\.´
(Interview_21_manager) 
Although this was the general tendency, some of the strategies discussed did require a major 
shift in the current policies, whereas others introduced technically innovative strategies. 
Innovative options were mostly debated in the workshops at the lower levels of decision-
making attended by junior level managers, mainly directors and deputy directors-general 
(Interview_6_manager). From this perspective, the planning workshops created a 
participative climate for challenging ideas to be articulated (Interview_ 41_planner). These 
ideas were diluted in time as they were revisited time and again throughout the three-level 
strategic decision-making pyramidWREHEURXJKWLQOLQHZLWKWKH0R,¶VH[LVWLQJYDOXHVDQG
policies (Interview_36_planner). Despite this, a few strategies that posed a challenge to the 
status quo in specific areas, such as performance appraisal of human resources, managed to 
find a place in the plan. The fate of these strategies is an interesting discussion topic and this 
is resumed in Section 7.3 in Chapter 7. 
As the process progressed, the MoI management faced the risk of excluding law enforcement 
agencies from the corporate strategic planning process. The Gendarmerie and the Coastal 
Guard Command were exempted from strategic planning by the PFMCL 2003 on the grounds 
of confidentiality, while a separate strategic planning process was mandated for the National 
Police by the PFMCL 2003. From the perspective of trying to achieve an integrated or 
corporate strategic plan and ensuing implementation and monitoring process, the exclusion of 
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WKHVH DJHQFLHV XQGHUPLQHG WKH 0R,¶V PLVVLRQ VLQFH ODZ HQIRUFHPHQW DQG VHFXULW\ KDG D
central position within it. The management aspired to include security strategies to 
FRPPXQLFDWHWKH0LQLVWU\¶VPLVVLRQDQGYLVLRQWRWKHSXEOLFDQGWKus, strengthen its public 
image. In an attempt to prevent such a contradiction, the team fostered close relations with 
the SDU unit of the Police (Interview_28_planner). The headquarters of the Police and the 
MoI being adjacent facilitated face to face communication. They had already made an official 
call to the Gendarmerie and the Coastal Guard Command at the outset for their contribution 
to the process (SDU, 2006a). To ensure co-ordination, the team held channels open for 
information sharing, particularly ZLWKWKH3ROLFHZKLFKDOVRKDGWRSUHSDUHLWV¶RZQVWUDWHJLF
SODQ7KHWHDP¶VDLPZDVWROLQNWKHDJHQFLHV¶VWUDWHJLFJRDOVWRWKH0LQLVWHULDOVWUDWHJLFSODQ
The planning team contemplated Strategic Goal 2 as a frame goal to integrate at least the 
strategies of the Police (Interview_36_planner). However, the provisions of the PFMCL 2003 
and of the MPSPPO by-law 2006 were clear and the situation was exceeding the power 
available to any team or any unit. They could not accomplish the integration of three agencies 
to the ministerial plan, which was perceived as a severe complication (Interview_36; 
Interview_41_planners). The Police had already finished and enforced its first strategic plan 
by 2009, one year before the MoI, in compliance with the deadline set in the MPSPPO by-
law 2006. This was perceived by the actors as an incongruity: 
³7KHPDLQSUREOHPKHUHLVWKDWWKH1DWLRQDO3ROLFHKDGSUHSDUHGDQGVWDUWHGWRLPSOHPHQWLWV
plan before the time we prepared our strategic plan; this was a very big contradiction.´
(Interview_41_planner) 
The Gendarmerie and the Coastal Guard Command never produced a strategic plan within 
the formal PFMCL framework, which was in accordance with the law, and therefore could 
not be integrated into the ministerial strategic planning process. The SDU made a last move 
under those conditions: 
³:H«VDLG µ7KLV LVRXUPLVVLRQ >DQG@ WKLV LVRXUYLVLRQ WKHVHDUHRXUJRDOVDQG WDUJHWV
these are our basic values. Consider these in the projects, activities, [and] operations that you 
intend to executH¶´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
5.2.4.2. The Analysis of Strategies 
The analysis of strategy alternatives in formal strategic planning is expected to be formal, 
analytical and comprehensive. However, evidence shows that the process of strategy analysis 
did not unfold in the way prescribed by the formal PFMCL framework. To understand this 
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VWDJH RI WKH 0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF SODQning journey, it is important first to provide some 
background information about the regulations in the law and the SP Guide 2006. The PFMCL 
2003 set out analysis of public projects as a prerequisite for their approval by the MoD. The 
law obliged public organisations to conduct a feasibility study which included a cost-
efficiency or cost-benefit analysis as well as environmental analysis. The specific guidelines 
for strategy analysis were provided via the SP Guide 2006. 
The practice in the field developed rather differently from the prescriptions of the SP Guide 
2006. The strategic planning programme did not include a stage dedicated to comprehensive 
analysis of alternatives, nor were the departments instructed to carry out such kind of 
DQDO\VHVIRUWKHSURSRVHGVWUDWHJLHV3DUWLFLSDQWV¶UHIOHFWLRQVVKRZHGWKDWWKH6'8XQGHUWRRN
costing and budgeting phases rather than a cost-benefit analysis stage: 
³1R LW ZDV QRW FDUULHG RXW FRVW-EHQHILW DQDO\VLV ZDV QRW FDUULHG RXW « EXW WKHUH ZDV WKH
EXGJHWLQJVWDJH«7KHVHNLQGRIVWXGLHVZHUHQRWWKDWSRVVLEOHWREHSHUIRUPHGLQWKHILUVW
planning period;  you have a group who are totally unfamiliar with the concepts [and] with the 
procHVVHV«´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
Strategy proposals were subjected to the routine, traditional or unit-specific analysis 
procedures of separate departments, independent of the strategic planning activities 
(Interview_28_planner).  
The strategy board held two meetings to discuss a set of goals as well as other issues related 
to the planning process and adopted the goal-set in 2007 (SDU, 2007e, 2008a)7KH6'%¶V
meetings took place in the traditional hierarchical way in which the undersecretary was 
GRPLQDQW 'HFLVLRQV ZHUH WDNHQ RQ WKH EDVLV RI D ³QDWXUDO FRQVHQVXV´
(Interview_28_planner), which was developing intrinsically during discussions. Although 
reasonable ideas were being voiced within debates, there was very little room for negotiation 
and bargaining. Every unit had a different mandate and the department heads most the time 
UHIUDLQHGIURPLQWHUYHQLQJLQDQRWKHUXQLW¶VDUHDRILQWHUHVW$Q\FRQIOLFWZKHUHLWHPHUJHG
was being settled by the chair of the meetings. In an extreme comment, a manager was 
reflecting the dominance of the chair (undersecretary) in the meetings saying:  
³+RZ FDQ \RX GLVSXWH WKHUH" ,W LV ZKDWHYHU WKH XQGHUVHFUHWDU\ VD\V LW LV´
(Interview_31_Former_Manager)  
As will be detailed in the section on budgeting, conflict and bargain was ruled out because 
planning did not function as a means of budget allocation, according to the planners. The 
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perception of the management matched that of the planners (e.g. Interview_13_manager). 
One planner surmised that the decisions were not being produced as a result of close 
interaction between the department heads: 
 ³2I FRXUVH WKHUHZHUHH[SUHVVLRQVRI LGHDVEXW WKHUHZDVQRW D VLQJOHGHFLVLRQ WDNHQXSRQ
H[WHQVLYH GLVFXVVLRQ WKDW FDQ EH FDOOHG DV µ<HV >WKLV LV@ RXU FROOHFWLYH GHFLVLRQ¶ 1RERG\
LQWHUYHQHG LQ HDFK RWKHU¶V PDQGDWH 7KH\ LQWHUYHQHG ZLWK WKH VWXII UHODWHG WR WKHLU RZQ
mandate. Others did not step in´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU  
The stage was neither theoretically nor practically closed to opposing comments but, as 
underlined previously, the discussions took place within the traditions of the MoI 
bureaucracy, which was putting considerable limitations on an open and democratic climate 
of discussion. The following comments by a manager highlight this dimension: 
 ³7KHUH LV WKH >XQGHUVHFUHWDU\@ WKHUH WKHUH LV KLHUDUFK\ VR EDUJDLQLQJ GRHV QRW WDNH SODFH
1HLWKHU FRHUFLRQQRUEDUJDLQ H[LVWV >,W@ GLGQRW WDNHSODFH%XW OHW¶V VD\ FRQYHUVDWLRQVDQG
talks occur for or against the subject matter on the agenda. Whichever is weighted gets 
DGRSWHGDVWKH%RDUG¶VRSLQLRQ.´ (Interview_35, Former Manager) 
$QRWKHUPDQDJHU¶VYLHZVUHYHDOHGWKDWGLVFXVVLRQVPRVWO\RFFXUUHGRQWHFKQLFDODVSHFWVVXFK
as claims of mandate overlaps or uncertainties over mandates (Interview_39_former 
manager). SDB meetings functioned as platforms for the settlement of such questions about 
mandates (Interview_31__former_manager). 
7KHUHVXOWVZHUHQRWVDWLVIDFWRU\IURPWKHSODQQLQJWHDP¶VSRLQWRIYLHZ:KHQWKHILUVWGUDIW
of the MoI Strategic Plan 2010-14 was finalised and sent to the SPO for approval in 2008, it 
included 25 strategic aims, 104 strategic targets and 344 performance indicators 
(Interview_36_planner). Performance indicators were seen as proxies for strategies and 
therefore the planning team did not include a specific section for strategies in the draft plan. 
The draft was criticised, as anticipated by the planners and turned down by the SPO for not 
including strategies more explicitly and for including numerous goals, objectives and 
indicators, which were seen as a challenge to effective implementation. The result was not a 
total surprise for the planning team: 
³6RWKHUHPLJKWKDYHEHHQLWHPVLQFOXGHGWKHUH>ZLWKLQWKHSODQ@WKDWZHUHLQFRPSDWLEOHZLWK
the logic of strategic planniQJ EHFDXVH IRU LQVWDQFH \RX ZRXOGQ¶W EH DEOH WR SHUVXDGH WKH
deputy director-JHQHUDOLQWKDWGHSDUWPHQW+HPLJKWKDYHVDLGµ1RWKLVLVLQGLVSHQVDEOHIRU
WKH0LQLVWU\¶:KDWKDSSHQVLQVXFKDVLWXDWLRQ«",WJHWVGHFOLQHGE\WKH632DWWKHUHYLHZ
stage´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU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Upon stern criticism from the SPO, the team started to review the draft and targeted three 
things: First, they aimed to reduce the number of strategic goals, targets, and performance 
indicators due to concerns about the applicability of such a plan. This task was not an easy 
one since the departments were very reluctant to concede. Secondly, they decided to include 
distinctive strategies explicitly within the plan. Thirdly, upon approval by the undersecretary, 
the SDU merged the Strategic Planning Department and the Department of Performance and 
Budgeting under the new Department of Strategic Management to synchronise planning 
activity and prevent some existing conflicts stemming from the bipartite structure (Director-
Planner-2, SDU).  
Meetings continued at the first and second levels of discussion. As time progressed the 
managers and the staff started to lose their concentration. The planning team emphasised the 
importance of adoption and management support for the success of the process at every 
opportunity. They then decided to be pragmatic and started to re-categorise the current set of 
goals and targets. They combined similar goals and pushed some goals down to the target 
level and joined related targets, even if they were loosely related (Interview_41_planner). A 
planner described the process as follows: 
³:HQRWLFHGWKDWDQGGLGWKDW<RXFDQWXUQWKHPLQWRVWUDWHJLHVE\UHJURXSLQJWHQRIWKHP
under one. By pulling the aims down, by pulling the targets down to a lower level, we 
transformed them into strategies. We then produced the indicators from there, and strategies 
ZHUHQRWGHYHORSHGLQDZD\VXFKDVµWKLVRUWKDW¶EXWLQDZD\WKDWRFFXUUHGDVGHJUDGLQJWKH
levels. But these have the same consequences´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHr) 
Following this the team initiated bilateral discussions with departments to generate effective 
performance targets. The units did not have attendance from high level managers during this 
round of debates. Nor did they engage in discussions on whether or not their activities were 
measurable in their results. By implication, they left this task to the team and to the SDU 
(Interview_36; Interview_41, planners). The diminished level of attendance increased the 
burden of the team twofold. They started, with the support of the NPC consultants, to 
examine the activities and projects of the departments to come up with reasonable 
performance indicators for the selected strategies. They then realised that service and 
mandate areas that could not be quantified were excessive in contrast to the ones that were 
quantifiable. They had particular difficulties when assigning indicators as measures of 
outcomes in policy-making and regulation-related areas such as local authorities and 
provincial administrations, which were two of the main service units in the organisational 
110 
 
chart. There were other fields posing problems, such as the civil registration services, as 
highlighted by a planner:  
³,WKLQNWKDWWKHFLYLOUHJLVWUDWLRQLVKDYLQJSUREOHPVZLWKWKHGHILQLWLRQRILQGLFDtors. In fact, 
we are having trouble with the civil registration although it is a unit that should not be 
experiencing problem´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
Civil Registration was a service delivery unit responsible for, among other things, issuing ID 
cards through provincial branches, which could easily be quantified. It ZDV ³WKH RQO\
department with a described duty within the MinisWU\ RI ,QWHULRU´ ,QWHUYLHZB
former_manager). The problem with civil registration was the exclusion of its provincial 
branches, which were performing the delivery function at the frontline, from the strategic 
plan. The strategic plan included the duties of the department centre, such as the completion 
of an e-government project. Therefore, performance indicators targeted inputs rather than 
more quantifiable service outputs.  
As a result of this complex exercise, the planners perceived unquantifiability of services as 
one of the most important challenges to beset strategic planning in the MoI (Interview_2; 
(Interview_33; Interview_36 Interview_41). The IROORZLQJZHUHDSODQQHU¶Vimpressions: 
 ³2XU«GHSDUWPHQWVDUHKDYLQJJUHDWGLIILFXOWLHVLQGHILQLQJLQGLFDWRUV7KHUHDVRQLVPD\EH
the limited level of direct service delivery towards the citizens; having a guiding character; 
makiQJ SROLF\ GHILQLQJ FULWHULD « 2QH RI WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW SUREOHPV LV GHILQLWHO\ WKH
specification of indicators that are not fully measurable, and the inclusion of indicators within 
the programme, in one way or another, that are not much outcome-oriented´  
(Interview_41_planner) 
The team had time constraints, hence had to be practical. As conveyed by the planners, they 
generated performance indicators from departmental activities (Interview_36_planner).  They 
took advantage of the Ministry Investment Programme, which included the projects and 
activities of the units in detail along with departmental proposals. It meant that performance 
indicators, in certain fields, were assigned as a measure of input only, such as the fulfilment 
of an activity or a project that is defined as formal effectiveness (Boyne, 2002), rather than as 
a measure of the outcomes of that specific activity. The outcomes of this process were 
perceived by a manager accordingly: 
³,QWKHH[LVWLQJ>VWUDWHJLF@SODQWRWKHH[WHQWWKDW,UHPHPEHUWKHUHZDVQ¶WWKDWDSSURDch in 
the sense of a measurable performance. Rather, it was a study of in what period specific duties 
ZRXOGEHSHUIRUPHGRYHU\HDUV´,QWHUYLHZBBIRUPHUBPDQDJHU 
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Eventually, when the team felt that they were ready to move on to the costing stage, they had 
drawn the twelfth version of the goal-set which included six strategic goals and thirteen 
strategic targets (Interview_36_planner). The simplification of goals and strategies was 
welcomed by the management and staff which had a direct effect on the extent of adoption, 
as observed by the planners:  
³%XWQRZLWLVHDVLHUWKHDGRSWLRQOHYHOVLQFUHDVHGVLQFHWKHLQGLFDWRUV were measurable and 
quantified. The adoption level considerably increased in the units as well; they became happy 
I mean.´,QWHUYLHZBBSlanner) 
The planning process produced its first output through the publication of a bi-monthly 
Internal Affairs Magazine in early 2009, organised by the SDU as part of the publicity 
strategy agreed during the planning meetings (Interview_ 33_planner). As expressed by the 
head of the SDU in the first issue of the periodical, its main target was to promote the new 
vision and mission of the MoI through communication of departmental activities, projects, 
best practices and developments with internal and external audiences under the principles of 
transparency and accountability (MoI, 2009a). 
5.2.4.3. The Content of the Strategies 
The selected six goals, cascading objectives and strategies reflected the perceptions, actions 
and reactions of the MoI management to the diverse developments, trends and related 
tensions occurring in its extremely dynamic environment, which was described above in the 
first section of this chapter. Hence, the reflection of the outcomes of the situation analysis 
within the strategic plan was crucial for the formulation of effective strategies to find the best 
ILWEHWZHHQWKH0R,DQGLWVKLJKO\G\QDPLFHQYLURQPHQW3ODQQHUV¶YLHZHGWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
of the results of analyses inadequate and pointed to a gap in this regard (e.g. 
Interview_41_planner). The accounts presented by the planners implied the existence of some 
bureaucratic rules acting as filters that defined what to count in and what to overlook during 
the formulation of strategies. The management was applying a combination of explicit and 
implicit criteria that was a blend of the management paradigm of the MoI and the obligations 
of the formal PFMCL framework. The selection criteria were observed to include five main 
decisive components: (1) legality, (2) JRYHUQPHQW¶V SUHIHUHQFH  EDVLF YDOXHV DQG
principles, (4) impact of the status quo and (5) cost (Interview_13; Interview_17; 
Interview_27; Interview_22; Interview_29; Interview_30; Interview_31, managers). How 
these criteria are employed for the selection of strategies is discussed at length in Chapter 7 
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section 7.2. Formulated in congruence with these criteria, six strategic areas were targeted 
WKURXJKVL[VWUDWHJLFJRDOVZLWKLQWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQ7KHVL[VWUDWHJLFDUHDVDQGJRDOV
were (MoI, 2009c, p. 54-74): 
1. Central Administration System: To enhance and reinforce the provincial 
administration (prefectural) system. 
2. Law Enforcement and Security: To advance and reinforce the homeland 
security services. 
3. E-government: To enable online delivery of the services provided by the 
Ministry. 
4. Local Authorities: To provide efficiency, effectiveness, participation, 
transparency, and accountability in local authorities. 
5. Civil Society: To obtain the development of the civil society. 
6. Re-organisation: To overhaul the organisational structure of the Ministry. 
5.2.5. Costing and Budgeting 
The stage of costing was a preparatory step for the following budgeting phase. The total cost 
of the strategic projects and activities had to remain within budgetary limits. This required the 
prioritisation of projects and activities by consideration of the principles of sustainability, 
effectiveness, efficiency and impact (SPO, 2006c, p. 43)(SPO, 2006). The stage developed 
straightforwardly. The SDU was responsible for the consolidation and finalisation of the 
Ministry budget. Therefore, it had the budgetary data in hand. As strategies were selected 
among already running activities and projects, the planning team could and did pragmatically 
refer to the budget projections of years 2010-2011 (Interview_36; Interview_41_planners). 
They had the projections for 2009-2011 since three-year budgeting had replaced single-year 
budgeting through PFMCL 2003 regulations. They also referred to the cross-governmental 
Mid-term Plan 2009-2011, which included across-the-board public budgetary forecasts for 
three years. Relying on this data and forecasts, the team calculated the cost for strategies for 
the next five years. They sent the draft strategic plan, including the cost forecasts, to 
departments for their last comments. The team turned departmental comments into a proposal 
and brought it into the agenda of the SDB. Upon approval of the proposal, the SDU sent the 
draft strategic plan once again to the SPO. This time the SPO asked for some minor 
corrections but did not want the plan to be re-VXEPLWWHG $IWHU FRUUHFWLRQV WKH 0R,¶V ILUVW
strategic plan for the years 2010-2014 was finalised.  
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The budgetary capabilities had been an important subject of debate during the SDB meetings. 
The management was of the view that limited budgetary funds would not allow for setting 
stretch JRDOV HYHQ LI WKHGHSDUWPHQWVZHUH LQ IDYRXURIGRLQJ VR7KH PDQDJHUV¶ DUJXPHQW
that their appropriations for capital and operating budgets were already definite was 
undermining the whole idea of strategic transformation. The department heads raised their 
REMHFWLRQVGXULQJWKHPHHWLQJV$SODQQHU¶VFRPPHQWVZHUH 
³7KH\VDLGµ:KDWFDQ,YLVXDOLVHEH\RQGWKLV,ZLOOGRWKLVDQGWKLVDQGWKDWDV'HSDUWPHQW
X, but the budget alloFDWHGWRPHLVGHILQLWH«,WKDVDOLPLW«¶7his point is one which turns 
all the motivation upside down´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
7KH PDQDJHUV¶ YLHZV FRLQFLGHG ZLWK WKH SHUVSHFWLYH WKDW WKH LQDGHTXDF\ RI UHVRXUFHV ZDV
one of the most important obstacles before formal strategic planning (Boyne et al., 2004). 
7KHPDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQRIOLPLWHGUHVRXUFHVZDVLQWHUHVWLQJJLYHQWKDWEXGJHWDU\UHVRXUFHV
increased by 54 percent in the first year of the plan. Data presented in Table 5.2 may explain 
the grounds of that perception.  
 
7DEOH7KH0R,¶V(VWLPDWHGDQG5HDOLVHG%XGJHWDU\)LJXUHV8QLWVLQ*%3 
Planning Preparation Implementation 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Estimated  
%XGJHW  1.029.102.681 986,147,937 892,447,664 1,005,673,976 
Estimated- 
Realised 
Spending 
Difference 
(%) 
 
 
32 8 35 41 
Realised 
Budget 
6SHQGLQJ 
716,548,152 883,654,864 1,361,911,364 1,064,833,245 1,201,048,450 1,418,114,382 
Increase in 
Budget 
Spending 
(%) 
 
23 54 -22 13 18 
* Figures converted from Turkish Lira to GBP by referring to the exchange rates of the Turkish Central Bank in the 
respective reference years. 
 
Source: (MoI, 2009c, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a) 
 
Table 5.2 presents the estimated and realised budgetary spending figures throughout the 
period 2008 and 2013, as well as the annual change in percentage. An important impression 
114 
 
emerging from Table 5.2 is the remarkable deviations in the estimated figures, which is an 
indicator of the incoherence of the predictions during the strategic planning process. The 
lowest deviation in estimated figures was in 2011 by 8 percent, while it was over 30 per cent 
in 2010 and 2012, reaching an apex of 41 percent in 2013. The amount of increase in the 
budget, according to the figures, could not be predicted by the management. 
The PFMCL model introduced two very important changes into the financial management 
system of the MoI, as well as the whole public sector. First, the PFMCL 2003 delegated 
financial powers, particularly spending power, to lower echelons within the hierarchy, which 
was traditionally accumulated at the centre. Second, it increased the temporal scope of 
budgeting from single-year to multi-year (three years) budgeting. The changes were 
welcomed by managers with great satisfaction, particularly by ones whose departments make 
large capital investments covering multiple years, for it removed uncertainty regarding 
income and opened room for manoeuvre. A manager commented: 
³%XGJHW ZDV SUHYLRXVO\ JRLQJ WR WKH GHSXW\ XQGHUVHFUHWDU\ HYHQ VRPH ZHUH JRLQJ to the 
Minister [for approval]. In the analytic budget it ends at the director-general; I mean it does 
not go beyond whoever the department head is. This is the right way, and it has mobilised [the 
GHSDUWPHQWV@PXFK«%HIRUH\RXZHUH«GRLQJ\RXUSURMHFWs on annual basis, and no work 
ends in one year. You can [now] plan more comfortably by looking ahead´
(Interview_31_former_manager) 
Although this was an important move forward, there was still a two-year gap, as the strategic 
plan was being prepared for five years. The Guide 2006 stipulated the prediction of budgetary 
revenues for the remaining two years by the MoI itself (SPO, 2006c).  
The formal PFMCL framework required the establishment of a strong link between strategic 
plan and budget. It introduced performance budgeting as a tool into the management system 
to establish this link. Regulations required the preparation of annual performance 
programmes and dispatch of the programme to the MoF and the SPO for approval. Unlike the 
extension of the budget period, performance budgeting evoked concerns among managers. 
They thought that they might not be entitled to receive appropriations for any project and 
activity that was excluded from the strategic plan. This motivated the departments to urge the 
planning team to include all departmental proposals within the plan complicating the process 
as mentioned earlier. The process did not unfold as rigidly as expected. Following was a 
PDQDJHU¶VYLHZ
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³, GRQ¶W WKLQN WKDW WKH DSSURSULDWLRQV ZHUH DOORFDWHG DFFRUGLQJ WR the strategic plan.´
(Interview_35_former_manager). 
There were, and still remain, strong system-related obstacles to performance budgeting. For 
example, the central and inflexible employment system of the public sector was impeding the 
calculation of labour costs for each project separately. Similarly, the accounting system was 
not based on programmes, but on functions. Therefore, the MoI continued to implement, in 
consultation with the MoF, the traditional line-item budgeting system. The perception of the 
management of the post-planning era was no different to that of the pre-planning era as 
regards to budgeting.  A typical comment was: 
³,W LV WKH VDPH DV UHJDUGV WR WKH EXGJHW , PHDQ DQ DSSURDFK RI µOHW¶V FXW WKLV GLUHFWRUDWH-
JHQHUDO¶VEXGJHWDQGDGGLWWR WKHUH¶GRHVQRWH[LVWLQJHQHUDO«7KH0LQLVWU\RI)LQDQFHFDOOV
LQWKLVZD\µWKHDSSURSULDWLRQVZLOOEHLQFUHDVHGE\WKLV\HDU¶«7KHSURSRVDOVDUHPDGH
DFFRUGLQJO\ « %XW >VD\@ WKH 'LUHFWRUDWH-*HQHUDO RI &LYLO 5HJLVWUDWLRQV GRHVQ¶W EDUJDLQ RU
have an argument on appropriations with the Directorate-*HQHUDO IRU /RFDO $XWKRULWLHV´
(Interview_13_manager). 
Although four annual performance programmes have been prepared by 2014, programme 
budgeting has not been implemented in the MoI.  
5.3. Implementation, Monitoring, Evaluation and Feedback 
5.3.1. Monitoring Implementation 
The formal PFMCL framework theoretically ensured implementation of strategies through ex 
ante annual performance programming and ex post performance reporting. It is argued that 
performance programming failed in the Turkish public administration (Kesik and Canpolat, 
2014). The situation was not much different in the MoI. The MoI departments started to 
report their performance data as required formally. The SDU was accountable for the 
accumulation of the reported data. The departmental data were being input through a module 
within the online e-butce5 application which was being centrally hosted by the MoF from 
2009 onwards. The key element for the future of effective plan implementation was whether 
or not the reports would have implications, either positive or negative, for the managers and 
departments. The practice showed that internal reporting became a routine activity without 
important consequences for the departments (Interview_36; Interview_42, planners).  
                                                 
5 Electronic budgetary management platform of the Turkish public sector, which is a component of the 
SGB-Net network of the MoF. 
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,QWKHPHDQWLPHWKHDSSRLQWPHQWRIWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V8QGHUVHFUHWDU\0UgPHU'LQoHU
who was the designer and the champion of the strategic management reform in the Turkish 
Public Sector, as the Minister of Labour and Social Security in mid-2009 marked the start of 
DQLPSRUWDQWGHFOLQHLQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VG\QDPLFHPSKDVLV (an emphasis shown by rhetoric 
and action) on strategic management reform. High levels of manager turnover undermined 
the stability of implementation as well, a weakness of the MoI detected during the situation 
analysis study. The inspections of the Inspection Board and the audits of the Internal Audit 
8QLWGLGQRWDIIHFW WKHPDQDJHPHQWV¶SHUFHSWLRQ7KH*RYHUQPHQWVWHSSHGEDFNIROORZLQJ
the enforcement of the Amendment Law 2012, from the legislation that empowered the Court 
of Accounts to perform performance review as part of external audit.  
The publicising of the reports, on the other hand, is perceived by the departments and the 
SDU officials as bringing to bear pressure for better implementation. However, the practice 
showed that this pressure was not actually imposed on the MoI or any other public 
organisation by Parliament, or by wider society. 
5.3.2. Evaluation and Feedback 
The SDU was designed to be a central evaluative unit by the formal PFMCL framework. 
Although it was assigned evaluative functions by the By-Law on the Operation Methods and 
Principles of SDUs 2006, such as the analysis of departmental performance, the conduct of 
R&D in failing or other service fields and the analyses of service effectiveness and service 
user satisfaction, the SDU has not been able to perform these duties in practice. The SDU, 
rather, performed the function of accumulating the departmental quarterly performance data 
and returning the data to the units as a single report for feedback purposes. As commented by 
a planner, feedback beyond the formal performance reporting was being given to the 
departments through informal channels: 
 ³7KLVLVVRPHNLQGRIDXQLWWKDWFDQYLHZWKH0Lnistry from above as a whole; at that level of 
TXDOLILFDWLRQ«,QWKLVUHJDUGLILWLVDOORZHGLWKDVWKHFDSDFLW\WRSHUIRUP>WKHHYDOXDWLRQRI
results]. We are transferring this orally to the units in some occasions when appropriate. There 
are units acting upon this´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
Completing the picture, the following account of a manager reveals a gap in evaluation of 
results and the continuation of traditional methods of evaluation:  
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³>3HUIRUPDQFH GDWD@ DUH WDNHQ >RU@ JDWKHUHG UHJXODUO\ DQG systematically in a reiterating 
manner. But I doubt whether or not these are evaluated´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The overall monitoring and feedback mechanism was perceived as inadequate by both the 
planners and the managers: 
³6R,FDQIUDQNO\VD\WKDWWKH monitoring and evaluation process of the strategic plan lacks; 
and that it does not operate effectively´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
³«,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWWKHHYDOXDWLRQV\VWHPJHQHUDWHVJUDYHFRQVHTXHQFHVIRURXU'LUHFWRUDWH-
General´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
A recent development has been promising. The Undersecretary decided in 2012 during the 
approval of the performance programme to receive the 2013 annual activity reports of the 
GHSDUWPHQWV LQ SHUVRQ 7KH 8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶V GHFLVLRQ KDG D SRVLWLYH LPSDFW RQ PDnagers 
through the pressure it generated. For example, the departments tended to include more 
SHUIRUPDQFH WDUJHWV WKDQ WKH SUHYLRXV \HDU DIWHU WKH 8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶V GHFLVLRQ ZDV
announced, to show how highly engaged they were in the pursuit of organisational goals 
(Interview_ 36_planner). The involvement of top management was perceived as the most 
LPSRUWDQWIDFWRUE\WKHSODQQHUVDQGPDQDJHUVLQHYRNLQJWKHPDQDJHUV¶LQWHUHVWVLQVWUDWHJLF
plan-related activities:  
³7KHUHDUHWLPHVLQZKLFKWKHWRSPDQDJHPHQt gets involved in the process, I believe they are 
now. We can form this pressure through the WRS PDQDJHPHQW « LI WKH DFWLYLW\ UHSRUWV DUH
spoken at the top management level; department by department - it is now being done - lets 
VD\ « LI WKH WRS PDQDJHU Rr the department heads asks why performance targets were not 
DFKLHYHG«WKDQLWPDNHVVHQVH´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
:KDW PDGH WKH WRS PDQDJHU¶V WKH 8QGHUVHFUHWDU\ SRVLWLRQ FHQWUDO DQG GRPLQDQW ZDV WKH
management culture of the MoI, as perceived by some of the managers (for example 
Interview_12_manager). These managers pointed to the detrimental effects of an absent link 
between performance and the appraisal of the managers on plan implementation. The 
publication of the annual activity report is reported to have had a positive effect on plan 
implementation; however, this effect was far below the potential pressure that it could exert, 
due to the low level of awareness and even indifference of the Turkish Parliament and of 
wider society to performance reports.  
Four annual activity reports were prepared and published by the MoI by 2014, the final year 
of the first strategic plan. The reports show that there are departments that outperformed as 
well as others that underperformed according to the formal effectiveness figures presented 
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(MoI, 2013). The first strategic plan of the MoI documented activities that were already being 
FDUULHGRXWDQGVWD\HGDVµDSODQRQWKHVKHOI¶LQWKHIRXU\HDUVRILPSOHPHQWDWLRQZKLFKZDV
far from generating the expected outcomes, according to the perceptions of a majority of the 
managers and planners. One manager stated: 
³7KHVHNLQGVRIDFWLYLWLHVDOUHDG\H[LVWHGEHIRUHSODQQLQJZKLFKZHDUHGRLQJXQGHUWKHWDJ
RI VWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJDV , VDLGEHIRUH6R WKHUH LVQ¶WDQ\WKLQJ What can be deemed changed 
XSRQWKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKHVWUDWHJLFSODQ«7KHVWUDWHJLFSODQSHUKDSVKDVUHJLVWHUHGWKHVH´
(Interview_9_manager) 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a coherent narrative of the strategic planning practice of the MoI 
thaWFDPHLQWRWKH0R,¶VDJHQGDE\OHJLVODWLYHPDQGDWHDQGWRRNSODFHLQDKLJKO\FRPSOH[
and dynamic environment. It told the story of a central governmental ministry with a strong 
and established culture and whose management is accustomed to day-to-day management and 
problem-solving, rather than goal-based planning. Strategic planning practice within the MoI 
was a combination of analytical and non-analytical practices. Evidence demonstrated how 
human relations, communication, diplomacy, persuasion and other kinds of interaction played 
important roles in the strategy-making process. Evidence also showed how the interaction 
among strategy practitioners, specifically managers, planners, consultants and stakeholders 
and their level of expertise and strategy knowledge affected the strategy formulation process 
and outcomes. There were a few factors and mechanisms that were successfully utilised to 
leverage the strategic planning process, such as the formation of the three-level decision-
pyramid to enhance participation and employment of strategy consultants. However, these 
positive aspects were overshadowed by many negative practices, such as problems with the 
formal PFMCL framework; inadequacy of training on what formal strategic planning is and 
how and why it should be applied; the insufficiency of the commitment of the top and other 
managers; high manager turnover; failure to link the strategic plan and budget; failure to 
establish effective monitoring, evaluation and feedback systems; and failure to integrate all 
agencies under corporate strategic planning, which made the first strategic planning practice 
of the MoI ineffective. The problem with the measurability of the service, which stemmed 
IURPWKHSXEOLFQDWXUHRIWKH0R,¶VVHUYLFHVZDVDVLJQLILFDQWIDFWRUWKat negatively affected 
the practice. The existing strong organisational culture and status quo prevailed and the 
implementation of strategic planning did not make significant impact upon the practice of the 
MoI, despite the comprehensiveness of the strategic planning reform. To conclude, the first 
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strategic planning trial of the MoI was ineffective and did not bear the expected change and 
positive results that were sought and expected.  
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CHAPTER 6 
RATIONAL PLANNING THEORY AND 
EVIDENCE FROM THE MOI 
 
 
³7KHODZKDVDVRXOOHVVODQJXDJHIRULWV«WUDQVODWLRQ«,WGRHVQ¶WKDYHDVRXOWKHUHLVWKH
body; we will blow the soul to that body. The generation will [gain experience], as I said, it 
will change, it will resemble us, and the owners will increase once it resHPEOHVXV´ 
  (Interview_21_manager) 
 
 
The process of strategy formulation, in the rational planning sense, shows patterns of high 
formality and explicitness throughout all the planning phases. It involves the deployment and 
pursuit of a series of highly analytical and logical procedures for the formulation of strategies 
(Collier et al., 2001) as evidence of procedural rationality. This chapter analyses the strategic 
planning practice of the MoI by applying the patterns of the rational planning model outlined 
in the conceptual framework in Chapter 2 (see Table 2.1) to the formal PFMCL framework 
and to the practice of the MoI. By testing the theoretical patterns against case patterns, the 
Chapter demonstrates the degree of coherence between rational planning and the formal 
3)0&/IUDPHZRUNDQGEHWZHHQUDWLRQDOSODQQLQJDQGWKH0R,¶VSUDFWLFH,WGLJVGHHSWRILQG
the root factors, structures and mechanisms that generate this practice. The results of pattern-
matching are discussed in the conclusion section of this chapter. The accounts of the 
managers and planners and the content of the legal texts and official documents form the data 
sources for the analysis. This chapter is structured in five main sections: 
1) Pattern 1: Comprehensive Analysis of Strategy Alternatives, 
2) Pattern 2: Formality, 
3) Pattern 3: Implementation, 
4) Pattern 4: Integration and Co-ordination, 
5) Conclusion. 
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6.1. Pattern 1: Comprehensive Analysis of Alternative Strategies 
It was argued in the Chapter 2 that analysis of alternative strategies in rational planning is 
formal, analytical and comprehensive with regard to cost-benefit analyses of available 
strategy options. Hence, it is expected that an organisation that adopts formal strategic 
planning will employ formal-analytical procedures for strategy analysis. In this section, the 
research looks into the fulfilment of the range of strategy alternatives considered, strategy-
related information gathering and use, particularly the extent to which innovative strategies 
were considered in analyses, the employment of formal analytical methods for cost-benefit 
analyses and piloting and the application of the efficiency rule in the MoI. The section not 
only retrospectively explores and explains the planning period, but also tracks changes in the 
perceptions of the managers throughout the plan implementation period.  
The formal PFMCL framework ascribed the duty of cost-benefit analysis to the SDU to 
ensure that it was conducted centrally and professionally. The SP Guide 2006 described how 
the analysis should be performed through exploration and selection of the best strategies and 
how the results of the SWOT analysis should be exploited in the analysis process (SPO, 
2006c). Central analysis of strategies occurred incompletely during the strategic planning 
process in the MoI. The process did not include a formal and explicit cost-benefit analysis of 
strategic alternatives, one in which monetary and other costs and benefits are weighed 
thoroughly and comparatively against alternative policies, programmes, projects, activities, 
DQGGHFLVLRQV,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU%HORZLVDSODQQHU¶VYLHZ 
³, WKLQN DQ HYDOXDWLRQ RI DOWHUQDWLYHV GLG QRW H[LVW , PHDQ WKHUH ZDVQ¶W DQ HYDOXDWLRQ RI
alternatives; but maybe it was partly tidying up the expressions´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
As pointed out by the planner, analysis during strategic planning focused on prioritisation of 
goals through reducing numerous departmental proposals to a feasible and concise guideline 
and articulation of expressions, which was carried out by the planning team. With this aim, a 
range of activities and projects were considered both through formal proposals from units and 
throughout the discussions in workshops at different levels. Formal proposals from the 
GHSDUWPHQWVPRVWO\UHLWHUDWHGµEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶7hey included what the units had already 
been doing and what they would be doing to meet their legal obligations in the following 
\HDUV,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU$SODQQHU¶VUHIOHFWLRQRIWKHSURFHVVZDV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³7KHIRUPDWLRQRIWKHVWUDWHJLHVILUVW>WKHSODQQHUV] in our unit formed drafts following the 
VSHFLILFDWLRQRIJRDOVDQGWDUJHWVOLNHµWKLVFDQEHDVWUDWHJ\¶DQGWKHVHGUDIWVZHUHUHYLVHG
upon discussions with the units´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
A study of costing took place following the formulation of strategies, in order to calculate the 
budgetary requirements for plan implementation (MoI, 2009c). As pointed out by some of the 
planners and managers, the superficiality of central strategy analysis was mostly perceived to 
stem from the lack of technical knowledge about formal strategic planning due to the novelty 
of the technique to the MoI management (For example Interview_36; Interview_41, 
planners).  
Another aspect of the process to be highlighted was the rather limited consideration of the 
situation analysis reports in the analyses. Since strategy analysis was perceived by the actors 
as the articulation and summation of business as usual, the link between the outcomes of the 
situation analysis and strategies could not be established adequately. A planner who 
described this deficiency as the weakest link of the whole planning process underlined this 
gap: 
³7KLVSRLQWLVWKHPRVWYXOQHUDEOHVSRWRIWKHVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ7KLVLVWKHPLVVLQJOHJ<RX
conduct plenty of situation analysis; situation analysis is consisting of many other sub-
DQDO\VHV«7KHVHZHUHFRQGXFWHGYHU\FRPSUHKHQVLYHO\DQGLQJRRGTXDOLW\« [But] I think 
WKDWWKHSURFHVVZDVQRWDQHDV\RQHIRUWKHUHIOHFWLRQRIWKHVH«,PHDQWKHUHDUHSRLQWVWKDW
have been reflected, but it is impossible to speak out within this bureaucratic structure that 
they have been totally reflected´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
To give an example, although the actors identified the weakness of organisational memory 
created by the high speed of staff turnover as a defect (MoI, 2009c), they could not formulate 
a strategy to overcome the issue and high staff turnover continued to be a problem. The 
motives behind this issue were multiple and varying depending on the area of interest, as will 
be seen in forthcoming sessions. 
Overall, the data revealed a fragmented form of analysis within the MoI, which was loosely 
connected with the strategic planning process. 
6.1.1. The Range of Alternatives Considered in Analyses 
Since the central analysis of strategies that was co-ordinated by the SDU and the planning 
team was incomplete, the research directed itself to departmental approaches to analysis 
within the researched period, particularly to how the managers perceived cost-benefit analysis 
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of strategies and the reasons behind this. The interview data demonstrated that regardless of 
the method of strategy analysis and its depth, it is an established routine for all departments 
of the MoI to search for alternatives and to include multiple options in strategic decision 
proposals. The managers, to a broad extent, perceived the consideration of different 
alternatives in analysis as unavoidable, a requirement, and in some cases as a method. They 
VDZLWDVDSURFHVV IRUGHWHUPLQLQJZKDW LVTXDOLILHGZKDWEHVWVHUYHV WKH0R,¶VJRDOVDQG
targets and a practice that continues as long as the conditions, such as the availability of time, 
allow. The managers perceived the MoI by and large as an organisation that is inquisitive, 
open for quest and not handicapped by obsession (Interview_24_manager). This applies to 
the pre-planning era as well as the planning and post-planning era. The following comments 
reflected the views of managers from different departments of the MoI: 
³&HUWDLQO\ZHOOWKHUHZDVDTXHVWIRUDOWHUQDWLYHVLQWKDW>6WUDWHJ\'HYelopment] Board; and 
among the specialists. We have a wide service area ... I mean alternatives are certainly 
LQYHVWLJDWHG´,QWHUYLHZBBIRUPHUBPDQDJHU 
 ³:HDOZD\VKDYHWKHDOWHUQDWLYHVLQIURQWRIXVZHIRFXVRQWKHRQHWKDWZHFRQVLGHUDVWKH
most eligible and on the alternatives that we believe shall serve best to our goals´
(Interview_23_manager) 
The range of alternatives considered varies according to different factors, for example with 
regard to whether they are innovative or familiar options.  
6.1.2. The Degree of Analysis of Alternative Strategies 
The data shows patterns of restricted and comprehensive analysis taking place at the same 
time in the examination of strategies. While both patterns are intrinsically analytical, the use 
or non-use of formal methods to support the analysis process marks the difference between 
the two (Beach and Mitchell, 1978).  
6.1.2.1. Restricted Analysis or Unaided-Analytical Method 
The majority of the MoI managers perceived strategy analysis in their respective departments 
to be informal or non-specific. This group of ideas is classified under the unaided-analytical 
procedures category after Beach and Mitchell (1978) and the analysis is rated as restricted. 
The decision procedures employed in this pattern are still analytical. Sources of information 
frequently used by managers are; previous experience with the strategic problem, best 
practices in or out of the country in the field (Interview_3_manager) and outcomes of written 
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consultations with other departments or agencies (Interview_11_manager). However, the 
extent of the analysis does not reach the level of formal analysis since it is not adequately 
supported by formal-analytical methods.  
Restricted analysis encompasses two slightly different threads within it. According to the first 
perspective, analysis is an intellectual activity that automatically transpires in the mind and in 
the sub-consciousness when a strategic problem is recognised. Analysis is a process of giving 
forethought to a choice in order to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of different 
options. Cost-benefit analysis does not necessarily unfold formally, systematically and 
scientifically. The managers in line with this perspective were from units with supportive 
functions such as human resources and staff training and a main service unit with 
FRRUGLQDWLYHIXQFWLRQV6RPHPDQDJHUV¶FRPPHQWVZLWKWKLVYLHZVXJJHVWHG 
³2IFRXUVH LW LVGRQH LQ WKHEDFNRI\RXUPLQGZLWKLQRQH¶VPLQG«LWFDQQRWEHZLWKRXW
giving it any forethought´,QWHUYLHZB_manager) 
³&RVW>ZHOO@WKHVHDUHFRQVLGHUHG:LOOLQJO\RUXQZLOOLQJO\HYHQLI\RXGRQRWGRFXPHQWWKLV
it already exists in the sub consciousness´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
According to a different perspective, strategy analysis is a process that is simply formal but 
non-specific in form or in other words it does not employ specific formal-analytical methods, 
a methodology, a template, or written criteria to judge strategy options against. This kind of 
cost-benefit analysis may occur in the form of a written consultation or discussion among 
actors at an official meeting. Cost-benefit analysis is not taken as a very technical and 
sophisticated endeavour according to this view and thus, it is conducted at a basic level. This 
view was reflected by managers from various departments functioning in different service 
domains such as provincial administration, the SDU, human resources, civil registration and 
association departments. Following are some of the comments in this vein: 
³, DP QRW RI WKH RSLQLRQ WKDW VFLHQWLILF PHWKRGV DUH HPSOR\HG « +HQFH D FRVW >-benefit] 
DQDO\VLVLVFDUULHGRXWHYHQWKRXJKDWWKHYHU\EDVLFOHYHO´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
 ³,W LV QRW LQIRUPDO EXWXQVSHFLILF LQ LWV IRUPRU LW LV SHUIRUPHGZLWKRXWKDYLQJD VSHFLILF
form´,QWHUYLHZBBPDnager) 
Taking a different stance from all other managers, one participant viewed analytical methods 
DVXQQHFHVVDU\IRUKLVGHSDUWPHQW¶VVHUYLFHDUHDGXHWRKLVSHUFHSWLRQRIDKLJKO\-regulated 
realm and due to performing regulatory functions. His comments were: 
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³:HOOVXFK>DQDO\WLFPHWKRGV@DUHQRWWKLQJV WKDWDUHPXFKUHTXLUHGDV IRUWKHVHUYLFHVZH
provide. But it can be done; certainly, such a study can be fulfilled technically´
(Interview_29_manager) 
The managers perceived cultural, system-related and service-related elements as factors 
limiting the analysis of strategies. These factors and how they lead to specific outcomes are 
discussed next. 
The first set of factors is cultural. Some of the MoI managers considered a bureaucratic-
authoritative management style as a significant impediment to comprehensive analysis. The 
leader-centred, top-down, highly authoritative management style dominant in the MoI was 
considered to have a negative effect on organisational democracy, which restricts internal 
stakeholder participation in strategic decision-making. It is perceived to lead to a restricted 
form of analysis, as it suppresses creative and alternative ideas suggested by the managers 
and by different members of staff. Hence, personal ideas and orders of the leader, such as a 
department head or the top manager, rule out a collective and systematic study of costs and 
EHQHILWVRIDYDULHW\RIVWUDWHJ\RSWLRQV$PDQDJHU¶VYLHZVZHUH 
³:HOO WKURXJK GLVFXVVLRQ RI D SURIHVVLRQDO WHDP WKURXJK ILQGLQJ RXW WKH UHTXLrements of 
science and logic, and by preparing and submitting alternatives to the decision-taker for a 
choice. No! It does not work like that here. An order must be given! Authoritarian culture! 
The characteristic of leader-centred societies´,QWHUYLHZB4_manager) 
The MoI is perceived to be a highly conservative organisation that has a status quo bias by 
most of the managers. Conservatism drives the management to refer to traditional or pre-
tested methods through the assumption of a priori reliability (Interview_6_manager). 
Although supported by weak evidence, the high influence of strong traditions may sometimes 
DPRXQW WR WDNLQJVRPHWKLQJµDV LWZDV¶ZKLFK LVHPERGLHG LQ WKHIROORZLQJFRPPHQWE\D
manager:  
"It was like this before, so we do it in the same way." (Interview_38_manager) 
A preference for traditional methods and the relative novelty of the cost-benefit analysis 
concept in public administration precludes the institutionalisation of formal strategy analysis. 
$PDQDJHU¶VUHIOHFWLRQVZHUH 
³7KLV cost-benefit concept has recently been introduced [into the Turkish public 
administration]. We cannot even say that it is fully introduced. Since it is not fully introduced, 
WKHUH LVQ¶W VXFK PHDVXULQJ RU FDOFXODWLRQ %XW LW LV QRZ RQ WKH SXEOLF VHFWRU¶V agenda´
(Interview_35_former_manager) 
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As regards to the consideration of innovative alternatives in analyses, some managers stated 
that status quo bias counteracts change, impeding institutionalisation of change and 
innovation, while some others commented that conservatism is a requirement and deliberate 
choice due to the service characteristics of the MoI, referring mostly to the core functions and 
mandates such as law enforcement and security that have highly public characteristics 
(Interview_22_manager)$PDQDJHU¶VYLHZZDV 
³:HOORIFRXUVHWHFKQLFDOO\LWLVSRVVLEOHEXWLWLVQRWVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGLQWKLVVWUXFWXUHZKLFK,
belong to. It is very difficult for demands for big change to emerge; to get approved; the 
functioning of this process is not an easy task´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Since formal analysis of strategies is not embedded or routinised within the management 
culture, fulfilment of in-depth analysis is very much dependent on leaders, individuals and 
staff with a limited scope. In the absence of institutionalised methods, analysis turns to a 
WUDGLWLRQDO XQVRSKLVWLFDWHG IRUP HQGLQJ XS LQ D UHVWULFWHG PDQQHU $ PDQDJHU¶V FRPPHQW
pointed to the methodology concerns: 
 ³:HKDYHDSUREOHPUHJDUGLQJ WKHPHWKRGRORJ\«ZHGRQRWKDYHGHILQLWH LQVWitutionally 
pre-determined [method], this is being carried out over individual-based evaluations´
(Interview_3_manager) 
The second set of factors that are mostly negatively associated with the extent of analysis are 
system-related. A small group of respondents perceived firm regulations as a constraint to the 
analysis of alternatives. Comments refer more to support, or unit-to-unit services such as 
human resources and in mostly public-to-public bodies that are regulated firmly by law. 
Bureaucratic structures show patterns of highly rule-based systems. In the case of the MoI, 
when rules and regulations define particularly who delivers the service to whom, where, 
when and how, the operational system of the units, at least the ones mentioned above, show a 
pattern of rule-based decision-making as opposed to a goal-based (Russell and Norvig, 2010) 
decision-PDNLQJPRGHO$PDQDJHU¶VYLHZSRLQWHGWRVXFKDSDWWHUQ 
³)RUH[DPSOH>WKHPRGHUDWRU@ is askingµ:KDWDUHWKHH[WHUQDOWKUHDWVWR\RXU0LQLVWU\"¶«
µ:KDt is your WDUJHW"¶ µ:HOO ,GRQRWKDYHDWDUJHW¶\RXDQVZHUµ7KH ODZKDVVWDWHGWKDW
>WKLVGHSDUWPHQW@GRHVWKLVLQWKLVZD\LQWKDWZD\DQGLQWKDWZD\,GRQ¶WNQRZDQ\RWKHU
WKLQJ,GRQ¶WKDYHDWDUJHW¶´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
7KHPDQDJHUV¶DFFRXQWVLQGicate a system of if-then rule-base that is the system of laws and 
regulations that define service delivery. In such a system, if a problem triggers a process, then 
a certain rule-base gets activated to respond with appropriate solutions. The solutions are also 
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pre-determined and formulated within the rule-base that operates in connection with the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDO PHPRU\ ZKLFK LV GHILQHG DV ³WKH VWRUHG LQIRUPDWLRQ IURP DQ RUJDQLVDWLRQ
KLVWRU\WKDWFDQEHEURXJKW WREHDURQSUHVHQWGHFLVLRQV´ (Walsh and Ungson, 1991, p. 61). 
Such a system should be renewing its memory and the rule-base continuously to respond 
effectively to the surrounding changes. While strict rule-based system structurally constrains 
the consideration of alternatives out of the rule-base and the organisational memory, at the 
same time it leads to limitations on managerial discretion, which then has a negative effect on 
both the extent of analysis and on change and innovation. A comment reflecting this 
perspective was: 
³>,QQRYDWLYH DOWHUQDWLYHs] can rarely be seen; at the end of the day we work within the 
framework of laws, regulations, and legislation, I mean we are working in the public sector. 
We have rules which mould this in a specific form. So it is rare to change and restructure 
them´Interview_4_manager) 
On the contrary, when strictly regulated units operate flexibly with a goal-based intellectual 
model, in which the actors search for the optimum action that yields the best expected utility 
against a set of preferred goals (Russell and Norvig, 2010), the analysis turns into a 
comprehensive mode, particularly when projects involve ICT infrastructure that allows 
SLORWLQJ$QH[DPSOHLV WKHµ(PHUJHQF\&DOO¶SURMHFW WKDWKDVEHHQLQLWLDWHGZLWKLQWKH
framework of Single European Emergency Call Number as an EU commitment (Dogan, 
2011). The 112 Call Centres project has been undertaken by the Directorate-General for 
Provincial Administrations, a department which has policymaking, regulatory and service 
delivery functions in a strictly regulated mandate and which delivers services to both public 
bodies and individual citizens. Goal-based decision-making and availability of piloting in this 
case enabled the management to abandon what is routine for the unit and turn to 
comprehensive analysis. $ PDQDJHU¶V DFFRXQW LV JLYHQ LQ-length below as it highlights the 
difference between the two approaches more clearly: 
³:KHQ VRPHQHZSURMHFWV DUH FRQGXFWHGGLVFXVVLRQV DUHRFFXUULQJZLWK UHJDUG WRKRZ WKH
service could be provided better, how it should be GHVLJQHG«UHJDUGLQJHLWKHULWVFRVWRULWV
contribution to citizens, to the efficiency and transparency of the service. Discussions have 
occurred on what we name as 112 project in short; we had serious discussions on the project 
while we were designing iW«WKHUHZHUHVHULRXV>GLVFXVVLRQV@RQDOWHUQDWLYHV%XWDVIRUWKH
continual services, which are delimited by the legislation, you are constrained by a certain 
zone. You can only make changes within the borders of that zone´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Limited to the mentioned aspects, the above account reflects that the managers searched for 
the best alternative strategy in the 112 project that satisfies an intrinsically ordered group of 
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goals in light of their trade-offs, which are minimising costs, providing efficiency, ensuring 
transparency and user satisfaction (and probably many more), which comprises an abstract 
³XWLOLW\IXQFWLRQ´RIWKHGHFLVLRQ-maker (Simon, 1955, p. 106).   
The third and the last set of factors are service-related. Regarding the consideration of 
innovative alternatives in analyses, a few of the managers commented with reference to the 
law enforcement and security domain in particular, that the mandate of the MoI does not 
favour substantive change. The following comment highlights this perspective: 
³7KHRFFXSDWLRQDUHDRIRXU0LQLVWU\LVQRWRQHWKDWFDQEHFKDQJHGLPPHGLDWHO\LWLVQRWD
field that can be differentiated sharply overnight or from today to tomorrow through 
arrangements´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU  
The extent of publicness of services is negatively related with the extent of analysis in the 
MoI context. The prominent public profile of the law enforcement service and the perception 
that it builds among the MoI managers, as expressed in the above quote, reinforces 
conservatism in the MoI. That is, security compliance is viewed as one of the core functions 
of the state apparatus, which should be continued steadily with minor adjustments (for 
example Interview_22_manager).  
6.1.2.2. Comprehensive Analysis or Aided-Analytical Method 
A smaller group of the MoI managers revealed that the strategy analysis process was mostly 
formal and comprehensive in their departments. This pattern is referred to in this section as 
aided-analytical category, for the analysis process is supported by formal methods (Beach 
and Mitchell, 1978, p. 441) such as piloting. Some of the managers in this group came from 
the ICT department or the departments which intensively rely on ICT infrastructure and 
exploit e-government applications widely in service delivery, such as civil registration and 
association services. Other managers originate in the local authority services whose main 
function is to regulate and standardise local authorities, and thus, work in a highly political 
domain.  
For this category, analysis involves the review of the relevant literature, the reports of 
national or international organisations and court rulings, in order to gain awareness of up-to-
date knowledge of the field. It includes extensive scanning of the internal and external 
environment to find and exploit prior experience. The scanning of the environment involves 
visits to other domestic organisations as well as other countries to witness and learn the 
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SKHQRPHQRQ LQ LWV RULJLQDO VHWWLQJ $ PDQDJHU¶V FRPPHQWV UHJDUGLQJ YLVLWV RUJDnised for 
learning from other country experiences were: 
³3UDFWLFHVRIRWKHU FRXQWULHV IRU H[DPSOH HYHQDW WKH IRXQGDWLRQRI WKHGHSDUWPHQW«ZH
examined the UK [experience]; we went there [to see] how the Charity Commission is 
working, how these things aUHEHLQJGRQH>LQWKH8.@´,QWHUYLHZBBIRUPHUBPDQDJHU 
Aided-analytical perspective involves piloting before the expansion of strategies, particularly 
costly ones. Additionally, the managers perceived more interaction and consultation with 
their stakeholders in this category. The views of the managers suggests that they perform a 
kind of unnamed SWOT analysis study, independent of the SWOT analysis carried out 
centrally during the strategic planning process, to figure out the risks/costs and benefits of the 
LQWHQGHGVWUDWHJLHV,QWHUYLHZB,QWHUYLHZB,QWHUYLHZBPDQDJHUV$PDQDJHU¶VYLHZ
was: 
³%XWZHDEVROXWHO\FRQGXFWFRVW-benefit analysis when making a regulation. I mean, we detect 
the risky areas. The weak aspects, the strong aspects, we are doing something similar to what 
ZHFDOO6:27DQDO\VLV´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Analysis shows that service delivery systems, availability of piloting, mandate and service 
domain and decision problem and environment are effective on the comprehensiveness of 
analysis. 
The first effective factor is service delivery systems. This is a factor that affects the nature of 
the analysis in the MoI. Services that are delivered through ICT infrastructure are those in 
which alternative analysis turns into a comprehensive mode. Most of the managers who 
conducted a formal cost-benefit analysis were either in the ICT department or in units that 
deliver a large part of their services online such as the civil registry and associations units. 
ICT services demand an extensive analysis of business needs, the definition of business 
processes and a subsequent analysis of possible solutions as underlined by some of the 
managers. A typical comment was: 
³:HOO DOO XQLWV ZHUH YLVLWHG WKHLU QHHGV ZHUH LGHQWLILHG DSSURSULDWH DQDO\VLV VWXdies were 
realised, and software models were developed, which fit to [the needs]´
(Interview_39_former_manager) 
A goal-based decision model replaces a rule-based model in ICT-related issues which calls 
for the decision-rule of efficiency or optimisation. Being an extremely flexible field, ICT 
enables the managers to search for the most beneficial option, rather than the least risky one, 
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among alternatives, which are effective and efficient (Interview_7_manager; Interview_40). 
Managers believe that quantifiability of data and availability of piloting or experimentation in 
the ICT domain facilitates analysis.  
Unlike other units, technical units, such as the Department for Information Technologies 
(DfIT) employ professionals and allocate a budget for analysis (DfIT, 2013), which is a 
characteristic of the aided-analytical strategy (Beach and Mitchell, 1978). In some, and 
mostly complex cases, analyses are performed under contracts by private ICT companies or 
by public organisations specialising in R&D, such as TUBITAK. In an organisation such as 
the MoI, in which the department heads belong to the prefectural class, dependence on 
professionals and private contractors to do analyses leads to different consequences. On the 
one hand, a high level of dependence is perceived by the managers to be an impediment to 
controlling the quality of analysis (Interview_25_manager). On the other hand, intensive 
interaction with private ICT companies brings in innovative ideas and solutions for the 
improvement of an already installed system or for the use of the system with other purposes, 
with some additional change in some cases (Interview_3_former_ manager). This interaction 
has important consequences as it does not only bring in innovative ideas on how services 
should be delivered, but also on what is to be delivered (Interview_31_former manager).  
Assuming the budget is available, the only limitation for experimentation in ICTs is the time 
limit. A comment in this regard was: 
³,QFKDOOHQJLQJLVVXHVZHDUHLQDQHQGHDYRXURIHxploration till the most correct results are 
WDNHQ%XWZHKDYHWRWHUPLQDWHWKLVSURFHVVDWVRPHSRLQWEHFDXVHLILWODVWVORQJ\RXZRQ¶W
have time for implementation´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU  
A goal-based decision model and the decision rule of optimisation lead the management to 
experimentation and piloting, therefore the process ends in a comprehensive mode of 
analysis.  
Although positive views were more common, two managers who worked in the ICT-related 
units did find the analysis restricted. In one case the manager referred to the MoI 
PDQDJHPHQW¶V JHQHULF DSSURDFK WR DQDO\VLV UDWKHU WKDQ WKH ,&7-related units. The other 
manager personally perceived the quality of technical analysis, rather than the procedures 
employed, as dissatisfactory. 
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Related to the first factor is the second factor of the availability of piloting. Most MoI 
managers perceived piloting as a method for strategy analysis employed by the MoI 
departments. Piloting is employed when important or radical policies or projects are involved 
and when the management lacks experience. Yet, it is not widespread, particularly in the 
Turkish public administration (Interview_6_manager). According to the managers, it is 
applied, for example, to see the practical effects of a policy in a small-scale setting or to test 
theoretical analyses in the field; to detect and eliminate potential risks of a policy or project; 
to retreat and recompense easily before the expansion of a policy to a whole country or 
region; and thereby to minimise the cost of strategies. Some examples of projects that 
involved piloting in the MoI and their years of initiation are presented in Table 6.1 below. 
Table 6.1 ± Pilot Projects Conducted by the MoI between 2003-2007 
No Project Title Content Year of Initiation 
1 e-icisleri  The  electronic communication network of 
the MoI 
2003 
2 MOBESE   National CCTV systems 2005 
3 Electronic ID Card Replacement of classical ID cards 2007 
4 112 Emergency Call 
Centres 
Combination of various emergency 
telephone numbers under 112 
 
2007 
Source: Adapted from MoI Activity Reports (MoI, 2012, 2013, 2014a) 
 
A representative example to the formal analysis in the ICT-based service provision is the 
Electronic ID Card (e-ID card) project of the Directorate-General for Civil Registration and 
Nationality. The aim of the project was to replace the existing classical ID cards with the 
electronic ID cards in order to enhance ID confirmation and prevent fraud in public services, 
DQG WR LPSURYH FLWL]HQV¶ OLYHV WKURXJK WKH DYDLODELOLW\ RI WKH HOHFWURQLF FDUGV for multi-
purpose use, such as e-passport and e-signature, according to the Decree of the Council of 
Ministers 2007 on Nationality Card Project. The project kicked off with the Nationality Card 
3URMHFW&LUFXODURI WKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFHDWD WLme when the strategic planning 
preliminaries of the MoI were just gaining pace. Hence, the realisation of the e-ID card 
project continued throughout the planning period and it was formulated as a strategy within 
the strategic plan in 2009 as follows:  
³7KH GHOLYHU\DQGH[SDQVLRQRIWKH³&LWL]HQVKLS&DUG´DVDUHSODFHPHQWRIWKHH[LVWLQJ³,'
&DUGV´VKDOOEHFRPPHQFHG.´(MoI, 2009c, p. 61) 
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The project was piloted in the City of Bolu from 2008 to 2010 to test various alternatives and 
options regarding the operating systems, materials to be used and service delivery systems 
(MoI, 2011).  
The electronic ID cards piloting project and other piloting cases referred to above show, first 
of all, that piloting, as a means of cost-benefit analysis, was applied by the MoI in the pre-
planning era, which means that formal analytical techniques were being employed by the MoI 
before the formulation and implementation of the first strategic plan. Secondly, piloting and 
project-based working was introduced into the Turkish public administration after the 
acceleration of Turkey-EU relations in early 2000s (for example Interview_13_manager). 
Thirdly, the piloting cases referred to above had technical dimensions and involved intensive 
investment in ICT infrastructure. And finally, the services targeted by the pilots were 
quantifiable to a great extent, such as the delivery of a certain amount of ID cards or 
installation of CCTV cameras and other systems. 
The third factor influential on analysis of strategies is the characteristics of the mandate and 
service domain. The political mandate of the MoI mostly relates to local authorities, such as 
municipalities and typically refers to its regulatory functions. Constituent-related issues, as in 
the regulation of local authorities, have a natural and close interplay with the political agenda 
and the interest and influence of the political actors on this mandate is demonstrably high in 
WKH0R,¶VFRQWH[W$FFRUGLQJWRDPDQDJHU 
 ³7KH SROLWLFDO DFWRUV DVVLJQ SULPH LQWHUHVW WR ZRUN ZLWK FRQFUete [political] outputs. For 
example, the local authorities department is still perceived as the most important department 
RIWKH0LQLVWU\,I\RXDVNZKDWWKH\DUHGRLQJ«7KH\LVVXHORDQSHUPLWVWRPXQLFLSDOLWLHV
and also they issue staff recruitment permits. But, this has concrete political returns. So, the 
ORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶VHUYLFHEHFRPHVDQLPSRUWDQWXQLW.´,Qterview_31_former_manager) 
While this domain attracts the full attention of politicians, strategic decisions in this area are 
perceived as associated with a high risk by the managers. Any legislation or regulation in this 
domain has a potential to cover about three thousand large and small municipalities which are 
extremely politicised bodies. The broadness of the scope and a subsequent high risk 
anticipation leads to an increase in the perception of the decision importance. As perceived 
by the managers who act in the political domain, when the strategic goal is related to highly 
political mandates and not restrictive, managers are strongly inclined to carry out broad and 
deep analysis both to find the best option and to persuade the minister or the government. A 
PDQDJHU¶VYLHZZDV 
133 
 
³6R ZH DOUHDG\ KDYH WR VWXG\ ZKDW NLQG RI ULVNV GRHV RU GRHVQ¶W H[LVW ZKDW NLQG RI
problems are present; what the pros and cons are; so that we can explain to the political will 
[and] persuade [them and] show that it is reasonable´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
When in the rare instances that the government agenda empowers managerial discretion, 
analysis occurs thoroughly both in range and depth. A comment in this regard was: 
³,IWKLVLVEHLQJSUHSDUHGE\XVLILWLVQRWWXUQHGLQWRDGLUHFWLYHVD\LQJWKDWµ\RXZLOOGRWKLV¶
«ZHHODERUDWHDOODOWHUQDWLYHV,PHDQLIZHGRLWLQWKLVZD\ZKDWWKHRXWFRPHVZLOOEHLI
we do in that way, then what. The proposals prepared for decision-takers include these 
alternatives.´,QWHUYLHZB_manager) 
The analysis takes place within the rules of political imperatives designed to minimise the 
political risks for the minister and the government while maximising positive reflections or 
satisfaction of the constituents about the consequences of the chosen strategy. Political risks 
rather than monetary costs, and political gains, such as the satisfaction of the constituents, 
rather than monetary savings or improvements are perceived as being more important in 
analysis (Interview_13_manager). In other words, political factors overshadow monetary 
aspects, although financial costs are included within analyses. Any regulation, for example, 
for an increase in the revenues of the municipalities is directly related to the government 
budget, not to the organisational budget of the MoI. Therefore, the cost of a strategy of the 
above kind is undertaken by the government.  
When a specific strategy is turned into a top-down instruction by the minister or the 
government, it distinctly constrains managerial discretion limiting the analysis of alternative 
strategies. A manager commented as:  
³:HGRZKDWWKHSROLWLFDOZLOODVNVIURPXVWRGRSODQ%SODQ& mostly are not prepared´
(Interview_19_manager) 
When managerial discretion is restricted by the political agenda, in-depth calculation of 
political risks and benefits is more likely to intensify. The decision-rule becomes the 
justification of the political decision and to provide rationale for the selected strategy. It 
becomes a process of the rationalisation of the political decision, as suggested in the literature 
(Bryson, 2011). The method used in analysis is one that has counterparts in Regulatory 
Impact Assessment (RIA) (Interview_20_manager), which is an analytical tool used to 
rationalise the preparation procedures of legislation proposals. The perceptions of the MoI 
managers regarding the use of RIA, as a formal-analytical method, are discussed below as a 
case for the use of formal-analytical tools for strategy analysis.  
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RIA was introduced as an analytical tool into the Turkish public sector in 2007 as a thread of 
the Better Regulation Practices project that was initiated by the government in 2000 (PM, 
2007). As an analytical method, it aimed at rationalising the preparation process of bills and 
regulation proposals that have considerable expected impact. The Decree of the Prime 
Ministry on RIA 2007 stipulated the quantification of targets of regulation, monetisation of 
its expected impact and preparation of a detailed standard report by public departments. 
Although the Decree on RIA 2007 stipulated the formal-analytical evaluation of a minimum 
of three alternative policies for draft laws and regulations that are expected to have an impact 
of 10 million Turkish Liras, experience shows that it is not institutionalised and routinised, 
and thus, rarely practiced. A typical comment from the MoI managers was: 
³1RLWLVQRWV\VWHPDWLFOLNHWKDW«LWLVREOigatory to carry out RIA through a regulation by 
WKH&RXQFLORI0LQLVWHUV,GRQ¶W WKLQNLW LVEHLQJGRQHDWDOO,KDYHQHYHUUHDGDGRFXPHQW
ODEHOOHGµ5,$¶UHODWHGWRDQ\ ZRUN«´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
This view accords with the following assessments of the European Commission on the 
Turkish public administration in the Turkey Progress Report 2013: 
³1R SURJUHVV ZDV PDGH ZLWK GHYHORSLQJ 5,$V ZLWK D YLHZ WR LQFUHDVLQJ WKH TXDOLW\ RI
legislation. In particular, no RIA was conducted prior to the adoption of key legislation.´(EC, 
2014, p. 8) 
A limited exception to this pattern emerges in the regulation of municipalities, which is 
highly politicised and constituent-sensitive. The method of analysis performed in relation to 
the political-regulatory mandate shows the characteristics of RIA to some extent as expressed 
either directly or indirectly by managers particularly by those who work in the local 
authorities department. Most managers who played a role in this domain reflected that they 
include criteria similar to the RIA to study the strengths and weaknesses of alternative 
options, though they imply that they do not use a standard form or template (for example 
Interview_20_manager). The RIA-like method is mostly employed when managers have 
discretion over alternative strategies and the analyses include quantitative data where possible 
(Interview_19_manager).  
Another exceptional case for the use of RIA was seen during the establishment of the new 
Directorate-General for Migration Management by the Law on Foreigners and International 
3URWHFWLRQZKLFKZDVIRUPXODWHGDVDVWUDWHJ\LQWKH0R,¶V strategic plan (2009, p.58). 
A 5,$ ZDV FRQGXFWHG E\ WKH 0R,¶V 0LJUDWLRQ %XUHDX GXULQJ WKH SUHSDUDWLRQ RI WKH ELOO
Following was the account of a manager who took part in the preparation process: 
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³)RU H[DPSOH WKLV ODZ >RQ )RUHLJQHUV DQG ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 3URWHFWLRQ@ KDV DQ 5,$ >UHSRUW@
Normally, almost no such studies are conducted [by public organisations] although it is 
obligatory for legislation. [And] no one asked us to conduct RIA during the preparation of the 
law; but we did it´,QWHUYLHZBPDQDJHU 
The above account presents another piece of evidence for the lack of institutionalisation of 
formal analysis and of how analysis is manager-dependent, despite the existence of a legal 
obligation to adopt the RIA. When governmental decree imposes one single option on the 
management, the RIA-like method inevitably gets halted. A recent example of this was 
observed during the legislation of the Law No.6360 on the Establishment of Thirteen New 
Metropolitan Municipalities 2012 that radically increased the numbers, powers and revenues 
of the metropolitan city municipalities and eroded some powers of the prefects. The bill for 
this law was prepared by the Directorate-General for Local Authorities under extremely 
limited discretion of the managers since specific preferences were already made clear by the 
JRYHUQPHQW$PDQDJHU¶VUHIOHFWLRQVZHUH 
³:HVHHLQPDQ\LVVXHVWKDW5HJXODWRU\,PSDFW$VVHVVPHQW>UHSRUWV@are not annexed to bills, 
although it is obligatory. Likewise, the law no.6360 [on metropolitan municipalities] that 
brought a big burden over the budget does not have a RIA [report]´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The management focuses on the rationalisation and justification of the preferred strategy in 
such situations, as argued above.  
The fourth factor impacting on analysis is the decision problem and environment. The 
perception of how important a decision is (Dean and Sharfman, 1993) affects the degree of 
strategy analysis DPRQJ 0R,¶V PDQDJHUV 0DQDJHUV IURP YDULRXV GHSDUWPHQWV YLHZHG
µdecision importance¶ as a cause for thorough analysis. According to the managers, when 
strategies are considered to relate to wide public groups; are costly; address politically and 
socially sensitive issues; are troublesome, problematic and involve uncertainties, or require 
excellency they are perceived as important and strategic by the management and analysis is 
widened and deepened. Some comments in this line were: 
³,WGHSHQGVWRWKHLPSRUWDnce of the subject PDWWHU«7KHUHDUHRFFDVLRQVZKHQ\RXEHKDYH
fastidiously according to the importance of the incident´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
³<RX ZRQ¶W KDYH WKH FKDQFH WR VD\ µSDUGRQ PH¶ DIWHU VSHQGLQJ ODUJH DPRXQW RI FDSLWDO´
(Interview_7_manager) 
³)RUH[DPSOHLQWKHVHHIIRUWVDERXWWKHWHUURULVP«,WLVEHFDXVHWKHLVVXHLVYHU\VHQVLWLYH
and because it includes serious risks.´,QWHUYLHZB7_former_manager) 
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Once managers believe a decision is sufficiently important, the first thing they do is to 
examine the internal and external environment to learn from others' experiences. Some of 
these managers conduct formal cost-benefit analysis and they are all from ICT-related 
departments. 
6.2. Pattern 2: Formality 
A high degree of formality is an important aspect of the rational planning model. The extent 
of formality within the formal PFMCL framework and the practices of the MoI can be 
understood by looking into the content of a strategic planning preparation programme, the 
formality of planning structures and procedures and the existence of a written strategic 
planning document.  
This research determined that strategic planning in the MoI was formal to a great extent, both 
theoretically and practically. Firstly, having a one-size-fits-all approach, the PFMCL model 
introduced a highly formal model of strategic planning. The legal arrangements established 
the principles and procedures of strategic planning in the Turkish public sector in a cascading 
fashion through laws, by-laws, a Strategic Planning Guide and circulars. Strategic planning is 
considered to be an area of special expertise. The establishment of SDUs as ad hoc 
departments by the Amendment to PFMCL in 2005 reinforced the formality of the model. 
The main legal document that defined the procedures to be followed throughout the strategic 
planning process is the MPSPPO By-law 2006.  
The provisions of the MPSPPO By-law 2006 explicitly set out the schedule of the strategic 
planning cycle from beginning to end. Article 7 determines a five-year period for a strategic 
planning cycle. Article 8 regulates the subjects of preparation period and preliminary 
programmes. According to Article 8 strategic planning is prompted by the issuance of a 
circular by the top manager, which would be the undersecretary in the MoI context. 
According to Article 13 preparation for the plan must be finalised and the draft sent to the 
MoD for review by the January of the year prior to the year that the plan comes into force. 
According to Article 8 the preliminary programme must include: 
1) Stages of strategic planning, 
2) Activities to be realised, 
3) Timetable that shows the deadlines for the stages and activities, 
4) Units and staff with responsibilities, 
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5) Need for training, 
6) Need for consultation services if required. 
Preliminary programmes of public organisations are reviewed and approved by the MoD 
before they pass on to the planning stage. The above provisions evince that the strategic 
planning model introduced by the PFMCL 2003 consists of unambiguous, explicit and formal 
procedures from top to bottom, which are under external supervision.  
The existence of a preparatory programme is the first dimension of formality. This research 
found that at the very beginning of the planning process, the planning team prepared a 
preliminary programme in light of the legislation and the Strategic Planning Guide 2006 and 
sent it to the SPO in October 2006 (MoI, 2009c). The preliminary programme served as a 
road map for the rest of the process for the planning team. A planner reflected the situation in 
the following way: 
³6XUH >LW ZDV IRUPDO@ D WHDP ZDV IRUPHG ZLWKLQ WKH VWUDWHJ\ GHYHORSPHQW XQLW LQ WKH
Ministry, at the specialist and assistant-level. A preliminary programme was prepared by the 
studies of this team. All these processes were carried out in compliance with the legislation. 
The preliminary programme included the definition of the actors and groups and teams who 
would take part in the preparation process. Their area of duty, the business that they would do 
was given a place comprehensively and a timetable related to strategic planning was issued. 
And the rest of the process was in accordance with the preliminary programme´
(Interview_41_planner) 
As a sign of explicitness and formality, the preliminary programme included a timetable that 
set the timings of the activities that would be finalised throughout the 35-month period 
between August 2006 and June 2009 (SDU, 2008c, pp. 4-5)7KH0R,¶V VWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ
schedule is presented in Table 6.2 below. The process unfolded in compliance with the 
schedule above. The definition of mission, vision, and basic values was fulfilled in February 
2007 earlier than expected, whereas it was scheduled for May-August 2007.  
The formality of structures and processes is the second dimension of formality. Both official 
documents and the accounts of the actors showed that strategic planning in the MoI was 
carried out using formal structures and processes. The managers referred to many aspects that 
indicated formality. For example, they referred to the obligatory nature of the formal PFMCL 
framework as the source of formality which included the proceedings of the planning process 
such as meetings, the departmental procedures in the formation and functioning of the 
committees, the pursuit of the Strategic Planning Guide 2006; the formal demands of the then 
SPO from the MoI, which were bound to deadlines; and the fulfilment of stakeholder 
analysis. 
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Table 6.2 ± The Strategic Planning Timetable of the MoI 
No Activity Period 
1 Preparation Period August ± October  2006 
2 Situation Analysis December  ± April  2007 
3 Specification of Mission, Vision, and Basic Values May  ±  August  2007 
4 Specification of Strategic Goals and Targets August  ± December  2007 
5 Determination of Detailed Activities/Projects and 
Performance Indicators 
January  ± September  2008 
6 Calculation and Specification of Cost and 
Estimated Budget 
  October 2008 
7 Finalisation of the Content of the Draft Plan   November 2008 
8 Evaluation of the Draft Plan by the Strategy 
Development Board 
  December 2008 
9 Dispatch of the Strategic Plan to the State 
Planning Organisation for Review 
January ± April  2009 
10 Finalisation of the Strategic Plan and Ratification 
by the Minister 
May ± June  2009 
Source: (SDU, 2008c) 
 
 
There was no hesitation in endorsement RIWKLVYLHZLQWKHPDQDJHUV¶DFFRXQWV 
³,WZDV IRUPDO VXUH VXUHHQWLUHO\ WKLVZDV DZRUNFRQGXFWHGZLWKLQ WKH IUDPHZRUNRI WKH
[Law] 5018´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
 ³,W LV IRUPDO ZHOO D SURFHVV WKDW SURFHHGV IRUPDOO\ LV PRUH H[SOLFLW  PHHWLQJV DW the 
beginning; a plan in these meetings, a programme, and the musts of strategic planning in that 
programme; contracting-out consultancy services. All these progress in a way to meet the 
formal requirements´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Formality prevailed over the stages of preparation and organisation, situation analysis, 
definition of mission and vision statements, formulation of goals, targets, and strategies, 
costing and budgeting during the preparation of the strategic plan. This was not an 
unexpected situation for the MoI, as formality was an enduring characteristic of its 
bureaucratic system. As initial steps to form the necessary structures for planning, the 
Planning Team was created in April 2006 while the SDB was established in June 2006 (SDU, 
2006b). The creation of the three-level decision structure was realised officially and formally 
by the approval of the Undersecretary at the top in June 2006.  
The conduct of the situation analysis demonstrated the same formality and explicit pattern. 
All four components of the situation analysis relied on official communication, survey 
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studies, meetings and reporting (MoI, 2009c). The planning team consolidated and 
documented the results of every stage of the situation analysis. The SDU published an 
Internal Structural Analysis, an Environmental Analysis, a Stakeholder Analysis, and SWOT 
Analysis Reports in 2007. 
Regarding the activities, the planning team held and attended a total of 115 official 
preparatory, informative, evaluative and training meetings, while they organised 32 activities 
for other members of staff across the MoI for the same purposes between 2006 and 2009, 
according to the SDU reports (SDU, 2008c, p. 7). The planning team sought the approval of 
the SDB, as the highest level of strategic decision-making, at each and every phase of the 
process. The board issued three main resolutions during its work to officialise decisions. 
Through Resolution-1 on 26 June 2007 (SDU, 2007f), the board officially defined the vision, 
mission and organisational values of the MoI in the presence of the Minister. The board then 
passed Resolution-2 on 12 February 2008 (SDU, 2008a), to approve the strategic aims and 
targets of the MoI. And, finally it passed Resolution-3 on 25 December 2008 (SDU, 2008b) 
which finalised the 0R,¶VILUVWVWUDWHJLFSODQLQDGYDQFHRIWKH632UHYLHZIRUWKHSHULRGRI
2010-15 by approving the strategies, performance indicators and their costs. 
The formality of the framework had consequences for the practice of strategic planning in the 
MoI. For instance, some managers considered it to be a requirement to embed strategic 
SODQQLQJ LQ WKH0R,¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQDOFXOWXUHDQGHQKDQFHSDUWLFLSDWLRQ2QHPDQDJHUDQGD
planner had this to say: 
³:HDUHDWWKHEHJLQQLQJVWDJH, HYHU\WKLQJLVJRLQJIRUPDO«%XWwe lose most things from 
the beginning when we start something informally. I mean, it becomes troublesome if it goes 
with nothing binding. We may not comply with [informal arrangements@´
(Interview_3_manager) 
³1RLWZDVGRQHLQDIRUPDOZD\LWZDVIXOILlled in a formal manner as it was expected to be. 
3DUWLFLSDWLRQ ZRXOGQ¶W EH VDWLVIDFWRU\ LQ RXU 0LQLVWU\ LI LW ZDV LQIRUPDO´
(Interview_36_planner) 
With a similar perception of formality as being equivalent to legal obligation, a manager 
perceived it to be a counter-power that broke the resistance of the management to the 
enforcement of strategic planning. He stated that: 
³7KHIDFWWKDWLWZDVREOLJDWRU\ZDVEUHDNLQJWKHUHVLVWDQFHQRRQHFRXOGH[HUWUHVLVWDQFH [to 
strategic planning] in that sense.´ (Interview_30__former_manager) 
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7KLVPDQDJHU¶VYLHZUHIOHFWVKRZIRUPDOLW\DFWLQJDVOHJDOREOLJDWLRQSOD\VDFUXFLDOUROHLQ
the adoption of strategic planning in a strictly bureaucratic structure. 
The obligation to produce a strategic plan at the end of the strategic planning process is 
DQRWKHUGLPHQVLRQRI IRUPDOLW\7KH IRUPXODWLRQRI WKH0R,¶VJRDOV WDUJHWV VWUDWHJLHVDQG
performance indicators within a concrete document was an indication of its formality within 
this context. At the end of the planning process, the MoI management came up with a 
documented strategic plan (MoI, 2009c) that included the mission, vision, basic values and 
principles, 6 strategic aims, 13 targets and 39 performance indicators, estimated cost of 
strategies and responsible units. 7KH VWUDWHJLF SODQ ZDV SXEOLVKHG WKURXJK WKH 0R,¶V ZHE
page (www.icisleri.gov.tr) and sent to the MoF and the Parliament for budgetary discussions 
and decisions, under the provisions of the MPSPPO By-Law 2006.  
6.3. Pattern 3: Implementation 
Implementation is a critical component of the rational planning model and is considered to be 
more challenging than strategy formulation (Elbanna et al., 2015). It is a distinguishable 
component of strategic planning and is based on formal, rational and explicit techniques as 
explained in Chapter 2 (see Section 2.2.1.3). It was argued in Chapter 2 that implementation 
is addressed as a unidimensional concept although it has at least two dimensions. The first 
dimension is the implementation of a strategic plan and the second is the overall application 
of the strategic planning model. This section tackles the two separately in turn. 
6.3.1. Implementation of the Strategic Plan 
Article 41 of the PFMCL 2003 based the monitoring mechanism on an annual performance 
reporting system, rather than a sophisticated performance management approach that linked 
personal and departmental performance to the goals and targets. Annual reports were 
envisaged to include the achievement levels of performance targets that were due to be set 
beforehand in a performance programme, as well as spending figures. The By-law on 
Activity Reports 2005 obliged annual reports to be published online to reinforce transparency 
and accountability. Reports at the same time were to be sent to the MoF and to the Court of 
Accounts as well, as the responsible institution for examining and submitting the reports to 
Parliament for debates, along with a statement of general compliance.   
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The external control of organisational performance was ascribed, in the formal PFMCL 
framework, to the Court of Accounts. The Court of Accounts was to perform performance 
audits and prepare performance reports in addition to its ongoing public spending reviews.  
There were two other control elements within the system in addition to the reporting 
mechanism. The first was the routine biennial inspections by the MoI Inspection Board 
conducted to determine the achievement of strategic goals as well as many other subjects. 
The second was the internal auditing system as part of the internal control system introduced 
by the PFMCL 2003. The internal auditing system was designed to conduct an annual 
analysis of internal and external risks that might impede the achievement of strategic goals 
and targets and to recommend necessary actions to be taken by the organisation, according to 
the Communique of the Public Sector Internal Audit Standards 2007.  
6.3.1.1. Monitoring 
The MoI adopted a mechanism of quarterly-reporting, in congruence with the By-law on 
Activity Reports 2005 and asked for quarterly reports of performance data from the 
departments accordingly (Interview_36_planner). The interview data disclosed a varying 
level of awareness among the MoI managers of the monitoring mechanism. Most MoI 
managers perceived the above mechanism to be ineffective for a number of reasons, while a 
small group of managers viewed it as effective. Internal auditing was defined as an important 
component even by those managers who did not have full insight of the monitoring 
mechanism. 
Only a small group of managers had a comprehensive view of the formal monitoring 
mechanism. These managers could describe the formal processes in detail. They listed the 
components of the monitoring mechanism as including items such as reporting to the SDU, 
internal control and audit, routine inspection, hierarchical control of the Undersecretary and 
the external audit of the Court of Accounts (for example Interview_5; Interview_14; 
Interview_22, managers). However, the majority of the managers had a partial view of the 
mechanism. For example, a manager perceived internal auditing as a monitoring mechanism 
while two other managers associated monitoring with the organisational hierarchy: 
³7KHUHLVDXQLWWKDWLVUHSRUWLQJWKLVEXWWKHUHLVQ¶WDXQLWWKDWPRQLWRUVZKHWKHU>WDUJHWV@DUH
achieved or not. For example, there is the internal audit unit; it is controlling the ongoing 
processes of the Ministry; they are reporting what is realised at what stage to the 
8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶VRIILFHHYHU\WZRWKUHH\HDUV.´,QWHUYLHZ_1_manager) 
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 ³,W LVKLHUDUFK\ZKDWPRQLWRUV WKLV ,GRQ¶WNQRZZKHWKHUWKHUH LVDQDGGLWLRQDOPHFKDQLVP
WKDWPRQLWRUVWKLV,GRQ¶WWKLQN>WKHUHLV@´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
³7KHUHLVQRPHFKDQLVP:HEULHIWKH8QGHUVHFUHWDU\´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The managers and planners viewed the existing plan implementation mechanism as 
ineffective to a great extent. The idea that the implementation mechanism is ineffective is 
supported by evidence from the annual performance reports of the years 2010, 2011, 2012 
and 2013. Table 6.3 presents detailed data with regard to the performance achievement levels 
vis-j-vis the strategic goals and years. 
Table 6.3 Performance Achievement Statistics 
 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 
 P*>Target P = Target P < Target P = Zero 
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Prefectual 
System - - - - 0 1 1 - - 2 - - - 2 2 2 1 1 - 4 
Law 
Enforcement - 1 1 3 4 2 - - - 2 1 2 2 2 7 - - - - 0 
e-government 1 1 2 1 5 5 1 7 10 23 1 1 3 5 10 2 5 1 6 14 
Local 
Authorities - - - 1 1 1 2 4 4 11 2 - 1 - 3 2 2 - - 4 
Associations 5 1 2 2 10 1 2 1 2 6 - - - - 0 - 2 - - 2 
Re-organisation 1 - 1 3 5 2 4 4 3 13 - 3 2 3 8 2 2 - 2 6 
Total of 
Indicators in 
Four Year  25  57 
 
30  30 
Grand Total 
of Indicators                          142 
% in Total ** 18%  40%  21%  21 % 
* P = Performance ; ** Percentage values are shown in integer values 
Source: (Adapted from MoI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a) 
 
Table 6.3 is divided into four sections. Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 present performance 
overachievement, on-target performance, underperformance and no-achievement 
respectively. Underperformance corresponds to performance values that are below 100 
percent. No-achievement corresponds to zero percent since no progress was made on the 
associated target. According to the figures, the total number of indicators set throughout the 
four years of plan implementation was 142. During the four years of implementation, 25 
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targets were overachieved, 57 were on-target, 30 were underachieved and there were no 
achievement at all on 30 performance targets within that year. Sections 1 and 2 are the 
SRVLWLYHVLGHRIWKH0R,¶VSHUIRUPDQFHDFKLHYHPHQWDQGWKHWRWDORIWKHWZRVHFWLRQVUHYHDOV
that 82 total indicators were achieved or exceeded, marking a 58 percent success rate in 
meeting targets. Sections 3 and 4 are the negative side of performance and the sum of the two 
sections shows that 60 indicators were underachieved or there was no progress in some at all, 
marking 42 percent underachievement or no-achievement in meeting the targets, which is an 
important indicator of deviation during plan implementation.  
Underachievement or no-progress can both be seen in all six targets during plan 
implementation. The greatest deviation was in the e-government and re-organisation 
strategies. For e-government strategies there was underachievement in 10 targets and no 
progress in 14 targets while these figures were 8 and 6 respectively for re-organisation 
strategies during the four years of plan implementation. The associations (civil society) 
strategy was the most stable field with regard to achievement of targets set in this area. 
Overall, the data presented in Table 6.3 shows that plan implementation was highly unstable, 
providing evidence of a loosely controlled process. The discussion now turns to the accounts 
of the actors to explain the dynamics of such practices. 
Most MoI managers and planners viewed the plan implementation mechanism as invisible. 
The invisibility of the mechanism had a close association with a perception of plan 
implementation being routine or insignificant, as well as with the novelty of strategic 
SODQQLQJLQWKH0R,7KHIROORZLQJDFFRXQWUHIOHFWVKRZDSODQQHUREVHUYHGWKHPDQDJHUV¶
approach to the reporting mechanism: 
³:Hprepared quarterly performance programme monitoring reports that were signed by the 
Undersecretary and sent them to the units. We tried to track, but our reports were not 
FRQVLGHUHGPXFK,WZDVWDNHQOLNHµ(UULW¶VURXWLQHZRUN¶´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
$QRWKHUPDQDJHU¶VYLHZZDVVLPLODU 
³,WKLQNWKDW>UHSRUWV@DUHPRUHURXWLQHVWXIIDUHQRWWKLQJVZLWKFRQWHQW,GRQRWSUHVXPHWKDW
any department would evaluate the three-PRQWKO\UHSRUWVJRLQJOLNHµ%ULQJ[the report]OHW¶V
see ZKDWZHKDYH>GRQH@¶´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
There were some reasons underlying this perception, which were most influential in the 
degree of plan implementation in the MoI. Firstly, the MoI managers and planners viewed the 
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lack of formal incentives and sanctions within the mechanism as a significant defect (e.g. 
Interview_23_manager). The following quotes are indicative of such views: 
³1R QR QR ZD\ WKLV EXVLQHVV FDQ¶W EH FRQWLQXHG ZLWK WKLV PHFKDQLVP 7KHUH PXVW EH
concrete sanctions´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
 ³:HOO QRZ LI you introduce something with no defined deadline, form, method, and 
sanctions in bureaucracy, its achievement in implementation will be dependent on the 
sensitivity of the day´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
As formal incentives and sanctions were seen as a requirement for effective implementation, 
the absence of these led to a weak link between the accountability of the managers and the 
plan implementation, resulting in low levels of implementation. Secondly, managers 
perceived the absence of a link between performance and staff appraisal as a deficiency 
impacting on implementation. The appraisal of staff was mostly based on loyalty and 
subjectivity which continued in the traditional way after the introduction of strategic 
planning. In this system, which empowered the top management with considerable discretion 
in staff appraisal, the level of strategy implementation continued to have a strong link with 
the attitude of the Undersecretary. The leader-centred organisational culture of the MoI, as 
described previously, reinforced the situation of the top management dominating the plan 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQSURFHVV$PDQDJHU¶VDFFRXQWZDV 
³, EHOLHYH WKLV >PHFKDQLVP@ ZLOO EH HIIHFWLYH « ZKHQ LW LV WDNHQ VHUiously by the top 
PDQDJHPHQW«7his is stemming from the organisational culture. It is a consequence of the 
management and career system of the Ministry, as well´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
0DQ\RWKHUPDQDJHUVYLHZHGWKHWRSPDQDJHPHQW¶VDWWLWXGHDVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWHOHPHQWLQ
plan implementation and they found the top managHPHQW¶VH[LVWLQJOHYHORIcommitment and 
emphasis inadequate or wanting:   
³,QIDFWWKHFRQWUROPHFKDQLVPLVQRWIXQFWLRQLQJ>WKHWRSPDQDJHPHQW@LVQRWFDOOLQJ\RXWR
account´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU  
 ³, EHOLHYH LW VKDOO EH PRUH HIIHFWLYH IRU H[DPSOH if the top management makes his 
TXHVWLRQLQJ«EDVHGRQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHWDUJHWV´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
$WHVWRIWKHVHVWDWHPHQWVZDVUHDOLVHGLQXSRQWKH8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶VGHFLVLRQWRKHDUWKH
annual performance reports of the departments in person from the department heads. The 
FKDQJH LQ WKH 8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶V DWWLWXGH QRWLFHDEO\ DIIHFWHG WKH PDQDJHUV¶ EHKDYLRXU LQ D
positive direction with regard to their engagement in meeting strategic targets. Concrete 
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evidence of such positive change came in the form of an increase in the number of 
performance indicators proposed by the departments for the forthcoming year. Following was 
WKHDFFRXQWRIDSODQQHUZKRREVHUYHGWKHFKDQJHLQWKHPDQDJHUV¶DWWLWXGH 
And, [the Undersecretary] especially called the department heads to determine their 
performance programmes bearing in mind that he would bring them to account the following 
year. The approaches [of the managers] have started to change this year [in 2013]´
(Interview_36_planner) 
A similar view was reflected by the managers. They disclosed how the change in the 
8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶VDWWLWXGHOHGWRDFKDQJHLQWKHLUDSSURDFKWRWKHDFKLHYHPHQWRIWKHLUWDUJHWV 
³:HOOZHDUHPDNLQJDSUHVHQWDWLRQWRWKH8QGHUVHFUHWDU\QH[WZHHNDERXWRXUGHSDUWPHQW¶V
performance targets within the strategic plan. So, that the top management is developing 
ownership and adopting [strategic planning] is affecting the perspective of the department, of 
the directorate-general and of other directorates-JHQHUDO«´,QWHUYLHZBPDQDJHU 
7KHLPSDFWRIWKH8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶VGHFLVLRQFDQEHFRQFUHWHO\REVHUYHGLQ7DEOH above. 
While the total numbers of performance indicators remained stable in the years 2010, 2011, 
and 2012 around 31 indicators, the figure surged to 49 in 2013, showing how interest in the 
process by management changed considerably in response to a change in emphasis from top 
management.  
:KLOHWKHDWWLWXGHRIWRSPDQDJHUVZDVLPSRUWDQWIRUSODQLPSOHPHQWDWLRQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V
dynamic emphasis was equally important as it wDV DQ DQWHFHGHQW IRU WKH WRS PDQDJHU¶V
attitude. The appointment of the PriPH 0LQLVWHU¶V 8QGHUVHFUHWDU\ 3URI gPHU 'LQoHU ZKR
was the designer and the champion of the strategic planning initiative, to a different post 
where he lost his influence on the strategic planning reform process, marked the start of a 
GHFOLQH LQ WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶VG\QDPLF HPSKDVLV RQ WKH UHIRUP$V WKHPDVWHUPLQGKHZDV
identified with the strategic planning reform so closely that most critiques of strategic 
planning were being directed to him personally (Interview_13_manager). Parallel to the 
YLVLEOH GZLQGOLQJ LQ WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V HPSKDVLV WKH SHUFHSWLRQ RI VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ DV D
source of unnecessary increases in workload prevailed over the implementation period in the 
MoI, as it did to a significant degree during the planning process. For example, a manager 
commented:  
³:HSHUFHLYHLWDVDQREOLJDWLRQ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQLVQRWSURJUHVVLQJZHOOIRUWKLVUHDVRQ:H
should save [the strategic plan] from being a document that is not re-visited´
(Interview_26_manager) 
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This development led to the growth of the idea that strategic planning would be abolished in 
the near future, which was underpinned by the perceived disagreement of strategic planning 
with the traditions of Turkish public administration and of a view of bureaucratic drudgery 
(Interview_36_planner). What reinforced this idea was the vagueness stemming from the 
LQFRQVLVWHQF\LQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDWWLWXGHDVSXWE\DPDQDJHU 
³$ELJXQFHUWDLQW\,PHDQHYHU\WKLQJFDQFRPHWRDQHQGLIWKH*RYHUQPHQWVD\VµNo need 
for these strategic plans¶DQGJLYHVXSWKLVEXVLQHVVRISODQQLQJ6WUDWHJLFSODQQLQJKDVQRW
\HWLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGLQWKDWVHQVH´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
There were other reasons cited by the managers as factors weakening monitoring and thus, 
effective implementation. Some actors viewed the external control arm of the mechanism to 
be inadequate (Interview_17_planner). This view developed due to a change in the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\GXULQJWKH0R,¶VSODQLPSOHPHQWDWLRQSURcess. The Court of Accounts 
had started to prepare performance reports in agreement with the formal PFMCL framework. 
It continued issuing performance reports in fields such as e-government and prevention of 
road traffic accidents until the year 2008 (Sayistay, 2014) when the government abolished, 
through the enforcement of the Amendment Law 2012, the legislation that empowered the 
Court of Accounts to perform performance reviews. This move damaged the link between the 
strategic plan and external audit, undermining the plan implementation process. The 
amendment was partly withdrawn by the Constitutional Court in the same year and a new 
legal arrangement is still due to be made.   
High staff turnover was found to be another impediment due to the damage it did to 
organisational memory. High levels of manager turnover undermined the stability of 
implementation, as identified by the managers during the SWOT analysis study (MoI, 
2009c). Even before the plan implementation started, in late 2009, some of the department 
heads, such as of the Associations Department and ICT Department, had been appointed to 
provincial branches. Upon a conflict between the heads of two departments within the SDU, 
the planning team leader, as the head of one of the departments in conflict, moved to a new 
position in a public university in 2009, just before the finalisation of the strategic plan. The 
fall of the leaves did not stop there. All the members of the strategy board, who had set the 
goals within the first strategic plan, had left their positions due to appointments to external or 
provincial posts or retirement by 2013. High staff turnover was not limited to the department 
heads. Many mid- or lower-level managers were subjected to circulation every two or three 
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years within the period of 2007-2013, weakening the organisational memory, which then had 
DQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQSODQLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ$SODQQHU¶VYLHZVZHUH 
³/HWPHJLYH\RXDQH[DPSOH\RXDUHPDGHWRH[SODLQDOOWKHSURFHVVIURPVFUDWFKWRWKHQHZ
incumbent. And you are doing WKLVFRQWLQXRXVO\«7KLVFRPHVDVDKDQGLFDSERWKIRU >WKH
SDU] and for the other units of the Ministry´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
The publication of the reports was perceived by the departments and the SDU officials as 
exerting potential pressure for better implementation. A manager suggested that the interests 
of civil society or the public, as external stakeholders, was considered to be as significant as 
WKHWRSPDQDJHPHQW¶VHQJDJHPHQWLQSODQLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ+HVWDWHG 
³7KH [external] stakeholders should WDNH PRUH DFWLYH UROHV « WKH IDFW WKDW WKH WRS
management is calling to account does not necessarily mean that the mechanism is 
functioning well.´,QWHUYLHZBBIRUPHUBPDnager) 
The practice showed that civil society pressure was not exerted on the MoI, or on any other 
public body, as a necessary consideration during the implementation of the first strategic 
plan. Neither is there evidence that political circles adapted to strategic management in the 
public sector. For example, the plans and performance reports of public organisations have 
not yet become the subject of parliamentary debates.  
Some activities, such as the projects developed by the Directorate-General for Local 
$XWKRULWLHV WR SURPRWH ZRPHQ¶V ULJKWV ZHUH FRQGXFWHG RXW RI WKH VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ 
framework. One of the managers perceived this as an obstacle to effective strategic planning 
and management. The low quality of some performance indicators was also viewed as a 
problem for effective plan implementation. According to this view, the lack of expertise and 
inadequate effort exerted to specify realistic performance targets led to underperformance in 
the course of implementation (e.g. Interview_23_manager).  
In contrast to the majority of the actors, a small group of managers viewed the existing 
mechanism as effective since it was extremely formal and consisted of powerful components. 
A common response in this pattern was: 
³$GGLWLRQDOO\WKHUHLVWKHLQWHUQDODXGLWDQGLQWHUQDOFRQWUROPHFKDQLVPV«WKHFRQWURORIWKH
&RXUWRI$FFRXQWV«ZKHQZHWKLQNRIWKH8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQWRWKHSURFHVVHVDV
a guiding activity, this system has a mechanism internally, and this is an effective 
mechanism.´,QWHUYLHZBBmanager) 
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+RZHYHU WKH VDPHPDQDJHUYLHZHG WKH LPSDFW RI WKLV V\VWHPRQPDQDJHU¶VPRWivation as 
LQHIIHFWLYH RU ³D SUHVVXUH WKDW VKDOO QRW HYRNH GLVFRQWHQW >DPRQJ PDQDJHUV@´
(Interview_22_manager). This shows that these managers refer mostly to the formal-legal 
aspect of the monitoring mechanism rather than its ramifications in practice. The 
8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶V UHFHQW GHFLVLRQ WR UHYLHZ GHSDUWPHQWV¶ DFWLYLW\ UHSRUWV SHUVRQDOO\ ZDV
REVHUYHGWRKDYHDQLPSDFWRQWKHVHPDQDJHUV¶YLHZVDVWKH\GUHZDWWHQWLRQWRWKHPHHWLQJV
with the Undersecretary in their responses.  
Although internal auditing was newly introduced along with the formal PFMCL framework, 
it was perceived to be an influential and significant component of the monitoring mechanism 
by many managers. In one case, internal auditing was considered to be unnecessary and 
dysfunctional by a manager from the civil registration services due to the lack of expertise of 
the auditors in ICT, because the service relied mostly on sophisticated ICT infrastructure 
(Interview_31_former_manager).  
The link between the budget and the activities and projects was seen as an influential element 
of plan implementation. Managers who raised this point perceived the budgetary process, 
particularly the capital budget, governed by the MoF and MoD and the process of convincing 
these ministries, as being more influenWLDO WKDQ WKH PRQLWRULQJ PHFKDQLVP $ PDQDJHU¶V
comments were: 
³7KHUHLVQ¶WDFRQVLGHUDEO\HIIHFWLYHPHFKDQLVPWREHKRQHVW7KH0LQLVWU\RI'HYHORSPHQW
on the one side, the ministry of finance on the other side, their activities during budgetary 
works are the most effective mechanisms for me´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU  
Parallel to these views, departments that make large capital investments were more motivated 
by the budget for better plan implementation, such as civil registration services. These 
departments were aware that a failure to meet a target may complicate negotiations with the 
WZR PLQLVWULHV IRU WKH QH[W \HDU¶V EXGJHW (Interview_31_manager). On the contrary, the 
departments with more regulatory roles, such as local authority services, whose budget is to a 
great extent constituted of staff costs, were less motivated by the budget 
(Interview_13_manager). 
The managers, in general, identified some factors that contributed positively to the 
implementation of the plan. For example, the quantifiability of the services was viewed as a 
facilitator of implementation (e.g. Interview_23_manager). 
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6.3.1.2. Analysis of Results and Feedback 
The analysis of the results of strategies is considered to be a central activity and assigned to 
the SDU within the framework of PFMCL 2003. This mandate encompasses the analysis and 
feedback of performance data and of the effectiveness of service user satisfaction. 
Effectiveness of service may refer to the ratio of outputs to outcomes of service, or to the 
ratio of inputs to outcomes of service, which is termed as cost-effectiveness (Pollitt and 
Bouceart, 2011). In either case, the outcomes of service are vital for the measurement of 
service effectiveness. The annual reports of the MoI prepared by the SDU in co-ordination 
with the MoI departments present input, limitedly output and formal effectiveness data. 
While the reports provide only one single dimension of performance, which is formal 
effectiveness, they do not provide outcome data (MoI, 2013). A defect in the input data is that 
it includes contracting-out costs of projects and activities while it excludes staff and other 
costs undertaken by the MoI departments for each project or activity. Another defect is that 
input data does not provide cost per unit figures, such as the cost per head of issuing a citizen 
ID card or passport. Therefore, any attempt to compute, for example, cost-efficiency or cost-
HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI WKH VHUYLFH RYHU WKH GDWD SUHVHQWHG LQ WKH 0R,¶V DQQXDO UHSRUWV PD\ EH
misleading, even if it could be done. Given the limitations of the input and output data, and 
the absence of outcome or impact data, the central analysis of the results of the strategies 
remains restricted to the statistics of formal effectiveness, even though the analysis has been 
legally systematised. The intermediate and final outcomes of programmes and their relation 
to costs have not been of systematic interest and input indicators and formal effectiveness are 
taken as the main criteria for the analysis of results. 
0RVWPDQDJHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQV HFKRWKHDERYHYLHZZKLFKFDQEHREVHUYHGLQWKH0R,¶VDQQXDO
reports 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. Despite the centralisation and systematisation of analysis 
within the framework of the PFMCL 2003, managers viewed the analysis of results as 
unsystematic, non-LQVWLWXWLRQDOLVHGGHSDUWPHQWDODQGVXSHUILFLDO6RPHPDQDJHUV¶FRPPHQWV
were: 
³0D\EHSDUWRIWKH6'8LVLQYROYed in [the analysis of results]; I am trying to say, they may 
KDYH D OHJDO IRUPDO GXW\ KRZHYHU LW LV QRW HIIHFWLYH LQ SUDFWLFH WKHUH LVQ¶W an effective 
performance [monitoring system]´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
³(DFK XQLW FRQGXFWV LWV RZQ >DQDO\VLV@ QHLWKHU KDYH , VHHQ LQ WKH 6'8¶V UHSRUWV WKDW WKH\
conduct analysis of results over outcomes´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU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An underlying reason for this is that strategic planning has not caused a shift from traditional 
input-focus to outcome-focus in the MoI. The activities or inputs are monitored, the impact of 
programmes on how they affect citizens is observed unsystematically and mainly through 
complaints of the service users. Systematic and comparative measurement of inputs, outputs 
and outcomes is absent in the system. The measure of achievement is the realisation of an 
activity or project. Departmental analysis of results is traditional, not explicit and not 
analytical to a great extent, except for ICT-based services. The quality of departmental 
analysis is individual and manager-dependent and hence variable. Managers reflect the 
DVVXPSWLRQWKDWµSXEOLFSURJUDPPHVEHQHILWWKHFLWL]HQV¶,QWHUYLHZB_former_manager). A 
manager who recognised this said as much: 
³7KLVLVRQHRIWKHODFNLQJDVSHFWVLQVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ>LQWKH0R,@,FRQVLGHUWKHV\VWHPDWLF
and routine analysis of results as a subject to be dwelled more on [in the Ministry]´
(Interview_22_manager) 
In an environment where the old culture prevails, the departments have not developed the 
means to measure the intermediate and final outcomes of their programmes and their links to 
inputs.  
From both the PDQDJHUV¶ DQG SODQQHUV¶ SHUVSHFWLYH Lt is also the ineffectiveness of the 
existing control mechanism, which leads to the exercise of traditional and partial results-
analysis in the MoI departments. The absence of adequate incentives and sanctions, the 
absence of a link between performance and staff appraisal build a perception of the 
insignificance of performance measurement among managers, and hence, ignorance. 
Analysis of results requires expertise, according to some managers and the MoI departments 
do not employ staff with the requisite skills. The accounts of two managers, one from 
vocational training and the other from human resources department, were: 
³7R EH KRQHVW « LQ YRFDWLRQDO WUDLQLQJ « ZH DUH KDYLQJ WURXEOH DERXW HPSOR\LQJ
professionals who will measure, evaluate, and plan this´,nterview_35_manager) 
³,I \RX DVN ZKHWKHU ZH KDYH VWXGLHV >RI DQDO\VLV@ , FDQ¶W VD\ WKDW WKHUH LV %HFDXVH LW LV
difficult; and it is an issue that requires some expertise.´,QWHUYLHZBBPanager) 
These accounts point to the fact that the SDU was not designed with a results-focused logic, 
which is the approach demanded by formal strategic planning. In some fields, such as the 
regulation of municipalities, analysis of the impact of regulation on society may require a 
sizeable budget while the existing budget does not allow for this. Even if the required funding 
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is available, analysis of outcomes is still perceived as challenging, particularly in the fields 
where quantifiability of outcomes is problematic, such as provincial administrations 
(Interview_18). A maQDJHU¶VYLHZZDV 
³2IFRXUVHDQDO\VHVDUHLPSRUWDQWEXWWKHVHDUHQRWHDVLO\PHDVXUDEOHIURPRXUGHSDUWPHQW¶V
perspective and from the point of the business that we do´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Acting upon complaints is perceived to be an important characteristic of the MoI (and 
Turkish) bureaucracy. The complaints of service users are a substitute for systematic results-
DQDO\VLV LQ WKH 0R,¶V FDVH DQG WKH\ FRQVWLWXWH DQ LPSRUWDQW SDUW RI WKH H[LVWLQJ IHHGEDFN
mechanism. Complaints direct the departments to see and eliminate the detrimental effects of 
public programmes on service users and re-shape the service in order to prevent such 
misconduct in the future. The complaints mechanism has progressively become systematised 
and simplified through e-government applications. For example, the Prime Minister 
HVWDEOLVKHGDGLUHFW OLQH FDOOHG3ULPH0LQLVWU\&RPPXQLFDWLRQ&HQWUH %ø0(5 WR UHFHLYH
FLWL]HQV¶ FRPSODLQWV DERXW SXEOLF VHUYLFHV LQ SHUVRQ E\ SKRQH LQWHUQHW RU WKURXJK OHWWHUV
The complaints were then directed to the relevant public organisation according to their 
relevance with a guaranteed 30-day response period.  
Managers whose service field is quantifiable and who use intensive ICT infrastructure, such 
as the civil registration and ICT departments, reveal a more systematic evaluation and 
feedback of results. 
6.3.2. The Application of Strategic Planning and Process Outcomes 
The application of the strategic planning model is the second dimension of implementation. 
To ascertain the extent to which the application of the model succeeded requires looking at it 
from a broader perspective. The effectiveness of strategic planning is best understood by 
assessing the extent to which strategic planning generates the expected results and initiates 
and achieves strategic change. From this perspective, the managers largely had negative 
views although a very small group of managers and planners did have positive views. 
Most managers and planners viewed strategic planning as ineffective in the MoI. According 
to a dominant view among the MoI managers, strategic planning resulted in the 
documentation of what the departments had already been doing to meet their legal mandate. 
It was the articulation of business-as-usual as expressed by a planner: 
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³7KH LVVXHV WKDW ZHUH UHTXLUHG to be enunciated and expressed tidily did appear [in the 
strategic plan]7KRVHSDUWVZHUHUHYLVHG%XWWKLVGRHVQ¶WPHDQUDGLFDOGLIIHUHQFHVLQVWUDWHJ\
and policy. One should see [the strategic plan] as limited to those revisions´
(Interview_28_planner) 
This line of argument suggests that the MoI departments had not operated arbitrarily before 
strategic planning was introduced. The assessment of departmental resources against their 
targets and monitoring progress, though limitedly, was part of the management remit and 
activity. Hence, the same kind of work was being performed previously, just not under the 
label of strategic planning. The same activities and projects would have been performed even 
LIVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJKDGQRWEHHQLQWURGXFHGWRWKH0R,¶V management system. The strategic 
plan merely registered, formalised and sanctioned the extant functions, according to 
PDQDJHUV 7KH SODQ UHPDLQHG DV µD SODQ RQ WKH VKHOI¶ GXULQJ WKH IRXU \HDUV RI WKH
implementation process, although quarterly performance reports were produced solely to 
PHHW WKH OHJDO REOLJDWLRQV DFFRUGLQJ WR WKLV ZLGHVSUHDG SHUVSHFWLYH $ PDQDJHU¶V YLHZV
were: 
³:HOO«7XUNH\KDVILIW\\HDUVRISODQQLQJKLVWRU\%XWQRRQHVWLOONQRZVZKDWWKHUHLVRU
LVQ¶WZLWKLQWKHSODQV6RLWIHHOV like the strategic plan [in the MoI] has remained at the same 
level´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Most managers believed that strategic planning did not bring about a significant change to the 
status quo in the MoI, particularly with reference to management capacity and service 
delivery or performance, though it made some limited contributions. Most of the managers 
recognised the problem as being related to dimensions of awareness building and adoption. 
The underlying reasons articulated by the actors are weak adaptation, insufficient training, 
inadequate external guidance and weak organisational memory. 
Weak adaptation is the first factor. According to this, strategic planning is not adequately 
tailored to the realities and needs of the Turkish public administration. The fact that it was 
originally a private sector technique that was directly transposed from Western public sectors 
in 2003 raised problems of adaptation. The PFMCL 2003 was extensively a direct translation 
of the Western models and so were the cascading regulations. Hence, the PFMCL 2003 
neglected to adapt the language of the source legislation or tailor the components of the 
strategic planning model to the Turkish public administration system, so as to facilitate its 
adoption and application. BasinJWKHV\VWHPRQGLUHFWO\LPSRUWHGZRUGVVXFKDVµVWUDWHML¶IRU
strategy), rather than on counterparts or similar terms in the Turkish bureaucratic tradition, 
FUHDWHGDPRGHOWKDWODFNHGFRQFHSWXDOFODULW\2QHPDQDJHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQZDV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³<RX FDQ HQIRUFH VRmething legally but adoption is something different. The adoption of 
[strategic planning] could not be provided. The reason is, first, the strategic planning [model] 
is a verbatim translation [rather than interpretation]. So, the [managers] have not been able to 
settle the concepts [in their minds] yet.´,QWHUYLHZBBPanager) 
7KH IROORZLQJ PDQDJHU¶V FKDOOHQJLQJ H[SHULHQFH UHSUHVHQWV DQ H[DPSOH RI ZKDW WKH DERYH
comment highlights: 
³,GRQ¶WNQRZVKRXOGLWVWHUPLQRORJ\EHWKDWPXFKGLIILFXOW",IHHOWKDWLWPD\EHVLPSOHU«,
still confuse vision and mission, for example, which one would be above and which one 
below [in the goal-hierarchy]. It always gets mixed up´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The strangeness and complexity of the terms and concepts raised the problems of perception, 
insight and adoption. As a widely recognised factor, the problem of insight continued during 
and after the planning process, subsuming the implementation period. As the managers could 
not ascribe meanings to the new concepts and elements of the new model or gain intellectual 
LQVLJKWWKH\FRXOGQRWDFWXSRQWKHPHIIHFWLYHO\$PDQDJHU¶VPHWDSKRULFDODFFRXQWSRLQWHG
to the link between tailoring and adoption: 
³7KHODZKDVDVRXOOHVVODQJXDJHIRULW¶VDWUDQVODWLRQ«,WGRHVQ¶WKDYHDVRul, there is the 
body; we will blow the soul to that body. The generation will [gain experience], as I said, it 
will change, it will resemble us, and the owners will increase once it resembles us´
(Interview_21_manager) 
Overall, the managers perceived a straightforward and powerful link between the 
practicality/outcomes of the model and the ability to comprehend problems that stemmed 
from directly importing foreign concepts and a lack of local tailoring.  
The second dimension is the insufficiency of training. According to some managers and 
planners, awareness-building and adoption requires intellectual preparation, which can be 
achieved through appropriate training. The problems associated with poor perception and 
comprehension of the concepts introduced by the formal PFMCL framework could be 
overcome by means of training. However, such training could not be given to the managers 
either before or after planning. Strong evidence supporting this argument comes from the fact 
that the managers were still struggling to understand the basic concepts such as mission, 
vision, target, and performance indicator in the fourth year of plan implementation. There are 
even doubts whether or not most managers have comprehended what strategic planning and 
strategic plans mean ,QWHUYLHZB BPDQDJHU DQG KRZ LW PD\ FRQWULEXWH WR WKH 0R,¶V
business (Interview_30_manager). Planners were not exempt as they also lacked the technical 
expertise to grasp key concepts, since it was the first time they had engaged in strategic 
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planning. The managers perceived the link between training and expected outcomes of 
strategic planning as strong. Following was the account of a manager in this respect: 
³7KHUHLVDELJNQRZOHGJHJDSIRUVXUH:HFDQWDONDERXWPRUHFRQFUHWHWKLQJVRQFHWKLVLV
overcome. We FDQWKHQVD\>IRUH[DPSOH@µ,t has contributed to integration; service quality 
has improved; corporation and co-RUGLQDWLRQKDVEHHQDIIHFWHG¶´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The third dimension is the inadequacy of external guidance during the planning process. A 
similar argument was made previously in the context of the US state agencies in Chapter 3 
(Franklin, 2001). Particularly the planners, who were responsible for the co-ordination of the 
planning work, criticised the weak guidance provided by the SPO as the watchdog for the 
strategic planning reform. The planners describe the formal model laid out by the PFMCL 
2003 and the Guide 2006 as ill-defined and full of grey areas that required further explanation 
(Interview_28_planner). It was argued in Chapter 5 that a training-the-trainees programme 
suggested by the MoI was turned down by the watchdogs at the outset. Despite deficiencies 
and critique, the MoD has not published an updated version of the Guide 2006 to date. 
The fourth dimension is weak organisational memory. The MoI is handicapped with a high 
turnover at both the political and management levels. As the appointment term for managers 
and the planning schedule did not converge in the MoI, untimely changes of actors have 
become inevitable, disrupting plan implementation and the construction of organisational 
memory with reference to strategic planning practice. High turnover was recognised by both 
internal and external stakeholders as a weakness and threat to the future of the MoI during 
planning (MoI, 2009c)$VD UHVSRQVHDQG WRSURYLGHFRQWLQXLW\ LQGHSDUWPHQWDOZRUN µWKH
HPSOR\PHQW RI SHUPDQHQW VSHFLDOLVWV¶ ZDV GHYHORSHG DV D KXPDQ UHVRXUFH VWUDWHJ\ XQGHU
Goal 1 (MoI, 2009c, p. 56). The necessary legal basis was created by the enforcement of By-
law on Home Affairs Specialists in 2013. The MoI started recruiting specialists in the same 
year. Yet, managers still perceive the present weakness of organisational memory and 
interruptions in management continuity as negatively related to the effective application and 
outcomes of strategic planning. 
As the last dimension, the managers perceived an important association between the 
leadership attitude and the outcomes of strategic planning. References were made to political 
and particularly to managerial leadership. Managers reflected the need for more top 
management commitment and engagement in the planning and monitoring processes. The 
perceived importance of leadership for effective plan implementation is also relevant for the 
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effective application of strategic planning. However, managers assigned less importance to 
the link between leadership and application of strategic planning than they did to the 
leadership-plan implementation link.  
Although it is widely perceived that strategic planning did not bring significant change and 
did not produce the expected outcomes, managers still recognised some favourable changes. 
The perceived changes mostly relate to management capacity. A few managers described the 
introduction of strategic planning and finalisation of the first strategic plan on its own as a 
VLJQLILFDQW FKDQJH ,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU VLJQDOOLQJ DQ ³LQWHOOHFWXDO UHYROXWLRQ´
(Interview_3_manager) given the high resistance from the bureaucracy at the beginning of 
the process. For some managers, strategic planning created awareness with regard to what the 
respective departments do and where they are situated in the wider canvas of the MoI. It 
helped management review and become aware of the roles and functions of the departments, 
delimit the mandate and service of the MoI, remove contradictions and institutionalise service 
and stabilise management by putting time and other constraints as controls on broad 
PDOOHDELOLW\DQGH[FHVVLYHGLVFUHWLRQ2QHPDQDJHU¶VYLHZVZHUH 
³,W IRUPDOLVHG >WKHEXVLQHVV DQG@ rendered it organisation-wide weakening its relation with 
individuals; so, the strategic plan established a continuous system that cannot be changed 
considerably by the appointment of a new manager´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Given the high rate of manager turnover in the MoI, this function of strategic planning was 
promising. Whoever came to the post would have to abide by the strategic plan. Strategic 
planning evoked the importance of prioritisation of business among managers, which is likely 
to lead to the establishment of a balance between the urgent and the significant issues in the 
MoI, where the former traditionally overwhelmed the latter. Managers became more aware of 
plan-based work vs. groping, long-term vs. short-term focus, prioritisation of tasks, 
quantifiability of service and measurability of achievement and became familiar with the 
concepts of goals, targets, performance indicators and the like. Following are two of the 
PDQDJHUV¶DFFRXQWV 
³:HKDYHFRPHWROHDUQWKDWWKHWKLQJVWKDWZHKDYHEHHn doing by groping according to the 
needs of the day are not persistent and sustainable´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
³, DW OHDVW EHOLHYH WKDW LW KDV PDUNHG WKH EHJLQQLQJ RI D QHZ FXOWXUH WKDW QHFHVVLWDWHV >WKH
preparation of] an action plan, and the specification of the Ministry strategies and policies 
[within] that action plan.´(Interview_39_former_manager) 
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Planning began to become a part of the organisational culture according to this view, yet in 
its very early steps. It has, as one of the managers commented, stirred the cumbersome MoI 
bureaucracy into action (Interview_3_manager). 
6.4. Pattern 4: Integration and Co-Ordination  
The formal PFMCL framework had an integrative approach. The first dimension of 
integration was the aim to include all functions and departments within the strategic planning 
process and plan. The MPSPPO By-law 2006 involved the participation and contribution of 
all the departments within the involved public organisation in the strategic planning process. 
Similarly, the Guide 2006 stipulated the formulation of projects and activities as counterparts 
for each and every legal responsibility ascribed to public organisations (SPO, 2006c). 
Organisational missions were seen as a means for this purpose (SPO, 2006c). The second 
dimension was the articulation of an inspiring vision as an abstract description of an ideal 
future of the public organisation as a whole (SPO, 2006c). This second dimension was 
particularly critical for multi-agency public organisations with multiple functions such as the 
MoI. 
The formal PFMCL framework adopted an enhanced style of co-ordination within strategy-
making in government. According to the By-law on Public Strategic Planning 2006, the 
strategic plan of the MoI, and of any other public body, had to be in accordance with upper 
level principles and norms formulated within the development plan, mid-term programme 
and any other national, regional and sectorial plans and programmes. The Ministry of 
Development was assigned by the PFMCL 2003 the duty of ensuring the compliance of 
strategic plans with the mid-term programme, as well as the evaluation and control of the 
investment proposals for public organisations. It was organised in the form of sectorial 
departments based on expertise, through which public investment proposals and projects were 
assessed, as in the case of the Department for Information Society, which controlled and co-
ordinated e-government projects cross-governmentally (MoD, 2014). Within this context, the 
MoI had to consider the goals, policies and macro indicators provided via the mid-term 
programme for the formulation of its strategies. Concurrently it had to stick by the 
appropriation proposal ceilings defined by the mid-term fiscal plan for resource allocation. 
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6.4.1. The Inclusion of All Departments 
For the first dimension, the MoI planners targeted the integration of all departments within 
the MoI into the planning process and the plan, through the support of the top management. 
This was one of the aims behind the creation of the comprehensive three-level decision-
S\UDPLG 7KH H[DPLQDWLRQ RI WKH 0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF SODQ VKRZV WKDW LW HQFRPSDVVHG IRXUWHHQ
main, support, advisory and other departments and the provincial branches of the MoI (MoI, 
2009c). These fourteen bodies in total did not include the three subsidiary agencies that were 
assigned to perform the most critical functions of law enforcement and security. The 
provincial branches of the MoI were formally included within the strategic plan. However, 
this integration could not be put into practice in reality, as will be argued below. 
The exclusion of law enforcement agencies had two aspects that stemmed from the formal 
PFMCL framework itself. Firstly, the Turkish National Police had to prepare its strategic plan 
independently of the MoI according to the By-law on Public Strategic Planning 2006. 
Secondly, unlike the Police, the Gendarmerie and the Turkish Coast Guard Command, which 
were affiliated with the Army in military issues, were exempted by the PFMCL 2003 from 
strategic planning obligations on the grounds of confidentiality and sensitivity around their 
duties. Neither the Turkish Police, nor the Gendarmerie or the Turkish Coast Guard 
Command could be integrated to the strategic plan due to the arrangements of the formal 
PFMCL framework. The Police had already finished and enforced its first strategic plan by 
2009, one year before the MoI, in compliance with the deadline set in the By-law 2006. It 
was perceived by the actors as a significant incongruity: 
³7KHPDLQSUREOHPKHUHLVWKDWWKH1Dtional Police had prepared and started to implement its 
SODQEHIRUHWKHWHUPZHSUHSDUHGRXUVWUDWHJLFSODQWKLVFRQVWLWXWHGDYHU\ELJFRQWUDGLFWLRQ´
(Interview_41_planner). 
The Gendarmerie and the Coastal Guard Command never produced a strategic plan within 
the formal PFMCL framework, in agreement with the law, and could not be integrated into 
the ministerial strategic planning and management process. The planning team attempted to 
overcome this discrepancy by giving a place to Goal 2 in the strategic plan, which was 
LQWHQGHG ³WR HQIRUFH DQG HQKDQFH KRPHODQG VHFXULW\ VHUYLFHV´ (MoI, 2009c, p. 57), as a 
guideline for strategy development in these agencies, at least for the Police 
(Interview_36_planner).  
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Although the regulations of the formal PFMCL framework explained this omission, it was 
widely believed that the legal arrangement itself was a consequence of a long lasting power 
struggle between the civil and uniformed bureaucracies, in which the latter always enjoyed 
more autonomy (Interview_3_manager; Interview_31_former_manager). This was the case 
for example with regard to public spending and accountability. According to this view, these 
subsidiary agencies, particularly the Gendarmerie and the Coastal Guard Command, are 
treated differently since they are semi-military organisations. Hence, it is a frequent practice 
by the legislator to bestow exemptions on these agencies in numerous laws intended to bring 
new responsibilities to public organisations. These agencies are loosely connected to the MoI 
(Interview_42_planner) and the problem of integration within the context of strategic 
planning cannot be solved unless this long-lasting organisational and structural problem is 
settled. The following account by a manager was illustrative:  
³:KDWLVWKHGHJUHHRIFRnnection of these agencies to the Ministry? To what extent are they a 
part of this system? And even if they prepare strategic plans, to what extent are they 
PDQDJHDEOH >E\ WKH 0R,@" « The first step should be the emplacement of the[se] pieces 
properly. If these pieces are properly situated, then that big picture emerges by itself´
(Interview_23_manager) 
The MoI management, to a great extent, perceived the situation to be problematic and as a 
barrier to the joining together of different departments around a common vision, mission and 
goals as well as to the synchronisation of units and enhancement of a sense of belonging 
ZLWKLQWKH0R,)ROORZLQJZHUHDSODQQHU¶VDQGDPDQDJHU¶V views: 
 ³7KHVXEVLGLDU\>ODZHQIRUFHPHQW@DJHQFLHVPXVWDVZHOOIRFXVRQWKH>FRmmon] goals and 
targets in order to provide the integrity of projects and activities; they must prepare strategic 
and action plans for the achievement of the same goals and targets´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU  
³7KHLUEXGJHWLVVHSDUDWHDQGWRSPDQDJHULVGLIIerent according to the law 5018 [PFMCL]; it 
is a subsidiary, and it can prepare [its own plan], but the ministry should determine the target. 
It is under civil authority. [The absence of this] creates a gap´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The managers and planners viewed this as an impediment to the accountability of top 
management within law enforcement agencies, who spend public money like any other 
department of the MoI. According to them, the law enforcement agencies should be included 
within the strategic plan, with safeguards in place to exempt confidential issues from their 
mandate. Their exclusion undermines the system by leaving their monitoring and evaluation 
solely to hierarchy rather than being subject to performance appraisal. Only a handful of 
managers viewed the exclusion of the law enforcement agencies as justified and as necessary 
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in some cases. Some managers thought that these semi-military agencies already had 
strategies, plans, goals and targets and that they always acted strategically. Hence, they 
believed the exclusion of these agencies would not do any damage to the integrity of strategic 
planning. According to others, their exclusion was a necessity due to the characteristics of 
WKHLUVHUYLFHGRPDLQ2QHPDQDJHU¶VDFFRXQWZDV 
³:HOO , EHOLHYH they are excluded due to the sensitivity at the agency level. This is quite 
normal; it is a requirement to my opinion.´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Provincial branches of the MoI include the offices of each department at the provincial level, 
such as civil registration and nationality, which are the main units with service delivery 
functions. The number of services delivered by the department headquarters at the centre of 
the MoI is limited. Interestingly, the provincial branches were treated both as internal and 
external stakeholders in the analysis study (MoI, 2009c), which appeared to be a 
contradiction in the approach to these branches during planning. Yet, unlike the law 
enforcement agencies, the provincial branches of the MoI were shown to have been assigned 
to duties through the strategic plan (MoI, 2009c). However, this reference was symbolic and 
provincial branches and their performance has never been monitored within the framework of 
strategic planning, according to participants in this study and annual activity reports of the 
MoI (e.g. MoI, 2013). A planner pointed to this gap: 
³«WKHSURYLQFLDOOHJLVQRWLQFOXGHGZLWKLQWKLVVWUDWHJLFSODQLWPXVWDEVROXWHO\EHGHVLJQHG
to include the governors and district governors´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
The exclusion of the provincial branches meant the exclusion of service delivery from 
planning to a great extentKDYLQJLPSRUWDQWFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUWKH0R,¶VSUDFWLFHRIVWUDWHJLF
planning. Most of the MoI services are delivered through the provincial branches of the 
departments. For example, national ID cards or international marriage certificates are issued 
by the provincial offices of the Directorate-General for Civil Registration and Nationality. 
Similarly, it is the duty of the provincial office of the Department for Associations to examine 
DQGPRQLWRUWKHDQQXDOGHFODUDWLRQVRIORFDODVVRFLDWLRQV2QHPDQDJHU¶VFRPPHQWZDV 
³0RVWRIWKHEXVLQHVVGRHVQRWVWDUWDQGHQGLQWKLVXQLW,PHDQZHGRQRWVWDUWDQGILQLVKWKH
whole process. If it was like that, we could undertake all the responsibility with all aspects. 
)RUH[DPSOH WKHSURYLQFLDOEUDQFKHVDUHSURFHVVLQJVRPHGRFXPHQWVZHVHQG WR WKHP«,
believe it would be more convenient if the [strategic plan] was prepared through the 
integration of the provincial units´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU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Due to the de facto exclusion of provincial branches from the strategic plan, most 
performance targets remained as input targets, such as completion of an e-government 
project. Following is a typical performance target taken IURPWKH0R,¶VDQQXDOUHSRUW 
³7KHHVWDEOLVKPHQWGDWHRIWKHVSDWLDODGGUHVVUHJLVWU\V\VWHP.´(MoI, 2013, p. 39) 
In this example, the date of the creation of a new system is taken as a performance indicator. 
However, no targets are put in place to link the new system to the delivery of any service. 
Evidence shows that the exclusion of the provincial branches has been a significant failing of 
WKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJH[SHULHQFH 
6.4.2. Building a Common Vision 
There is evidence that the integrative effect of strategic planning over management remained 
extremely limited. The main reason for this is the multi-department structure of the MoI, in 
which departments perform distant and, to a large extent, disconnected functions. For 
example, while the Local Authorities Department performs regulatory functions over 
municipalities, the Civil Registration Department performs direct service delivery, such as 
the issuance of national ID cards to citizens. Similarly, the Associations Department and law 
enforcement agencies act in different domains. In such a system, the MoI departments reveal 
patterns of introverted working as expressed by a manager: 
 ³2XU GHSDUWPHQWV DUH PRVWO\ LQWURYHUWHG 7KH\ GRQ¶W LQWHUIHUH ZLWK RWKHU GHSDUWPHQWV¶
business; neither have they allowed others to interfere with their own work´
(Interview_25_manager) 
The negative effect of this culture on discussions during the SDB meetings was discussed 
previously. An important common point between different units was the management class of 
the departments: the prefects (Interview_15_manager). While evidence points to a low level 
of a perceived common vision and integration, some managers viewed this as a matter of time 
and thought it was too early to see such effects of strategic planning. One manager said: 
³,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHUHLVDQDZDUHQHVVRILQWHJUDWLRQ,EHOLHYHWKDWZHQHHGVRPHPRUHWLPHIRU
that´,QWHULYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Practitioners did mention some positive integrative and co-ordination effects of strategic 
planning but most of these positive views relied on assumptions rather than concrete 
observations. It is assumed by some planners and managers that high levels of interaction 
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during the planning meetings might have contributed to the impression of a common vision, a 
sense of integrity and co-ordination. Since the strategic plan is not reviewed periodically 
through meetings, the assumed positive effects are likely to have faded over time. The 
following account by a manager points to the need for continuity through meetings for a 
better sense of integrity: 
³,IDVWUXFWXUH>DQGSURFHVV@FDQEHFUHDWHGIRUWKHDQQXDOUHYLHZRIWKHVWUDWHJLFSODQDQGLI
review meetings can be held with the stakeholders, it can contribute a great deal to 
integration´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
This view is in conformity with the empirically supported calls in the literature for a more 
flexible sort of strategic planning model and a blend of rational and incrementalist models 
that allows the revisiting and revision of strategic plans (Poister et al., 2013), for example on 
an annual basis. 
6.4.3. Co-ordination 
The results of stakeholder analysis during the planning process showed that the majority of 
the internal stakeholders of the MoI found the level of co-ordination and co-operation among 
departments, and between main service departments and subsidiary agencies, as falling below 
the expected standard (MoI, 2009c). The customary manner in which inter-departmental 
relations are constituted with low co-ordination continued to be the case following strategic 
planning. The close interaction during the planning process showed a temporary positive 
effect in this regard. There are two important aspects of co-ordination to be addressed for the 
0R,¶s practice. First, strategic planning was expected to centralise strategy analysis under the 
co-ordination of the SDU. How and why strategy analysis remained departmental and 
fragmented, and how and why central analysis developed superficially during planning was 
discussed in the first section of this Chapter. Secondly, the monitoring, evaluation and 
feedback of plan implementation was similarly anticipated to be centralised and co-ordinated 
by the SDU. Although implementation was monitored centrally by the SDU through three-
monthly performance reporting, the evaluation and feedback functions could not be fulfilled 
effectively as explained under the implementation dimension. Hence, neither the ex-ante 
analysis of strategies nor the ex-post evaluation of results could be centralised effectively at a 
level of high central co-ordination, although the formal PFMCL framework created necessary 
structures and processes. The inadequacy of the SDU to centralise strategy work was also the 
consequence of power relations among departments and ineffective actor certification of the 
162 
 
SDU. In other words, the SDU did not manage to wield its legal powers fully against 
powerful departments, with regard to strategy formulation, monitoring implementation and 
analysing and feeding back results.  
As with the internal stakeholders, the external stakeholders of the MoI found the 
effectiveness of co-ordination with the MoI weak or average at the start of strategic planning 
(MoI, 2009c). Managers from various departments perceived no change in cross-
governmental co-ordination. A manager stated:  
³, FDQ¶W VD\, at least for our department, that such awareness [of high-co-ordination with 
external stakeholders] has developed´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
However, there is evidence that strategic management had a positive impact on co-ordination 
between government departments, at least in some respects, with consequences for the MoI. 
The MoD had a critical role in this regard. It was legally given the role of a hub, where all 
strategic plan proposals are gathered and checked for compliance with governmental goals, 
constitutional and legal arrangements, technical aspects of strategic planning and to prevent 
duplication of projects by different organisations. An increased co-ordination in the field of 
ICT and e-government strategies was observed in this regard, which is due to the efforts of 
WKH'HSDUWPHQWIRU,QIRUPDWLRQ6RFLHW\RIWKH0R'2QHPDQDJHU¶VDFFRXQWZDV 
³)RU H[DPSOH WKHUH LV WKH 'HSDUWPHQW IRU ,QIRUPDWLRQ 6RFLHW\ LQ WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI
'HYHORSPHQW « ,W LV WKH XQLW WKDW FR-ordinates e-JRYHUQPHQW DFWLYLW\ « 7KHy transfer 
capital and support you primarily if your project overlaps with the governmental goals. For 
me, they are fulfilling a successful co-ordination.´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
According to the managers, enhanced co-ordination in the e-government domain helped to 
synchronise organisational goals with that of the government, the compatibility between e-
government applications in different departments and helped prevent repetition in the public 
sector. One dimension of positive co-ordination can be found in cross-governmental strategy 
documents and plans, such as the Information Society Strategy (2006), that have considerably 
grown in number since the enforcement of the PFMCL in 2003. These are the documents in 
which governmental goals are formulated and to which acquiescence is mandatory. The MoI 
was strict in demanding compliance to its goals and targets with such plans and documents, 
as in the example of the Information Society Strategy (2006) that guided the e-government 
goals and strategies of the MoI (MoI, 2009c) 
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Since e-government is extensively used in the MoI and in the Turkish public sector for many 
functions, from production to the delivery of services, improved co-ordination in e-
government is expected to have more than a moderate impact on government-wide co-
ordination. 
6.5. Conclusion 
Through a pattern-matching approach, this chapter compared the patterns of rational planning 
theory with the patterns of the formal PFMCL framework and with the patterns of observed 
strategy implementation of the MoI to explain the dynamics of practice. The results of 
pattern-matching are presented in Table 6.4 below, which is structured in the following way: 
the second column indicates the involved dimension of rational planning; the third column 
shows only the degree of convergence between the pattern of rational planning and the formal 
PFMCL framework; the fourth column shows the observed practice in the MoI; the fifth 
FROXPQ FRPSDUHV WKH SDWWHUQV WKH 0R,¶V SUDFWLFH ZLWK WKDW RI UDWLRQDO SODQQLQJ WKH VL[WK
column shows the area of concern; and the seventh column shows the effect of strategic 
SODQQLQJ UHIRUPRQ WKHSDWWHUQREVHUYHG LQ WKH0R,¶VSUDFWLFH1H[W WKH results of pattern-
matching are discussed for each pattern. 
6.5.1. Comprehensive Analysis of Alternative Strategies 
Although the formal PFMCL framework envisaged formal analysis of alternative strategies 
centrally, the data shows that a link between the strategic planning process and cost-benefit 
analysis of alternative strategies could not be established firmly during the planning process. 
The analyses of strategies occurred within the normal workflow in the MoI departments 
through conventional methods during planning. Cost-benefit analysis of departments showed 
patterns of comprehensive (aided-analytical) and restricted analysis (unaided-analytical) both 
of which continued to co-exist during pre-planning, planning and post-planning eras, as 
exhibited in Table 6.4. Perceived as the generic approach of the MoI, restricted analysis is 
found to be a consequence of some cultural, system-related and service-related factors which 
lacks a precise methodology and depends mostly on a rule-based decision-making mental 
model.  
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Table 6.4 ±  Results of Pattern Matching for Rational Planning 
 
No 
Pattern of 
Rational 
Planning (RP) 
PFMCL  
to  RP 
Pattern of Practice 
Observed 
MoI 
Practice 
to RP 
Areas of Concern Effect of SP  
on Practice 
1 
Formal 
Comprehensive 
Analysis 
High 
Situation and SWOT 
analysis for strategic 
planning purposes 
High 
The SDU and other 
MoI Departments High 
 
 
 
Formal-comprehensive 
analysis of strategy 
options by departments 
High 
Technical and 
quantifiable services 
delivered through ICT 
infrastructure; 
Political domain 
(where managerial 
discretion exists) 
Low 
 
 
 
Restricted analysis of 
strategy options by 
departments 
Low 
Most MoI 
departments (services 
that are not delivered 
through ICT and e-
government)  
Low 
2 Formality High Formal strategic planning High 
The whole strategic 
planning process High 
3 
a) Implementation 
of the Strategic 
Plan 
Moderate Weak implementation Low 
The strategies 
formulated within the 
strategic plan 
Low 
 
b) Application of 
the SP Model High Weak Application Low 
Components of 
strategic planning 
(PFMCL framework) 
Low 
4 a) Co-ordination High Enhanced co-ordination High 
Cross-governmental 
(by the Ministry of 
Development) 
High 
 
  
Analysis of strategies 
fragmented Low 
Analysis of strategies 
is departmental OR is 
not performed by the 
SDU centrally 
Low 
 
  
Evaluation and 
feedback of results 
fragmented 
Low 
Evaluation and 
feedback is 
departmental OR is 
not effectively 
performed by the 
SDU centrally 
Low 
 
b) Integration High Partial inclusion of units Low 
Law enforcement and 
security agencies, and 
provincial branches 
excluded from SP 
Low 
 
  No  buy-in of common 
vision  Low Organisation-wide  Low 
 
This chapter has described how restricted analysis is dependent on individuals and marked by 
risk-minimisation and justification of decisions, which are the two kinds of decision rules 
employed in the decision-making process. A pattern of comprehensive analysis is found to 
exist in ICT departments and ICT-related services, such as e-government. In this mode, 
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analysis is systematic, formal and conducted by professionals; built on goal-based decision-
making; mostly a consequence of service delivery systems, availability of piloting, the 
characteristics of mandate and service domain and the dimensions of decision problem and 
decision environment. The decision rule employed is efficiency or optimisation. Contrary to 
expectations, the findings show that strategic planning in practice could not transform 
restricted analysis to comprehensive analysis in the MoI. The pattern of comprehensive 
analysis observed in the MoI is not the consequence of strategic planning, but mainly of 
computerisation, Europeanisation effects and domain-specific pre-planning culture. Hence, 
pattern-matching is indicated both as high and low with regard to comprehensive and 
restricted analysis in Table 6.4 and strategic planning effects on this result are shown to be 
low, except for situation and SWOT analysis, which were introduced to the MoI management 
through strategic planning reform. 
6.5.2. Formality 
The evidence shows that the formal PFMCL framework is highly formal, legally binding and 
structures and processes were created and functioned formally. The MoI strictly adhered by a 
plan preparation programme and a strategic plan document was produced at the end of the 
process. Formality, in the sense of legal obligation, is seen as a requirement for the initiation 
and adoption of strategic planning in the MoI. As formality prevailed over all practiced 
components of strategic planning, pattern-matching in this dimension is marked as high. 
Strategic planning effects are also marked as high in Table 6.4, since formality of the process 
stemmed from the formal PFMCL framework or the strategic planning model introduced. 
6.5.3. Implementation 
Pattern-matching between the theory and the formal PFMCL framework is rated as moderate 
for implementation of strategies with regard to the quality of the formal monitoring and 
evaluation systems. It is rated high for the application of the strategic planning model, since 
the application of the formal PFMCL framework is mandated to the MoI and is under legal 
guarantee. Regarding the practice, the evidence suggests that the monitoring mechanism 
proved mostly inefficient during the course of plan implementation. The lack of incentives 
and sanctions and the lack of a link between performance and staff appraisal, or the absence 
of performance-based objective criteria for appraisal, lead to the negligence of the strategic 
plan (Poister and Streib, 2005). In such a system, the MoI managers are mostly accountable 
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to more senior heads, who have excessive discretion in terms of staff appraisal in the existing 
subjective system for managing personnel in the MoI. Hence, the attitude of the leadership 
cadre takes on critical importance by shaping the attitudes of department heads and lower 
level managers. The evidence shows that effective implementation is contingent upon the 
existence of a politically strong process champion (Bryson, 2011, p. 104), external audit, and 
stability of government policy, parliamentary control and civil society engagement to hold 
public agencies accountable. Similarly, nurturing an environment for a strong strategy-related 
organisational memory and linking strategic planning to budgetary allocation were found to 
be important factors for plan implementation. While the relationship between the plan and the 
budget is vital for service delivery units that exploit high capital spending, its effects are 
negligible for regulatory and policy-making units. Measurability of service is found to be a 
facilitator of implementation.  
As for the application of the strategic planning model in the broader sense, the MoI 
managers, to a large extent, perceived a poor application of the model due to the problems of 
awareness and adoption. The managers largely perceived that the anticipated outcomes of 
strategic planning did not transpire. Evidence reveals that weak awareness and adoption of 
strategic planning led only to the formalisation of a business-as-usual approach and could not 
function as leverage for strategic change in the MoI. Lack of familiarity with the new goal-
based decision-making model, insufficient tailoring and training, weak external guidance of 
the reform watchdogs and weak organisational memory stemming from high manager 
turnover are discussed as the central factors and mechanisms that led to weak awareness and 
acceptance of the strategic planning model in the management class. The MoI could neither 
apply the components of strategic planning model properly, nor took the strategic plan as the 
PDLQUHIHUHQFHSRLQWIRULWVRSHUDWLRQVOHDYLQJWKHSODQµRQWKHVKHOI¶+HQFHIURPDSUDFWLFH
perspective, pattern-matching for both the application of the model and implementation of the 
strategic plan are marked as low in Table 6.4, demonstrating that strategic planning had a 
limited effect on management practice. 
6.5.4. Integration and Co-ordination 
The formal PFMCL framework stipulated a highly integrative system, in which a high level 
of co-ordination was supposed to exist. Therefore, the match between the integration and co-
ordination patterns of the theory and the formal PFMCL framework are marked as high in 
Table 6.4. In practice, the law enforcement and security subsidiaries and provincial branches 
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RIWKH0R,ZKRGHOLYHU0R,VHUYLFHVDWWKHVWUHHWOHYHOFRXOGQRWEHLQWHJUDWHGWRWKH0R,¶V
corporate strategic planning process, undermining the whole strategic plan and defying the 
logic of strategic planning by excluding service delivery to a great extent. Strategic planning 
activities created an impermanent impression on integration among managers, which faded 
during the plan implementation period. The MoI could not realise the sustained integration of 
its departments around a common vision, since it did not develop an organisational culture 
where strategies could transform the strong tendency for introversion among the departments, 
all of which had considerably detached functions. 
The MoI could not realise its aim to centralise the analysis of strategies and of evaluation and 
feedback of results either, due to the continuance of the pre-planning culture and due to the 
6'8¶VZHDNDFWRUFHUWLILFDWLRQ&URVV-governmental co-ordination was enhanced, visibly in 
the e-government domain, through the effective role of the SPO and later by the MoD. Cross-
governmental strategy documents that increased in number after strategic planning provided 
the basis for effective co-ordination across the government. Finally, the match between the 
theory and practice is marked as high in Table 6.4 with regard to cross-governmental co-
ordination, while it is marked as low for the rest of the integration and co-ordination 
elements. Table 6.4 demonstrates cross-governmental co-ordination is enhanced by the effect 
of strategic management, while it had limited impact on internal systems. 
To conclude, the analysis of the evidence from the MoI case exhibits a high level of match 
between the patterns of rational planning and the formal PFMCL framework, except for 
implementation, which is at a moderate level. This confirms that strategic planning reform 
was based on a rational planning theory. Pattern-matching is low in most dimensions with 
regarG WR WKH 0R,¶V DFWXDO SUDFWLFH H[FHSW IRU HQYLURQPHQWDO DQDO\VLV FRPSUHKHQVLYH
analysis in some domains under certain conditions, cross-governmental co-ordination and 
formality of strategic planning. Table 6.4 reveals that the effect of strategic planning 
UHPDLQHGDWORZOHYHOVLQFKDQJLQJWKHPDQDJHUV¶EHKDYLRXUH[FHSWIRULQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDO
environmental scanning, cross-governmental co-ordination, and formality of the process, in 
which the effects of strategic planning were high. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE THEORY OF INCREMENTALISM AND 
EVIDENCE FROM THE MOI 
 
 
³:KHQ ZH FRPH WR RXU PLQLVWU\ LW FRQWLQXHG D VWUXFWXUH WKDW XQGHUOLQHG VWDELOLW\ DQG WKDW
IDYRXUHGDGMXVWPHQWXSWRWKHWLPHEHLQJ ,GRQ¶W WKLQNIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIWKHVHUYLFHV
we provide that it would be beneficial to consider very different alternatives, I would rather 
FRQVLGHUPRUHVLJQLILFDQWWKHHIIRUWVIRUFRQWLQXRXVDGMXVWPHQW´ 
(Interview-22, manager) 
 
 
The theory of incrementalism posits that public organisations act in highly political 
environments in which decision-making operates through patterns of partisan mutual 
adjustment (Pal, 2011). Decisions in the public sector are taken through negotiation, 
bargaining and agreement. Agreement and political rationality, rather than procedural 
rationality, is the best criterion for public sector strategies (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970). 
Analysis is margin-dependent, incrementally different options, both from each other and from 
the existing strategies, are considered in analysis and decisions are made upon the basis of 
increments of change in values promised by a limited number of strategy options (Atkinson, 
2011). Analysis of strategies develops progressively in a trial-and-error fashion. Strategy 
formulation is considerably flexible and it is an ongoing and dynamic process (Quinn, 1980). 
This chapter analyses the case evidence with an explanatory approach by using the 
dimensions of incrementalism theory as patterns. In a similar approach to Chapter 6, analysis 
is directed both to the formal PFMCL IUDPHZRUN DQG WR WKH 0R,¶V SUDFWLFH +HQFH WKLV
chapter compares theory with the formal PFMCL framework, and theory with the practice of 
the MoI. Analysis is conducted by means of interview and documentary data in an integrative 
manner and the causes of the patterns observed in the case are traced back to their source 
factors, structures and mechanisms. With this aim, the Chapter is structured in the following 
way: 
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1) Pattern 1: Partisan mutual adjustment, 
2) Pattern 2: Criteria for good strategy, 
3) Pattern 3: Simple incremental analysis, 
4) Pattern 4: Trial-and-error, 
5) Pattern 5: Flexibility and dynamism, 
6) Conclusion 
7KH&KDSWHUEHJLQVZLWKDµSDUWLVDQPXWXDODGMXVWPHQW¶SDWWHUQWRH[SODLQZKHWKHUVWUDWHJLF
decisions are taken by politically motivated departments of the MoI through interaction, 
specifically through conflict and bargaining, with other departments or external actors, who 
are also politically motivated. 
7.1. Pattern 1: Partisan Mutual Adjustment 
For the intra-organisational politics, in ministries such as the MoI that include various 
departments and agencies with separate functions, strategic planning can be employed for 
main two aims: Firstly, for directing resource allocation among agencies; secondly, for 
ascribing strategic tasks to departments in light of environmental changes  (Faludi, 1973). In 
public organisations, the latter may occur as prioritisation of goals and actions. Accordingly, 
resource allocation and prioritisation of goals emerged as potential areas of conflict and 
bargaining (Favoreu et al., 2015) ZLWKLQWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSURFHVV 
The formal PFMCL framework stipulated the establishment of a link between the plan and 
the budget through performance budgeting, which was a radical change to the classic 
budgeting system. The idea of linking the plan to the budget gave MoI managers the 
incentive to ensure all departmental goals were included within the strategic plan, but also 
creating potential conflicts and bargaining over resources. For example, the insistence of the 
planners on to implement performance budgeting caused an upsurge in departmental 
performance indicator proposals to three-fold all of a sudden (Interview_36_Planner). The 
managers believed that any activity or project that fell outside the strategic plan would not be 
apportioned money in the budget. As one manager stated: 
³,QRUGHUWRUHFHLYHDVKDUHRIWKHEXGJHWZHZURWHGRZQHYHU\WKLQJWKDWZHKDGEHHQGRLQJ´
(Interview_26_Manager) 
+RZHYHU WKH GHYHORSPHQWV GXULQJ WKH 0R,¶V SODQQLQJ SURFHVV VKRZHG WKDW LW ZDV QRW Dn 
easy task to turn to performance budgeting due to a series of systemic and other factors, such 
as lack of experience and the inflexible personnel system. Neither the MoI nor any other 
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public organisation in Turkey has implemented performance budgeting to date and budgeting 
has continued in the traditional way. Conflict and bargaining on resource allocation was ruled 
out to a great extent because strategic planning did not function as a means for resource 
allocation. The following extract highlights a planQHU¶VYLHZV 
³:KHUHGRHVEDUJDLQLQJRFFXU",WRFFXUVZKHQVKDULQJVRPHWKLQJZKHQVKDULQJDUHVRXUFH
Now, that kind of bargaining did not happen; [such as] µOLQNLQJ WKHSODQ WR WKHEXGJHW LQD
way when we have a certain size of cake and sharing the cake¶7his did not happen since the 
extent of the [planning] work had not reached that point´,QWHUYLHZBB3ODQQHU 
The realisation of costing and budgeting chronologically after the formulation of goals and 
strategies (MoI, 2009c), rather than concurrently, shows a weak link between the two.  
The prioritisation of goals and strategies was the second potential source of conflict. The 
basic reason was that the strategic plan was intended to be a concise guideline, particularly 
due to the directives of the SPO, whereas the MoI departments were motivated to have all 
their activities listed. Discussions for prioritisation took place at the three-level decision-
pyramid created by the SDU for strategic planning purposes. The most interactive debates 
took place in the first and second level of the pyramid, in which managers other than the 
department heads and the Undersecretary took part. The parties involved in the discussions 
were the departments, on the one side, and the planning team or the SDU, on the other side. 
Departments were motivated by the instinct of survival and maintenance of functionality. The 
managers from main service departments (either with delivery or regulatory functions) 
viewed the inclusion of their respective goals and actions within the strategic plan as an 
important means for ensuring the continuity of their units (for example 
Interview_31_former_manager). The planning team, on the other hand, was motivated by the 
aim of developing a technically perfect strategic plan. Hence, a rather moderate degree of 
conflict and bargaining between the departments and the planning team occurred 
(Interview_13_manager). One of the planners described the process: 
³7KHUH ZHUH GLVFXVVLRQV EXW QRW VHYHUH ,W ZDVQ¶W ULJKW WR DSSURDFK JRLQJ OLNH µ:H NQRZ
everythiQJ¶7KHGHSDUWPHQWVWDIINQRZV WKHGHSDUWPHQW¶VFKDUDFWHULVWLFVEHWWHUWKDQXV:H
rather considered what they said, but at the same time we tried to direct them in order to adapt 
proposals into the formality of planning. Some of them insisted on some issues; we resisted. 
Yet, we found a common point.´,QWHUYLHZBBBIRUPHUBPDQDJHU 
The units that are not assigned service delivery or regulatory functions, such as the Inspection 
Board, were less motivated by such stimulus and the discussions they were involved in took 
place as consultation on technical issues with the planning team (Interview_34_manager).  
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In the SDB, discussions on the prioritisation of goals between the planners (SDU), 
department heads, deputy undersecretaries and the Undersecretary developed in the form of 
talks on pros and cons of proposals, exchange of ideas, constructive criticism, consultation, 
and clarification of situations in congruence with the MoI traditions. Similarly with the 
deputy heads and directors, the department heads were motivated by the aim of getting their 
departmental priorities accepted by the board or to be included within the strategic plan. The 
6'8¶VSRVLWLRQZDV WKHVDPH7KHGLVFXVVLRQVDW WKHERDUG OHYHOGLGQRWDPRXQWD OHYHORI
conflict and bargaining. A manageU¶VYLHZZDV 
³1RLWLVQRWEDUJDLQLQJDV,VDLGZHOHDUQHG>VWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ@DOOWRJHWKHUDWWKDWWLPHZH
did it collectively´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Several underlying reasons existed. Firstly, most of the managers believe that departmental 
mandates are clearly defined by the Statute of the MoI and it is primarily the department 
heads and managers who prioritise their respective goals and actions gradually throughout the 
three-level decision-pyramid. According to this view, departmental relations are not based on 
PXWXDOLQWHUHVWVVLQFHPDQGDWHRYHUODSVDUHUDUHDPRQJGHSDUWPHQWV$PDQDJHU¶VYLHZZDV 
³2QHVKRXOGQRWH[SHFWEDUJDLQLQJKHUHEHFDXVHWKHUHLVWKHGHSDUWPHQWDO>DSSURDFK@GXULQJ
WKHSUHSDUDWLRQRIWKHSODQ«VREDUJDLQLQJLVQRWSRVVLEOHVLQFHWKHUHLVQ¶WPXFKLQWHUVHFWLRQ
SRLQWV>DQG@VLQFHWKHUHLVQ¶WDUHODWLRQEDVHGRQPXWXDOLQWHUHVWV.´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
According to the managers, conflicts can stem from mandate overlaps, although its likelihood 
is perceived as low. Examples of conflicts that stemmed from mandate overlaps occurred as 
denials or claims of a service or mandate between two departments, or uncertainty over the 
power to manage some funds between the SDU and the Department of Administrative and 
Financial Affairs, due to a change in the public spending system by the PFMCL 2003. 
Conflicts of mandate overlaps cannot be the subject of negotiation, bargaining and agreement 
among equivalent departments. Rather such conflicts are settled by the highest managerial or 
political authority in the MoI.  
Secondly, the vertical organisation and hierarchical system in the MoI, according to some 
managers, does not adopt negotiation and bargaining as a method. A planner reflected: 
³(TXDO >GHSDUWPHQWV@ FDQQRW PDNH D FKRLFH DPRQJ WKHPVHOYHV >LQ WKH 0R,@´
(Interview_28_planner). The role of the Undersecretary, and occasionally the minister, are 
seen by the MoI managers as the most important factor in impeding the development of 
interaction, similarly to partisan mutual adjustment. The hierarchical system depresses 
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conflicts intrinsically and through the powerful position occupied by the Undersecretary in 
decision-making, who is also empowered by the law to conduct strategic planning on behalf 
of the minister. In this system, the departments express their position and perspective on an 
issue in the SDB, which is dominated by the Undersecretary. Decisions are taken on the basis 
RID³QDWXUDOFRQVHQVXV´,QWHUYLHZBB3ODQQHUWKDWGHYHORSVQDWXUDOO\WKURXJKGLVFXVVLRQV
Unsettled conflicts are resolved ultimately by the Undersecretary, in consultation with the 
SDU if required, for being the unit that acquired the expertise of strategic planning, at least in 
theory. The department heads act upon the orders and directives of the Undersecretary. Due 
to his strong position, the Undersecretary, or the minister on some occasions, has the power 
to mediate to get agreement on goals, strategies and priorities. In such a setting, as viewed by 
D PDQDJHU ³GHFLVLRQV DUH PDGH HDVLO\´ ,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU This description of 
decision-making or consensus-building is similar to what Bryson (2011, p.23) portrayed 
previously:  
³,QWKHIUDJPHQWHGVKDUHGSRZHUVHWWLQJVWKDWFKDUDFWHULVHPDQ\SXEOLF«RUJDQLVDWLRQV«
there will either be consensus on goals, policies, programmes, and actions necessary to 
achieve organisational aims, or there will be someone with enough power and authority that 
FRQVHQVXV GRHV QRW PDWWHU « 2QO\ LQ IDLUO\ FHQWUDOL]HG DXWKRULWDULDQ DQG TXDVL-military 
bureaucracies will the assumption hold ± PD\EH5REHUWV	9DUJR´ 
The MoI offers an example of what Bryson describes above, at least with reference to the 
internal politics of planning. The managers reveal that the decision-making system of the MoI 
only permits flexibility to the H[WHQWRIWKHWRSPDQDJHU¶VSHUVRQDOZLOOWRVKDUHSRZHUZLWK
other actors. Such an organisational setting does not allow the cultivation of a pluralist 
culture that builds on diversity and conflict of ideas.  
Hence, with reference to the intra-organisational dimension, strategic planning developed as a 
process constituting various interactions at moderate levels such as discussion, influence, 
persuasion and reconciliation, rather than bargaining, among the actors. Thus, intra-
institutional diplomacy was employed by the planning team for the settlement of minor 
conflicts.    
For the extra-organisational relations of the MoI it is better first to look into the formal 
arrangements of the PFMCL 2003. The formal PFMCL framework recognised the political 
nature of the environment of public organisations by including stakeholder analysis as a 
component (SPO, 2006c) in the broader situation analysis. The guide adopted interviewing, 
PHHWLQJVZRUNVKRSVDQGTXHVWLRQQDLUHVWXGLHVDVPHWKRGVIRUUHFHLYLQJVWDNHKROGHUV¶Yiews 
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(SPO, 2006c). The MoI acted in congruence with the guidelines provided within the Guide 
2006. The planning team conducted a central stakeholder analysis study in mid-2007 through 
the use of a questionnaire methodology. This was a form of information gathering, a discrete 
and discontinuous activity that lacked interaction between the MoI and its stakeholders for 
shaping the future strategies. Yet, it was an important step for the MoI management for the 
systematic analysis of their political environment. Figure 7.1 presents how the MoI perceived 
its political environment (MoI, 2009c)oas having a wide range of actors as stakeholders, from 
provincial branches and local authorities to civil society institutions, political parties and the 
PHGLD7KHµJRYHUQPHQW¶LWHPLVDGGHGWRWKH)LJXUHE\WKHDXWKRURIWKLVWKHVLVLPSO\LQJ
WKDW HOHFWHG SROLWLFLDQV DUH DOVR LPSRUWDQW VWDNHKROGHUV LQ WKH 0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ
process. 
 
The solid arrow represents the big impact of the government on the MoI, at a time when the 
strong one-party government that has been in power for the last twelve years considerably 
weakened this dichotomy and became the most important determiner of the public strategy 
and policy-making. The MoF and the MoD are purposefully included by the author to 
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Figure 7.1 The Political Environment of the MoI 
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indicate that these two institutions, among other public organisations, are important 
VWDNHKROGHUVRIWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSURFHVV 
7KHSUHSDUDWLRQRIWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQWRRNSODFHEHWZHHQDQG(MoI, 2009c). 
While planning activities progressed through interaction among departments, the SDU and 
the top management, the departments were not isolated from the external environment and its 
effects upon them. Departmental interaction with their primary stakeholders continued either 
within or outside the context of the strategic planning work.  
Conflict, bargaining and agreement mostly occurred in the external environment of the MoI 
according to the MoI managers, where the political and managerial domains intersect. The 
interaction occurred in the form of bargaining when other ministries, as equivalents of the 
MoI, were involved. The interaction occurred in the form of influence, inducement, and 
persuasion of the MoI by its stakeholders when non-equivalent stakeholders were involved. 
Particularly the departments that work in close proximity to the political domain are 
perceived to engage in more interaction with their stakeholders. Some departments in the 
political realm with regulatory functions, such as the Department for Associations, conducted 
their own stakeholder analysis through meetings with external stakeholders. The department 
received the viewpoints of the associations in these meetings and there was harmony rather 
than conflict between the MoI bureaucracy, the government and the associations regarding 
the goal of enhancing civil society at a time when governance and transparency were rising, 
mostly due to the impact of accession talks with the EU.  
The Directorate-General for Local Authorities was a department that acted in the political 
UHDOPZLWK UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH UHJXODWLRQRI ORFDODXWKRULWLHV7KH'HSDUWPHQW¶V UHODWLRQV
with municipalities, who are its primary stakeholders, were extremely dynamic due to the 
intrinsic characteristics of the field. The managers reflected a high level of stakeholder 
LQWHUDFWLRQDQGFRQIOLFWZLWKLQWKLVGRPDLQ$PDQDJHU¶VDFFRXQWZDV 
³(YHU\ SDUW\ ZDQWV D UHJXODWLRQ WR EH PDGH DFFRUGLQJ WR WKHLU RZQ SRLQWV RI YLHZ )RU
example, the perspectives of the metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities are in 
conflict [in general]. If you design the system according to the viewpoint of one of the 
conflicting parties, you may make one of the parties happier, but you damage the system as 
ZHOO«7KHYLHZSRLQWVVKRXOGEHUHFHLYHGbut making regulations that will not damage the 
functioning of the system is significant´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The above account reflects a contrasting view with the case of the associations department. 
The local authorities department is motivated by the desire to preserve the system or the 
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status quo in local-with-local and local-with-centre relations which puts the MoI bureaucracy, 
at least some part of it, in conflict with the local authorities and the government. A 
manifestation of this occurred during the legislation of Law No: 6360 on Metropolitan 
Municipalities-2012, within the strategic plan implementation period. The Directorate-
General for Local Authorities received the views of the mayors of metropolitan and other 
municipalities, MEPs, governors, district governors and other stakeholders in order to 
propose a suitable model to the government. The attempt of the Department to establish a 
balance between the demands of the stakeholders and the existing system was ignored by the 
government. FollowLQJZDVDPDQDJHU¶VDFFRXQW 
³$V EXUHDXFUDWV ZH WULHG WR UHIOHFW >WKH YLHZV RI WKH VWDNHKROGHUV@ GXULQJ WKH OHJLVODWLRQ
SURFHVV«EXWZHFRXOGQ¶WVXFFHHGWRD great extent. Because, there were big gaps between 
the model in the governmenW¶VPLQGDQGWKHPodel that we drafted. The full stop was put by 
the government´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
+DUERXULQJVHULRXVFRQWUDGLFWLRQVZLWKWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQ/DZ1RKDVDOVREHHQ
an example of how government preferences can lead to the suspension of the strategic plan. 
Hence the government, comprising elected politicians, is highlighted in Figure 7.1 to indicate 
its dominant role and decisiveness in the field of public policy.  
Stakeholders direct their efforts to persuade, rather than bargain with the MoI bureaucracy, 
while they bargain with the elected politicians in order to maximise their benefits in the 
SROLWLFDO UHDOP5HFRJQLVLQJ WKHSROLWLFDOQDWXUHRI WKH8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶V UROHDVDQDJHQWRI
the political establishment and the grey area on which the political and the managerial are 
intertwined, the Undersecretary reflected two interlaced roles: a representative of the 
bureaucracy to be persuaded on technical issues, or a government agent who negotiates 
politically with the stakeholders.  
Unlike political fields, technical service domains such as civil registration and nationality 
services do not show high political interaction, conflict and bargaining patterns. These 
domains do not attract as much attention from internal and external stakeholders as does the 
political domain (Interview_31_former_manager). Technical services are quantifiable to a 
KLJKH[WHQWDQGEXVLQHVVDQGWDVNSURFHVVHVDUHFOHDUO\GHILQHG,QWHUYHQWLRQE\WKH0R,¶VWRS
management is perceived to be low in technical services. As with the internal politics of the 
MoI, in which the Undersecretary has the unique power to induce consensus on goals and 
actions, the strong one-party government had control over enforcing agreement on necessary 
legislation in the Turkish Parliament until mid-2015. 
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A cyclical and recurrent form of bargaining among equivalents is perceived by the managers 
to transpire in the budget preparation process and in the negotiation of the investment 
programmes. The formal PFMCL framework introduced a dual system based on the 
dichotomy of the budget and investment procedures. According to Article 17 of the PFMCL 
2003, the MoI, as other public organisations, had to send its budget proposal to the MoF and 
its investment programme proposal to the MoD. The two ministries are highlighted in Figure 
7.1 to underline this relation. In this system, an investment proposal could not receive funds 
unless it was approved by the MoD, as the co-ordinator of public investments. 
Although the budgeting system continued in the form of classical budgeting, the departments 
were to continue to defend and justify their budget proposals through negotiation with the 
MoF according to the PFMCL 2003. Increasing the departmental budget beyond the fixed 
annual rate was possible by transferring from the reserve fund budget item, which increased 
the likelihood of bargaining. The law authorised the minister of finance to secure such 
transfers, implying interaction and bargaining between ministers at the political level, as well 
as the one between bureaucraWVIRUWKHSXUVXLWRIWKH0R,¶VJRDOV$OWKRXJKDOLQNEHWZHHQ
WKH 0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF SODQ DQG UHVRXUFH DOORFDWLRQ FRXOG QRW EH HVWDEOLVKHG WKH IROORZLQJ
account of a manager showed how strategic planning could have a justification role in 
budgeting processes during negotiations with the MoF: 
³$GGLWLRQDOO\ WKH SURFHVV XQIROGHG DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH >3)0& /DZ 1R@  7KHVH LVVXHV
ZHUH UDLVHG E\ WKH LQYROYHG >0R,@ GHSDUWPHQWV GXULQJ WKH GHIHQFH RI EXGJHWV:H VDLG «
µ7KLV>DFWLYLW\@H[LVWVLQRXUVWUDWHJLFSODQ; we have to carry out this activity; so you have to 
allocate this resource to us.¶´,QWHUYLHZBBIRUPHUBPDQDJHU 
The negotiations for the investment programme with the officials of the MoD were similar to 
the one with the MoF. The MoD is the supervisor of the public strategic planning activities in 
7XUNH\ 7KH 0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF SODQ FRXOG RQO\ FRPH LQWR IRUFH XSRQ WKH H[DPLQDWLRQ DQG
approval of the MoD. In its examination, the MoD sought for the congruence between the 
0R,¶VJRDOVDQGVWUDWHJLHVSDUWLFXODUly capital investment proposals within this context, with 
cross-governmental goals and strategies. The MoI departments, therefore, had to negotiate 
their investment project proposals with the officials of the MoD. The interaction with this 
ministry was found to be moderate when compared to the one with the MoF on budget, as 
reflected by the actors (for example Interview_31_former_manager).  
The external environment of the MoI demonstrated more of the characteristics of a 
centralised system because of the accumulation of executive and legislative powers in the 
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(one-party) government that had a unique position in the public policymaking system. This 
power was underpinned by the traditional functioning of Turkish democracy and political 
parties, in which government proposals can seldom be challenged by the ruling party deputies 
in the Parliament, unlike for example the UK system, due to strict party discipline and strong 
leadership. Although the departments of the MoI engaged in different kinds of interaction 
with their stakeholders, this interaction did not show a strong pattern of partisan mutual 
adjustment that can be seen in highly pluralistic systems, such as the US as argued by 
Lindblom (1979).   
7.2. Pattern 2: Agreement as a Criterion for Good Strategy 
In WKLVVHFWLRQ WKH0R,¶VSUDFWLFHLVDQDO\VHGZLWKUHJDUGWRVRPHFULWHULDGHWDLOVRIZKLFK
are discussed progressively, that were applied for the selection of strategies. That is whether 
it has been the attainment of agreement, or another set of criteria that has been influential in 
the strategy choice.  
The formal PFMCL framework adopts a method similar to rational planning theory. It 
stipulates the determination of values and goals and the analysis of strategy options with 
regard to their costs and benefits in light of these values and goals (SPO, 2006c). Figure 7.2 
presents the criteria for the selection of strategies in the MoI and how the selection process 
occurs in practice. The accounts of managers and planners and examination of the planning 
documents disclose that the MoI formulates its strategies, to a great extent, to address social 
problems and needs. In practice the MoI evaluated the benefits and the likely costs of strategy 
options through a restricted form of central analysis within the context of strategic planning 
and through varying degrees of departmental analysis in light of some pre-adopted values, as 
shown in Box A in Figure 7.2. The main values were proclaimed by the MoI in its strategic 
plan as legality, human-orientedness, enhanced speed and better quality service, democracy, 
effectiveness, efficiency and respect for human rights (MoI, 2009c, p. 53), which have been 
referred as dimensions of organisational performance (Boyne, 2002). This was in accordance 
with the arrangements of the Guide 2006, which stipulated that values could address people 
(internal and external stakeholders), processes, and dimensions of performance (SPO, 2006c). 
The link (Y) shows that these values can be adopted for the MoI, as well as for the whole of 
the public sector, by the Government.  
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In this section, first, the values and principles in Box-A in Figure 7.2 that guide strategy 
selection shall be defined and discussed. Then, how other factors, such as the government and 
management paradigm, affect strategy selection in light of these values shall be argued. 
Finally, the role of costs, as a criterion, and the link between the values, benefits and costs 
shall be discussed. 
7.2.1. The Basic Values of the MoI 
Legality is the foremost value that guides strategy development in the MoI according to its 
strategic plan (MoI, 2009c, p. 53) and according to the accounts of the majority of managers 
and planners. As a value, legality is related to the merits of bureaucracy such as predictability 
and equity before the law (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Strategies, for the MoI, are the 
means to achieving these values. Another aspect of legality, that is compliance with the law, 
is discussed in the next section. 
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Enhanced service delivery speed is treated as an aspect of service quality, while quality is 
dealt with as a dimension of organisational performance in the public management literature 
(Boyne, 2002; Poister, 2003). Fast and better quality service was one of the basic values 
aspired to by the MoI, as detailed in its strategic plan (MoI, 2009c, p. 53). Participants in this 
research supported this view as the following account by a manager demonstrates by posing a 
strong link between service speed improvement and strategic planning: 
³6WUDWHJLF SODQ PXVW EH WKH FDOFXODWLRQ of how [services] within your mandate can be 
provided best and in a short period of time through the targets [and] measurable indicators 
specified by you.´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQager) 
High quality and enhanced service speed have been repeatedly emphasised by tKH 0R,¶V
strategic plan, as in the following quote: 
³7KHLQIRUPDWLRQDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQWHFKQRORJLHVZLOOEHH[SORLWHGWRWKHKLJKHVWH[WHQWLQ
order to provide citizens with the simplest and most effective, high-quality, swift, continuous 
and secure opportXQLWLHV LQ WKH SURYLVLRQ RI VHUYLFHV WKDW DUH ODLG GRZQ LQ WKH 0LQLVWU\¶V
PLVVLRQ«´(MoI, 2009c, p. 60) 
References are made to the improvement of service delivery speeds with relation to goals 1, 
2, 3, and 6 (see section 5.2.4.3 for a list of goals) in the strategic plan. There was harmony 
between the government and the MoI bureaucracy with regard to improvement of service 
delivery speed, as can be traced in the cross-governmental strategy documents, such as the 
Information Society Strategy (SPO, 2006a). Strategies such as the expansion of e-government 
applications that promised this outcome were widely adopted. A planner commented as 
follows: 
³7KH VHUYLFHV FDQ EH SURYLGHG LQ D VKRUW SHULRG RI WLPH >E\ PHDQV RI H-government]; this 
increases both the citizeQV¶DQGWKHVWDWH¶VVDWLVIDFWLRQLQKLJKGHJUHHV7KLVPDNHVHYHU\RQH
happy in the ministry, no one resists this´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU  
Human-orientated (or citizen-oriented) public service was another principle and value that 
was firmly adopted by the Turkish government (SPO, 2006b), and by the MoI (MoI, 2009c). 
As noted in Chapter 4, human-orientedness was employed in the Turkish public service as a 
refutation RIWKHµFXVWRPHUDSSURDFK¶LQVHUYLFHSURYLVLRQ7KHIROORZLQJORJLFH[SUHVVHGE\
a manager lies behind such approach: 
³,VKRXOGVD\WKDW,VWURQJO\RSSRVHWRWKLVLGHDµ&LWL]HQLVFXVWRPHU!¶1R&LWL]HQLVQRWD
customer in public service. If you define him or her as a customer, you have to show him or 
KHUWKHDOWHUQDWLYH«&LWL]HQLVWKHRZQHUof the business´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU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While this account reflects the inadequacy of competition (referring to alternatives) in public 
service provision in Turkey, it also implies the highly public ethos of the services provided by 
the MoI, particularly security and law enforcement. Human-orientedness was an overarching 
and superior value that encompassed the value of service quality mentioned above. 
5HIHUHQFHVZHUHPDGHLQWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQWRHLWKHUKXPDQ- or citizen-orientedness in 
WKH 0R,¶V Pission statement and with regard to goals 1, 2, and 3. A manager from the 
registration and nationality services, in which e-government is dominant, pointed to the 
essential nature of this value: 
³2XUEDVLF>YDOXH@LVKXPDQ-orientedness. The outcomes should directly target the citizens´
(Interview_31_former_manager) 
Service user satisfaction, which is an aspect of organisational performance (Poister, 2003), 
was considered as a dimension of human-orientedness by the Turkish government (SPO, 
2006a). In accordDQFH ZLWK WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V SHUVSHFWLYH VHUYLFH XVHU VDWLVIDFWLRQ ZDV
viewed by many actors from various departments of the MoI as a significant criterion for the 
evaluation of strategy options. According to them, strategies should meet the expectations 
and needs of citizens and act as the main trigger for departments to take action. One manager 
described this as: 
³$QG«FLWL]HQV¶VDWLVIDFWLRQWKLVLVYHU\LPSRUWDQW,VHHWKHDWWDLQPHQWRIWKHH[SHFWDWLRQV
of the target population as a significant criterion in this regard´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
One aspect of citizen satisfaction that was perceived by managers, particularly from the 
registration and nationality department and the local authorities department, was whether a 
strategy had the potential to simplify the lives of citizens. According to this view, a strategy 
can be more easily adopted by the MoI if it promises to facilitate a better life for citizens 
leading consequently to their satisfaction (for example Interview_26_manager). Respect for 
human rights, which is referred to in the context of civil society strategies in the strategic plan 
(MoI, 2009c), can be considered to fall under the category of human-orientedness.   
Democracy was adopted as an important value by the MoI management. References were 
made to Goals 3, 4 and 5 (MoI, 2009c). Efficiency and effectiveness shown in Figure 7.2 are 
related to inputs, outputs and outcomes of the process and how these play a role as selection 
criteria is discussed in the context of the application of the criteria below. 
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7.2.2. The Process of Strategy Selection 
Figure 7.2 shows that strategy development is triggered by the awareness of a problem or a 
social need by the MoI departments (Link-1). A problem can be ascribed by the government 
to the MoI as a task and responsibility to be solved as shown by the Link (X). The following 
account by a manager reflects the function of strategy development as problem solving: 
³:HOO>GRHVWKHVWUDWHJ\@PHHWWKHQHHGVRIWKHSXEOLF"$QGVHFRQGGRHVLWVROYHWKHSUREOHP
in WKDWILHOG"´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
In whichever field the strategies are developed, the values in Box (A) serve as the main 
principles and guides. For example, when strategy is related to direct service delivery, the 
VWUDWHJLFWDUJHWEHFRPHV³WKHSURYLVLRQRIEHWWHUTXDOLW\VHUYLFHVZLWKHQKDQFHGVSHHG´(MoI, 
2009c, p. 61). Similarly, for the value of democracy or participation, a strategic target is 
IRUPXODWHGDV³WKHREWDLQPHQWRISDUWLFLSDWLRQ«LQORFDODXWKRULWLHV´(MoI, 2009c, p. 62). 
Although the formal strategic planning framework stipulates central analysis of strategies, 
analysis is mostly departmental and fragmented in the MoI. Strategies are analysed by the 
departments in view of their benefits and costs, as shown by Link 2 and strategy options are 
supplied as input through the strategic planning process. The emphasis of the departments on 
values varies, particularly with regard to efficiency and cost-effectiveness and so does the 
extent of their analysis. Before explaining the extent and dynamics of the variation, the 
FULWHULDRIOHJDOLW\DQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHDUHZRUWKGZHOOLQJXSRQ 
Legality is the most important criterion for strategy development in the MoI, mostly with 
reference to compliance with law. The dashed outer square in Figure 7.2 represents legality. 
It constitutes a comprehensive basis that comprises all activities including strategic planning. 
/DZ LV WKH PDLQ VRXUFH RI WKH 0R,¶V PLVVLRQ WKXV LWV PLVVLRQ VWDWHPHQW UHIOHFWV LWV OHJDO
mandate (MoI, 2009c). The lines drawn by the law are the borders and strategies should and 
PXVWDGGUHVVLVVXHVZLWKLQWKHVHSDUDPHWHUV7KHIROORZLQJLVRQHPDQDJHU¶VDFFRXQW 
³7KHUHLVWKHOHJDOLW\FULWHULRQLQWKHILUVWSODFHEHFDXVHDQ\WKLQJWKDW\RXGRPXVWEHZLWKLQ
the framework of the legislation; within the lines that it draws. You have to look from the 
perspective of legality when you consider things in front of you.´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHr) 
+HQFHDVRFLDOSUREOHPRUQHHGPXVWILQGDSODFHLQWKH0R,¶VUHSHUWRLUHRIUXOHVWREHFRPH
a subject of strategy formulation. The strategies formulated within the strategic plan were 
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DFFRUGLQJO\VHOHFWHGLQVWULFWFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHODZ2QHSODQQHU¶VDFFRXQWPDGHUHIHUHQFH
to central strategy analysis: 
³:HFRQVLGHUHGWKHOHJDOPDQGDWH>IRUVWUategies]; what is being done at the present or will be 
GRQHLQWKHIXWXUH«WKHOHJDOPDQGDWHVZHUHFRQVLGHUHGUDWKHUWKDQWKHEHQHILWVDQGFRVWV
[of strategies]´,QWHUYLHZBB3ODQQHU 
The above planner referred to the central analysis of strategies, rather than the departmental 
GLPHQVLRQRIDQDO\VLV7KLVLVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIWKH0R,¶VFODVVLFEXUHDXFUDWLFRUJDQLVDWLRQDV
well as that of the broader public administration, in which compliance with law, rules and 
procedures are essential. In this bureaucratic entity, if any problem falls outside the lines 
drawn by the law, then a new rule must be created to constitute the legal infrastructure for 
required activities (Interview_37_manager).  
7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHLVSHUFHLYHGDVDQRWKHULPSRUWDQWFULWHrion for the selection of 
strategies. While the law may include broad and vague expressions, government preferences, 
which can be deemed as a representation of the view of the majority in society, comprise 
down-to-earth steps and actions to be taken. These preferences emerge in two forms. Firstly, 
they can be identified as formal strategy expressions through cross-governmental plans, 
programmes and strategy documents. These official documents are the products of formal 
bureaucratic procedures that process aQG WXUQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V EURDG JRDOV LQWR OHJDOO\ DQG
practically feasible plans (Interview_28_planner). Compliance with these preferences is 
PDQGDWRU\ IRU WKH 0R, DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH IRUPDO 3)0&/ IUDPHZRUN 7KH JRYHUQPHQW¶V
preferences are then input through strategy options, as shown by Link 3 in Figure 7.2, to be 
GLUHFWO\ LQFOXGHG ZLWKLQ WKH VWUDWHJLF SODQ 7KH 0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF SODQ ZDV SUHSDUHG LQ VWULFW
compliance with such preferences formulated in the 9th Development Plan, 60th Government 
Programme Action Plan, Mid-term Plan, and Information Society Strategy (MoI, 2009c). 
3DUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUFHSWLRQVZHUHDIILUPDWLYH 
³1LQWK 'HYHORSPHQW 3ODQ « DQQXDO SURJUDPPHV JRYHUQPHQW SURJUDPPHV WKHVH DUH RXU
reference points. Our strategic plan must be in congruence with the upper level plans of the 
state [and] the government. The preferences of political power were reflected [to the strategic 
SODQ@ « RXU >SODQ@ KDV DOZD\V EHHQ LQ DFFRUG ZLWK WKRVH GRFXPHQWV´
(Interview_33_manager) 
Secondly, the preferences of elected politicians are extremely unpredictable, which generates 
WKHSUREOHPRI³VWDNHKROGHUXQFHUWDLQW\´(Elbanna et al., 2015, p. 7) and unplanned change in 
policy. In such situations, mostly a single strategy option was dictated by the government to 
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the MoI out of the strategic planning framework, which was mostly perceived to occur in the 
political realm, such as the regulation of local authorities (for example 
Interview_19_manager). Government preference dominates any other criteria, except for 
legality, for the DGRSWLRQRIVWUDWHJLHV:KHQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHFRQIOLFWVZLWKWKH
existing rule-base, a new rule is created. The government can afford the creation of a new law 
easily relying on its incontestable majority in the Turkish Parliament. Strategies that overlook 
RU VWDQG LQ FRQIOLFW ZLWK WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V FKRLFHV FDQQRW EH LPSOHPHQWHG IRU H[DPSOH
Interview_30_manager). One manager pointed to this: 
³,I\RXSURGXFHVRPHWKLQJQRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ>WKHJRYHUQPHQW@«\RXZLOOJHWVWXFNDWVRPH
point, even if you have formulated the best strategy; the best plan in the world´
(Interview_23_manager) 
The MoI management acted upon this issue during the planning process as conveyed by some 
participants:  
³6RPHRI WKH >GHSDUWPHQWDO@ VXJJHVWLRQV IRU VWUDWHJLF WDUJHWVZere declined on the grounds 
WKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VYLHZZDVGLIIHUHQW´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
The MoI culture demonstrates a strong tendency towards conservatism and status quo bias. 
Hence, the strategy options taken into consideration were strictly subjected to a management 
paradigm-test during analysis. Options that radically challenged the status quo were either 
declined during strategy formulation or could not be implemented even if they were adopted 
in the strategic plan. An example of the latter situation is the MIAPER (Performance 
Appraisal) Project that is discussed in the following sections. The exceptional status of this 
regularity is shown by Link-4 by Figure 7.2, whereby the MoI tested a far-reaching option 
DJDLQVW WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHV+ence, if a strategy option that challenged the status 
quo was within the preferences of the government, it was adopted without resistance, since 
the MoI bureaucracy did not have the power to resist the government. 
The values discussed in the previous section could be achieved but had some cost 
implications, such as expenditure of resources in terms of public money, staff, physical 
infrastructure and social costs as shown in Box B. There were two views of the role of costs 
as a criterion for strategies. Firstly, most MoI managers perceived of costs as being 
equivalent to budgets, which showed the limits of annual spending. According to this 
mainstream view, costs were an important but not the primary criterion for strategy 
development. This was particularly the case for departments with regulatory functions, where 
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social costs, rather than monetary costs, played a greater role. This also applied to other 
departments such as human resources and provincial administrations. Cost is a wholesale 
figure that is determined by the addition of the price of each single strategy, as practiced 
during strategic planning (MoI, 2009c). Hence, the criteria of efficiency and cost-
effectiveness, which required the close and concurrent consideration of values/benefits and 
costs, were not the primary measures for the selection of strategies 
(Interview_27_former_manager). Values, social benefits, solutions to social problems or 
meeting the needs of the public were more influential as criteria, with an eye kept on the 
budget. This logic was strongly underpinned by the notion of legality as compliance with law. 
Hence, services were described, designed and delivered through the law in advance and the 
task of the departments was to provide these services within the limits of the budget. The 
EHOLHI WKDW ³GHOLYHULQJ WKH VHUYLFH LQ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK ODZ DQG ZLWKLQ WKH EXGJHWDU\ OLPLWV
JHQHUDWHVEHQHILWV´ZDVWDNHQIRUJUDQWHGLQ this perspective (Interview_35,former_manager). 
$ FRQVLGHUDEOH LQFUHDVH LQ WKH 0R,¶V EXGJHW WKDW VWDUWHG LQ PLG-2000s and continued 
throughout the planning period possibly had some effect on the perception of the 
insignificance of cost-effectiveness, as pointed out by a manager (Interview_22_manager). 
7DEOHGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWWKH0R,¶VEXGJHWDOPRVWGRXEOHGIURP to 2013. According 
to this view, the cost-effectiveness dimension received limited attention from the MoI 
management under the conditions of resource abundance. 
Secondly, a small group of managers from departments such as Civil Registration and ICTs, 
who use a digital communications infrastructure in all or some service  delivery through e-
government projects, assigned primary importance to efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The 
criterion for a good strategy was the optimisation of utility, according to these managers, 
where utility was a combination of different values that are expected to be achieved, such as 
user satisfaction, higher speed, enhanced security, efficiency, and effectiveness 
(Interview_29; Interview_39_managers). Selections were made through the analysis of 
expected utility and costs of strategy options in light of these values, rather than through a 
process of negotiation and reconciliation.  ICT permitted some experimentation for the 
optimisation of expected utility as long as finances and time sufficed.  
Changes in the values of efficiency and cost-effectiveness of services were not systematically 
monitored by the MoI, although performance measurement was introduced through the 
formal PFMCL framework. The formal effectiveness of its programmes was the focus of 
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performance measurement, instead (MoI, 2012). Strategies for internal or external service 
delivery were the product of either restricted or comprehensive analysis, rather than the 
outcomes of political negotiation and agreement. The exception to this finding was the 
regulation of local authorities, in which government preferences reflected political interaction 
between the government and its stakeholders, particularly the municipalities.   
As a final point, since the existing level of resources and available strategy options 
determined what the MoI could do and achieve in the short term, a process of adaptation of 
JRDOV HQGV DQG VWUDWHJLHV PHDQV EHFDPH WKH QRUP 7ZR RI WKH PDQDJHUV¶ DFFRXQWV
indicate this link: 
³:HOOZHGRQ¶WKDYHthe opportunity to say, as being the Police Force, [for example,] that we 
have fifty thousand policemen [this year and] this will be one hundred fifty thousand next 
year. The budgetary figures are definitely considered there´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
³6HFRQG WKH ILQDQFLDO VLWXDWLRQ « WKH OHYHO RI VWDII SK\VLFDO LQIUDVWUXFWXUH WKHVH KDYH
SULPDU\VLJQLILFDQFH:HOOZKDWFDQ\RXGRZLWKRXWKDYLQJDGHTXDWHUHVRXUFHV«ZHKDYH
just managed to hold a mini-scale international conference on public-civil society relations 
WKLV\HDU«WKHUHZDVWKHOHJDOEDVLV>DQG@ZHKDGLWLQRXUVWUDWHJLFSODQEXWZHGLGQ¶WKDYH
the resources and [qualified] staff previously´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The second quote constitutes a good example for what happens when goals are not adapted to 
means. In this example a delay occurred until the necessary resources were obtained. 
7.3. Pattern 3: Simple Incremental Analysis 
Analysis of a limited number of policy options that are marginally different from each other 
and from the status quo is an important stratagem of disjointed incrementalism and it is by its 
RZQ UHIHUUHG DV ³VLPSOH LQFUHPHQWDO DQDO\VLV´ (Lindblom, 1979, p. 517). The distinction 
EHWZHHQ WKH µWULDO-and-HUURU¶ DQG µVLPSOH LQFUHPHQWDOLVP¶ VWUDWDJHPV RI EURDGHU
incrementalism theory is that the former may lead an organisation to change in the long run 
when applied consistently and sequentially, while the latter leads to the preservation of the 
status quo (Atkinson, 2011).  
The accounts of the managers suggest that the MoI management had a tendency towards 
prioritising their past experiences or those of others in adopting strategies particularly with 
UHJDUGWREXWQRWOLPLWHGWRLWVFRUHIXQFWLRQV2QHPDQDJHU¶VFRPPHQWVZHUH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³:KHQZHSDUWLFXODUO\ ORRN LQWRRXU0LQLVWU\ , WKink that [strategies] are more established 
applications relying more on our past experience [and] on the experiences of other countries´
(Interview_21_manager) 
$V LQ WKH PDQDJHU¶V DFFRXQW WKH RULJLQV RI WULHG DQG WHVWHG VWUDWHJLHV FDQ EH GRPHVWLF RU
foreign. Whatever the source, the adopted option leads to incremental progress. Characterised 
by strong conservatism and status quo bias, the organisational paradigm of the MoI is viewed 
by the managers as an influential determinant in this respect. According to this assessment, 
WKH0R,¶VSDUDGLJP IDYRXUV DGDSWDWLRQ WR LWV HQYLURQPHQW LQ VPDOO VWHSVSURJUHVVLYHO\ DQG
GHFLVLYHO\ GXH WR WKH LQWULQVLF IHDWXUHV RI LWV FRUH IXQFWLRQV 7KH WHUP µFRUH IXQFWLRQ¶ LV
critical in this context. The dominant core function of the MoI is recognised as security and 
law enforcement by internal and external stakeholders with a convergence in their respective 
approaches (MoI, 2009c). Law enforcement and security, at the same time, is a core central 
state function and regulations and actions in this domain define an important part of the 
relation between the state and the public. Hence, any suggestion of radical change has the 
potential to change the nature of the state-public relations affecting the state system, its main 
paradigmVDQGWKHµVRFLDOFRQWUDFW¶$FRQVHUYDWLYHVWDQFHLVDGRSWHGLQWKLVGRPDLQE\WKH
WRSPDQDJHPHQWWRHQVXUHWKHFRQWLQXLW\RIWKHH[LVWLQJV\VWHP$PDQDJHU¶VYLHZZDV 
³:KHQ ZH FRPH WR RXU PLQLVWU\ LW FRQWLQXHG D VWUXFWXUH WKDW XQGHUOLQHG VWDELOLW\ DQd that 
IDYRXUHGDGMXVWPHQWXSWRWKHWLPHEHLQJ ,GRQ¶W WKLQNIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIWKHVHUYLFHV
we provide that it would be beneficial to consider very different alternatives, I would rather 
consider more significant the efforts for continuous adjustmeQW « , PHDQ RXU 0LQLVWU\ LV
RQH RI D IHZ WKDW QXUWXUHG DQ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH WUDGLWLRQ >DQG@ JHQHUDWHG VWDELOLW\´
(Interview_22_manager) 
From this perspective, a strategy option gets adopted if it is familiar and not radically 
different from the established norms. The untested and far-reaching options, particularly with 
UHVSHFWWRWKH0R,¶VFRUHIXQFWLRQVDUHLJQRUHG 
³7KH0LQLVWU\LVQRWHQWKXVLDVWLFDERXWPDNLQJFKDQJHVLQEDVLFDUHDV,WLVSHUFHLYHGDVULVN\
to deviate from the gained experience and [established] practice´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
New strategy alternatives are considered with reference to their relevance to the existing or 
pre-existing methods. An alternative is accepted by the top management if it can be 
associated with the pre-tested policies, such as the example of community policing strategy 
DGRSWHG LQ7KHIROORZLQJPDQDJHU¶VYLHZ LV LPSRUWDQWDV LW VKRZVKRZQHZVWUDWHJ\
options are linked to past experience: 
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³)RU LQVWDQFH D SURMHFW FDOOHG FRPPXQLW\ SROLFLQJ ZDV LPSOHPHQWHG . We suddenly saw 
that we adapted what once the neighbourhood guards performed to the present day when 
implementing community policing. [Community policing strategy] says that the police should 
know who they provide services to, should visit businesses and households. The 
QHLJKERXUKRRGJXDUGVGLGWKHVDPHWKLQJ«+HQFHWKHUHLVQRFKDQJHLQWKHPLVVLRQ>DQG@
the target. But, of course the population is now three thousand while it was three hundred in 
the past. Now you are to know the [service users] by the KHOSRIWHFKQRORJLFDOPHDQV«<RX
develop measures according to the needs of the day. The core of the business does not change, 
as I told.´,QWHUYiew_35_former_manager) 
The adoption of an alternative that is considerably different from the status quo, meaning a 
deviation from simple incremental analysis, is possible by the intervention of the government 
in the strategy selection process, for example by a reform agenda. A recent example of such 
LQWHUYHQWLRQFRXOGEHIRXQGLQ7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDSSURDFh to the problem of separatist 
terrorism in Turkey changed from it being seen as a security problem and an armed struggle 
to a social conflict that needed a peaceful solution based on the recognition of differences in 
society. This shift considerably alterHGWKHµQDWLRQVWDWH¶SDUDGLJPRIWKH7XUNLVK6WDWHWKDW
had long overlooked ethnic diversity in society. Hereby, another dimension of strategies in 
the core functions emerges. While the MoI bureaucracy has tended to preserve the status quo 
in its core fields, making radical changes in these areas falls beyond its powers. It requires the 
will and support of the elected government, as representatives of the public, for any far-
reaching strategies to gain legitimacy. This substantiates the exogenous nature of goal-setting 
in the core fields (Wechsler and Backoff, 1986). Simple incremental analysis is perceived to 
exist in some degrees across the MoI departments, such as the provincial administration 
services, with functions that have similar characteristics to the law enforcement and security 
domain. Innovative strategies can still be found in the core fields such as the extensive use of 
e-government.  
Despite this generic approach of the MoI management, four groups of far-reaching strategies 
were detected, which were developed either to start or sustain change in and out of the MOI. 
These are found in (i) e-government and ICT, (ii) re-organisation in security and law 
enforcement, (iii) human resources and, (iv) strategies in regulatory functions. It is discussed 
next how innovative strategies that somehow found a place in the strategic plan were 
undermined by the existing management paradigm of the MoI, except for the e-government 
strategy. 
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7.3.1. E-government and ICT strategies  
These strategies were formulated for the enhancement and expansion of ICT infrastructure 
and e-government applications across units, functions and services of the MoI. They aimed to 
develop and further extend ICT and e-government projects that had been initiated in the pre-
planning era in mid 2000s such as:    
x E-icisleri (2003),  
x E-ID Card Project (2006),  
x ID Data Sharing Project (2005),  
x MAKS (Spatial Address Registry System) Project (2006), and  
x Electronic archive (2007) projects.  
$Q DQDO\VLV RI WKH 0R,¶V DFWLYLW\ UHSRUWV   012, and 2013 shows that these 
projects were either completed or made significant progress. For example the MAKS project 
was completed in 2012 (MoI, 2013), while  the e-ID Card project passed to the final phase of 
delivery by adapting the infrastructures of the provincial civil registry branches in 2013 (MoI, 
2014a). The documentary and interview data demonstrates that the adoption and 
implementation of e-government and ICT projects were relatively straightforward in the MoI, 
although they brought radical change to service design and delivery. 
One explanation is that the strong dynamic emphasis backed by legislation on specific policy 
DUHDV E\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DJHQGD 7KH JRYHUQPHQW KDG DOUHDG\ VHW DQG GHFODUHG WKH
expansion of e-government applications as a strategic goal via the Government Programme, 
the 9th Development Plan 2007-13, the Mid-term Plan 2011-13, Annual Programme 2013, 
Information Society Strategy and Information Society Strategy Activity Plan. The 
government set a target to deliver 70% of public services through online applications and 
realise one of every three public sector transactions through electronic channels by the year 
2010 (SPO, 2006a). The MoI had already had some experience from early 2000s to see how 
e-government applications could improve public services and make positive changes. The 
MOIs provincial branches and prefect offices had already begun to use ICT in service 
provision independently of each other and of the headquarters before it was adopted as a 
generic strategy by the MoI. While these separate experiences demonstrated the concrete 
benefits of ICTs to service provision a need for co-ordination and synchronisation of the 
systems emerged concurrently, which required a comprehensive approach in the ICT field 
(Interview_39_former_manager). The creation of electronic ID database (MERNIS) and ID 
Data-Sharing (KPS) projects considerably hastened ID confirmation services in public to 
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public, public to private and private to private services opening up a new era in public service 
provision in Turkey, which also drew the attention of many other countries 
(Interview_31_former_manager). The e-government strategies under Goal 3 targeted both 
service delivery and internal operating systems. 
The annual activity reports of the MoI shows considerable progress in the realisation of e-
government projects that brought big change to the design and delivery of services (MoI, 
2010b, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a). The most effective factors were the influence of the 
political agenda and the expected contributions of such projects to improved service quality 
(including speed) and human-RULHQWHG VHUYLFH GHOLYHU\ DV SULQFLSDO YDOXHV RI WKH 0R,¶V
VHUYLFHSURYLVLRQSROLF\7KHH[SHULHQFHRI WKH0R, WKURXJKRXWVDQGRWKHUFRXQWULHV¶
experiences in the e-government field were also influential. From another point of view, 
systems such as CCTV or electronic ID cards increased the surveillance capacity of the state 
RYHUWKHSXEOLFE\SURYLGLQJµ%LJ%URWKHU¶ZLWKQHZDQGHIIHFWLYHPHDQVRIFRQWUROZKLFK
could hardly be rejected by a traditional bureaucracy. Finally, the previous empirical 
evidence suggesting that ICT strategies that particularly targeted internal operating systems 
reinforced command and control in hierarchies in some cases (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011) 
PD\ DOVR KDYH D UROH WR SOD\ LQ WKH HDV\ DGRSWLRQ RI VXFK VWUDWHJLHV E\ WKH 0R,¶V WRS
management.  
It should be re-emphasised here that ICT strategies brought innovation to the content of the 
service delivered as well as the methods of service delivery, particularly through consultation 
with professional ICT analysts. Since e-government strategies date back to the pre-planning 
era, a direct link between a change in this realm and strategic planning cannot be established 
straightforwardly.       
7.3.2. Re-organisation Strategies for Security and Law Enforcement  
7XUNH\¶V UHRUJDQLVDWLRQ VWUDWHJLHV ZHUH GHYHORSHG SDUWLFXODUO\ WKURXJK WKH LPSDFW RI
accession negotiations with the EU in view of the recent developments in the service realm 
and society. Turkey undertook several responsibilities in its National Programme 2003 under 
&KDSWHU  WLWOHG µ-XVWLFH DQG +RPH $IIDLUV¶ LQFOXGLQJ WKH QHFHVVLWLHV RI UHRUJDQLVDWLRQ
VWUDWHJLHV WRKDUPRQLVH LWV SROLFLHVZLWK WKH(8¶V DFTXLV (IA, 2013). The strategies in this 
area targeted the establishment of two new departments under the MoI in the migration and 
border security service areas that have traditionally been delivered by the law enforcement 
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and military forces. The first of these was the establishment of the General-Directorate for 
Migration Management (MoI, 2009c). A migration bureau had already been created in late 
DVDQXFOHXVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHµ$V\OXPDQG0LJUDWLRQ$FWLRQ3ODQ¶IURPWKH
3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFH(IA, 2013, pp. 18-21) before the first strategic plan came into force in 
2010. The bureau was transformed into an agency in 2013 by the enforcement of its statute. 
Recognising the establishment of this new agency as a significant shift in existing migration 
and asylum policy, a manager described how he perceived the creation process of the new 
unit as being straightforward: 
³7KHUHDUHGHFUHHVRIFRXQFLORIPLQLVWHUVQDWLRQDOSURJUDPVXQGHUWDNLQJVIRUWKH(8QHHGV
RIWKH&RXQWU\ WKH0LQLVWU\VWUDWHJLFSODQ«WKLQJVZULWWHQLQWKHGHYHOopment plans so on 
and so forth; since there was lots of stuff written in various documents we did not have 
trouble´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The second strategy was the transfer of the border security services from the military forces 
to a new directorate-general specialising in integrated border security. In a similar manner to 
migration services, the preliminaries for the establishment of the new department started in 
2003 with the creation of a Project Management Centre within the MoI to co-ordinate EU 
projects on integrated border management (MoI, 2014c). A bureau was founded in 2008 and 
ZDV RYHUKDXOHG LQ  DV WKH µ%RUGHU 0DQDJHPHQW %XUHDX¶ 8QOLNH WKH PLJUDWLRQ DQG
asylum department, this new department has not been established under the auspices of the 
MoI as yet, although it was included as a strategy under the Target 2.1 in the strategic plan 
(MoI, 2009c, p. 58). 
Reorganisation strategies were partly realised by the establishment of the new migration 
agency and the most influential factor was the iPSDFW RI (8 UHODWLRQV DQG 7XUNH\¶V
commitments within this context, rather than internal dynamics, strategic planning and 
change. The political agenda also played an important role for the facilitation of the process, 
as perceived by the actors (Interview_32_manager). 
7.3.3. Human resource strategies  
Within the context of human resource strategies, performance-based appraisal of prefects was 
adopted as a strategy in the Strategic plan (MoI, 2009c). Both managers and planners viewed 
the performance appraisal of prefects as challenging since the existing appointment system 
for the prefects was firmly embedded in the status quo in the MoI. It was not an easy task to 
change this system that had been operating for years, according to one of the managers 
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(Interview_8_manager).  The origins of this strategy dates back to the pre-planning era in the 
development of the MIAPER project (Performance Appraisal of Prefects) in 2006 by the 
former Strategy Centre (CfRS, 2014b). Its adoption as an organisational strategy formally 
through the strategic plan meant a major shift from a system based on broad discretion, 
loyalty to both political and managerial leaders, and patronage to a more objective system for 
personnel appraisal. The piloting of the developed performance criteria continued until 2008 
(MoI, p. 77), however, MIAPER was not included as a target within the performance 
programmes during the four years of plan implementation between 2010 and 2013. The MoI 
management could have enforced the new model through a ministerial regulation but they 
discontinued the project: 
³0,$3(5«,WVDSSURSULDWLRQZDVZLWKLQWKHFDSLWDOEXGJHWXQWLOODVW\HDU7KH\VDLGµ,WLV
done¶DQGLWZDVFDQFHOOHG´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU 
The managers perceived that innovative strategies such as the MIAPER could not be put into 
practice due to internal resistance in the MoI: 
³>0,$3(5@FRXOGEHHDVLO\SXWLQWRSUDFWLFH«:HOOZHDGRSWWKHLGHDDQGHYHQLQLWLDWHWKH
process enthusiastically; however when it comes to implementation, a braking occurs in the 
0LQLVWU\ « 3HUKDSV LW LV WKH VDPH LQ DOO RWKHU « SXEOLF RUJDQLVDWLRQV´
(Interview_34_manager) 
The internal resistance expressed by managers reflects the prevalence of the status quo in the 
MoI that has been elaborated in the preceding and present chapters. Hence, this radical 
strategy could not be implemented because of the resistance from the status quo, although it 
ZDVJLYHQSODFHLQWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQ 
7.3.4. Strategies in the Area of Regulatory Functions  
The innovative strategy in regulatory functions aimed to set national standards for local 
authority services and central monitoring of service performance. By the adoption of the 
strategy, the MoI showed decisiveness to use its regulatory powers on local authorities that 
were extremely politicised bodies. The antecedents of the strategy lie in 2001 with the start of 
the BEPER (Performance of Municipalities) project (MoI, 2012). The General-Directorate for 
Local Authorities aimed to develop performance criteria and an online database through 
testing and piloting in order to measure, compare and benchmark local service performance 
indicators and enhance democracy, participation, transparency and accountability in the local 
authorities by providing public access to data (MoI, 2011). The ultimate aim was the 
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enactment of a law to enforce performance measurement in local authorities (MoI, 2010b). 
The MoI allocated funds for the completion of the project in 2010 and 2011 during the plan 
implementation period (MoI, 2011; 2012). However, the project was halted in 2012, without 
an explanation, although a fund was allocated in the 2012 budget (MoI, 2013). Accordingly, 
the strategy to measure service performance in local governments was abandoned. The end of 
the project marked the continuity of the status quo with regard to the accountability of local 
DXWKRULWLHV 7KH IROORZLQJ PDQDJHU¶V DFFRXQW SRLQWHG WR WKH GLIILFXOW\ RI UHJXODWLQJ and 
standardising local services: 
³<RX NQRZ WKDW WKH ZRUN UHODWLQJ WR WKH ORFDO DXWKRULWLHV LV SHUIRUPHG E\ WKH 'LUHFWRUate-
General for Local Authorities. But, it can still be considered as a fantasy for [this department] 
in the Ministry to carry out a study to analyse how services can be delivered in shorter times, 
more efficiently, with lower costs. It is because of the domain characteristics and the 
[political] nature of the domain.´,QWerview_39_former_manager) 
The most decisive factor in this respect was the pressure from local authorities that have been 
enjoying a great deal of power and autonomy through the support of the localisation agenda 
in the last decade as well as the government itself, which favoured the empowerment of the 
local against central bureaucracy. 
Overall, the evidence presented in this section demonstrates that simple incremental analysis 
is a stratagem that is frequently applied in the MoI, particularly in core functions. However, 
far-going strategies can be put into practice as long as they contribute to service delivery and  
do not radically alter the policies in core functions and established systems.   
7.4. Pattern 4: Trial-and-Error 
Trial-and-error, or sequential analysis, is an important pattern of incrementalism theory either 
within a disjointed or logical mode. Trial-and-error is not theoretically expected to be found 
in the MoI, since strategy formulation was based on a formal strategic planning model. In this 
section, firstly, the existence of trial-and-error in strategic decision-making is highlighted 
from the perspectives of the MoI managers. Documentary evidence is integrated where 
appropriate to support arguments. Secondly, analysis is directed to whether trial-and-error is 
practiced purposively, as a deliberate and logical method of strategy formulation and 
implementation, or non-purposively as a sign of muddling through or groping.  
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The perceptions of actors reflect two competing views. While one view supports the 
existence of trial-and-error in the MoI as a method, the other view advocates the opposite. 
The discussion starts with the latter view. 
About half of the MoI managers perceived trial-and-error as non-existent or an infrequent 
PHWKRGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIVWUDWHJLFJRDOVRUSUREOHPVLQWKH0R,7KHZRUGµHUURU¶LVSHUFHLYHG
with negative connotations by these managers and trial-and-error, for them, is the last resort. 
Error is not an option, in this perspective, even though the managers are aware that it occurs 
IUHTXHQWO\LQSXEOLFRUJDQLVDWLRQVDOODURXQGWKHZRUOG7ZRRIWKHPDQDJHUV¶YLHZVZHUH 
³1R QR WKHUH LV QRWKLQJ FDOOHG WULDO-and-error; it is not our management style.´
(Interview_14_manager) 
 ³1R ZH GRQ¶W GR H[SHULPHQWV ZH GRQ¶W XVH WULDO-and-error; something gets weighed, 
discussed, then implementation EHJLQV´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Several factors were cited by the managers as the underlying reasons. Among these were the 
ownership of the resources, that is public vs. private ownership, strict rules and regulations 
that govern public spending in the sector and  availability of piloting.  
With regard to resource ownership, trial-and-error in the context of strategic goals and 
problems is considered to be inappropriate since the MoI uses public resources to produce 
and deliver services. The use of public resources, mainly public money, is perceived to be 
related to two factors. The first is the strict rules and regulations that define how public 
money can be spent by the MoI departments. Public spending is seen as a highly regulated 
field that puts severe restrictions on managerial discretion. Tight budgeting procedures 
involve the provision of a service or the fulfilment of a specific project or activity within a 
pre-determined time frame, with a certain amount of public resource, whereas trial-and-error 
UHTXLUHVPRUHIOH[LEOHVSHQGLQJ$PDQDJHU¶VYLHZUHIOHFWLQJWKLVSHUVSHFWLYHZDV 
³7KHUHIRUHWKHEXGJHWLQJLQEXUHDXFUDFy [and] public administration operates over tight fiscal 
GLVFLSOLQH 7KHUH LV KHVLWDWLRQ LQ WKDW VHQVH , PHDQ µWKH DSSURSULDWLRQ LV WKLV DQG LW LV
OLPLWHG¶<RXPD\QRWKDYHWKHRSSRUWXQLW\HYHQLI\RXZRXOGOLNHWR>try something new].´
(Interview_42_manager) 
Another dimension of tight regulations is the matter of authorisation for the practice of trial-
and-error in the public sector. One manager commented: 
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³%XW\RXKDYHWRJRWKURXJKQXPHURXVSURFHGXUHVWRWU\VRPHWKLQJ>QHZ@LQWKHSXEOLFVHFWRU
To wKDWH[WHQWZLOOWKH\DOORZ\RX"$QG\RX>ZLOO@QHHGWRFRQYLQFHWKHP«><RX@ZLOOQRW
have authorisation most times.´,QWHUYLHZB25_manager) 
Hence, if and when a strategic decision involved monetary costs, then highly strict budgetary 
regulations and the issue of authorisation invokes risk-averse attitudes (Kissler et al., 1998a) 
dismissing trial-and-error as a method for strategy analysis. An example for the latter is the 
need for ratification by the High Planning Council chaired by the Prime Minister for big 
capital investments.  
Some managers think that however perfectly designed strategies in theory are, they should be 
tested against the practicalities of life, against the unforeseen and the overlooked details that 
might have grave consequences in implementation (Interview_23_manager). These managers 
were motivated by the perceived high risk of wasted public resources, as well as other factors 
such as social risks and the public reputation of their departments and the MoI. Perceptions of 
high risk are amplified by irreversibility of costly decisions. This alternatively leads to two 
different actions.  On the one hand, it may lead to the exploitation of intra- and extra-
organisational lived experience. In this case the analysis process shows the patterns of a 
process of simple incremental analysis, as it was argued in Section 7.3. On the other hand, it 
may lead some departments to go thorough analysis in technical areas where the availability 
of experimentation and piloting plays an important role as an enabler. Departments that 
deliver some of their services through digital communications infrastructure, particularly 
ICT, civil registration and associations, tend to analyse comprehensively µKRZ¶ WKH VHUYLFH
should be provided, as the field allows for R&D, innovation, and piloting. The following 
comment from a manager in the ICT department points out the relationship between 
irreversibility of decisions, their costs and analysis: 
³,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWZHKDYHDFKRLFHLQWKLVVXEMHFW,PHDQZHDUHWU\LQJPRUHto dwell on the 
UHVHDUFKGLPHQVLRQ«<RXZRQ¶WKDYHWKHFKDQFHWRVD\µ3DUGRQPH¶DIWHUVSHQGLQJODUJH
amount of capital´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The sequence of analysis that takes place is (1) R&D of the project, (2) piloting and (3) 
implementation. All these stages were perceived to involve formal procedures such as the 
preparation of feasibility reports. Whether a project shall be implemented is decided in the 
first phase, while how it shall be implemented is settled in the piloting phase. The 
irreversibility of the decision and the option of piloting pushes departments towards 
conducting some analysis of a policy, project or activity within the context of a strategy, prior 
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to its expansion. Piloting is viewed by these managers as an indispensable and proper 
alternative to trial-and-error. Furthermore, it is perceived to be getting engrained within the 
0R,¶V PDQDJHPHQW FXOWXUH DV D URXWLQH PHWKRG RI DQDO\VLV DV ZHOO DV ZLWKLQ WKH 7XUNLVK
public sector as a whole (for example Interview_13; Interview_22_managers).  
Some of the managers in this respect view trial-and-error as an extravagant approach, an 
outdated method which unnecessarily empowers personal discretion in the public sector and 
they view errors, in service provision, particularly in costly strategies, as a risk for the 
wellbeing and public image of the agency in the long-run:  
³:HOO , FRQVLGHU WULDO-and-error as a luxury. You provide a service here, and you use 
resources for doing this, and this resource belongs to the public. Therefore, analysis, research, 
investigation and certainty instead of trial-and-error´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The following views of a manager on how to approach strategic matters describes a method 
that is very similar to formal strategic planning: 
³7KHUHVKRXOGEHDPHFKanism for decision-making. You collect the information, analyse it, 
form the strategy; and there should be a documented programme which shows the method of 
implementation. You make the decision and monitor implementation. If the implementation 
leads to an XQDQWLFLSDWHG GLUHFWLRQ \RX GRQ¶W FKDQJH LW WKH IROORZLQJ GD\ <RX VKRXOG
develop a mechanism to change it´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Some managers viewed cultural factors as effective. They felt that trial-and-error was not an 
institutionally adopted generic strategy for the analysis of strategic decisions and neither was 
LW DQHOHPHQWRI WKH0R,¶V WUDGLWLRQVDQGRI LWVPDQDJHPHQWHWKRVDQGKHQFH LWZDVQRWDQ
established and routinised managerial behaviour (Interview_13; Interview_42, managers). 
Trial-and-HUURULVFRQVLGHUHGE\VRPHRIWKHVHPDQDJHUVDV³DFWLQJZLWKRXWIHHOLQJFRQILGHQW´ 
(Interview_9_manager). For these reasons it was seen as inappropriate for public service and 
particularly for the MoI. 
Social risks are also seen as influential, as public service involves large populations 
consisting of individuals who cannot be treated as subjects of policy experiments. The 
consequences of errors may be severe not only for the members of the organisation, its image 
and trustworthiness but also for large numbers of individuals as the users of public services. 
$PDQDJHU¶VYLHZZDV 
³%HFDXVH SXEOLF DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ LV D PDQDJHPHQW ILHOG ZKLFK EHDUV FRQVHTXHQFHV IRU ZLGH
masses. So, it is not much possible to apply to trial-and-error. It is targeted to eliminate or 
PLQLPLVHHUURU«WKURXJKSLORWDSSOLFDWLRQVLQVWHDG.´ (Interview_42_manager) 
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Despite these views, the existence of trial-and-error as a method attracted support from some 
practitioners and this is discussed next.  
The other half of the managers interviewed pointed to the existence of trial-and-error within 
the practices of MoI departments, however most times as a result of impulsiveness. 
According to this view, trial-and-error is not a purposeful choice, rather an unintended 
consequence that the MoI departments endure with regard to strategic issues. Neither is it an 
H[SOLFLWO\ IRUPDO SURFHVV VKRZLQJ WKH SDWWHUQV RI ORJLFDO LQFUHPHQWDOLVP 7ZR PDQDJHUV¶
comments sharing this perspective were: 
³7ULDO-and-error is not a method that is highly appreciated in our administration perspective. 
6RPHWLPHV«LWKDSSHQVLQWKHIROORZLQJZD\<RXGRVRPHWKLQJEXWQRWWRVD\µ,ZLOOVHH
ZKDWKDSSHQV¶<RXGRLWDQGVHHWKDW\RXIDLODQGFKDQJHLWLQDVKRUWSHULRGRIWLPH,WWXUQV
to trial-and-HUURUEXWLW¶VQRWyour initial intention. It happens both in the department and in 
the ministry´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
³,W LV QRW SHUIRUPHG SXUSRVHIXOO\ « EXW LW LV VR LQ SUDFWLFH YLUWXDOO\ , PHDQ LW LV GRQH
unconsciously. Well we observe it every day; the laws [and] regulations are changing every 
GD\>DQG@FRQWLQXRXVO\«7KHUHLVQRFKRLFHDVµ/HW¶VGRLWLQWKLVZD\LIZHVHHHUURUVZH
FDQ FRUUHFW >WKHP@¶ 7KH SUDFWLFH LV QRW EDVHG RQ VXFK D SULRUL DFFHSWDQFH´
(Interview_34_manager) 
Though unintended, it is perceived by a few of the actors to be the most significant descriptor 
of strategic decision processes either within their respective departments or of the MoI as a 
ZKROH$PDQDJHU¶VYLHZZDV 
³:HOO LW ZRXOGQ¶W EH PXFK SRVVLEOH WR VD\ WKHVH LQ D SODQQHG SHULRd of five years with a 
strategic plan. But, what is our generic approach? Trial-and-HUURU LV D VLJQLILFDQW PHWKRG´
(Interview_12_manager). 
Implicitly or explicitly the Managers felt that the negligence of formal strategy analysis, 
which is a component of WKH 0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ IUDPHZRUN UHVXOWV LQ LQVXIILFLHQW
scrutiny leading to a process of trial-and-error. Evidence for this pattern is seen in a 
continuous change in laws and regulations within a short period of time of their enforcement. 
The process is driven by reactions from affected groups in the field, such as service users, 
politicians as their representatives, prefects as implementers at the local level and other 
stakeholder groups of the MoI, rather than as a result of systematic analysis of the policy 
outcomes. Error does not occur in a controlled process in this pattern, but as a consequence of 
a lack of adequate formal cost-benefit analysis or imperfect calculation $ PDQDJHU¶V
reflections were: 
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³>7ULDO-and-error] is an important method in WKH7XUNLVK>3XEOLF@$GPLQLVWUDWLRQµ/HW¶VGR
WKLVLILWGRHVQ¶WZRUNZHFKDQJHLW¶«,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWFRPSUHKHQVLYHORQJ-term analyses 
DUHFRQGXFWHGVXFKDVµ:KDWSURVDQGFRQVDUHZHOLNHO\WRIDFHLQWKHORQJ-run? Does this 
happen if that ocFXUV"¶´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Some of the underlying reasons perceived by the managers include decision-related factors, 
such as the tolerability of decision consequences and reversibility of the decision and the 
impact of the political agenda. The management culture and paradigm of the MoI has an 
overarching impact over the processes.  
The decision-related factor reflects the continuity of the practice from the pre-planning era, at 
least in some departments. The low level of adoption of the strategic planning framework, 
lack of technical expertise and experience, weak leadership support and other factors lead to 
the negligence of the formal strategic planning framework and to the exercise of an extremely 
flexible and unplanned practice. A narrative related to this kind of approach is found in the 
VD\LQJ³Caravan gets aligned on the way´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU7KHIROORZLQJDFFRXQW
presents how trial-and-error can have an important role in the departmental practice: 
³$OORXU>SUDFWLFH@LVFRQGXFWHGWKURXJK trial-and-HUURU:HGRLWLILWZRUNVZHVD\µ2.¶LI
LWGRHVQ¶WZHFKDQJHLW«ZHGRQ¶WKDYHDFOHDU>IRUPDO@PHWKRG´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Managers or departments tend to follow this path mostly when the expected consequences of 
a decision are relatively non-costly or tolerable and when decisions are easily reversible, even 
though it requires new legislation in Parliament. The following account reflects this 
dimension: 
³%XWWKHULVNVJHQHUDOO\DUHDEVRUEHGLQLQWHUQDOPDWWHUV<RXDPHQGDODZE\HQDFWing a new 
law upon three days of its enforcement, if it fails´,QWHUYLHZBBIRUPHUBPDQDJHU 
The above account implicitly refers to the ease with which new laws can be passed in the 
Turkish Parliament. This stems from the strength of the one party government as an executive 
branch with indisputable dominance over the legislative in Turkey, where an effective 
balance of powers is not established in the state system. These kinds of decisions may bear 
social costs and specific costs for affected groups, such as the employees as the targets of 
human resource strategies. An example was given by two managers with reference to the 
amendment in the appointment system of the prefects from 2010, which targeted the 
appointment of more experienced and senior prefects to the underdeveloped southeast part of 
Turkey, which is also affected by ethnic terrorism. The first manager commented as follows: 
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³)RUH[DPSOHZHGHFLGHGQRW WR OHDYHDQ\VL[WKFODVVGLVWULFWV LQ WKHZHVW >RI WKH&RXQWU\
and we did]. But later we saw that it affected the east very much and we stepped back. We are 
now increasing the number of sixth [class districts] in the west in order to appoint more senior 
[prefects] to the east, to the fifth zone´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The other manager completed the story: 
³>:H@KDYH WXUQHGVL[W\RI WKH VL[WKFODVVGLVWULFWV LQWR IRUWKFODVV >LQ WKHVRXWKHDVW@ZLWKLQ
two-year period [and] appointed district governors who have at least two years or more 
H[SHULHQFH7KLVEULQJVDQHZVLWXDWLRQWRRXUV\VWHP«:HDUHSOaying within the system. 
:HGRQ¶WEUHDNWKHV\VWHPEXWZHFUHDWHIOH[LELOLWLHVZLWKLQLW2UZHDUHPDNLQJFKDQJHVEXW
the main tenets of the system remains as they are´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
These accounts demonstrate how the process of amendment unfolded in a trial-and-error 
manner. A different form of trial-and-error occurs through the impact of the political agenda 
which is driven by unexpected changes in Governmental preferences, particularly in highly 
political areas such as the regulation of local authorities. In this pattern, a change in 
governmental preferences leads directly to the suspension of the formal strategic planning 
IUDPHZRUN DQG WKH 0R,¶V PDQDJHPHQW SDUDGLJP 6HW DSDUW IURP SUHYLRXV SDWWHUQV WKH
change is far-reaching rather than increPHQWDO7KHPDQDJHPHQW¶VUROHLQWKLVFDVHLVWRJLYH
technical assistance for necessary legislation or regulation. Although the financial costs of 
VWUDWHJLHVDUHDQDO\VHG WRUDWLRQDOLVH WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFKRLFH WKHVRFLDO LQGLUHFWDQGRWKHU
risks and costs, for example, of the uncertainty lying ahead, are not evaluated formally within 
the process. An example of this lies in the reform process of the Turkish local authorities that 
started in 2003 and continued to date with an important peak in late 2012 by the enforcement 
of the Law No.6360, which increased the numbers, expanded the borders and boosted the 
powers of metropolitan municipalities following the March-2014 local elections. A manager 
commented about the process as follows: 
³,PHDQZKDWRXUGHSDUWPHQWLVGRLQJLVQRWZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIVWUDWHJ\«:HGLGQRW
WDON>DQG@GLVFXVVDERXWH[SDQGLQJWKHERUGHUVRIWKHPHWURSROLWDQPXQLFLSDOLWLHV«QRRQH
WDONHGDERXWVXFKDPRGHO7KHVHZHUHQRW LQFOXGHG LQRXUUHSRUWV%XW«WKHUHRFFXUUHGD
shift LQ WKH &RXQWU\ EHJLQQLQJ IURP ODVW \HDU 7KLV LVQ¶W VRPHWKLQJ KDSSHQLQJ ZLWKLQ WKH
context of strategy´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Within the same context, the following account of a manager showed how the situation 
exceeded the managerial and organisational frontiers: 
³>7KH/DZ@LVQRWRXUGHFLVLRQ:HDUHDFWLQJDVWHFKQRFUDWVLQWKLVVLWXDWLRQ,WLVWKH
GHFLVLRQRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW,PHDQ,WLVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSURMHFW«LWLVQ¶WVRPHWKLQJDW>WKH
management] level. It is totally about the high level political will´,QWHUYLHZBB0DQDJHU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The legislation of the Law No.6360 meant the abolishment of Special Provincial 
Administrations in metropolitan municipalities, which was in direct conflict with the strategic 
WDUJHW  RI WKH 0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF SODn that stipulated the improvement of these 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQV1HLWKHU KDG WKH0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF SODQ LQFOXGHG VXFK D VWUDWHJLF WDUJHW LQ LWV
first strategic plan nor did the government purposefully adopt a trial-and-error approach. 
Instead the development showed a pattern of inadequate formal analysis and unintentional 
trial that generated non-incremental outcomes. Law No.6360 came into force in 2014 and 
three changes were made to it by July 2014. The implementation process needs to be 
observed to see if more evidence supports, or contradicts, the perceptions of the managers.  
7.5. Pattern 5: Flexibility and Dynamism 
Incrementalism posits that continuous adjustment of means and ends is a superior approach to 
an inflexible long-term planning practice (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1970). This approach 
requires continuous reconsideration of goals and strategies after every move. Hence, strategy-
making unfolds flexibly and dynamically (Quinn, 1980). Having a strategic plan is not a 
necessity in incrementalism and it woulGEHWUHDWHGDVDµZRUNLQJSDSHU¶HYHQLIRQHH[LVWHG
In this section, the formal framework of the PFMCL and the strategic planning practice of the 
MoI are examined with regard to the extent that they allow the reconsideration and revision 
of goals, targets, and strategies in order to adapt to changes in the internal and external 
environments. The analysis includes the extent to which strategy formulation and 
implementation demonstrate dynamic characteristics in the MoI. 
The formal PFMCL framework offers a limited form of flexibility with clear margins that set 
the bars high, with an assumption of operating in a mostly static environment.  It stipulates 
two methods for the reconsideration of strategic plans: update and renewal. Relevant 
provisions for the update and renewal of strategic plans are given place within the MPSPPO 
By-law 2006. The update of a plan is defined in the MPSPPO By-ODZ  DV ³WKH
numerical changes in performance targets without any change to the mission, vision and 
strategic goals of WKHSODQ´ (p. 1) and a plan can be updated within at least two years of plan 
implementation. The renewal of a plan is defined in the MPSPPO By-ODZDV³WKHUH-
preparation of a strategic plan from scratch for a new five-\HDUWHUP´ (pp. 1-2). Renewal can 
be made in the case of: 
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x A change in legislation regulating the mandate, duties and responsibilities of a 
public organisation, 
x A change of government, 
x A change of minister, 
x A natural disaster, hazardous infectious diseases or severe economic depression. 
While the formal strategic planning framework stipulated a restricted form of flexibility, the 
managers reflected a highly malleable and dynamic strategic planning model that 
hypothetically allows for responsiveness to changes in the internal and/or external 
environment. Their views relied mostly on personal speculation, rather than concrete 
information, pointing out a knowledge gap in the above arrangements made by the By-law 
2006. A comment in this respect was: 
³6WUDWHJ\-making is a dynamic thing. We can change this document even after a year has 
elapsed [upon its enforcement].´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Despite low levels of awareness of the procedures for update or renewal, flexibility was 
perceived as an important principle for the effective implementation of strategic planning in 
WKH0R,7ZRRIWKHPDQDJHUV¶UHVSRQVHVZHUH 
³1HLWKHULVLWXQFKDQJHDEOH«LIWLPHQHFHVVLWDWHVVLJQLILFDQWFKDQJHVZHVKRXOGEHDEOHWR
GRWKHP2WKHUZLVH«WKHSODQZRXOGWLHXVGRZQ.´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
³:HOOLWGRHVQ¶W mean that the strategy is indispensable after you specify it and after the plans 
and programmes for three-\HDU WHUPV DUH PDGH « WKH SODQV RI VWUDWHJLHV VKRXOG QRW EH
indispensable and immutable, if so, this is not right´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
The goal-hierarchy of the MoI cascaded classically from broad to specific dimensions at five 
levels described as (MoI, 2009c) Vision ± Mission ± Goals ± Targets ± Performance 
indicators. The analysis of performance reports and activity reports in the years 2010, 2011, 
2012 and 2013 of the MoI revealed that no renewal action took place with respect to the 
strategic plan at the first four levels of this goal-hierarchy model, despite four ministerial 
changes from 2010 to date during the plan implementation period (MoI, 2014b). Neither did 
the management carry out a review process during implementation to re-assess organisational 
goals and targets in light of new developments. The enactment of Law No.6360 in late 2012 
marked a far-UHDFKLQJ PRYH LQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V H[LVWLQg policy for the regulation of 
metropolitan city municipalities, which precipitated the need to re-address Goal 1 
(reinforcement of the prefectural system) and Goal 4 (reinforcement of local authorities). 
While these symbolise the tension between central bureaucracy and local government, such 
revisions could not be made in accordance with formal procedures. However, once the MoI 
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management realised that the reinforcement of the prefectural system was close to impossible 
within the powerful current of localisation, a de facto change was made to the first strategic 
WDUJHW LQ  WKURXJK WKH UHPRYDO RI WKH SKUDVH µSUHIHFWXUDO V\VWHP¶ )ROORZLQJ LV WKH
RULJLQDOIRUPRIWKH7DUJHWLQWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQ 
³7KH SUHIHFWXUDO V\VWHP ZLOO EH RYHUKDXOHG LQ RUGer to serve better to the citizens.´ (MoI, 
2009c, p. 56) 
%HORZLVWKHWUDQVIRUPHGIRUPRIWKH7DUJHWLQWKH0R,¶VSHUIRUPDQFHUHSRUW 
³7KHQHFHVVDU\DUUDQJHPHQWVZLOOEHPDGHLQRUGHUWRVHUYHHIIHFWLYHO\DQGZLWKEHWWHUVSHHG
to the citizens.´(MoI, 2012, p. 85) 
This was an important step back from the original strategic position; however, the change did 
not occur within the formal procedures of the formal PFMCL framework. Furthermore, the 
change was made in the annual performance reports; hence, the strategic plan remained in its 
original form. The following account by a planner confirms this: 
³1RFKDQJHZDVPDGHWRWKHVWUDWHJLFSODQDIWHULWZDVSXEOLFLVHG:HFRXOGQRWGR>LW@DW
WKHOHYHORIPLVVLRQYLVLRQ>DQGJRDOV@«KRZHYHUZHWULHGWo provide that dynamism at the 
level of activities and indicators during the preparation of the performance programmes.´
(Interview_41_planner) 
The last sentence reveals that the MoI found its own solution to enhancing the flexibility of 
the strategic planning framework through circumventing the legal arrangements made by 
MPSPPO By-law 2006. This was a de facto adaptation of the plan to the changing 
circumstances within the limits of the initial budgetary figures. While the MPSPPO By-law 
2006 allowed solely for alteration in the numeric values of the performance targets set in the 
strategic plan, the MoI introduced new performance targets every year through annual 
performance programmes, as expressed by the planner above. Other participants took a 
similar line: 
 ³2I FRXUVH VLQFH \RX SUHSDUH >DQQXDO@ SHUIRUPDQFH SURJUDPPHV ZLWKLQ WKH VWUDWHJLF
planning framework, you have a chance to make some changes´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
³7KHOHJLVODWLRQDOORZV>FKDQJHVWRWKHVWUDWHJLFSODQ@EXWZKHWKHULWGHYHORSVLQWKDWZD\«
in practice is doubtful. So, it is dynamic in this aspect, but is it that much relevant in practice? 
«,WLVG\QDPLFRQO\LQRQHDVSHFWVLQFHSHUIRUPDQFHLQGLFDWRUVDUHUHGHILQHGHYHU\\HDULQ
practLFH´,QWHUYLHZBBSODQQHU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The change occurred in, and is limited to, performance indicators at the fifth level of the goal-
hierarchy, except for the change made to the Target-1 as mentioned above. Table 7.1 presents 
the use of the previous and new performance indicators between 2010 and 2013.  
 
Table 7.1 ± Use of New Performance Indicators 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013  
Goal 
No 
Strategic Goal T P N T P N T P N T 
1 Reinforcement of the 
Prefectural System 
3 - 2 2 1 - 1 1 1 2 
2 Law Enforcement & 
Security 
3 1 2 3 3 - 3 3 2 5 
3 e-Government 9 1 6 7 3 10 13 1 21 22 
4 Reinforcement of local 
authorities 
5 - 4 4 2 3 5 2 3 5 
5 Enhancement of civil 
society 
6 5 1 6 3 - 3 1 3 4 
6 Reorganisation of the 
Ministry 
5 2 7 9 3 4 7 - 11 11 
TOTALS 31 9 22 31 * 15 17 32 ** 8 41 49 
(N) = New, (P) = Previous, (T) = Total 
*The figure is presented as 30 in the MoI Annual Report 2011, due to the presentation of two 
indicators as one single indicator. 
**The figure is presented as 33 in the MoI Annual Report 2012 due to a misprint. 
 
Source: Adapted from  (MoI, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014a) 
 
The figures show that new performance indicators have been frequently introduced during the 
four years of plan implementation. Both the number of new and total indicators reached a 
peak in 2013. The number of new indicators was 41 out of 49 total indicators in 2013, while 
it was 22 out of 31 in 2011 and 17 out of 32 in 2012. The e-government strategy (Goal 3), in 
which ICT Department and the Directorate-General for Civil Registration and Nationality 
had active roles, was the most dynamic with 6, 10, and 21 new indicators in years 2011, 
2012, and 2013 respectively. The realm of the sixth goal, reorganisation of the Ministry (Goal 
6), was also active in including 7, 4, and 11 new indicators in the same years, while the areas 
of the other four goals remained stable. 
The analysis of new performance indicators demonstrated either complementariness or 
discreteness patterns. For complementariness, each new indicator marked and represented a 
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different aspect or stage of the involved strategy. For example, developments in the strategy 
related to the e-ID card project were measured through the use of the following performance 
indicators in the years 2010, 2011, and 2012 respectively: 
³7KH SHUFHQWDJH RI WKH FRPSOHWLRQ RI WKH 75 >7XUNLVK 5HSXEOLF@ ,' FDUG SLOot project 
SUDFWLFHV´(MoI, 2011, p. 93). 
 ³7KHFRPSOHWLRQGDWHRIWKHSURMHFWIRUWKHDGDSWDWLRQRIWKHWHFKQRORJLFDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUHRI
WKHSURYLQFLDOFLYLOUHJLVWUDWLRQEUDQFKHVWRWKHQHZ75,'FDUGV´(MoI, 2012, p. 85). 
³7KH FRPSOHWLRQ GDWH RI WKe feasibility, investment and procurement works related to the 
>GHOLYHU\RIWKH@QHZ75,'FDUGV´(MoI, 2013, p. 39). 
In this example, each indicator represented a further stage of the e-ID card strategy observed 
as; finalising piloting (2010), adapting infrastructure (2011), and feasibility and procurement 
of the delivery service (2012).  
The pattern of discreteness was observed when new indicators were mostly unrelated with the 
previous ones under the same strategy. This appeared in re-organisation strategies (Goal 6) in 
which various departments, such as Human Resources, SDU, Media and Public Relations 
$GYLVRU¶V 2IILFH 'HSDUWPHQW IRU 7UDLQLQJ 'HSDUWPHQW IRU )RUHLJQ DQG (8 5HODWLRQV KDG
performance measures (MoI, 2011, 2012, 2013). For example, the Department for Foreign 
and EU Relations and the Department for Training had performance indicators for the first 
time within the strategic planning context in 2013 under Goal 6.  
Table 7.2 ± Dynamism of Performance Indicators 
 
Goal-1 Objective  Performance Indicator 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Strengthen the 
Prefectural 
System 
The 
prefectural 
system will be 
re-designed to 
serve better to 
citizens 
1 The number of standardised One-Step Bureaus ¥    
2 The completion rate of the scaling 
work (%) ¥    
3 The establishment date of  the new 
migration unit (date) ¥    
4 The number of 112 Emergency Call Centres taken into operation   ¥ ¥ ¥ 
5 The number of forms  ¥   
6 
The number of 112 Emergency Call 
Centres with completed physical 
infrastructure 
   ¥ 
 
Source: Adapted from (MoI, 2010b, 2012, 2013, 2014a) 
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The highly flexible and dynamic practice of introducing new indicators harmed the steadiness 
of performance measurement. Table 7.2 shows an example of interruptions in the steadiness 
of the use of performance measures under Goal 1 throughout the years 2010, 2011, 2012, and 
2013. 
No single performance indicator was used throughout all four years of plan implementation. 
The indicators 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 were used only once during the period, while indicator 4 was 
used for a three-year period. The statistics for the remaining five goals are similar. One main 
underlying reason is the focus on the formal effectiveness dimension of performance and the 
use of discrete input and output indicators, which terminate upon the completion of the given 
task.  
The system developed to enhance flexibility was a response to demands from departments to 
meet their practical needs. The managers saw flexibility as a requirement from several 
aspects, including the need for change when analyses are weak or incoherent, foresights and 
predictions are imprecise and a business process is ill-defined, which renders a pre-
determined performance target impractical. A maQDJHU¶VFRPPHQWZDV 
³6XUHVXUHVXUHLWFDQEHLQWKLVZD\HLWKHU$WWKHHQGRIWKHGD\\RXFDQODWHUVHHDWDUJHW
as unrealistic, which you consider realistic today. Or you might have defined an unrealistic 
target due to incorrect analysis or inadequate scrutiny of the data, or incorrect definition of the 
business process´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
Other factors recognised by the planners as influential include the lack of technical expertise 
in specification of performance indicators, uncertainty particularly with regard to budgetary 
prospects of a five-year plan term, a misperception of high flexibility of the strategic planning 
PRGHODQGQHJOLJHQFHRI WKHGHSDUWPHQWVGXHWRDSHUFHSWLRQRIµLQVLJQLILFDQWURXWLQH¶7KH
following account by a planner reflects how perceptions of uncertainty regarding costs and 
budgets leads to the desirability of a more flexible strategic planning: 
³,EHOLHYHWKDWSHUIRUPDQFHLQGLFWRUVVKRXOGEe re-specified annually. Because, when you are 
told to define performance indicators for a five-\HDUWHUPLWUHTXLUHVFRVWLQJ«,WLVQRWPXFK
SRVVLEOH WR VSHFLI\ WKH FRVW RI DQ DFWLYLW\ « IRXU \HDUV LQ DGYDQFH LQ WKH SXEOLF >VHFWRU@´
(Interview_17_planner) 
In practice, implementation by the MoI reflects the above account since new indicators have 
been introduced annually, as demonstrated in Table 7.3. The deviation between the estimated 
DQGUHDOLVHGEXGJHWILJXUHVSUHVHQWHGLQ7DEOHDOVRVXSSRUW WKHSODQQHU¶VYLHZRIIXWXUH
uncertainty in the public sector. The extraordinary upsurge in new and total indicators in 
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 LV PRVWO\ UHODWHG WR D FKDQJH LQ WKH WRS PDQDJHPHQW¶V DWWLWXGH WRZDUGV PRUH
engagement in the plan implementation process, which is discussed in section 6.3.1.1. 
Evidence reveals that proposals for big changes to the strategic plan are not welcomed by the 
SDU. For example, one of the managers described the rejection of their proposal to introduce 
significant change to the strategic plan: 
³:HWULHGDIHZWLPHVEXW,GRQ¶WNQRZZKHWKHULWVWHPVIURPWKHHWKRVRIVWUDWHgic planning 
>RUQRW@«WKHUHLVDQDSSURDFKRIµ7KLVSODQLVSUHSDUHGLWLVJRLQJWREHLPSOHPHQWHGWKHUH
LVQ¶WDFKDQFHWRPDNHDFKDQJH¶´,QWHUYLHZBBPDQDJHU 
This manager added that other reasons for the rejection of their proposals were related to the 
GHVLUH WR DYRLG H[WUD EXUGHQV RQ WKH EXGJHW DQG WKH 0R'¶V QHHG WR HQVXUH SODQQLQJ
discipline, as an external supervisor.  
7.6. Conclusion 
This chapter tested the patterns of the theory of incrementalism against the formal PFCML 
framework and the practice of the MoI through a pattern-matching approach that is detailed 
in Table 7.3 below. In this table the second column indicates the dimension of 
incrementalism involved; the third column demonstrates the extent of convergence between 
the pattern of incrementalism and the formal PFMCL framework; the fourth column exhibits 
the pattern observed in the MoI; the fifth column shows the degree of convergence between 
the patterns of incrementalism and the practice; the sixth column is dedicated to the area of 
concern and the seventh column indicates the effect of strategic planning reform on the 
observed pattern. 
7.6.1. Partisan Mutual Adjustment   
With regard to partisan mutual adjustment, Table 7.3 shows that it is not applicable to the 
formal PFMCL framework since the PFMCL adopts a method similar to rational planning in 
which goals are formulated deductively. Resource allocation did not constitute a basis for 
conflict and bargaining because performance budgeting failed, classical budgeting continued 
and a link between the strategic plan and resources could not be established. Similarly 
partisan mutual adjustment did not occur during the prioritisation of goals, rather there was 
an exchange of opinions and persuasion.  
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Table 7.3 ±  Results of Pattern Matching for Incrementalism 
No Dimension of 
Incr.* 
 
PFMCL 
to Incr. 
Pattern Observed MoI 
Practice  
To Incr. 
Areas of Concern Effect of 
SP  
on Practice 
1 Partisan Mutual 
Adjustment 
n/a 
Analysis  
(restricted or 
comprehensive) 
Low 
Intra-organisational 
relations (mostly in 
technical service 
domains) 
Low 
 
 
 
Conflict and 
Bargaining Moderate 
Extra-organisational: 
Regulation of local 
authorities; 
Budgeting; Capital 
investment 
Low 
2 Agreement as Criterion n/a 
Compliance by law 
and by 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V
preference;  
Analysis (restricted 
or comprehensive) 
Low Most service domains Low 
 
 
 Agreement    Moderate Regulation of local 
authorities Low 
3 
Simple 
Incremental 
Analysis 
n/a 
Consideration of 
marginally different 
strategies from each 
other and from the 
status quo 
High 
Generic approach of 
the MoI management, 
particularly in core 
functions such as law 
enforcement, 
regulation of local 
authorities and of 
provincial 
administrations 
Low 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Consideration and 
implementation of 
innovative 
alternatives 
 
Low 
 
E-government 
strategy; and Re-
organisation of 
migration service 
 
Low 
4 Trial-and-error n/a Non-purposeful 
trial-and-error High 
Decision: Risks and 
costs tolerable; 
reversible.  
Political agenda: 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V
directive (can be non-
incremental) 
n/a 
 
 
 Piloting n/a 
Quantifiable services 
delivered through 
ICT infrastructure  
Low 
5 Flexibility and 
Dynamism 
Low 
Highly flexible and 
dynamic practice High 
Change in 
performance 
indicators and the 
strategic plan 
Low 
 
* Incr. = Incrementalism 
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Inter-departmental relations were not based on mutual interests and decision-making was 
highly authoritative, leader-centred and hence, straightforward. Therefore, the degree of 
PDWFKEHWZHHQWKHSDWWHUQVRISDUWLVDQPXWXDODGMXVWPHQWDQGWKH0R,¶VLQWUD-organisational 
practice is low as shown in Table 7.3. 
Regarding extra-organisational politics, decision-making in the wider environment showed 
patterns of central decision-making due to the dominance of the government in policymaking. 
Formal stakeholder analysis did not lead to partisan mutual adjustment because it was a 
discrete action conducted over a survey study. Negotiation and bargaining, to some extent, 
was seen in relationships with municipalities and also in a recurring manner in relationships 
with the MoD and MoF in budgeting and capital investment issues. Municipalities, as 
politically motivated actors, tried to persuade the MoI management on the content of local 
government reforms. 
Interaction never reached the level of partisan mutual adjustment because the strong one 
party government was the main decision-maker for the content of the reforms, as it was in all 
policy-making areas. The motivation of the MoD and the MoF was mostly technical rather 
than political. Hence, the degree of correspondence between partisan mutual adjustment and 
WKH 0R,¶V extra-organisational relations is moderate in the fields of the regulation of 
municipalities, budgeting and capital investment, as shown in Table 7.3, due to accumulation 
of decision-making power at the core of the government. The impact of strategic planning is 
VKRZQWREHORZLQERWKLQGLFDWRUVDVWKH0R,¶VSUDFWLFHVKRZHGQRFRQVLGHUDEOHFKDQJHLQ
the post-planning era. 
7.6.2. Agreement as Criterion for Good Strategy 
This pattern is not applicable to the formal PFMCL framework since the PFMCL 2003 adopts 
comprehensive analysis or procedural rationality as the criterion for the selection of 
strategies.  As for practice, it is shown that the MoI addresses social needs and problems 
through strategies and evaluates the costs and benefits of strategy alternatives vis-a-vis some 
adopted values, such as service quality, democracy and respect for human rights. Instead of 
agreement as a criterion, goals are set and strategic decisions are made to a great extent in 
compliance with the law, adopting governmental preference and through analysis. On the 
other hand, analysis unfolds either in the restricted or comprehensive form. Therefore, the 
GHJUHHRIFRUUHVSRQGHQFHZLWKWKHGLPHQVLRQRIµDJUHHPHQWDVFULWHULRQ¶LVLQGLFDWHGDVORZ
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Agreement appears to be a criterion for strategies in the regulation of local authorities with a 
moderate effect as shown in Table 7.3. In both cases, the effect of strategic planning 
remained low as rated in the Table. 
7.6.3. Simple Incremental Analysis 
Two tendencies in the MoI management are discussed in relation to simple incremental 
analysis. Firstly, the management tend to consider alternatives that are slightly different from 
each other and from the existing strategies when particularly core functions of the MoI are 
involved. Any suggestion of radical change in the strategies in the core fields requires the 
intervention of elected politicians or a reform agenda to be put into practice, showing the 
exogenous character of goal-setting in the MoI. Innovative strategies, such as e-government, 
are often limited with the aim of increasing service speed and reducing costs in the core 
fields, although efficiency and cost-effectiveness are not professionally monitored. There is a 
high level of convergence in this regard and strategic planning demonstrated a low effect on 
this result as shown in Table 7.3. Secondly, the management tend to consider far-reaching 
alternative strategies in some fields such as e-government strategies and migration services 
where there were considerable changes. While the origins of e-government strategies were 
found in the early 2000s, the establishment of a new Directorate-general for Migration 
Management was, to a great extent, the consequence of Europeanisation. Matching between 
these two strategies and the effect of strategic planning on these outcomes are low, as shown 
in Table 7.3. Although performance measurement strategies that challenged the status quo 
were considered and formulated in the fields of human resources and regulation of 
municipalities, these could not be put into practice due to resistance from those upholding the 
status quo.  
7.6.4. Trial-and-error 
As shown in Table 7.3, the trial-and-error pattern is not applicable to the formal PFMCL 
framework since the framework obligates a formal-comprehensive analysis instead. Two 
different views emerged from the practice point of view. According to the first view, trial-
and-error is not practiced since resources are owned by the public, spending is subject to 
strict rules and regulations and experimentation is available in public service provision. The 
MoI departments tend to pilot, particularly in ICT-related projects, when there is a perceived 
high risk of resource wastage due to irreversibility of decisions, such as those with high cost 
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implications, when theUHLVKLJKVRFLDOULVNDQGDULVNRIKDUPLQJWKH0LQLVWU\¶VUHSXWDWLRQ
This pattern corresponds with the pattern of comprehensive analysis discussed in Chapter 6. 
It is shown as piloting in Table 7.3 and it is applicable in quantifiable services which rely 
heavily on ICT infrastructure. Pattern-matching is indicated as low under these conditions. 
According to the second view, trial-and-error is practiced within the MoI, but in a non-
purposeful manner. The basic reason for this is the neglect of management of formal analysis 
of strategy options, which results in restricted forms of analysis. The process unfolds 
impulsively and in an uncontrolled manner, unlike the pattern of purposeful incrementalism. 
Unrestrained trial-and-error is mainly experienced due to the prevalence of a pre-planning 
culture and unplanned shifts in government policy. Although there is convincing evidence 
that trial-and-error exists in the MoI, some managers might have denied its existence on 
certain grounds. Firstly, availability of piloting and experimentation in ICTs rules out trial-
and-error in ICT-intensive services as explained above. Secondly, some managers might have 
experienced trial-and-error but they may not be aware of it since it unfolds unwittingly. 
Thirdly, perceiving trial-and-error pejoratively and with negative connotations as a weakness 
of bureaucracy, some of them might have exhibited a bureaucratic reaction of denial. Hence, 
Table 7.3 shows a high level of correspondence between both the decision characteristics and 
tKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V SUHIHUHQFH IDFWRUV 7KH ORZ HIIHFW RI VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ RQ WKH UHVXOWV
exhibited in Table 7.3 reveals that strategic planning has not brought about considerable 
change in the management culture. 
7.6.5. Flexibility and Dynamism 
The formal P)0&/IUDPHZRUNVXJJHVWVDUHVWULFWHGIRUPRIIOH[LELOLW\WKURXJKµUHQHZDO¶DQG
µXSGDWH¶ SURFHGXUHV PRVWO\ GXH WR WKH DVVXPSWLRQ RI D VWDEOH H[WHUQDO PLOLHX +HQFH WKH
match between the PFMCL framework and incrementalism is indicated as low in Table 7.5. 
In contrast, the practice of the MoI management unfolded in an extremely malleable and 
dynamic manner, particularly through the introduction of a considerable number of new 
performance indicators annually. Changes were made de facto through the circumvention of 
formal procedures. Although the strategic plan remained unchanged in its original form, it 
was not immune to becoming a de facto working paper subject to changes made to the 
content of the targets and indicators through performance programmes. Hence, Table 7.5 
VKRZVDKLJKOHYHORIFRUUHVSRQGHQFHEHWZHHQWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSUDFWLFHDQGWKH
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pattern of flexibility and dynamism of incrementalism, while the effect of strategic planning 
UHPDLQHGORZRQWKHPDQDJHPHQW¶VSUDFWLFH 
To conclude, the findings show a low level of match between the patterns of incrementalism 
and the formal PFMCL framework as expected. Four of the dimensions are not applicable to 
the PFMCL framework, while there is a low level of match with regard to flexibility and 
dynamism, as the PFMCL model stipulates a restricted form of flexibility and dynamism. On 
WKH FRQWUDU\ 7DEOH  SUHVHQWV FRQVLGHUDEOH RYHUODSV EHWZHHQ WKH SDWWHUQV RI WKH 0R,¶V
practice and the patterns of incrementalism. Pattern-matching is high particularly with regard 
to simple incremental analysis, trial-and-error and the flexibility and dynamism dimensions, 
while it is moderate or low concerning partisan mutual adjustment and agreement-as-
criterion. The last column in Table 7.3 shows that strategic planning had a considerably low 
effect on the practices of the MoI, which means that the pre-planning management culture 
and paradigm prevailed, although changes were observed as a consequence of various factors, 
such as Europeanisation, technological developments and governance. 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
   
³,QGHHGZKDWHYHUWKHPHULWVRIVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJLQWKHDEVWUDFWQRUPDOH[SHFWDWLRQVKDYHWR
be that most efforts to produce fundamental decisions and actions in government through 
strategic planning will QRWVXFFHHG´ 
        (Bryson and Roering, 1988, p.995)       
 
7KLVWKHVLVLVDUHVXOWRIWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VLQWHUHVWLQWKHRU\DQGSUDFWLFH,WXQGHUWRRNWKHWDVN
of explicating the difficulties and challenges inherent in the application of strategic planning 
in the Turkish Ministry of Interior, covering the period 2009 to 2013. Utilising a case study 
method, the thesis first reviewed the descriptive and empirical literature on public strategic 
planning and presented a synopsis of practice-based success and failure factors (see Table 
3.1). These are to be utilised in the first section of this concluding chapter for a discussion on 
WKH0R,¶VSUDFWLFHH[DPLQHGGXULQJILHOGZRUN,WWKHQGHYHORSHGDFRQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUNLQ
Chapter 2 (see Table 3.1 in Section 3.4) by critically reviewing the theories of rational 
planning and incrementalism, as the two enduring process theories of strategic planning. 
Upon giving an account of its methodological grounds in Chapter 4, the thesis presented the 
chronological story of WKH 0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ SURFHVV ZLWK D KROLVWLF DQG H[SODQDWRU\
logic in Chapter 5. Chapters 6 and 7 deconstructed the strategic planning process of the MoI 
for theory-testing through pattern-matching. Chapter 6 tested the patterns of rational planning 
vis-j-vis the patterns of the formal PFMCL framework and the practice of the MoI. Next, 
Chapter 7 tested the patterns of incrementalism against the formal PFCML framework and the 
practice of the MoI using the same logic. This concluding chapter undertakes further 
discussion of the findings by revisiting the research questions outlined in Section 1.4 in order 
to draw a conclusion. To reiterate, the research questions are: 
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x µ+RZ ZDV VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ SUDFWLFHG LQ WKH 0R, DQG ZK\ GLG RU GLGQ¶W LW
generate tKHH[SHFWHGFKDQJHDQGUHVXOWV"¶ 
x µ7RZKDWH[WHQWKRZDQGZK\GRHVUDWLRQDOSODQQLQJRULQFUHPHQWDOLVPH[SODLQ
WKHVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSURFHVVDQGSUDFWLFHRIWKH0R,"¶ 
 
Sections 8.1 and 8.2 are followed by the section 8.3 on limitations of the study and the 
conclusion section 8.4 in which contributions to the literature and methodology of public 
strategic planning, and further research agendas are discussed. 
µ+RZZDVVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSUDFWLFHGLQWKH0R,DQGZK\GLGRU
GLGQ¶WLWJHQHUDWHWKHH[SHFWHGFKDQJHDQGUHVXOWV"¶ 
The first question has a practice focus. It entails making judgements on the practice of the 
MoI, which is laid out as an explanatory narrative in Chapter 5 and gained breadth and depth 
in Chapters 6 and 7, against the practice-based criteria derived from the empirical literature 
(see Table 2.1). This task is fulfilled in this section and the discussion is made with regard to 
the components of strategic planning (see Section 2.2). The analysis so far has evidenced that 
the first strategic planning attempt of the MoI has been ineffective to a great extent. 
8.1.1. Contingencies 
The significance of external environmental contingencies for the initiation and success of 
public strategic planning are elaborated in Section 3.2.1. Within this context, the absence of 
sister public agencies or a network of strategic management in the surroundings made the 
application of a formal strategic planning model more challenging for the MoI. Strategic 
planning is easily adapted if there are near-by agencies that have previous experience and that 
can be emulated (Berry and Wechsler, 1995).  
With regard to the internal environment, the first issue was the large size of the MoI (Roberts 
and Wargo, 1994) with a staff of 2049 to 2581 in the headquarters between 2010 and 2013. 
Although, some successful cases of formal strategic planning in large public organisations 
have been observed previously (for example Campbell, 2002), the multitude of departments 
constituting the MoI was a challenge for co-ordination of corporate strategic planning and 
particularly for keeping the attention of the heads of these many departments to the end of the 
planning process. Departments were represented by mid-level, instead of senior managers 
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towards the end of the process. These considerations became an impediment for strategic 
planning in the case of the MoI.  
A highly leader-centred structure significantly facilitated decision-making in the SDB 
meetings in the MoI, as suggested by empirical evidence (Hendrick, 2003; Long and Franklin, 
2004), however, decision-making at the top  did not reflect the ethos of team-work or 
collective rationality that was observed in successful cases of public strategic planning 
(Baker, 1992; Roberts and Wargo, 1994).  
8.1.2. Preparation  
Evidence from the MoI suggests the need to consider adoption and implementation problems 
separately. The MoI case, as a whole, reflects how and why weak preparation leads, firstly, to 
failure in applying effective strategy formulation processes and secondly to weak 
implementation of the plan. The problems generated by paucity of awareness and 
comprehension lead to poor application of the strategic planning model. Application problems 
stem from the deficiencies in the preparation stages and affect the implementation of the 
strategic plan. Both managers and planners who participated in this study viewed the problem 
of poor planning outcomes more as an issue with training, awareness and buy-in, thus of the 
application of the model, rather than plan implementation. 
The existence of management capacity, particularly to use analytical tools, was found to be a 
success factor (Kemp et al., 1993; Streib and Poister, 1990)7KH0R,¶VH[LVWLQJFDSDELOLWLHV
rather than reflecting such analytical capacity revealed a tendency towards unplanned and 
day-to-day management because of the way in which prefects functioned at the provincial 
administration level. For example, the MoI did not have the expertise to conduct a 
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis.  
In an attempt to prepare the actors psychologically and intellectually to undertake the process 
and to ensure buy-in, as proposed previously (Baker, 1992; Kemp et al., 1993; Poister and 
Streib, 2005; Wheeland, 1993), the SDU invested in manager and staff training, hired external 
consultants, produced strategic planning and management books and booklets, and held 
workshops and presentations. However, the activities were short, remained superficial and did 
not suffice to enlighten managers and staff, who were dealing with strategic planning and its 
conceptual and practical complexities for the first time. An important shortcoming was that 
the senior managers did not attend any substantive training programme , conduct an intensive 
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literature review or engage in a self-assisting programme to get some deeper insight into 
strategic planning, which is considered to be an important achievement factor in the literature 
(Baker, 1992; Kemp et al., 1993). The exceptional conduct of the Head of the Department for 
Associations ZKRKDGD0DVWHU¶VGHJUHHIURPD8.XQLYHUsity and wrote his dissertation on 
public strategic planning was important case to point the importance of training in strategic 
planning. Contracted external consultants were also found to be incompetent and unhelpful, at 
least by some of the MoI managers, because they lacked the requisite expertise on strategic 
planning. This was a negative factor that led to ineffective planning. While successful 
preparation to include a projection of anticipated outcomes and resource requirements is 
recommended as a key step in the strategic planning process (Kemp et al., 1993), the MoI did 
not produce such a forecast at the outset of the planning period. Previous experience with 
strategy development and a subsequent supportive culture is empirically found to be an 
important determinant of success (Poister and Streib, 2005). Yet, the MoI did not utilise and 
benefit from previous experience gained by the former Strategy Centre, which was created to 
produce strategy content (see Section 5.1.2.2).  
When the gap between technical knowledge and expertise and the lack of experience of 
strategic planning cannot be effectively addressed through recruitment of strategic planners 
and training activities, this can lead to a failure in the ability of management to make sense of 
what strategic planning is, its importance and how it can be practiced effectively and 
successfully. This eventually leads to the failure of the whole planning process. Although the 
employment of strategic planning experts, which the MoI failed to do, is important for a 
technically good plan, it is not enough to overcome the problems posed by poorly informed 
PDQDJHUV SDUWLFXODUO\ WKRVH LQ VHQLRU SRVLWLRQV $ ODFN RI DZDUHQHVV RI µZKDW VWUDWHJLF
SODQQLQJ LV¶ OHDGV WR UHVLVWDQFHDPRQJPDQDJHPHQWQRWRQO\ WRZDUGV the new, but also the 
unknown. It was discussed in Chapter 4 how the initially strong resistance from managers 
started to ebb through the impact of training activities, however limited they might have been, 
as familiarity with strategic planning grew. This demonstrates the importance of equipping the 
managers, who are the most important strategy practitioners, with adequate knowledge and 
skills to mitigate the initial resistance, encourage buy-in and achieve success in strategic 
planning. All these findings support the conventional proposition that high levels of expertise 
in planning, such as having an ad hoc planning unit, experience and management capability, is 
positively associated with successful adaptation to formal strategic planning (Boyne et al., 
2004).  
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8.1.3. Strategy Formulation 
A one-size-fits-all approach is strongly rejected in the empirical literature in favour of 
contingency planning (Poister and Streib, 2005; Roberts and Wargo, 1994) because the 
former neglects the specific contexts of public organisations and becomes a barrier to meeting 
their needs for tailoring standard strategy practices (Long and Franklin, 2004). Strategic 
SODQQLQJ FDPH LQWR WKH 0R,¶V DJHQGD LQ H[DFWO\ WKLVNLQGRI WRS-down and one-size-fits-all 
fashion through a legislDWLYHPDQGDWH7KH0R,¶VFDVHVXSSRUWVWKHDUJXPHQWIRUFRQWLQJHQF\
planning and provides more evidence on how such a mandatory strategic management model 
can be detrimental with regard to basic formal strategic planning principles, such as 
integration, central co-ordination and an outcome-focus. The MoI had to apply this single 
formal strategic planning model to all of its units that had regulatory, policymaking and 
service delivery functions. For example, while setting measurable goals was straightforward 
in service delivery units, it was highly challenging in some services that mostly performed a 
regulatory or policymaking role. The problem with this approach was not only the 
incompatibility of the model with service requirements but also its rigidity, which was an 
obstacle to adaptability. As this approach hindered the MoI in adapting to changing 
circumstances in the external environment, flexibility and dynamism emerged organically in 
practice during the implementation period, as discussed in Section 7.5.  
The case of the MoI shows that problems with strategic management can be external and stem 
from the mandated model itself and that these problems can emanate from political factors as 
well as technical ones. For example, the exclusion of the military-related Gendarmerie and the 
Coastal Guard Command from the process was a consequence of the historical power politics 
between the military and the bureaucracy in the Turkish state system, in which the former 
until recently has been dominant. This finding underlines the difference between public and 
private, by showing how socio-political factors may affect strategic management processes in 
a central governmental organisation. 
)RUPDOLW\ RI SODQQLQJ LV IRXQG WR EH D SRVLWLYH IDFWRU IRU WKH 0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF SODQQing 
practice, as anticipated in the empirical literature (for example (Poister et al., 2013). 
Formality, with reference to a legal mandate, is perceived to be a requisite for the initiation 
and embedding of strategic planning in the MoI. Hence, formality is not only critical for the 
breadth and depth of analyses, but also for routinising the standard strategic planning 
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practices in MoI-like organisations, which continuously seek compliance with the law in their 
decisions and operations. 
The performance of the MoI with regard to analytical practice varied from one component to 
the other. The stakeholder analysis, SWOT analysis and definition of vision and mission 
stages were satisfactory to some extent as argued in the relevant sections. However, the stages 
of formulation of goals, objectives, strategies and performance indicators, cost-benefit 
analysis, implementation, monitoring and feedback, which demanded enhanced training, 
expertise and experience, were unsatisfactory. While the empirical literature proposed that an 
enhanced management capacity and a capacity to utilise analytical tools, particularly 
performance budgeting and cost-benefit analysis, is of crucial importance for successful 
strategic planning (Elbanna et al., 2015; Kemp et al., 1993; Poister and Streib, 2005; Streib 
and Poister, 1990), the MoI management neither had the capacity to conduct cost-benefit 
analyses nor to apply performance budgeting. Line-item budgeting continued in the traditional 
way, but not incrementally, as presented in Table 5.1 in Section 5.1.1.5. The case of the MoI 
confirmed previous findings that agencies practicing line-item budgeting struggle with linking 
resources to strategic plans (Poister and Streib, 2005). A formal cost-benefit analysis was not 
undertaken, which is a finding that is widespread in other public administration settings 
(Poister, 2005).  
Contrary to the requirements of the integrated or corporate approach (Baker, 1992; Campbell, 
2002) adopted, the MoI could not manage to incorporate law enforcement and security 
agencies as well as its provincial branches to its strategic planning process. This was due a 
number of factors including the shortcomings of the model created by the PFMCL 2003, the 
insufficiency of technical knowledge on strategic planning and other socio-political factors. 
The exclusion of provincial branches and security agencies from mandatory planning by the 
3)0&/XQGHUPLQHGWKHLQWHJULW\RIWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSURFHVV, leading to the 
ineffectiveness of the process. 
Clarification of goals is both a crucial element of the process and an aim of strategic planning 
(Poister and Streib, 2005). The managers and planners experienced difficulties during the 
assignment of impact indicators to objectives particularly in departments that undertook 
coordinating or regulatory roles. Missing nuances between regulation, policymaking and 
service delivery, the planners came to think that the regulatory and policy units were 
redundant since they struggled with assigning performance indicators for service output or 
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delivery. A similar problem was also faced in some service delivery departments due to the 
exclusion of provincial branches from strategic planning, which were responsible for service 
delivery at the front line. Hence, the clarification of goals occurred in a rather limited fashion. 
Parallel to the empirical findings that suggested the participation of mid-level managers and 
staff for obtaining employee buy-in (Kemp et al., 1993), the middle and lower-level managers 
and staff were included ZLWKLQ WKH0R,¶V VWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSURFHVVE\ PHDQVRI WKH WKUHH-
level decision-pyramid. The decision-pyramid was not dictated by legislation and was an 
original idea developed by the planning team to meet the unique needs of the MoI. Hence, it 
was a step taken outside the context of the formal model as a way of adapting it to the 
0LQLVWU\¶V FRQWH[WXDOQHHGV KLJKOLJKWLQJ WKH LQDGHTXDF\RI DRQH-size-fits-all approach. As 
explained by a senior manager, it was an exceptional period in which the MoI bureaucracy 
was heavily involved in strategic planning for the very first time.  
To ensure participation, strategic planning efforts took a bottom-up approach by means of the 
three-level decision-pyramid (Kissler et al., 1998a; Long and Franklin, 2004). The three-level 
decision-pyramid included training workshops, committees, presentations and other meetings 
as consultative exercises with internal stakeholders, which were supportive activities for 
strategic planning (Baker, 1992; Favoreu et al., 2015; Kissler et al., 1998a) 7KH 0R,¶V
experience showed that the bottom-up approach was not immune to pitfalls. The mission, 
vision and organisational values were produced as proposals in the lower levels and submitted 
to the SDB for approval in short duration meetings. In such a bureaucratic setting, formal 
proposals to the strategy board were not able to challenge the status quo and precipitate 
strategic change. While collective action and consulting at all levels of management is critical 
for buy-in of a strategic plan (Campbell, 2002), strategy is mainly a top management 
responsibility and interest (Miles and Snow, 2003) and cannot be left to subordinates. 
&DPSEHOO¶V VWXG\RQFRUSRUDWH VWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ LQ WKH86$LU)RUFH UHYHDOHGKRZ
top-down corporate strategic planning can lead to success in such strict bureaucracies 
VSHDUKHDGHGE\IRUZDUGORRNLQJOHDGHUV7KHUHVXOWVRI&DPSEHOO¶VVWXG\DUHLPSRUWDQWVLQFH
the MoI has some shared characteristics with the US Air Force, such as the sensitivity and 
confidentiality of some of its service domains, prominent public position and strict 
bureaucracy. These characteristics favour a top-down planning approach. In contrast, the 
political domains of the MoI, such as local authorities and civil society associations require 
close interaction with external stakeholders. Hence, purely top-down planning is very likely to 
undermine consensus on goals in these domains. While the literature presents evidence in 
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favour of both bottom-up (Roberts and Wargo, 1994) and top-down (Hendrick, 2003) 
approaches and wide internal and external participation is by and large considered to be 
beneficial (Blair, 2004; Favoreu et al., 2015; Wheeland, 1993), the multiple-goal nature of the 
MoI and dissimilarities in some domains demands a balance between the two approaches for 
effective strategic planning. This is strategic planning in which the top management team is 
fully engaged and associations, local government representatives and other stakeholders 
included, for example through regional meetings (Kissler et al., 1998b). The MoI already has 
this experience, albeit somewhat recent in nature, that can be exploited for use as a centralised 
systematic stakeholder analysis process.    
While internal stakeholder participation was satisfactory, external stakeholder participation 
was unsatisfactory. The views of external stakeholders did not make a considerable change to 
the content of the strategic plan. Legal duties and governmental preferences, rather than 
stakeholder (other than elected politicians) preferences, had the greatest influence on the 
IRUPXODWLRQRIWKHVWUDWHJLHVDVGLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQ7KLVLVVLPLODUWR)UDQNOLQ¶V(2001) 
study in the US federal agency context, which found that strategic planning had not made 
significant change to the content of federal agency strategic plans, but had still contributed to 
the inclusion of different external stakeholder groups and the public. Hence, unlike some 
previously successful cases (for example Kissler et al., 1998a), the MoI did not benefit from 
face-to-face meetings of any kind with its external stakeholders within the framework of the 
formal stakeholder analysis. Such face-to-face meetings with external stakeholders held by 
separate departments, such as the Associations Department, had positive effects on their 
strategic planning process. These supportive activities were departmental, sporadic and 
outside the formal strategic planning process. Empirical findings suggest that participation 
becomes meaningful and fruitful when there is a supportive culture that favours organisational 
democracy (Long and Franklin, 2004). Again, the unsupportive decision-making culture of 
the MoI significantly counteracted the benefits of the participation mechanisms. Reflecting 
previous findings (Campbell, 2002; Roberts and Wargo, 1994), the MoI senior management 
was not very enthusiastic about discussing issues with external stakeholders due to a strong 
perception of confidentiality in their mission. 
Another aspect of participation was the environment in which it took place. Successful cases 
show that effective participation occurs in creative environments particularly through the 
practice of techniques such as visualisation, back-casting, scenario building and stretch goal-
setting (Campbell, 2002; Wheeland, 1993).There was no evidence of such practices during the 
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meetings particularly in the SDB as the highest platform with the power to decide on 
strategies. The exception to this was the brainstorming practices at lower level meetings, 
which resulted in the emergence of some ideas that could not be put into practice. 
Conflicts that did arise during the strategic planning process were less destructive in the MoI, 
unlike other cases (for example Baker, 1992), because these were easily settled through the 
Undersecretar\¶VPHGLDWLRQ+RZHYHUWKLVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWWKHUHZHUHQRGLVDSSRLQWPHQWV
frustrations and displeasures during the process. An example (see section 4.2.4.2) was the 
merging of the two departments in the SDU to overcome ongoing conflicts between the team 
leader and the other department head. While strategic planning processes developed more 
productively with knowledgeable managers in other cases (Poister, 2005), insufficient 
technical knowledge led to conflict among senior managers in the MoI. 
8.1.3.1. Practitioners¶ Role 
An important agent and practitioner of strategy was the SDU in the MoI. The existence of a 
corporate level specialised unit is necessary for good strategic planning (Boyne et al., 2004). 
Creation of the SDU as a corporate strategy unit provided guidance, support, and co-
ordination for the process, as evidenced in the literature (Ugboro et al., 2010). However, it 
was limited in its scope due to two factors. Firstly, the MoI did not complete the 
establishment of the SDU by supporting the unit with planning experts with prior experience 
of strategic planning. Hence, the establishment of the SDU remained incomplete depriving the 
organisation of a fully-fledged support unit at the corporate level. This subsequently deprived 
the departments of effective internal guidance by the corporate planning centre, which is a 
similar finding to Boyne, Williams, Law and Walker (2004) in the context of BV regime in 
Welsh local authorities. Secondly, from the actor certification perspective (Barzelay and 
Jacobsen, 2009), there were some missing elements. Initially, the head of the SDU did not 
take an active role and certify this newly created unit by giving it strong representation, 
leaving this role to the team leader. Secondly, strategic change was not a priority in the 
8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶V DJHQGD ZKHUHDV LW ZDV DQ LPSRUWDQW FRQGLWLRQ IRU HIIHFWLYH DFWRU
certification of the SDU (Barzelay and Jacobsen, 2009). Finally, apart from the personal skills 
and efforts of the process champion, the SDU could not instil the standard practices of 
strategy into organisational routines. For example the SDU could neither centralise strategy 
development nor could it effectively monitor plan implementation. The departments 
continued to conduct themselves as they had in the pre-planning era. Replacing the former 
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Strategy Centre with the SDU, sans its staff, proved to be a step backwards with the loss of 
tacit strategy knowledge, prior familiarity and experience with the creation of strategy content 
as a minimum. 
Another group of practitioners were senior managers. The readiness, knowledge and 
commitment of senior managers is a significant determinant of success in strategic planning 
(Baker, 1992; Bryson and Roering, 1988; Poister and Streib, 2005; Ugboro et al., 2010), 
nonetheless,  the MoI managers did not give a powerful demonstration of such values. Senior 
managers conceived of strategy as a responsibility that could be relegated to mid- and low-
level managers and simply ratified by themselves, which was a crucial misconception. Unlike 
successful leaders who know that good implementation requires full insight of the strategic 
planning model (Baker, 1992; Barzelay and Campbell, 2003; Kemp et al., 1993), the top 
management of the MoI did not exert themselves to gain comprehension of strategic planning. 
The SDB meetings that only lasted a few hours were the only platform where top 
management engaged with the proposals of lower committees. While good insight of strategic 
planning enhances the productivity of practitioners in the process (Baker, 1992; Barzelay and 
Campbell, 2003; Poister and Streib, 2005; Wheeland, 1993), poor insights sometimes led to 
conflicts on technical and other dimensions between the department heads and the strategic 
planning team in the MoI. Hence, top management did not allocate enough time, energy or 
priority to strategic planning, which negatively affected the ownership level of the staff, as 
previously suggested in the literature (Ugboro et al., 2010). 
Instead of exhibiting strategic leadership (Joyce, 2012) and taking the opportunity to review 
and revise the long-term strategic direction of the MoI, the Undersecretary acted as a sponsor 
by giving support to the team leader to facilitate his work for the finalisation of the plan. The 
WRSPDQDJHU¶VUROHDVDVSRQVRUIDFLOLWDWHGWKHWHDPOHDGHU¶VZRUNLQSUDFWLFHJLYLQJFUHGHQFH
to previous empirical findings (Bryson and Roering, 1988), however, it was not enough for 
the overall success of strategic planning. The high rate of manager turnover and short cycles 
in ministerial appointments undermined the institutionalisation of commitment in the MoI, 
which confirmed empirical research arguing that these were challenges to public sector 
strategic planning (Baker, 1992; Berry and Wechsler, 1995; Bryson and Roering, 1988).  
The need for a process champion in effective strategic planning was backed by strong 
empirical evidence (Barzelay and Jacobsen, 2009; Wheeland, 1993), and the team leader 
SHUIRUPHGWKLVUROHLQWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJSURFHVVVXFFHVVIXOO\$VDGLrector in the 
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SDU, he was an associate professor; had a strong character and good communication skills, 
was committed and developed ownership of the process, which enhanced his performance. As 
an example of his competence, he was the main author of the booklet and later the book titled 
Strategic Management, that was published for training purposes at the preparation stage. An 
implicit shortfall of his situation was his rank (director), which can be an important point of 
negotiation with senior managers in bureaucratic organisations. He overcame this weakness, 
to a considerable extent, by taking the full sponsorship of the Undersecretary and the head of 
the SDU, and by the advantages derived from his personal skills. A critical turning point came 
when the team leader left, following conflict with another director in the SDU, for a position 
in a state university just before the finalisation of the strategic plan. He left the MoI, taking 
with him all the practical experience and tacit knowledge he gained during the preliminary 
stages, which was a significant blow to the success of the overall process.  
The establishment of a planning team was a positive step, as found previously in other 
successful cases (Barzelay and Jacobsen, 2009; Bruton and Hildreth, 1993). Notwithstanding 
this, the team members did not have the expertise and experience of strategic planning  or of 
any other kind of planning although there were officials in the team who were formally 
employed as planning specialists. Nor were the non-permanent staff, employed from other 
departments to support the team, experienced or skilled in strategic planning. This hindered 
the performance of the team. For example, the team did not know how to create sound 
performance measures for each service and hence, could not guide departments properly. 
They developed solutions by learning-by-doing throughout and kept the process going by 
engaging in different kinds of activities and coordination with representatives of the 
departments, thereby reconciling strategic goals and actions. Overall, both the SDU and the 
planning team played an important role for the co-ordination of planning efforts in the first 
cycle and for the emergence and accumulation of tacit strategy knowledge saved in the 
organisational memory. That was an important dimension of a corporate strategy culture that 
is crucial for the forthcoming planning cycles. The high rate of manager and staff turnover, 
however, crippled this gain in strategy information which was mainly a tacit form of 
knowledge that was subjective and personal to the active practitioners of the period. 
The absence of or weak external guidance was unhelpful for strategic planning in the newly 
engaged public organisations (Long and Franklin, 2004). The planning team felt the need for 
such external guidance, however, the SPO, as the watchdog of the reform and as an important 
strategy practitioner, did not guide the process effectively. The SP Guide 2006, prepared by 
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the SPO, was inadequate and included statements that required further explanation. The 
experience of the MoI management had similarities with some US federal agencies in this 
regard, which could not conduct successful external consultation due to weak guidance by the 
watchdogs of the GPRA (Long and Franklin, 2004).  
Empirical findings have underlined the importance of mid- and lower-level manager role for 
the success of strategic planning processes (Kemp et al., 1993). In line with these findings, the 
planning team formally included the mid- and lower-level managers and staff in the process. 
These managers had better training from abroad, were generally open for strategic 
management-like innovative approaches and were more aware of strategic planning, which 
were supportive factors for the success of the process. These were the Young Turks of the 
MoI. However, unlike the team-based decision-making systems in many successful cases (for 
example Baker, 1992; Kissler et al., 1998a), the leader-centred decision-making culture and 
greater tendency towards status quo bias in the MoI trivialised many new ideas discussed in 
the workshops and brainstorming meetings by these managers. Hence, the active role taken by 
these managers was not considerably decisive for the final outcome of the process. Only a few 
innovative ideas survived till the end of the planning process and none were implemented in 
practice, as discussed in Section 7.3 at length. 
Despite shortcomings in the strategy formulation stage, there was a positive move with regard 
to stakeholder analysis. The MoI consulted with its internal stakeholders systematically for 
the first time and the three-level decision-S\UDPLG VHUYHG DV DQ ³LQVWLWXWLRQDO EXWWUHVV´
(Campbell, 2002, p. 426) of collective decision-making in the next cycles of strategic 
planning in the MoI. 
8.1.4. Implementation 
It was discussed in Chapter 6 at length that the MoI engaged in an overly flexible, dynamic, 
unstable and decentralised plan implementation that resulted in poor performance, according 
to the formal effectiveness figures presented in Table 6.3. This view reflects an incremental 
strategy implementation pattern in practice (Andrews et al., 2011b) at a time when formal 
strategic planning was in force. This was supported by the perceptions of participants in the 
study. Previous research found that lack of incentives for staff led to poor plan 
implementation (Smith et al., 2001), while linking planning, budgeting, and performance 
management processes with each other led to better plan implementation (Poister and Streib, 
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2005) . The results support these finding and suggest additionally that a failure to link staff 
appraisal as well as accountability to performance and lack of sanctions as well as incentives 
to motivate staff undermine plan implementation. The MoI managers continued to be held 
accountable to the top manager during the planning period, with no reference to their 
SHUIRUPDQFH EXW UDWKHU WR PHHWLQJ WKHLU OHJDO PDQGDWH DQG WKH WRS PDQDJHU¶V VXEMHFWLYH
FULWHULD$VWULFWDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQWKHPDQDJHUV¶DWWLWXGHWRZDUGVSODQLPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQG
the top maQDJHU¶VH[HUFLVHRIKLVSRZHUWRKROGWKHGHSDUWPHQWKHDGVDFFRXQWDEOHH[LVWHGLQ
the MoI. The critical role of strong leadership in the strategy formulation process was stressed 
in the literature (Barzelay and Campbell, 2003; Wheeland, 1993). Participation of managers at 
all levels in strategic planning is evidenced to enhance strategy implementation (Elbanna et 
al., 2015) and inadequate engagement of senior management in plan implementation process 
was reported to lead to poor implementation (Smith et al., 2001). These findings are equally 
valid for the MoI. Strategic planning can be effective to the extent that top managers attribute 
importance to it both during the formulation and implementation processes. Hence, the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V SHUVLVWHQFH LQ WKH LPSOHmentation of the reform, which has gradually 
GLPLQLVKHGDQGWKH8QGHUVHFUHWDU\¶VHQWKXVLDVPIRUDQGHQJDJHPHQWLQVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJDUH
two very important factors for effective plan implementation. The discontinuity of 
government policy in the planning period, lack of parliamentary engagement in holding public 
agencies accountable according to their performances and lack of civil society demand for 
more accountable public services were other factors that led to weak implementation.  
Performance measurement, linking budget to plans and linking plans to benchmarks are 
proven to ensure effective implementation and monitoring of planned strategies (Kissler, et 
al., 1998; Poister, 2005); however, the MoI failed to establish such a link. Previous research 
also showed that linking performance targets to specific individuals, such as heads of 
departments, generates positive results (Poister, 2005). The MoI did not establish such links to 
leverage its performance system. Failure to link resource allocation to the strategic plan 
WKURXJKSHUIRUPDQFHSURJUDPPLQJOHGWRWKHHPHUJHQFHRIWKHLGHDDPRQJPDQDJHUVWKDWµWKH
VWUDWHJLFSODQGRHVQRW PDWWHU¶7KH0R,¶V H[SHULHQFH UHYHDOHG WKDW D IDLOXUH WR FUHDWH VXFK
link results in the negligence of the plan for the sake of thHYHU\EXUHDXFUDWLFLQVWLQFWµ0HHW
WKHOHJDOPDQGDWH¶,QFRQWUDVWWKHSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIDVWURQJOLQNEHWZHHQWKH
strategic plan and the budget raised concerns for future resource allocation and led to a high 
level of positive change in thHPDQDJHUV¶PRWLYDWLRQVIRUSODQLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ7KHVHUHVXOWV
are consistent with studies by Berry and Wechsler (1995), Poister and Van Slyke (2002) and 
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Poister and Streib (2005) who found that strategic plans are implemented more effectively 
when linked to budgets. Evidence from the MoI shows that performance budgeting, rather 
than classical budgeting, is necessary for proper implementation of strategic plans.  
The evaluation of results and feedback functions were similarly ineffective. The MoI did not 
use strategic planning as a leverage to transform its input-focused management to an output- 
and impact-focused one. By the same token, the fragmented and unsystematic nature of 
evaluation and feedback continued. While comprehensive monitoring systems are empirically 
shown to enhance organisational capacity and plan implementation (Andrews et al., 2011b; 
Elbanna et al., 2015; Hendrick, 2003; Poister, 2005), a lack of legal obligation for the MoI to 
create a sophisticated performance monitoring, measurement or management system was an 
H[WHUQDOQHJDWLYHIDFWRUWKDWDIIHFWHGSODQLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ7KHWRSPDQDJHUV¶OLPLWHGLQWHUHVW
in performance figures and reports, lack of policy evaluation experts with necessary skills, 
endurance of complaint-based evaluation and feedback culture were internal factors with a 
detrimental impact. In the absence of external and internal forces for effective evaluation and 
feedback as well as the lack of previous experience, the pre-planning organisational culture of 
the MoI continueG LQWR WKH SODQQHG SHULRG 7KH HVWDEOLVKHG EHOLHI WKDW µSXEOLF VHUYLFH
automaticaOO\EHQHILWVFLWL]HQV¶ ODVWHG to exist. This culture underlined input or provision of 
the service rather than outputs, outcomes and their links to costs. An effective evaluation and 
feedback mechanism is a component that makes the difference between a controlled or 
conscious and uncontrolled strategy process. A conscious strategy process results in 
organisational learning, while an uncontrolled process does not. Uncontrolled systems are 
prone to repeating their faults (Faludi, 1973). Learning has a strict relation with memory. The 
strategy-related organisational memory of the MoI was weakened by a high level of manager 
and staff turnover in departments, as mentioned earlier. The intensive use of ICT 
infrastructure by the MoI in recent years is an important advantage since ICT systems allow 
the storage of excessive data and instant access to the stored data. 
As suggested by previous empirical studies (Boyne et al., 2004), the multiplicity of goals of 
the MoI, some of which were in apparent conflict (for example enhancement of central 
bureaucracy and empowerment of the local, cuncurrently) undermined the implementation of 
WKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQ7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHIRUHPSowerment of local authorities 
overwhelmed the preference of the bureaucracy, which was the empowerment of the 
prefectual system. 
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8.1.5. Outcomes 
7KH 0R,¶V H[SHULHQFH SURYLGHV LPSRUWDQW LQVLJKWV ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH RXWFRPHV RI VWUDWHJLF
planning, which are mainly improvement in organisational capacity and service performance. 
The generation of expected outcomes requires a good comprehension of the model and 
finalisation of the chain of stages in good quality. The case of the MoI shows no significant 
change in perceptions of managers with regard to the outcomes of strategic planning in the 
course of the plan implementation period. These deficiencies are related to the problem of 
application of the strategic planning model due to weak awareness and buy-in of strategic 
planning and weak implementation of the strategic plan. The problem of awareness and buy-
in was a consequence of newness and inadequate adaptation of the model to the MoI context 
in terms of its language, terms and components, inadequate training and external guidance and 
weak organisational memory. 
<HWVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJVWLOOEURXJKWDERXWVRPHFKDQJHVLQWKH0R,¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQDOFDSDFLW\
Clarification of goals is one of the most frequently cited contributions of strategic planning in 
the literature (Berry and Wechsler, 1995, p. 164). It helped, albeit minimally, departments to 
clarify their mandates and goals and made them aware of the importance of prioritisation of 
tasks and the necessity of long-term thinking and measurement of service performance.  It 
also initiated a process in which organisational strategy was expected to finally become 
institutionalised and immunised against short-term and unforeseen changes in preferences of 
top managers and elected politicians. This last point is particularly relevant to the MoI for the 
stability of strategies given the high rates of manager turnover and frequency of unexpected 
political manoeuvres. Strategic management may serve public organisations in similar 
contexts as a stabiliser of strategies. The MoI case demonstrates compellingly that unplanned 
government interventions, as a dimension of stakeholder uncertainty (Elbanna et al., 2015), 
may interrupt plan implementation processes. 
8.1.6. The Conceptual Framework of Public Strategic Management Revisited 
The empirical analysis so far encourages the researcher to revisit the conceptual model 
presented in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1.4). The findings suggest putting extra emphasis on 
µSUHSDUDWLRQ RI DFWRUV¶ IRU VXFFHVVIXO VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ ZKLFK LV VKRZQ LQ D dashed box, 
between the determinants and components of the model, as presented by link (x) in Figure 
8.1. 
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Different from the original model, Figure 8.1 incorporates strategy practitioners  into the 
equation by highlighting the readiness of these actors for strategy practice. Strategic planning 
UHTXLUHVDQ H[SDQVLRQ LQPDQDJHPHQW¶VDZDUHQHVVDQG LQVLJKWDQGDFFHSWDQFHRI WKHPRGHO
through the transformation of the intellectual decision-making mechanism and mental models 
of the management. Transformation was expected to take place from a rule-based to goal-
based decision-making mental model in the MoI as argued in Section 6.1. The findings of the 
existing research point to the fact that this transformation can be provided through effective 
training.  
  
On the one hand, readiness in analytical management capacity leads to a productive process 
through high performance of strategy practitioners who gain the capacity and capability to 
master strategic planning. On the other hand, good understanding and acceptance of strategic 
planning leads to smooth social practice, for example by avoiding unnecessary conflicts. 
Hence, good preparation results in better analytical and social practices of strategy. The lack 
of a good-quality preparation stage shows its effects mainly on the application of the strategic 
planning model, but also on plan implementation. Links x, y, and z show how the preparation 
stage interacts with other components in the process. Considering that cultural changes and 
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intellectual transformation are challenging and time-consuming in public organisations, the 
stage of preparation becomes highly relevant in the public strategic management process. 
8.2. To what extent, how and why do theories of rational planning or 
incrementalism explain the strategic planning practice of the MoI? 
The second research question is elaborated in Chapters 6 and 7 at length. Hence, this section 
will address it by combining the results of theory-testing (pattern-matching), discussing 
underlying mechanisms and the implications of findings from a theoretical viewpoint.  
Table 6.4 and Table 7.3 summarise the results of theory-testing. Table 8.1 presents a broader 
view of pattern matching findings in a matrix in order to simplify explanation, leaving the 
details to Tables 6.4 and 7.3. The patterns show high level of correspondence between the 
formal PFMCL framework and the rational planning model, (A, 1). The high level of match 
demonstrates that the formal PFMCL framework is built principally on a rational planning 
model, as the original theory stated. The observed lack of match between the formal PFMCL 
framework and the alternative theory of incrementalism underpins this finding (A, 2).  
Table 8.1   The Combined Pattern-matching Matrix 
  1 2 
  Rational Planning Incrementalism 
A Formal PFMCL framework High No Match 
B 7KH0R,¶V3UDFWLFH Low High 
 
Pattern matching between the theories and the practice of the MoI showed mixed results (Row 
B). The theory of incrementalism, as the rival theory, received support for almost all of its 
dimensions from moderate to high degrees (B, 2). Hence, the explanatory power of 
incrementalism as a middle range theory (Atkinson, 2011) is underpinned by the findings in 
the context of the MoI. In contrast, rational planning found support for lesser dimensions and 
sub-dimensions with regard to practice. The low-match between rational planning and the 
practice of the MoI (B, 1) evidenced a deviation from the prescriptions of the rational 
planning model. 
One aim of this research is to uncover the mechanisms that underlie the superiority of one 
theory over another in explaining the case study of the MoI. As strategic planning is a 
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complex phenomenon, all the factors discussed in the first section of this chapter play a role in 
varying extents in these results. However, building on its findings, this research associates a 
goal-based decision-making intellectual model with rational planning (or formal-
comprehensive analysis) and a rule-based decision-making intellectual model with 
incrementalism (or restricted analysis) locating these two on the two ends of a spectrum. 
Sections 6.1.1.1 and 6.5.1 presents detailed arguments on this subject. Strategic planning 
practice in the MoI, in general, locates it on a position that is close to the rule-based 
intellectual model on the spectrum. ICT-related service domains are the exception of this 
conclusion. What follows is the implication of findings for the two theories. 
8.2.1. Implications for Rational Planning 
The findings have implications with regard to a number of factors including the exogenous 
character of public organisations, external environmental characteristics, availability of 
resources, procedural and substantive rationality and the use of ICTs in decision-making.  
While rational planning favours autonomy in decision-making, the MoI shows an exogenous 
character in goal-setting. The findings reinforce the idea that the exogenous character of 
public organisations presents barriers to effective application of strategic planning in public 
organisations (Stewart, 2004; Walker et al., 2010). For example, the MoI was not able to 
integrate the law enforcement and security units into the strategic planning process because 
they were given varying degrees of exemption in the PFMCL by the reformers. Hence, while 
the MoI bureaucracy was expected to develop a strategic plan autonomously, it did not have 
the power to tailor the strategic planning model, to define its scope and to set stable goals, 
which put it in a contradictory position. 
Public sector strategies are argued to achieve better results in stable environments regardless 
of strategy formulation or implementation approach (Poister et al., 2013). Yet, there are 
conflicting views. Incrementalist strategy implementation is argued to work better in complex 
and dynamic environments (Walker, 2013). The external milieu of the MoI was unusually 
dynamic both in the pre-planning and planning period (2000s) due to a number of recent 
developments particularly Europeanisation, technological evolution, localisation, 
democratisation, civilisation, governance, transparency and accountability in the public sector. 
)XUWKHUPRUH WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V SULRULWLHV ZHUH LQFRQVLVWHQW DQG YDULDEOH 7KH DFWLYH UHIRUP
agenda generated an extremely dynamic and hostile environment for the MoI, in which 
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tackling the uncertainty of the future became highly challenging. While the literature 
suggested incremental approaches to tackle dynamic and turbulent environments, the MoI had 
to follow the rigid procedures of formal strategic planning due to the legislative mandate. Yet 
in practice, plan implementation unfolded rather flexibly. Unexpected alterations in 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHIHUHQFHVXQGHUPLQHGWKH0R,¶VVWUDWHJLFSODQE\QXOOLI\LQJVRPHJRDOVWKDW
addressed central bureaucracy and local government. The findings show that under conditions 
of a dynamic and hostile external environment that is marked by uncertainties, rational 
planning does not fit well particularly with the political domain, in which goal-setting is 
highly exogenous. 
On the contrary, the perceptions of the managers and the data presented in Table 6.3 suggest a 
relatively stable planning process in the regulation of associations. A distinctive characteristic 
of this realm was that the developments in the field did not pose a threat to the mandate and 
powers of the MoI bureaucracy. There was convergence between the ideas of the elected 
politicians and the MoI bureaucracy for the development of civil society and the preferences 
of the elected politicians showed continuity. The findings suggest that rational planning works 
better in the political domains in public administration when the environment is stable and 
munificent, particularly with regard to the preferences of powerful stakeholders. These 
findings suggest that researchers should take into account not only stability, but munificence 
vs. hostility of the environment being analysed.  
The findings have implications regarding the extent to which the availability of resources, 
expertise and experience affect the success of rational planning. Availability of resources  was 
argued to be a positive factor for effective strategic planning (Boyne et al., 2004). However, 
the MoI could not apply strategic planning effectively despite the 60 percent upsurge in its 
budgetary resources between 2009 and 2013 (see Table 5.1), showing that resource 
abundance is not on its own a decisive factor for effective strategic planning and management, 
but many other factors, such as technical expertise that the SDU and the MoI lacked in 
general. This is in line with the previous findings (Boyne et al., 2004, p. 342; Streib and 
Poister, 1990, p. 31).  
The research presents arguments against comprehensive rationality by demonstrating that a 
public organisation may not apply the decision-rule of efficiency or behave substantively 
rationally in addressing its weaknesses through development of effective strategies, although 
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it operates in a procedurally rational manner. For example, the MoI did not effectively address 
the issues of;  
x High staff turnover,  
x The need for restructuring for successful plan implementation,  
x The requirement for an effective and outcome-focused performance measurement 
system.  
The underlying reasons for ineffective responses mostly emanate from the political nature of 
the public sector and from cultural-behavioural factors (Lindblom, 1979; Simon, 1955). It has 
been argued in this thesis that the inability of the MoI to devise appropriate strategies in the 
above areas was not the consequence of computational problems or procedural rationality 
because the necessity for such strategies was detected by the management during SWOT 
analysis. Politics, the prevalence of the existing culture and status quo bias are more likely 
underlying mechanisms. Stimuli other than limitations to cognitive capacity, such as loss 
aversion (attributing more weight to losses than to equal gains (Eidelman and Crandall, 
2012)), that underlie status quo bias may have an inhibiting influence on the formulation of 
sound strategies.  
While rational planning is reported to achieve high levels of organisational performance in the 
context of highly centralised organisations with a defensive stance, i.e. focusing on efficiency 
of the existing services (Walker, 2013), the adoption of the model proved to be challenging in 
the MoI despite its highly centralised structure. A distinction hereby needs to be made 
between centralised team-based decision-making and centralised leader-centred decision-
making. The leader-centred decision-making in the MoI is one in which the Undersecretary, 
as the top manager, has the greatest influence on the final choice. This is perceived to be a 
VWURQJO\ OLPLWLQJ IDFWRU IRU FRPSUHKHQVLYH UDWLRQDOLW\ DV WKH WRS PDQDJHU¶V SUHIHUHQFHV
replaces procedural rationality. Unlike the team-based system, this is an impediment to 
collective rationality and it explains to some degree why some centralised systems adapt 
easily and benefit more from strategic planning while others do not. Hence, the application of 
the rational planning-based strategic planning model may bear different results from 
authoritative, leader-centred systems to team-based systems. 
Strategic planning aims to replace the rule-based mechanism with a goal-based mechanism, 
which works very well in the ICT field as discussed by others (for example by Dror, 1968) 
and supported by the findings of this research. This underpins the conventional claim that the 
ICT domain is more convenient for rational planning (Dror, 1968). This effect is seen not only 
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in the ICT department, but also in the departments that deliver some services through ICT 
systems, such as e-government. ICT shows this effect through several mechanisms. First, ICT 
is a technically sophisticated domain and analysis in this field requires the employment of 
experts and professionals. Analysis unfolds formally and comprehensively. Secondly, services 
that are intended to be delivered through ICT tools, such as e-government, require and compel 
the departments to provide detailed definitions of the business processes. A precise definition 
of the service for e-government purposes means the quantification of that service and 
clarification of tasks, which is essential for goal clarity and the successful practice of rational 
planning. Thirdly, ICT allows project development, experimentation and piloting, which 
enables departments to work on a long-term focused goal-based decision-making mechanism, 
rather than the short-term-focused rule-based decision-making mechanism that characterises 
WKH0R,¶VSUH-planning generic management approach. The increasing use of ICTs in service 
design and delivery causes the diffusion of the technique. Finally, ICT is a favourable field for 
innovation. ICTs today have become decision-making agents in many fields similar to human 
agents and are increasingly creating space for the rational model. Although most public 
problems are complex and political in nature as well as unmeasurable, ICTs can still make an 
immense contribution to the implementation of strategic planning in the public sector as well 
as to service delivery, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. 
8.2.2. Implications for Incrementalism 
The findings from this case study have implications for incrementalism with regard to strategy 
content and incrementalism, disjointed vs. logical incrementalism and the rule-based decision-
making model. 
Strategic decisions are described as ones that have a far-reaching impact, that are less 
reversible (Poister et al., 2013) and that are to some extent associated with innovation. Recent 
findings show a high association between incrementalism and innovation, particularly with 
regard to incremental strategy implementation along with a prospector strategic stance 
(Walker, 2013). This shows a degree of contradiction as incrementalism has traditionally been 
accused of promoting the preservation of the status quo. First of all, incrementalism can lead 
WRLQQRYDWLRQWKURXJK³DIDVW-PRYLQJVHTXHQFHRIVPDOOFKDQJHV´(Lindblom, 1979, p. 520). 
Secondly, only prospector organisations, which are innovative and risk-takers, but not 
defenders, tend to be distinctively innovative and fast-moving despite adopting incrementalist 
strategy formulation and implementation. The MoI had a defender stance particularly 
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regarding its core functions, in which change was not welcomed. The stratagem adopted in 
core functions was simple incremental analysis rather than trial-and-error (Lindblom, 1979). 
This explains why change in these areas in the MoI was incremental. Therefore, 
incrementalism may lead to strategic change and innovation if it unfolds purposefully and 
sequentially in a trial-and-HUURUPDQQHUDORQJZLWKDSURVSHFWRU¶VVWDQFH 
Having no explicit strategy formulation method, the MoI acted through groping its way 
through in the pre-planning era and this attitude clearly continued after strategic planning was 
introduced, as shown by the high match between the patterns of incrementalism and the 
SDWWHUQVRIWKH0R,¶VSUDFWLFH7KHSDWWHUQVSRLQWWRDGLVMRLQWHGIRUPRILQFUHPHQWDOLVPWKDW
unfolds non-purposefully in the form of uncontrolled trial-and-error (groping), rather than 
logical or purposeful incrementalism (Quinn, 1980). The effect of uncontrolled trial-and-error 
is visible on plan implementation and this pattern is supported by statistical data. When 
Tables 6.3, 7.1 and 7.2 are read together, they draw a picture of high flexibility and dynamism 
in which myriad performance indicators are introduced and terminated and performance 
achievement fluctuate considerably between no-achievement of targets and overachievement 
between 2010 and 2013. An important implication of uncontrolled trial-and-error or groping 
is that strategic learning (Bryson, 2011; Mintzberg, 1978) does not take place effectively due 
to lack of systematic evaluation of results and feedback. More than half a century later, these 
findings provide support for LiQGEORP¶VDUJXPHQWVUHJDUGLQJWKHJHQHUDODSSURDFKRI
public policy analysers. 
Incremental analysis in the MoI is highly associated with rule-based decision-making mental 
model. The main characteristics of this model are short-term focus, shallowness of 
information seeking and lack of planning. Rules themselves are products of short-term focus 
and non-comprehensive search procedures. Hence, the rules are subjected to change in short 
intervals. They are created to respond to certain conditions, rather than for the achievement of 
long-term goals that are associated with performance targets as indicators of success. The 
ability of the agents to contemplate long-term goals, develop and channel resources for the 
attainment of these goals, search for information and planning is highly restricted. Agents 
follow the rules not targets, or put differently, their target is to comply by the law. The 
restrictive effect of the rule-based mechanism is reinforced by other elements of 
organisational culture, such as a tendency to reproduce the status quo. 
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It was argued that simple incremental analysis was purposefully preferred in the core 
functions of the MoI. This practice led to the prevalence of the status quo, as argued in the 
literature (Atkinson, 2011; Etzioni, 1967), particularly at a time when a radical move was 
needed to address and settle a wicked problem, such as terrorism. It was shown (Section 
5.1.2.2 in Chapter 5) how a new anti-terrorism strategy developed by the former Strategy 
Centre, which tackled the problem by recognising social diversity and through social means 
rather than military means, was suppressed by the status quo. This suggests that public 
agencies must bear in mind the risks inherent in being mired unconsciously in the status quo 
when they firmly adhere to simple incremental analysis and nurture a highly conservative 
culture for strategy development. 
8.3. Limitations to the Study 
This study adopted a holistic approach and looked into the MoI as a whole. This approach has 
the potential to overlook differences in departmental attitudes with strategic planning. In an 
effort to minimise this risk, the research reflected variances in departmental approaches to 
strategic planning, where these nuances stem from sub-cultures nurtured within the broader 
organisational culture or from intra- and extra-departmental or domain-specific factors. 
Additionally, the external validity and generalisability of the findings of this research to a 
wider population is limited since it is a single case study. However, the findings can still be 
relevant to public agencies in similar contexts. It is very likely that the results will have 
important implications for other Turkish ministries as well as agencies in the Turkish public 
administration. Further, the study incorporated theory and a theory-based bi-partite conceptual 
framework to overcome the limitations to external validity and allow for generalisability. 
Analytical generalisations made with respect to the two theories have strong grounds, as 
suggested by Yin (2013).  
 
8.4. Conclusion 
This research shows how and why top-down mandatory and formal strategic planning in a 
one-size-fits-all fashion can be poorly practiced in an authoritative and bureaucratic Ministry 
located in the Turkish central government in a highly centralised and dynamic policymaking 
HQYLURQPHQW &RQILUPLQJ %U\VRQ DQG 5RHULQJ¶V  S claim quoted in the 
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introduction of this chapter, it argues that the application of strategic planning does not 
produce automatic results at least in the short-run in the MoI. Incremental thinking may 
dominate decision-making systems in a period in which rational planning-based formal 
strategic planning is adopted as the legal-formal strategy development model. Hence, strategic 
planning is highly difficult and challenging for public organisations like the MoI as they face 
various problems during the application of the model.  
8.4.1. Contributions to the Public Strategic Planning Literature 
This thesis makes original contributions to the strategic management literature, firstly, by 
presenting an in-GHSWKFDVHVWXG\RIWKH7XUNLVK0R,ZKLFKRSHQVXSWKH³FDXVDOEODFNER[´
(Poister et al., 2010) RI WKH 0R, PDQDJHPHQW WKURXJK WKH YDQWDJH SRLQW RI DQ LQVLGHU¶V
perspective. The thesis casts light on the practice and theory dimensions of public strategic 
planning. Thereby, the thesis offers the public strategic planning literature with a full account 
of how the initiation of strategic planning stimulates a range of causal mechanisms, how these 
causal mechanisms interplay with each other and how the standard practices of strategic 
planning are filtered through the active mechanisms. Within this context, the study provides 
good examples regarding how complex and interwoven mechanisms generate the observed 
practice. For example, it argues that the perception of a budget-plan link increased manager 
engagement in strategic planning processes. It also argues by tracing root causes that the 
perception of a budget-planning link motivated manager engagement through the stimulation 
of the basic instinct of survival (of their departments). From this perspective, the study 
provides ample explanatory analysis. The research, in so doing, responds to calls from 
scholars for more qualitative research and in-depth case studies on strategic planning 
processes and practices of public organisations (Bryson et al., 2010; Poister et al., 2010).  
Secondly, the research contributes to a specific stream of public strategic planning research 
that attempts to understand and explain the difficulties and challenges in the application of 
strategic planning in the public sector (Joyce et al., 2014) by providing empirical evidence in 
the context of the MoI. The research posits a variety of factors as underlying mechanisms that 
include: strategic planning model (e.g. gaps in legislation, top-down and blueprint planning), 
environmental contingencies (e.g. stakeholder uncertainty, exogenous goal-setting), 
institutional contingencies (e.g. size, goal multiplicity and conflict,) socio-political relations 
(e.g. power conflicts between civil and military bureaucracy), cultural tendencies (e.g. mental 
models, status quo bias, authoritative management, leader-centred decision-making, 
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complaint-EDVHG IHHGEDFN SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶ DFWXDO SUDFWLFH HJ LQDGHTXDWH SUHSDUDWLRQ, weak 
analytical capacity, weak actor certification, exclusion of provincial branches), culture of 
democracy (e.g. inadequate parliamentary and civil society engagement), public service and 
domain characteristics (e.g. confidentiality, political nature), organisational memory (e.g. high 
management turnover), leadership (e.g. lack of commitment of top management), values (e.g. 
legality as compliance by law, human-oriented service, service quality) and powers and 
tendencies (e.g. Europeanisation, localisation, computerisation). The focus of previous case 
study research has generally been on best practice and successful examples (Campbell, 2002; 
Kissler et al., 1998b; Smith et al., 2001), with limited attention to failing cases and to 
underlying reasons of poor practice of strategic planning in public organisations. The thesis 
contributes to the attempts that fill this gap in the literature. 
By postulating the causal mechanisms, the research makes an original contribution also to the 
study of theories of strategic planning, in addition to the theoretical implications discussed in 
sections 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 above. Within this context, firstly, it argues that no single theory can 
fully explain the strategic planning process of the MoI, although incrementalism does it better 
than rational planning. This is an interesting finding for the MoI, in which formal strategic 
planning is valid. The research shows that different patterns of incrementalism can co-exist in 
an organisational setting in which partisan mutual adjustment (political decision-making) is 
weak due to the concentration of power at the centre of the MoI and of the government. 
Hence, an implication of the findings is that incremental decision-making is not always 
political decision-making or negotiation (Andrews et al., 2011b).  
The thesis debates how a specific mental model, rule-based decision-making, functions as a 
mechanism and leads to the practice of incrementalism and restricted analysis in conjunction 
with other factors and mechanisms (such as status quo bias) and how goal-based decision-
making mechanism leads to procedural rationality and hence, to comprehensive analysis. This 
is an original finding for the literature and it implies and entails a transformation in the mental 
models of strategy practitioners for effective strategic planning in MoI-like public 
organisations, which is a challenging task in the public sector. The findings of the thesis show 
that ICTs may have an important role to play in this transformation. The case of the MoI 
presents strong evidence supporting the use of ICTs, suggesting that they may be used as 
leverage for more rational decision-making and better strategic planning. This finding 
provides support for Bryson et al.¶VUDWLRQDOHIRUSUHGLFWLQJPRUHUHVHDUFKRQWKHUole 
of ICTs in public strategic management in the future. 
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Thirdly, the thesis argues that the weak preparation, poor analytical skills and social practices 
of the strategy practitioners are the most significant and decisive elements in the 
ineffectiveness of strategic planning in the MoI. It shows within this context that rational 
planning fails with unprepared practitioners and inadequate expertise even when there is 
resource abundance. This finding directs increased attention to the perspective of strategy-as-
practice (Bryson et al., 2010; Jarzabkowski and Paul Spee, 2009), which locates the 
practitioners of strategy and their readiness and practice at the centre of strategic management 
research. 
8.4.2. Contributions to Methodology 
The thesis shows that strategic management research requires attention to at least five 
different literatures. These are general planning, public policymaking, public management, 
decision-making and strategic planning and management literatures. This research involved a 
review of sources from all these literatures. Although these have many points in common, 
they helped understand different dimensions of a public strategy process. For example, while 
decision-making literature explained micro-scale decision-making and the meaning of basic 
concepts such as values, preferences and uncertainty; public policymaking situated strategy-
making in the wider society, adding the macro-scale perspective to the analysis. Attention to 
these literatures will help researchers of public strategic planning to better understand and 
explain public strategy processes. 
The thesis defined the dimensions of rational planning and incrementalism based on a 
comprehensive literature review and utilised these dimensions as criteria for judging the case 
evidence. This contributes to strategic management research methodology in the following 
ways: firstly, previous research looked into certain dimensions of strategic planning excluding 
others, and this led to a call for the employment of all-inclusive views of strategic planning in 
research (Poister et al., 2010; Poister et al., 2013). This study employed a vast array of 
dimensions from rational planning and incrementalism theories with a comprehensive 
approach in order to cover all aspects of the strategic planning and management phenomena 
in the case. Secondly, previous case study research applied the theories in general terms 
without setting objective criteria for the judgement of data and for further critique of the 
findings by the audience. For example, they referred to a case as a successful one; however, 
they did not provide enough empirical evidence to determine how it represented a successful 
case (Poister et al., 2010). By contrast, the conceptual framework developed in this research 
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provided a comprehensive basis for the investigation of every aspect of strategic planning in 
the case organisation and constituted an objective basis for the analysis of data. By doing this, 
the research presented criteria for the judgement of its findings by the audience. 
8.4.3. Area of Future Research 
This case study generated a significant amount of knowledge with regard to public strategy 
processes and practice. Firstly, a reasonable research agenda should be the extension of this 
study by testing some derived hypothesis through Large-N survey research in the broader 
Turkish public administration context. Researchers may conduct parallel quantitative research 
in settings other than Turkish public administration. Particular attention should be paid to the 
existence and effects of the rule-based decision-making mental model, which is found as a 
generative mechanism for the practice of incremental decision-making and restricted analysis 
in the MoI. 
Secondly, the role of ICTs as facilitators of strategic planning should be brought under 
scrutiny. While changing existing management culture is a challenging task, ICTs interrupt 
the existing culture and substitute it for its own procedures: professional and comprehensive 
analysis. Intensive use of ICTs is likely to lead to a cultural change in the public sector, 
particularly from rule-based thinking towards more goal-based thinking, which is what 
strategic planning is intended to achieve in the public sector. This calls for a research agenda 
of in-depth case studies that aim to understand the role of ICTs in successful adaptation of 
public organisations to strategic planning.  
Thirdly and lastly, the study provides a rich body of evidence that underpins the case and a 
research agenda for strategy-as-practice perspective, which views strategy as a product of 
analytical and social practices and as a product of human actors. As presented throughout the 
thesis, strategy is a blend of logic and emotions; the explicit and the tacit; quantities and 
qualities; the analytical and the social. This thesis proposes that if the theory is the skeleton of 
a body, practice is the flesh and blood. And, if one claims that theory is the body; than 
practice is the soul, as stated by one of the MoI managers (see Section 6.3.2). Hence, strategic 
management research and the field can progress more appropriately by attending concurrently 
to the theory and practice. 
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Appendix 1 ± Interviewee List 
 
Undersecretary and Deputy Undersecretaries 
Interview_9 ± Interview_21 ± Interview_22 ± Interview_35 ± Interview_37 
 
Department for Strategy Development 
Interview_2 ± Interview_12 ± Interview_17 - Interview_28 ± Interview_33 ± Interview_36 ± 
Interview_41 
 
Directorate-General for Civil Registry and Citizenship 
Interview_23 ± Interview_25 ± Interview_26 ± Interview_31 ± Interview_42 
 
Directorate-General for Local Administration 
Interview_13 ± Interview_15 ± Interview_19 ± Interview_20 
 
Directorate-General for Personnel 
Interview_3 ± Interview_4 ± Interview_8 ± Interview_11 
 
Directorate-General for Provincial Administration 
Interview_1 ± Interview_5 ± Interview_18 ± Interview_29 
 
Department for Information Technologies 
Interview_7 ± Interview_39 ± Interview_40 
 
Department of Associations 
Interview_14 ± Interview_30 
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Department for EU Affairs and Foreign Relations 
Interview_6 ± Interview_38 
 
Department for Smuggling, Intelligence, Operation and Data Collection 
Interview_10  
 
Centre for Research and Studies (Former Strategy Centre) 
Interview_27 
 
Department for Training, 
Interview_24 
 
Department for Administrative and Financial Affairs, 
Interview_16 
Directorate-General for Migration Management 
Interview_32 
 
Ministry Inspection Board 
Interview_34 
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Appendix 2 ± Interview Guide 
Strategic Planning in the Public Sector: The Case of the Turkish Ministry of Interior 
INTRODUCTION  
1. Is there any mechanism that co-ordinate the strategy development, formulation and 
implementation process in the MoI?  
2. Have you ever had experience with strategic planning previously?  
3. 'LG \RX WDNH SDUW LQ WKH 0R,¶V VWUDWHJLF SODQQLQJ DFWLYLWLHV" :DV WKLV D NH\ UROH"
Could you please explain? 
DETERMINANTS 
4. Could you evaluate the internal and external environment of the MoI with regard to 
the pace of change, change trends, predicWDELOLW\ DQG WKHLU HIIHFWV RQ WKH 0R,¶V
adaptation to its environment? 
5. Why do you think the MoI has started strategic planning? Whether planned or not, 
why does the MoI develop strategies?  
STRATEGY FORMULATION 
6. If you think of the process of strategy-making in the MoI, how could this process be 
described? Is it explicitly formal or informal? What do you think about the role of the 
high, middle and low level managers in this process and the level of their 
participation? Does strategy-making finish by the formulation and enforcement of the 
strategic plan, or is it a dynamic process? 
7. Do you experience hot debates, big conflicts and bargain (similar to the political 
processes) on strategies during the process of strategy formulation? How and why? 
8. Does your organisation have clear and precise goals and objectives and are these 
achievable?  
9. Do you consider the views and opinions of internal and external stakeholders in 
strategy formulation?  How? 
10. Do you systematically analyse and evaluate the changes in the service environment of 
the MoI? How and why do you, or not, conduct this kind of analysis?  
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11. Do you consider and evaluate alternative programmes, policies, projects and strategies 
regarding a strategic priority, how and why? To what extent can these alternatives be 
different from the existing ones and why? What is the extent of information gathering 
in analyses? Do you utilise any specific method in analysis? 
12. Do you utilise methods such as trial-and-error or experimenting for strategy 
development on a regular basis? Do you pilot projects and why? 
13. Are there any important criteria for the MoI for the selection of strategies? 
14. How or in what way has the first strategic plan affected the status quo in the MoI with 
regard to the strategies developed in the first strategic plan? 
STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION  
15.  Is there a specific management process to ensure effective strategy implementation? 
Can you describe it? How do you ensure that strategies are effectively implemented?  
16. Do you regularly and systematically analyse and evaluate the outputs, outcomes and 
impacts of strategies? Is this done by a single unit or is it a departmental activity? 
BENEFITS AND PROBLEMS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING 
17. Has strategic planning contributed to the organisation by strengthening the integrity of 
units and by enhancing external co-ordination? What implications do the exceptional 
situation given to the two law enforcement agencies and the situation of the Turkish 
Police have? 
18. If you consider the broader picture, has strategic planning contributed to the 
performance of your unit, and to the performance of the MoI as a whole? How and 
why? Could you please exemplify?  
19. What have been the benefits, if any, of strategic planning to the MoI so far? How and 
why do you think strategic planning generated these benefits? 
20. What kind of problems have you experienced, if you did, with strategic planning? 
Why do you think these problems have occurred? 
 
CONCLUSION 
21. Now we have come to the conclusion. Before we finish, would you like to add any 
comments about the subject? 
 
